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# THE ARTILLERYMAN

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
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
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
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












# THE ARTILLERYMAN

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THE EXPERIENCES AND IMPRESSIONS OF AN  
AMERICAN ARTILLERY REGIMENT  
IN THE WORLD WAR

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129<sup>TH</sup> F. A.



1917-1919

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BY

JAY M. LEE

A MEMBER OF THE REGIMENT FROM ITS ORGANIZATION TO ITS DISCHARGE

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KANSAS CITY, MO.  
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1920

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
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# CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF 129TH FIELD ARTILLERY, 1917-1919.

Aug.	5, 1917.	Mobilized as 2nd Mo. F. A. in Kansas City, Mo., except Batteries C and E which mobilized in Independence, Mo.
Sept.	26, 1917.	Entrained for Camp Doniphan, Ft. Sill, Okla.
May	10, 1918.	Entrained for Camp Mills, Long Island, N. Y.
May	20, 1918.	Sailed for overseas (except E Battery which sailed on May 18th and F Battery which sailed on May 27th), via England, and entering France at L'Havre.
June	11, 1918.	Billeted in Angers area.
July	7, 1918.	Entrained for Camp Coetquidan, near Guer, Brittany.
Aug.	17, 1918.	Entrained for Vosges.
Aug.	19-20, 1918.	Detrained at Saulxures.
Aug.	23, 1918.	Moved into position in Gerardmer Sector, in Vosges Mountains, with echelon at Kruth, Alsace.
Sept.	1, 1918.	Relieved from positions.
Sept.	3-5, 1918.	Billeted at Vagny and Zainvillers.
Sept.	6-10, 1918.	Billeted at Ville-en-Vermois and Coyviller, south-east of Nancy.
Sept.	10-12, 1918.	On march.
Sept.	12-15, 1918.	In Army Reserve in St. Mihiel Offensive, in Forest de Haye.
Sept.	15-22, 1918.	On march.
Sept.	22, 1918.	Took position on Hill 290, northeast of Neuville, with echelon at Aubreville.
Sept.	26-30, 1918.	In action in Argonne-Meuse Offensive in support of 35th Division.
Oct.	1-2, 1918.	Continued in action in support of 1st Division which relieved 35th Division.
Oct.	5-12, 1918.	At Seigneulles, north of Bar-le-Duc.
Oct.	15, 1918.	Took position in Sommedieue Sector, on Meuse Heights east of Verdun in support of 35th Division.
Nov.	7, 1918.	Remained in support of 81st Division when 35th Division was relieved.
Nov.	9, 1918.	In action in new offensive toward Conflans and Metz.
Nov.	11, 1918.	At 11 A. M. ceased firing as per orders on account of Armistice.
Jan.	22, 1919.	Moved to Bar-le-Duc area.
Feb.	17, 1919.	Reviewed, with 35th Division, by General Pershing and the Prince of Wales.
Mar.	6, 1919.	Entrained for Le Mans area.
Mar.	29, 1919.	Moved to Camp Pontanezan, Brest.
Apr.	9, 1919.	Sailed for home on S. S. Zeppelin.
Apr.	20, 1919.	Landed in Hoboken and billeted in Camp Mills, L. I.
Apr.	30, 1919.	Entrained for home.
May	3, 1919.	Parade and reception in Kansas City, Mo., then proceeded to Camp Funston, Kansas.
May	6, 1919.	Final discharge issued at Camp Funston, Ft. Riley, Kansas.



129TH F.A.



UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY  
WEST POINT, NEW YORK


April 21, 1920.

To the  
Officers and Men  
129th Field Artillery.

For a short time while you were preparing yourselves for the battle fields of Europe, it was my privilege and pleasure to serve with you and as one of you. I shall never forget your loyalty, your spirit, your enthusiasm, the "punch", and "pep" which you put into your work - they were perfectly inspiring and stamped you as real Americans, true to the traditions of the very finest type of American soldiery.

Your record of service on the battle field, and your comrades who sleep in France, prove the character and the honor of your regiment. May you who were prepared to die for your Country, now live for it in the truest and best sense of the term; may you individually, and as a fraternal organization, put the same intensity of spirit, enthusiasm and resistless energy into the welfare of your Community, State, and Nation, as you did into the welfare and good name of the 129th Field Artillery.

May you ever stand for law and order, good government, and a square deal for every man; and finally may success and happiness crown your efforts; this is the wish of one who, for a time, had the honor to be your "Commander", your "Instructor", and who will ever remain your "Friend".

  
ROBERT M. DANFORD  
Lieut. Colonel, U.S. Army,  
Commandant of Cadets.

## PREFACE.

---

It was an inspiring feature of the call to service when America entered the Great War that every part of the country at once responded with whole-hearted spirit, each making its characteristic contribution to the general cause.

Of the men who at the first demand offered their services, no more truly representative regiments were formed than those gathered in the heart of the Central West, which was at the same time the center of the great area known a little over a century before as New France, acquired in what we call the Louisiana Purchase.

Of these regiments, the one which became known as the 129th Field Artillery was typical; typical in its ready response, typical in its Americanism and in the character of its personnel, typical in its experiences in camp and at the front.

This story is primarily a record of that regiment; not only of the time when it was in action, which was about three months, but also of the months of training and preparation; of movement and anticipation; of waiting afterward; and of all those things which go to test the quality of a soldier and are a part of his experience, and which made up the twenty-one months of the regiment's service.

So far as it goes beyond that it is an effort to give a true perspective of the movements and incidents of which that regiment was a part; and, as well, of those experiences

and impressions which were common to all whose service took them to the front in France.

If in its treatment of events the story appears local or personal to the regiment, it is because it is written from the standpoint of those on the inside looking out and around rather than with the larger field of view of those on the outside or at a distance.

But limited as it is in its scope, it is hoped that it will be found to be, within that scope, accurate and dependable. Its statements of fact are in no case mere conclusions or assumptions, but are based upon solid foundations of record or personal recollection; and so far as that fact may justify the claim, the book may be considered authoritative.

The many who have aided me in the preparation of the work, with records, pictures and data, and above all, with the encouragement of their good-will, are too numerous to make possible an acknowledgment of each by name. Whatever of merit the book may have was made possible by their co-operation.

The men who went into the army when the emergency came went as part and parcel of the country as a whole. We of the 129th Field Artillery were the accredited representatives of the communities from which we came, in that part of the national movement which involved service under arms and at the front. In full appreciation of the responsibility we assumed, and of the whole-souled support of those at home who made any success in our efforts possible, we offer this inadequate report of how we tried to execute the trust imposed upon us.

J. M. L.

# THE ARTILLERYMAN

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE CALL TO SERVICE.

The struggle for civil liberty, for democracy, which means the right of a people to work out the salvation of its own members amongst themselves, and not as the mere pawns and civic mendicants of a ruling autocracy, in 1914 had reached another crisis. England had fought the battle through the centuries, from Magna Charta down, in the course of which kings had lost their thrones and their heads; and the American Revolution, in establishing a new republic, had been another victory for human progress and civil liberty in England itself; and in both countries the results attained, with the power, the right and the understanding to steadily improve and strengthen those results, had reached a high level. France, after the excesses of her first wild outburst of freedom in her own Revolution, had gone through a century of struggle for self-mastery, learning by bitter experience that the right to live and grow did not carry with it the right to dictate to her neighbors; and now for more than forty years the republic had grown and strengthened in self-respect and in the world's esteem. Belgium, under the democratic ruler whom she had rightly learned to trust, had developed industrially to where the most crowded population in Europe was prosperous, happy and at peace with its neighbors. Modern Italy was fast developing in popular government and progressive ideals; and the Balkans, turbulent, unsettled and suspicious, at least were no man's vassals.

Only in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia still prevailed the old idea of the autocratic power and rights of the State, by which was understood an entity unbound by any rules of human conduct, operated by a ruling class

likely to be ambitious, unscrupulous and irresponsible to anyone but themselves. In Russia the iron hand of the group of which the Czar was the figure-head repressed rigorously the always stirring unrest, unwieldy and difficult to organize in the magnitude of the nation's geography and popular ignorance. In Austria-Hungary the insolubility of jarring races made possible the close combination of dominant elements which held in tight control the rest of the discordant empire.

But in Germany, racially homogeneous and generally literate, autocracy in another aspect was presented. A national vanity, fed up by a series of successful aggressive wars, and nurtured for half a century in a school which at all times stressed the superiority and ultimate triumph of German civilization and standards, of German methods and Kultur, of German invincibility and right to control, developed a psychology and attitude of mind as unnatural as it was threatening. The fact that Germany wanted a thing, whether the natural aspirations of a growing and active people, or merely as the shortest and easiest means of getting something coveted, was in her new code of ethics all sufficient justification (if any justification at all was necessary) for her to take it, even by violence, and no matter from whom, if she had the power.\*

Whatever obstacles might have arisen among her own

---

\*The glowing periods of a newspaper editorial writer cannot be taken as the deliberate expression of governmental policy; nevertheless the prominence of Maximilian Harden in the then contemporary German public life, and the standing of his newspaper, *Die Zukunft*, give force to his article as an accurate expression of the dominant German position and of the public voice:

"Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it; because we had to wish it and could wish it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience. We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Our power shall create new law in Europe. Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war. \* \* \* We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned nor in order to free enslaved people, and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view and with the conviction that Germany, as a result of her achievements, and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain, wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The powers from whom she forced her ascendancy, in spite of themselves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. \* \* \*

Now strikes the hour for Germany's rising power." Maximilian Harden, quoted in *New York Times*, Dec. 6, 1914, and in *New York Times Current History*, II, p. 130.

citizenship to the development and strengthening of this national ideal were lulled to ineffectiveness by a sort of governmental paternalism, on the one hand, and of state subsidies or other aid to its great commercial enterprises, on the other hand, which very definitely exacted in return an all but complete subserviency, political and social, to the ruling oligarchy and the military caste; while a system of more or less graduated petty social distinctions, to which habit or the national temperament gave an importance not easily appreciated, lent itself to the strengthening of existing conditions.

So long as this attitude of the German people was confined to their own boundaries it was their own affair, a part of the process of their own development. But the desire to dictate to the world at large was the logical sequence, and produced the natural result. It is not to be presumed that there were not in Germany some to whom the national tendencies were distasteful, especially among those less wedded to what we are wont to call "Prussianism";\* some who resented the domineering overlordship of the army, and who desired to win pre-eminence in the world by the natural processes of efficient industry and enterprise, and to live in peace with the nations about them in the mutual enjoyment of their own rights. Indeed, the growing insistence of a more liberal and democratic spirit, of which there were not a few evidences, may have been an element in the considerations which determined the war party, to strengthen and secure its own domination, to drag the nation into what they conceived would be another short and glorious war; a war which like those of 1866 and 1870 would expand German frontiers, feed the national sense of racial superi-

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\*"The German people had themselves coined the phrase 'Prussian militarism,' although this very Prussian militarism, the spirit of selfless loyalty, the surrender of the individual to the conception of the State, had created Prussia and achieved for Germany its magnificent development."

From "Ludendorff's Own Story," Vol. I, page 429. (Harpers, 1919.) The somewhat labored, but we may assume, sincere, effort of the German Field Marshal at an analysis of the principles, motives and phenomena which sustained Germany in her successes, and of the controlling causes which brought about her defeat, is of illuminating interest. There is apparent all through it the underlying conception of "authority," of the assumption that all wisdom and responsibility, and all national direction, rested in the State, as an entity, to which the individual must be subordinated; of the possibility of "single control of the press" (page 443); of the idea of maintaining public morale by "telling" them from above.

ority, and bolster German finances with the indemnities which they would impose upon the conquered peoples. But at best the liberals, if there were such, with the rigid and unequal electoral system,\* had little weight in the national life and national policies; and Germany continued to grow as the dominant, aggressive advocate and exemplar of the modern version of the "divine right of kings"; of the autocratic power of the State and the governmental and military organism which represented it over the individual; of the irresponsibility of the State to anyone or anything, even its own plighted faith, save only the limitations of its own power; of materialism over idealism.

It was perhaps inevitable that the clash should come; that the "old regime" would not die without a struggle; that its very self-centered blindness to the steady march of human progress should make it take the offensive when it was challenged.

Russia, inconsistent with herself, after the sacrifice of millions of lives at last withdrew within the narrowed limits permitted her by the scant charity of the then still unhumiliated Prussian (and by the reaction against her own years of oppression of subject peoples who now began to stir) there to work out the problem in her own way.

\*In the German Imperial Parliament the Upper House, or Bundesrat, was composed of representatives of the various states, kingdoms and principalities, not elected, but appointed by their respective sovereigns. Of the 61 members, Prussia had 17 of her own and controlled 3 additional from the "Crown-land" of Alsace-Lorraine. No amendment to the Imperial Constitution was valid if 14 votes were cast against it, thus fixing and tightening Prussian control. The Lower House, or Reichstag, was elected; but in Prussia, the dominating state, with 235 out of the total of 397 members, its members of the Reichstag were elected by a classified electorate, according to wealth and rank, whereby in effect thousands of the public at large had no more representation than a single fortunate individual. And when elected, the Reichstag's powers were of limited extent, compared with those of the Bundesrat, which normally met in secret session, and which had a veto on all legislation. The Imperial Chancellor, appointed by the King of Prussia (the Kaiser), was the only cabinet officer (all others being theoretically his subordinates, not his colleagues), and he vigorously asserted the fact that he was not responsible to Parliament but to the Sovereign who appointed him. The Reichstag had no control whatever over ministries, and could itself be dissolved by the Bundesrat.

Theoretically the consent of the Bundesrat (not the Reichstag) was required to declare war, except a war of defense. This helps to explain the labored efforts to show that France was "preparing" for war; for, in fact, not even the Bundesrat was consulted in this case.

The negotiations which preceded hostilities, the ultimatums, the mobilization of German troops on Aug. 1, 1914, and the invasion of Belgium and France which initiated the Great War, were all carried on by the Imperial Government on its own authority; while the Reichstag did not meet and receive official information of it all until August 4, 1914, at which time the Imperial Chancellor advised them that "Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory."

The clash was perhaps inevitable; and when on August 4, 1914, the German army crossed the frontier of Belgium it became evident that that which it had been the effort of the statesmen of Europe for half a century to avert, had come; that the thing, the dread of which had consciously or unconsciously affected all their national policies and national life, governmental and social, which had molded their statesmanship, turned the direction of their commerce, colored their national literature, and like the fear of hunger to the poor, had never ceased to haunt their consciousness, was now a reality, grim, fierce and inescapable.

At once, like metals responding to a suddenly electrified magnet, the several peoples drew together in one or the other of the two hostile groups; drawn by the inevitable and instinctive compulsion of common ideals and common national outlook.

On July 28, 1914, Austria, urged on or encouraged by Germany, after her baldly insincere ultimatum to Serbia, which by its very terms was impossible of compliance with,\* and by the shortness of its time allowance and the refusal to listen to suggestions for peace from England and Italy, was evidently not intended to be possible of compliance with, had declared war. On that day an order for general mobilization was signed. Following this, Russia, uneasy as to the possible outbreak of the century-old "Balkan Conflagration" and mobilizing on her Austrian frontier as a precaution, furnished Germany the excuse she was seeking,† which, indeed, she had forced; and so on the plea

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\*See Note C, page 18, post.

†That the German Imperial officials did not have a genuine fear of aggression from Russia seems clear, both from the manner in which they encouraged Austria in her bellicose attitude, and from the records:

"Subsequently I learned that at the decisive conference at Potsdam on July 5th, the Vienna inquiry received the unqualified assent of all the controlling authorities, with the further suggestion that it would not be a bad thing if war with Russia should result. \* \* \*

"Next I received instructions to try to induce the English press to adopt a friendly attitude, should Austria administer the 'death blow' to the pan-Serbian movement. \* \* \* I added a warning against the whole plan, which I characterized as adventurous and dangerous; and I advised that moderation be recommended to the Austrians, as I did not believe that the conflict could be localized. Herr von Jagow replied to me that Russia was not ready. There would probably be some blustering, but the more firmly we stood by Austria the more certainly Russia would give way. Already Austria was accusing us of flabbiness, and for this reason we must not hold back. \* \* \*

"In view of this attitude (which, as I found later, was based on reports from Count Pourtales that Russia would not move



that if Russia went to war with Austria, Germany would support Austria, and that in such case it was to be expected that France would support Russia, therefore without waiting more Germany would strike first against France, she set her armies in motion westward. And so Belgium, whose offense was her geographical location, was overrun and ravished and burned and enslaved, in the name of War. §

From the standpoint of pure self-defense England could not have stood aloof; for with France humbled and her channel ports in hostile hands, England could not long expect to

under any circumstances—that caused us to incite Count Berchtold to the utmost energy), I hoped for rescue through English mediation." \* \* \*

"On the 30th of July, when Count Berchtold showed a disposition to change his course, we sent an ultimatum to St. Petersburg merely because of the Russian mobilization and though Austria had not been attacked; and on the 31st of July we declared war against the Russians, although the Czar pledged his word that he would not permit a single man to march as long as negotiations were still going on. Thus we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement."

From "My London Mission," by Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London in 1914.

This pamphlet of Prince Lichnowsky was written by him as a private memorandum in the summer of 1916, and was unauthorizedly published in 1918.

Count Pourtales was German Ambassador in St. Petersburg; Count Berchtold was the Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Herr von Jagow was the German Secretary of State.

(See also Note B, page 18, post.)

"According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict. \* \* \* He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. \* \* \* France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war."

British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edw. Grey, July 25, 1914. British White Paper No. 32.

"Austrian colleague said to me today that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war."

British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edw. Grey, July 28, 1914. British White Paper No. 71.

"\* \* \* Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.

"Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It is true that the French Government declared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained."—From speech by Imperial German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg before the German Reichstag, on August 4, 1914.

"\* \* \* Belgian neutrality, which had to be violated on strategic grounds."—From message of Emperor William to President Wilson, August 8, 1914, reproduced in Ambassador Gerard's book, "My Four Years in Germany," pages 200, 433. (See also Note A, page 18, post.)

be permitted to stand unbowed before Prussian "Kultur."\* And more than this, England, with France and Prussia herself, had pledged themselves to maintain Belgian neutrality; not perhaps, because of any artificial sentiment for Belgium (though the spirit of standing by the weak moves even nations at times, as we like to feel was our own history with Cuba), but as an agreed international "No Man's Land" between the Powers of Europe, to respect which was at once an evidence of good faith and an avoidance of spontaneous or unintended clashes.

France, to prove the sincerity of her efforts to avoid a conflict, and to her lasting honor in the world's history, had in the tense and nervous days when diplomacy was seeking to avert the crisis, withdrawn her armies 10 kilometers within her borders. But "The Day" had dawned in German self-consciousness and national ambition, and nothing could stay her.

Certain facts stand out in bold relief in the history of those days. That Austria, not satisfied with the achieved humiliation of Serbia, who had met her ultimatum on all except the one point which involved her national sovereignty, still insisted on the last jot and tittle of her demands; and

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\*"The creation of a powerful fleet on the other side of the North Sea, the development of the most important military power on the continent into the most important naval power as well, could not but arouse in England a sense of at least discomfort. On this point there can be no reasonable doubt. In order to keep the lead it had gained and needed, and not to lose its independence, in order to secure the rule of the sea, which Great Britain requires to avoid starvation, it was forced to proceed to armaments and outlays that weighed heavily on the tax-payer. . . . but England would no more have grasped the sword on account of our fleet alone than on account, say, of our trade, which is alleged to have bred envy and finally war. . . . On the other hand, the increasing exchange of goods with Germany, to which Great Britain exported more merchandise than to any other country in Europe . . . had created a desire to maintain good relations with their best customer and business friend and had gradually supplanted all other considerations."

"Soon after my arrival I become convinced that under no circumstances had we to apprehend an English attack or any English support of an attack by a third power, but that under any circumstances England would protect the French."

From "My London Mission," by Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London in 1914.

"The alpha and omega of English policy has always been the attainment and maintenance of English naval supremacy. . . . It would be foolish to dismiss English policy with the hackneyed phrase of 'perfidie Albion.' In reality this supposed treachery is nothing but a sound and justifiable egoism, which, together with other great qualities of the English people, other nations would do well to imitate." . . .

"France would attack if she thought she were strong enough; England would only do so if she thought she could not defend her vital economic and political interests against Germany except by force."

From "Imperial Germany," by Prince von Bulow (predecessor of Bethmann-Hollweg as Imperial Chancellor).

scorning the good offices of other nations, hurriedly opened hostilities against Serbia, though she knew this was an affront to Russia. That she did this, knowing its possibilities as a cause for a general war, because she felt she had the support of Germany, and that Germany assured her of that support, seem beyond question. It is also clear that the black guilt of actually beginning hostilities lies with the then Austro-Hungarian Government; and there is a principle of law that a man is presumed to know the natural results of his acts, and is responsible accordingly. The same principle is true of nations.

That Germany encouraged Austria in her unbending attitude toward Serbia seems also clear from the dispatches exchanged between the various Governments of Europe at that time.\* The cool, calculating attitude of Germany is indicated by her efforts to induce England to agree to remain neutral, in which she offered assurances that she would agree not to make territorial acquisitions from France; but even in this, she refused to bind herself as to French colonies.† She refused, also, to agree to respect the neutrality of Belgium, in case of hostilities,‡ although she was under treaty obligation (moral obligations aside) to do so, and although France made a fresh pledge that Belgian neutrality would not be violated by her. Instead, Germany used this question as ground for a new proposition or inquiry of England, as to whether England would agree to remain neutral if Germany agreed to respect Belgian neutrality;§ and further suggested, now, as an additional inducement, that she might respect French colonies.§

\*"We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Serbia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that war-like moves on the part of Austro-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into war in accordance with our duty as an ally."—German "White Book," August 3, 1914.

"We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved and the danger of a World War must have been known to us."

From "My London Mission," by Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador to England in 1914.

†Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to British Ambassador, July 29, 1914; quoted in British White Paper, August 5, 1914; No. 85.

‡British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, quoting German Secretary of State, July 31, 1914; British White Paper, August 5, 1914, No. 122.

§German Ambassador in London to Sir Edward Grey, August 1, 1914, quoted in British White Paper, August 5, 1914, No. 123.

But perhaps the extreme of cynical assurance is displayed in the proposition that England join Germany in the attack on France ("guarantee with his armed forces the neutrality of France") that Germany might be free to pursue her aims in other fields.\* If this offer was made seriously it is but another evidence of the sordid view of international ethics and almost absolute lack of understanding of the psychology and ideals of other nations existing in the minds of those then controlling German policies. If it was not sincere it is even stronger evidence of their contemptuous indifference to international public sentiment and their self-centered confidence in the ability of German arms and the terror-striking aspect of the German frown to successfully maintain their own policies in any event. Besides the light it throws on the German Government's attitude at this time, the Emperor's message telling of the proposition is striking as an admission that Germany was at the time still free to "refrain from attacking" France; and that the extreme of Germany's charge against France at that moment was that she was "preparing" to enter Belgium; and this in the face of the specific and announced withdrawal by France of all her armed forces to a distance of 10 kilometers within her borders, as an evidence of her good faith.

To her everlasting credit, England refused to commit

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"In a telegram from London my ambassador informed me he understood the British Government would guarantee neutrality of France and wished to know whether Germany would refrain from attack. I telegraphed to H. M. the King personally that mobilization being already carried out could not be stopped, but if H. M. would guarantee with his armed forces the neutrality of France I would refrain from attacking her, leave her alone and employ my troops elsewhere. H. M. replied that he thought my offer was based on a misunderstanding; and as far as I can make out, Sir E. Grey never took my offer into serious consideration. He never answered it. Instead he declared England had to defend Belgian neutrality, which had to be violated by Germany on strategical grounds, news having been received that France was preparing to enter Belgium, and the King of the Belgians having refused my petition for a free passage under guarantee of his country's freedom."—From message of the Emperor to President Wilson, August 8, 1914.

(In the original message in the Emperor's handwriting, a fac-simile of which is reproduced in Ambassador Gerard's book, the Emperor appears to have first written the word "knowledge," but crossed it over and substituted the word "news" in the sentence, above quoted, "news having been received that France was preparing," etc.)

"If France offers me her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army and navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier."

Emperor William to King George, August 1, 1914.

"We guarantee, however, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until Monday, the 3rd of August, at seven P. M., in case England's assent is received by that time."

Bethmann-Hollweg to German Ambassador at London, August 1, 1914.

herself to any such bargain at the expense of France; but warned Germany of the feeling that the invasion of Belgium would be sure to arouse. §

And certain final facts stand out; that France stood back, with 10 kilometers of her borderland unoccupied by troops, until the German invasion began; that England took no hand until Belgium was invaded; invaded in spite of the international treaty to maintain her neutrality (the treaty which the German minister called a mere "scrap of paper"); that England was unprepared for war, her handful of regulars being almost annihilated within six weeks, and her new army not raised and ready for nearly a year; and that the war was fought, not on German soil, but on that of France. Germany's bitter resentment at England,\* her protests to the effect that if she had known England was coming in the war she would not have started it,† and her belated claims of self-defense, are not borne out by the record of history. There is another principle of law, that a man cannot deliberately begin a controversy and when he has gotten his adversary to a point when he must either kill or be killed, kill that adversary and claim self-defense. The same principle applies to nations.

At first, here in America, in the perspective of a half-world's distance, and with the natural variance of predilections in our people, opinion was not wholly confined to either side, though even then there was an instinctive preponderance of sympathy for the Allied or "Entente" cause. But as

§German Ambassador in London to Sir Edward Grey, Aug. 1, 1914, quoted in British White Paper, August 5, 1914, No. 123.

"But England \* \* \* that had received far-reaching assurances from us regarding the sparing of France and of Belgium, seized the sword. In saying this, I by no means accept the view that is widely held among us today, that England laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an understanding with us."

Herr von Jagow, former German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, March 23, 1918; translated in New York Times Current History, June, 1918.

\*"I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency immediately began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word, 'neutrality,' a word which in war-time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her."

British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, Aug. 8, 1914, reporting on conference with the Imperial German Chancellor respecting violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.

†"The English change the whole situation—an obstinate nation—they will keep up the war. It cannot end soon."—Emperor William to Ambassador Gerard, Aug. 8, 1914. Quoted in "My Four Years in Germany," by U. S. Ambassador James B. Gerard; page 206.

the war continued it became more and more impressed upon the American people that this was more than an ordinary conflict between nations, in which, as in all things human, natural human limitations and selfishnesses and self-interest were opposed for mere temporary advantage. More and more did they come to realize that underneath it all it was a conflict of ideals and standards; that that which Germany represented in the struggle was the world-old theory of the power of Might over Right; that it was more, even, then a mere assertion of the right to consult one's own good rather than that of others, but was rather the bald assertion that there were no such things as rights, but only power;

"The good old rule  
Sufficeth them—the simple plan,  
That they should take who have the power,  
And they should keep who can;"

and that good faith and solemn engagements were only to be observed as means to an end, while they were of use, and no longer.‡

And when to the sacking of cities and towns, the deliberate killing of civilians without distinction of age, sex or calling, and the taking and punishing or shooting of hostages on the slightest pretexts, in a policy of terrorizing their opponents into submission, was added the deportation and practical enslavement of non-combatants, the use of poison gases, and indiscriminate submarine warfare; warfare directed not only against warships, but against merchant ships; not only against merchant ships of the combatant nations, but against those of neutral nations as well; and not only against merchant ships of all nations, but against passenger ships laden with men, women and children; then America realized as never before that the fight was hers.

Such acts were not only directly contrary to the laws of war as theretofore accepted by all civilized nations, and more especially in violation of the express agreements of

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\*"The acts of the State cannot be judged by the standards of individual morality. \* \* \*

Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. \* \* \*

Briefly, in the business of war, men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, the marches, etc. \* \* \* It will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself. \* \* \*

(From "Germany and the Next War," by General F. von Bernhardi.)  
This book, published not long before the war, had a wide sale as an expression of the military party's attitude.

The Hague and Geneva Conventions, to which Germany as well as America was a party; but more deeply it was felt that quite aside from formal engagements, a nation which could bring itself to adopt and justify such methods, even in the name and for the sake of War, was, so long as it practiced and defended them, a menace to the world's progress and to our own national safety; a menace, too, to that ideal in government and human relationships, the development and maintenance of which our forbears had left to us, in trust for our children and for the world.

Elated with the stimulant of a false ideal; violent with the intoxication of initial successes, and perhaps sub-consciously terrified, as the war progressed, with a realization of the possibility of failure, all restraints seemed to be cast aside. The sinking of the *Lusitania*, and of other ships bearing American lives, even those under the American flag, with the threat that any such ships attempting to defend themselves would be treated as pirates, brought forth vigorous and repeated protests from our Government; while our people chafed under the apparently deliberate assaults upon the lives and liberties of our citizens and the honor and well-being of our nation, and the apparently even more deliberate refusal to express regret or to assure a discontinuance of similar acts in the future.

The intrigues in Mexico against our national sovereignty and national integrity, and here at home for the destruction of our factories, bridges and ships, proven by letters and documents traced through German officials,† here and abroad, brought out ever more vividly that in effect we were already at war, without the power of defense; that German victory in Europe would be a direct threat at the very foundations of our institutions and national standards; which sooner or later we would be called upon to defend.\*

The last straw came when, at 6:00 p. m. on January 31, 1917, the German Government notified the American Ambassador that at midnight that night unrestricted U-boat activities would be resumed against all shipping coming into European waters, irrespective of its flag or character. This

†See annotations to the President's Flag Day Address, in pamphlet issued by the Committee on Public Information, Sept. 15, 1917.

\*"America had better look out after the war." "I shall stand no nonsense from America after the war."—The Kaiser to Ambassador Gerard, Oct. 22, 1915.

was not only a hostile act in itself, but was in violation of the German Government's promises; and above all it was a defiance of good faith and of world order. No choice remained us, as a self-respecting people with ideals for the present and aspirations for the future. It was clear that America as a nation could no more stay out of the conflict than an individual American, who was fit and able to go, could stay out after war was declared.

On April 2, 1917, Congress met in special session and at once listened to the President's message reviewing the history of our relations with Germany, and their present status. Without delay Congress passed the bill, signed by the President April 6, 1917, declaring that a state of war existed, and authorizing the President to use all the land and naval forces and the resources of the Government to carry it on. §

The country responded instantly with enthusiasm and great unanimity. The Regular Army and the National Guard both recruited rapidly; while contrary to the evident anticipation of the German leaders, Congress quickly passed a law providing for universal registration of all men in the country between the ages of 21 and 31, and for their enlistment by selective draft into the military service. Collectively, the men thus enlisted were commonly known, for convenience of reference, as the National Army, as distinguished from the Regular Army and the National Guard. When once mobilized into service, however, all branches of the service came under common direction and control, as the Army of the United States.

On July 9, 1917, the President by proclamation\* set August 5, 1917, as the date upon which the whole National Guard of the United States was to be called into the service of the United States, under authority of the Act of Congress approved May 18, 1917. On March 31, 1917, immediately preceding the Declaration of War, the strength of the Regular Army was 127,771, † with an authorized peace strength of 175,000 men. \*\* Inadequately provided with experienced

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§For Declaration of War, see Appendix A.

\*Published in G. O. No. 90, War Department, July 12, 1917.

†Report of Chief of Field Artillery, 1919, page 22.

\*\*U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916, Sec. 1882-a.



officers for their authorized strength, even the number it had were soon spread out thin to meet the immensely augmented demands of the war. At this time the National Guard of the various states furnished organizations ready to hand of as many more, with an authorized strength of approximately 400,000 men. § With the Regulars they formed the "front-line" of the Army organization, while the "National Army," raised under the provisions of the Selective Draft Law, was forming. With all the defects, real or imaginary, fundamental or casual, of the National Guard system, it filled a breach and met an emergency in 1917 for which no other adequate preparation had been made by existing law. Like that of the Regular Army, its personnel was made up of volunteers. Its divisions were organized, and their training, even of the newly formed regiments, was well under way in their permanent cantonments, by the time the men of the first National Army were drawn.

The 129th Field Artillery looks back with pride to its record in this respect. Batteries B and C were already organized, ‡ and had served on the Mexican Border for six months in 1916; but by now their membership was greatly reduced by expiration of enlistments. Battery A was organized in the early spring of 1917, when war was inevitably imminent. All the rest of the regiment was organized,\* and the personnel of the whole regiment was recruited to the necessary war strength by voluntary enlistments under the existing machinery of the law, immediately after the Declaration of War, in the knowledge and with the desire that it meant active service—the sooner the better. Battery F, the last one organized, was formally mustered in on June 22, 1917.

They went in fully organized at the first mobilization on August 5, 1917, and were in action at the front up to the last moment, when stopped by the Armistice at 11 a. m. on Nov. 11, 1918. They did not go for the mere excite-

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§ U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916, Sec. 3044-d.

‡ See Appendix B.

\* Of the old Missouri Artillery Battalion which served on the Mexican Border, B and C Batteries formed the base for the new Kansas City regiment. The old Battery A of St. Louis was also the nucleus for a new regiment in that city, lacking one battery. In addition to forming a complete artillery regiment in Kansas City and Independence, those communities also furnished the men for Battery E of the St. Louis Regiment (later designated the 128th), thus filling out that organization.

ment and novelty of it (for though that feeling would have its effect on any red-blooded man, there were some in the land who, with apparently no family or business need to restrain them, had no difficulty in resisting it), but under the inspiration of a more or less inarticulate but very real feeling that they were doing something bigger than themselves, giving their best for their country and their fellows, responding to the highest and noblest and most unselfish that was in them.

Of the Field and Staff Officers Colonel Klemm, the regimental commander, was a graduate of West Point who had been in civil life for several years prior to the present war; Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott had commanded B Battery on the Mexican Border; Major Miles (a veteran of the Spanish War) had commanded C Battery on the Border, and Major Gates, Captain Carr, Regimental Adjutant, Captain Thacher, Battalion Adjutant, and most of the battery commanders, had served on the Border. Practically all of the other officers of the regiment at the outset had had active service, either in the National Guard on the Mexican Border and prior thereto, or in the Regular Army, or in previous years at the Plattsburg Training Camp, that far-sighted movement which proved so invaluable an aid in preparing the army for the final emergency.† Several were graduates of the Artillery School of Fire at Fort Sill, and a number of the other officers had attended schools of instruction at Fort Riley and elsewhere. Major Chas. E. Wilson, Captain C. G. Butterfield and Lieutenant Slagle (besides Major Miles) had also served in the Spanish War, and Lieutenant (later Captain) Marks had served in the British Grenadier Guards, London.

†The law of June, 1916, which was the outgrowth of the Plattsburg Camp movement of the previous two years, gave express authorization for having these camps, and made a substantial appropriation for the purpose. It was planned to conduct them as four weeks' camps for general training of such volunteers as desired to attend. But when war was declared in April, 1917, the original plan was amplified so as to provide a three months' course of training, the graduates of which received commissions as reserve or National Army officers. With the law and the appropriation ready to hand, it was possible to get the first group of National Army officers trained, commissioned and ready for service almost as soon as the Army Bill, with its general plan of procedure, had finally passed its way through Congress and become a law; and these officers were ready to begin immediate training of the very first levy of selective draft soldiers. Those whose foresight and energy were responsible for it may rightly take satisfaction in retrospect at this instance of an intelligent, reasonable and effective measure of preparedness.

The regiment was thoroughly organized long before the 5th of August, and Officers' School conducted daily from 1 to 5 p. m. at Manual Training High School building. The men of the regiment entered heartily into the spirit of their new duties; and as a matter of *esprit du corps*, equipped themselves at their own expense with complete uniforms, thus anticipating the



129th Band on "The Parade,"  
Kansas City.

army issue of clothing by several weeks.

With this personnel of officers and men, and with such equipment as Batteries B and C had on hand, the training of the regiment went forward rapidly and eagerly.



Chaplain Tiernan holding open-air-  
service on "The Parade," Kansas  
City.

On Sunday, August 5th, 1917, pursuant to the President's call, the regiment (then known as the 2nd Mo. F. A.) mobilized. Regimental Headquarters with the Headquarters and Supply Companies, and Batteries D and F, were billeted in Convention Hall, at Thirteenth and Central Streets,

in Kansas City, Mo. Batteries A and B were quartered at the old B Battery Armory at Seventeenth and Highland, where all of that battery's artillery equipment was; while Batteries C and E, which had been organized in Independence, Mo., in the same county, had their rendezvous in C Battery Armory, in that city, under Major Miles.†

Convention Hall, that big concrete and steel assembly building which has housed everything from a national political convention to a horse show, and from a foot-ball game to grand opera, made an excellent armory. Its floor was

†G. O. No. 5, Hq. 2nd Mo. F. A., August 2, 1917.

large enough for indoor drill when occasion demanded. There, too, several farewell entertainments were given by and for the men of the regiment. The city parks were utilized as drill-grounds, and the public baths therein were set aside for their free use at designated hours.

On August 23d, Battery A, under Captain Roy T. Olney, left Kansas City for Camp Doniphan, Oklahoma, as an advance unit to prepare camp for the regiment.

On September 13th, 1917, the regiment felt honored at taking an official part in a Memorial Service held at the Cathedral on West Eleventh Street, in memory of Lieutenant William T. Fitzsimmons, M.R.C., a Kansas City physician, known to many of our men, who was the first American officer killed in France—killed by a German bomb dropped on a military hospital where he was serving.

A week or ten days later that part of the regiment, with regimental headquarters, which had been billeted at Convention Hall, moved to the large building then just completed across the street from the Union Station, and thenceforth commonly referred to as "Camp Sweeney."

About a week later our long anticipated orders to proceed to what was to be the divisional training camp, or cantonment, on the Ft. Sill Reservation, Oklahoma, were published. On the day we were to leave the people of Kansas City had arranged a parade and farewell demonstration for this and other organizations from the city, but a heavy down-pour of rain canceled this program. Retreat was had for the last time on the plaza in front of the station, and after a long wait in line in the station, while their friends loyally crowded about to cheer them off, our men filed into the cars provided for them. Meanwhile, C and E Batteries said good-bye in Independence, where they entrained, later picking up B Battery as they passed through Kansas City, with its flat-cars of guns, caissons and artillery materiel added to those of C Battery already on the train.

It was after dark, September 26th, 1917, when the train containing Headquarters and Batteries D and F, Headquarters Company and Supply Company, finally moved out of the station.

With the exception of a short stop at Chickasha, Oklahoma, where the troops were given a fifteen minutes exercise around the streets, they did not leave the train until it arrived at Camp Doniphan.

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NOTE A

"\* \* \* First of all, a short word about Belgium. It is well known how the unfortunate position of constraint and distress, brought about by our marching into Belgium, gave us the reputation of being barbarians, and led to our being credited with the blame for the war. I spoke frankly and straightforwardly about Belgium on August 4th. You know how, later on, what I said then was accounted to me as a crime by a large section of our public opinion. I still abide by every word I said then, and have nothing to add. \* \* \*

"Where I think we were to blame was in not having understood how to treat Alsace-Lorraine in such a way as to make its inhabitants gradually forget the change in their political nationality, and at the same time prevent the feeling from gradually taking form, as it has done in many parts of the world, that we did a great wrong in 1871, a feeling that was certainly not general in 1871, particularly in England and America. In the history of the world England's example has often shown how the violence of conquests is gradually forgotten.

"Above all, however, we must admit that by failings in our national character, and faults in our general behavior, we contributed to the war-like tension which pervaded the political atmosphere, not in the last decade alone. Words were repeatedly uttered which might be interpreted as provocation. Pan-German agitations did us great harm, both at home and abroad, and above all, the so-called fleet policy led us into disastrous antagonisms. To this may be added a variety of shortcomings in our domestic policy."—Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, in the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," quoted in the "Living Age," Feb. 1, 1919, page 261.

NOTE B

"Baron Wangenheim, the German Ambassador at Constantinople, \* \* \* informed me that a conference had been held in Berlin in the early part of July (1914), at which the date of the war was fixed. This conference was presided over by the Kaiser; the Baron Wangenheim was present to report on conditions in Turkey. Moltke, the Chief of Staff, was there, and so was Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. With them were the leaders of German finance, the directors of railroads, and the captains of industry. \* \* \* Each was asked if he were ready for war. All replied in the affirmative, except the financiers, who insisted that they must have two weeks in which to sell foreign securities and arrange their loans."

(Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador to Turkey, in N. Y. World, Oct. 14, 1917.)

NOTE C

"Even though we condemn the activity of the Pan-Serbian Nationalists, nevertheless wanton provocation of war upon the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government calls for the sharpest protest. The demands of that Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any civilized State in the history of the world, and they can be regarded only as intended to provoke war."

(From the German newspaper Vorwarts, July 25, 1914.)

## CHAPTER II.

### IN CAMP DONIPHAN.

It was about 5 o'clock on the evening of September 27th when the train pulled into Camp Doniphan and unloaded.


A twenty minutes' tramp over the prairie brought our men to the camp site which A Battery had prepared for them, and which was their home for more than seven months thereafter. The other section, with B, C and E Batteries, arrived a few hours later. Upon its arrival at Camp Doniphan the regiment became a constituent part of the 60th Field Artillery Brigade, 35th Division.\*

For the men, pyramidal tents were provided; but even by crowding them to their capacity there were not enough to cover all the men that night. Many slept on the ground or on the long tables in the mess-halls. What man who was there will forget that night, his first "in camp!" Though the season was early fall, the air was chilly, and very light equipment had been issued. With cotton "khaki" breeches, O. D. shirts, and no blouses, and with the scant allowance of blankets issuable, the night was not altogether comfortable. But the air was quiet and serene, the sky was clear and filled with the brightest of stars, the moon shed a soft mantle of light over all, and stepping out after taps and gazing upward one could not help feeling a sense of thankfulness at our lot in being sent to so satisfactory a spot. Alas, it soon developed that our first night was merely a "dud." Wind, wind, and still more wind, always from the north or south, but equally violent and misery-producing from either direction, raising clouds of dust which, literally, often obscured objects no more than fifty

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\*For organization of the 35th Division, see Appendix D.





# MAP NO. 1

CAMP DONIPHAN, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, 1917-1918. Squares are 1,000 meters, or 3,280 feet. Elevations are in meters. Contour intervals are 5 meters, or 16.4 feet. (Not all of reservation is here shown.)

or one-hundred feet distant, soon proved to be the normal atmospheric condition.

Camp Doniphan (named for Colonel A. W. Doniphan, who led the American troops, mostly from Missouri, into New Mexico in the Mexican War) was located in the Fort Sill Military Reservation, in southwestern Oklahoma, near the Wichita Mountains and within the old Comanche Indian Reservation. Representatives of the tribe were still a common sight on the streets of Lawton, especially on Saturdays, now garbed as normal Americans but affecting bright colors. The camp, containing approximately 1,200 acres, was laid out in the form of a rough oval or horse-shoe, of which the "New Post" of Fort Sill formed the northeasterly corner. The "Old Post," farther eastward, was established about the Civil War period, and its buildings, many of them of adobe, were antiquated and out-grown; but picturesque and homelike in outward appearance. Railroad tracks ran westward from the main lines through the Old and New Posts, and into the heart of the camp; and a trolley line ran from the New Post to the City of Lawton, some five miles to the southeast. But for the camp generally it was necessary to depend upon the "jitney" service, at 40 cents each way, to go to Lawton. "All aboard, South and West sides" became a greeting of identification of troops meeting by chance even as far as New York Harbor.

At night anyone who dropped suddenly into our midst would have thought he was in the suburbs of a great city. Electric lights lined the macadam roads (lights and roads were just newly installed) and in the distance the lights across the Horse-shoe or at the Aviation Field, a mile distant to the eastward, gave a semblance of city streets or illuminated viaducts. The hum of the ever present aeroplane overhead added to the impression of city life. Automobiles, as always, were ubiquitous, skirting the outer edges of the Horse-shoe. Only by riding out for miles on the prairie or among the Wichita hills in any direction (save south, where the reservation line was just over the crest of Grierson Hill) would one realize our distance from settled civilization.

The elevation of the camp was at its highest point about 1,230 feet above sea level. Signal Mountain, four



miles to the west, reached 1,752 feet. Seven miles to the northwest, outside the reservation, overhanging the lake from which came the camp water supply, was Mount Winfield Scott, the highest in the range. About four miles nearer, in the same direction, Monument Hill, a practically treeless cone with an elevation of 1,584 feet, bore on its summit the burial place of Geronimo, the old Apache Indian Chief. Northward, rising beyond the New Post, were the four hills known as Medicine Bluff, No. 1, No. 2, No. 3



Signal Mountain.

and No. 4, their northern sides dropping in an abrupt perpendicular cut to the bed of Medicine Bluff Creek. Just west of these, behind Division Headquarters, were Rumbough Hill and Heyl's Hill. Off to the east and northeast stretched the rolling prairie, on the horizon of which, five and

one-half miles distant, the blockhouse on Arbuckle Hill vied, a poor second, with that on Signal Mountain, as the favorite "aiming point" in artillery firing practice.

This huge military reservation of approximately 100 square miles area, with its varied physical features, from open prairie to forested mountain, would have been an ideal training ground had it not been for the climatic and meteorological conditions which normally existed there. The troops were there for training in the technical requirements of a soldier. The wind and dust storms were more than a discomfort. They seriously interfered with the effective training of the army. They did not even have the theoretical value (dear to the heart of some commanders) of "making the men used to it"; for the weather conditions at Doniphan were not like anything in the heavens above or the earth beneath, in any part of France.

The location of the 129th's camp was high, slightly, with excellent sanitation, and, except for climatic conditions, was fairly comfortable. A shortage of tents in the beginning made it necessary to crowd more men in each tent than was comfortable or hygienic, twelve and

thirteen at first, and later eight or ten, being not infrequent. In time however, this condition was so far improved that the rule of only five men to a tent became practicable.

Immediately on arrival the men began trying to make themselves comfortable; and the many scraps of lumber left lying around by the camp contractors were rapidly utilized



"F" Battery Street, Camp Doniphan, Sept., 1917.

in making rough floors, walks, etc., for the tents. During the fall, the War Department supplied lumber for building tight floors for each tent, and for walling up the sides about four feet. Thus constructed, and equipped with a Sibley stove in the center of each, the chimney running straight

up through the ventilating aperture in the peak, they became the winter quarters of the regiment. Each battery had in addition a mess hall built of frame, where the men ate at long plank tables, and a bath-house where hot water heaters were eventually installed (and which generally worked).

There was at first some complaint of the water supply, which came from the moss-filled Medicine Lake, some miles to the northwest. It was not only not always adequate in volume, but it was very pronouncedly of the prevailing O. D. color, uninviting to look at, and not pleasant to the taste,

whatever its pathological character. This improved with time, however.



Vaccination Line, Camp Doniphan.

It is a matter of history that in previous wars, typhoid and kindred scourges have been a greater foe to our armies than the human enemy. To meet this every man in the

army was required to be inoculated with the triple typhoid vaccine, besides the ordinary anti-smallpox vaccination. Long columns of men, lined up for their turn, with

sleeves rolled up, were disposed of promptly. This precaution, and the stringent training in sanitation and hygiene in all camps, had the desired result; for the deaths from typhoid and the usual camp diseases were reduced practically to *nil*.\*

The camp was new, set down on the prairie with everything to do to make it comfortable. Drainage trenches were dug and maintained along the battery streets, about the mess halls and in the corral, to take care of the rains (that seldom came); and the constant "policing" of the camp and quarters, super-imposed upon the regular schedule of drill, inspections, and study, kept everyone occupied all the time. Wednesday afternoons were excepted from the normal schedule; but it took careful management to so dispose of the necessary requirements of laundering, barbering, letter-writing, etc., as to leave the day open to more interesting recreations.

There was, in fact, little time for recreation. Reports from other camps of football games and organized athletic activities only served to remind our men that they were in camp for work; and, theoretically at least, were expected to move at short notice. For such off duty hours as they did have there were in camp a Y. M. C. A. building just east of us and a Knights of Columbus building just west; while off in the center of the "Horse-shoe" the American Library Association, during the following winter or early spring, established a central library for the Division. Over on the north side, near the railway station, was a Hostess House, where visiting mothers, sisters and wives could be entertained.

On the second or third day after our arrival, orders came down to go over to the Remount Station, near the Old Post, and draw our supply of horses. This order was received generally with great enthusiasm by the men, as it meant a definite step forward in our development as a regiment and as artillerymen.

Each battery was assigned a separate corral in which picket lines were stretched and the horses there lined up by sections. Later in the fall, frame shelters were erected;

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\*See Appendix E.

none too soon to protect the animals from the bitter winds which swept across the prairie. These sheds were long double affairs, with twenty-two stalls on each side, and mangers down the central dividing wall. The prevailing winds being north and south, the sheds were built to extend that way; so that even when a gale was blowing, the open sheds furnished considerable warmth and comfort by comparison. With two sheds, forty-four stalls in each, two horses to a stall, each battery corral could take care of 176 horses.

The stable program then instituted, while often varied in detail, was typical of that which became part of the daily life of the soldier, and made him sometimes wonder what was the basis for the cheers with which the original announcement of the issuance of the horses was greeted.

At 6 a. m. each battery marched to the corral in a body, and proceeded to water the animals, rake out the stalls, and place hay in the mangers. This hay was issued in bales, and



Horse Training at "F" Battery Corral.

the disposition of the baling wire so as not to become a source of danger to the horses or of offense to the scrutinizing view of the inspector, was one of the ever-present worries of the enlisted man. During the watering of the horses, the special stable detail put the morning feed of oats in the feed boxes.

At 11:30 a. m. watering and stall cleaning as in the morning.

At 3:30 p. m. came the call for "Stables." This included not only a procedure similar to that of the early morning, but also the daily grooming.

Every officer in the battery not on actual duty elsewhere, was required to be present.

This daily duty, irksome though it often seemed (being in addition to the normal schedule of drill and study), was of immense value in the training of the regiment in the care,

management and handling of horses; an experience hitherto unfamiliar to a large majority of the men. Some accidents occurred. A few vicious animals, such as "Dynamite" in F Battery, took their toll in the process of getting acquainted, and several men went to the hospital with more or less serious injuries from kicks. But soon both men and horses grew accustomed to each other; and a keen rivalry for the best appearing outfit produced the natural result of well-cared-for, well-trained and well-handled horses. A considerable tendency to sickness among the animals which developed at first, was efficiently met and overcome, in co-operation with our two veterinarians, Lieutenant Timothy Riley and Lieutenant Carl Parker.

The instruction in handling of the horses was systematic and gradual. Besides the training of both men and horses in the processes of care and grooming, the horses were given daily exercise by being led out in pairs. Then some twenty-five or thirty at a time were saddled and ridden out, perhaps with a companion horse being led. Later followed harnessing and driving in harness, then with limbers, until regular mounted drill with full artillery equipment became the regular order.

Later, in the winter, under orders from Colonel Danford, the horses were shifted around by colors, so that they were as follows:

A Battery—Black	D Battery—Bay
B Battery—Dark brown	E Battery—Sorrel
C Battery—Light brown	F Battery—Black,
	White and Gray

The regiment spent a busy fall. Two batteries, B and C, being old pre-war organizations, were equipped with three-inch guns and caissons. By arranging a schedule of drill hours each battery was given the use of this equipment for a half of every other day, for gun drill. The later acquisition of a considerable number of limbers and caissons from the 130th F. A., which was scheduled to become a six-inch battery, gave further opportunity for mounted drill. (Later in the season our guns were also loaned on certain days for the use of the "Third Officers' Training Camp" in which candidates from the 35th Division were selected for commissions.)

During the fall Troop B, Missouri Cavalry, organized in St. Louis, after various vicissitudes, was finally disbanded as a cavalry unit, and on December 4, 1917, its members were assigned to the 129th F. A., where they were distributed among the various batteries of the regiment. It was a bitter disappointment to most of them to have to give up their own organization; but they took up their new work with good spirit, and for the regiment they were a valuable acquisition.

About the middle of November the regiment, with the other regiments in the Division, was put to work constructing trenches, dugouts and artillery emplacements in selected positions in the neighborhood of Signal Mountain. Four gun-pits, each with a shell-proof shelter, a Battery Commander's and telephone dugout, and an ammunition dugout, nearly all connected by trenches, were the result of many hours' of hard labor on the part of the 129th, while the other regiments engaged in similar work. Much of the excavation was in rock; and even the soil, from long lack of moisture, was almost equally hard. Marching three or four miles from camp to the position, alternating in 10-minute working shifts all day save for an hour's rest and lunch at noon, and a return march in the afternoon, were no trifling test of patriotism; but this hardship, like many experienced later under more critical conditions in France, was gone through with by the men cheerfully, with spirit and good-will. Long after the novelty of it had worn off, they "played the game" in good part.

On October 30, 1917, by G. O. No. 18, Hq. 35th Division, the 60th F. A. Brigade was further organized by the designation of its regiments as follows:

128th F. A., 4.7-inch guns, motorized.

129th F. A., 3 -inch guns, horsed.

130th F. A., 6 -inch guns, motorized.

This order did not affect the 129th, which was already training as a 3-inch gun, horse-drawn regiment. (Upon their arrival in France, months later, both the 128th and 129th were issued 75 mm. horse-drawn guns, corresponding to the 3-inch guns; and the 130th was issued 155 mm. howitzers, also horse-drawn.)

Every evening the officers of the regiment were assembled for "school" in the 1st and 2nd Battalion officers' mess halls, for an hour and a half, where Artillery Drill Regulations, Field Service Regulations and pamphlets on recent operations in France, were systematically gone over, together with practice in firing-data problems.

The men, too, had each evening to attend a battery conference or instruction period. With this added to the daily schedule of drill, stables, policing, guard-duty, etc., there was little time or inclination for recreational activities such as baseball, football, song-fests, or the like by our men. By the time taps blew at 10 P. M., they were generally too tired to keep awake if they had wished to.

Clothing supplies came in installments. One of the first and most welcome articles of issue was the "slicker," a long, noisy, rather stiff garment. But as the issue of woolen uniforms, overcoats and heavy clothing was delayed, they were life-savers day and night, in the cold of the advancing autumn season. A timely issue of sweaters and comforts by the Red Cross, was much appreciated. By the first of the year the regiment was pretty thoroughly equipped with winter underwear and socks, overcoats, blankets and comforts, gloves, woolen uniforms and extra shoes.

Thanksgiving Day was celebrated with an extra big dinner in each battery with menus that might have made the folks at home envious. Again at Christmas the various mess sergeants and cooks fairly outdid themselves, working practically all night long the preceding night. Some of the batteries, in addition to their Christmas dinner, had evening celebrations with trees, music, singing and short speeches.

The regiment was originally composed entirely of volunteer enlistments. On October 24th, it received its first bunch of replacements, some two or three hundred selective draft men from Camp Funston, mostly recruited from Missouri and Kansas. Divided up among the various organizations they soon became integral parts of the regiment and all distinctions were soon lost sight of.

A troublesome formality for the men between 21 and 31 years of age was the filling out of their "question-

naires" under the Selective Draft Law. All men from 21 to 31 years of age not actually in the service on June 5, 1917, had registered; and though later they enlisted, they were obliged to fill out the blanks showing that fact.

Late in the fall the division was given a try-out in the field. The infantry occupied three lines of trenches they had dug just below the northwest slope of Signal Mountain. Batteries of the 128th, 129th and 130th Field Artillery regiments took position in the respective emplacements and trenches they had constructed on the southern side.\* For twenty-four hours actual battle conditions were simulated, close telephone communication being maintained with the infantry P. C., and with gun crews constantly at their posts. All calls for a barrage were started at the infantry front line, came through the infantry wire to the Infantry P. C., and thence through the artillery liaison officer on his own wire to the artillery Battery Commander's P. C., whence the command was given direct to the guns. A careful check made at the Infantry P. C. on one of the calls (when Battery F happened to be on duty) showed that from the time it originated in the infantry front line until the sound of the artillery fire (blank shells being used) came back over Signal Mountain, there elapsed but thirty seconds.

On December 28, 1917, Colonel Klemm and Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott, in common with all the other artillery and infantry colonels and lieutenant-colonels of the Division, were sent to Ft. Sam Houston, Texas, for some three months of special instruction at the Brigade and Field Officers' School. We owe it to Colonel Klemm that the regular army officer sent to command the regiment during this period was his former West Point classmate, Lieutenant-Colonel (afterward Brigadier General) Robert M. Danford, whose name was already familiar to us as author of the then latest, most thorough and most up-to-date American book on artillery, a work published just before the Declaration of War and used in every artillery training camp and school in America, as a fundamental book of instruction. Colonel Danford arrived a day or two before

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\*See Map No. 1 of Camp Doniphan.



New Year's Day and immediately began a thorough personal inspection and survey of the regiment, which had then been in service approximately five months. Coming at a time when the novelty of the life had worn off; when the routine of various kinds of drill, foot and mounted, battery and regimental, and of the daily care of horses and camp, had begun to pall; when the construction of and life in the trenches had become a monotonous bore, it was no light task that Colonel Danford found before him. He at once instituted a carefully thought-out schedule of daily drill and instruction which was technically thorough and psychologically a marvel.

The day was divided into fifty minute work periods, with ten minute intervals. Each officer in each battery had a given schedule of instruction or drill to cover. By shifting the cannoneers, detail-men, and drivers in the different periods, and by laying out a specific course for each period in each week, with gun work, signalling and communications practice, Drill Regulations, Field Service Regulations and the care and management of animals and equipment all included, with odds and ends of important specialties worked in, which gave a pleasing variation while insuring a better rounding out of the instruction, the daily tasks became a pleasure; all the irksomeness and monotony of training disappeared, and the day's work was over almost before you realized it had begun. Each week a new schedule was published, as the training progressed.

Better results and better feeling in the achieving of them were never obtained than during the time this schedule was permitted to remain in effect, and until it was suddenly discontinued by Brigade order. It was a complete demonstration that intelligent enthusiasm, an appreciation of the spirit, the true purposes and the ultimate meaning underlying the forms and methods of army service, with a keen interest in its science and technique, a highly developed sense of fairness and justice, a knowledge of human psychology, a broad sympathy and understanding, and a strict discipline which asked and gave a man's thorough best, were not only not incompatible, but when combined were productive of the most effective results.

Daily meetings with the regimental officers, the first

half-hour of which was devoted to suggestions, comments on regimental work and conditions, and to reports as to the relative standing of the batteries in the daily inspections, were of tremendous value in arousing the spirit of the regiment. To get the best looking front line and bat-

tery-street, the cleanest kitchen, the neatest bath-house or the best kept stables, was not a merely formal or occasional effort but was a continuous, conscious ambition on the part of everyone; while the occasional inter-battery contests in gun-drill aroused keen interest.

Nothing escaped Colonel Danford. Daily he impressed on officers and men the meaning of military duties and the spirit that should govern a soldier. Strict in the enforcement of military discipline, it was as discipline always, and not the mere display of authority. A



Lt. Col. Robert M. Danford.

strong sense of justice and fair dealing was one of his most dominant characteristics. He would tell his officers, "If a man or junior officer under you does something wrong, be sure that he, and not yourself, is to blame before you discipline him. Be first sure that he has had an opportunity to learn what is expected of him; that you have not yourself failed in your duty; then if he refuses to do right, land on him."

Sometimes he would visit the guard-house, and without coddling them in the least would talk with the men confined there; and many good lessons he taught his officers from his deductions from those visits. To handle

offenders by battery discipline whenever possible, reserving court martial for only the persistent or serious offenders, was his advice and personal method.

And who can forget his interpretation of the salute? It was not, he would say, to be given in the manner or spirit of servility or inferiority; but with head erect, eye to eye, as if to say, "Sir, I am with you," and the return salute, "I know you are, and I with you."

Whether it was "laying" a gun, reviewing the regiment or inspecting its quarters, fitting a shoe for a soldier or a saddle for the comfort of both horse and rider, establishing a battery position, splicing a rope, promoting a comfortable and sanitary camp, apportioning an issue of rations with the least waste, or running a field telephone, no phase of a soldier's life and duties but was with him a matter of interest and intelligent, co-operative effort toward regimental efficiency.

One of the first acts of the regimental authorities after arrival at Camp Doniphan was the establishment of a regimental exchange, or "canteen," under the responsible supervision of First Lieutenant Harry S. Truman, with the assistance of Sergeant Edward Jacobson of F Battery. Shortly after his arrival, Colonel Danford attended a meeting at Division Headquarters at which the condition of the various canteens in the Division was discussed. An especially commendatory report on the business-like and efficient management and condition of one canteen, without naming it, was made; and Colonel Danford was later much gratified to learn, and to pass the information on to his next officers' meeting, that the canteen in question, so highly commended, was that of the 129th Field Artillery.

In the six months that Lieutenant Truman was responsible for it, the exchange paid dividends of \$15,000, or 666 per cent. These dividends went to the six batteries, Supply Company and Headquarters Company, to the credit of their respective funds, for the benefit of the men. By furnishing close at hand a liberal and well selected supply of the little conveniences, comforts and luxuries demanded by the soldiers, at fair prices, thus avoiding the expense and trouble of a trip to Lawton, and the return of all profits to them in the form of contributions to their battery funds,

the canteen was a social and financial success.

In the latter part of January a considerable number of field artillery officers were sent to the 60th F. A. Brigade from the Training Camp at Leon Springs, Texas. About 15 were assigned to the 129th and were soon identified with the work and life of the regiment.

On February 25th there was held a Brigade Review, the first we had had on so formal and complete a scale. The regiment was in formation, mounted and equipped, at 7:45 a. m., and Major General William Wright, commanding the Division, reviewed the brigade on the prairie south of camp. Shortly afterward a thorough inspection by an officer from the Inspector General's Department, was made.

On February 28th a War Department order provided for the giving of a serial number to every enlisted man in the army. The numbers allotted to the 35th Division were numbers 1,401,000 to 1,485,000 inclusive, those to the 129th F. A. being numbers 1,464,131 to 1,465,630. The number thus assigned to each man was placed on his service record and on all muster-rolls, and was stamped, together with his name, on each of the two aluminum disks which each man was required to wear suspended from his neck underneath his clothing as identification tags.

On March 9th an order came down directing Colonel Danford to give up command of the 129th Field Artillery and to report to Washington, where he was soon promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and assigned to duty in command of troops. The news of the order was received with unalloyed regret in the regiment. By his personality, his efficiency, his fairness and his soldierly qualities he had won both the respect and the affection of those who served under him, from senior major to the lowest second class private. Seldom anywhere in military or civil life does a man impress himself on a group of men as he did upon the men of the 129th. All were pleased at his deserved promotion, however. All felt that any brigade might be congratulated on having him as its commanding officer.

The day he was to leave each battery was formed and marched separately to his quarters to bid him adieu. To each he made a brief talk of friendly farewell and encouragement. To all he said in conclusion, "Soldier, soldier all

the time." Not a man who heard him ever forgot his words or his example; and to the morale, the idealism, the spirit of soldierly service, which were so earnestly inculcated by Colonel Danford in its formative period, must be ascribed a share, in no small measure, in whatever of success or credit came to the regiment in its service at the front.

For the next few weeks the regiment was in command, save for brief intervals, of Major Miles, until the return of Colonel Klemm.

Frequent inspections, combined with persistent rumors, made us feel that our turn would come soon. About this time, in pursuance to orders from the War Department, a detail of ten officers and one hundred men was selected from the 129th Field Artillery, along with similar details from other regiments, (aggregating 144 officers and 456 men), to constitute an advance detachment to go to France for instruction, and to be fitted to help in the training of the full regiment on its arrival.

The departure of this "Overseas Detail," as it was commonly called, was delayed from time to time, but finally in the early dawn of March 20th, 1918, after an all-night wait in the mess halls, for orders, they left Camp Doniphan. At New York they were stationed at Camp Merritt, whence

the report came back that the "35th Division Detachment" was the best equipped detachment that had gone through. Whether the report or the superlative was correct or not, there could be no denial of the earnest, intelligent effort that had been made to equip every man, down to the smallest detail, with the things required and ex-



Tents Rolled for Inspection. Battery  
"F" Street, Camp Doniphan.

pected. They sailed on March 31st on the "George Washington."

Shortly after this the War Department loosened up in its restrictions on the use of artillery ammunition for field practice and thereafter for a considerable period two bat-

teries of the regiment would daily proceed to the open country over towards Signal Mountain for firing. Numerous targets had been placed at sundry points over the prairie, on the mountain side, and in ravines. The batteries being placed in position with proper defilade, all the officers of the regiment not on other duty were assembled at a suitable observation point, and in turn given an opportunity to conduct the fire. It was excellent practice for officers and men, including the B. C. details, whose duty it was to promptly establish communication by field wire, from guns to observation station.

On April 2nd the whole division took part in a tactical march of about 8 miles over the reservation. Division Headquarters were established on Grierson Hill, and wireless communication was maintained from various points.

Further replacements were assigned to the regiment from time to time, individually and in small groups; and on April 4, 1918, a considerable number came from Camp Travis, Texas. An excellent lot of soldiers, too, they proved to be. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the pistol practice which shortly thereafter came into our routine schedule of instruction turned up some most excellent shots from among them.

On April 3rd, Major Koehler, "Master of the Sword" at West Point and the winner of world championship awards as an all-around athlete, came to Camp Doniphan and spent ten days in instruction in calisthenics in mass formations.

On Jan. 5, 1918, the Division Officers' Training School, (commonly known as the 3rd Training Camp, in sequence with those established by the War Department in various parts of the country in May and August, respectively, 1917) had been started. Candidates for commissions were selected from the enlisted personnel of the division, not more than 1.7 per cent of the enlisted strength of any organization being chosen. About 30 men were sent from the 129th F. A. to the school, which lasted three months.\* At its close on March 31st a substantial number of its 51 newly commissioned artillery graduates were assigned to the 129th, among them the man with the highest grade in the

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\*See Appendix F. The artillery branch of the school was in charge of Captain J. Andre Foulhoux, later a member of the 129th F. A.

school, Keith Dancy, who later became captain of A Battery.

The encouragement given by the War Department to the men to apportion a part of their monthly pay to the purchase of "Liberty Bonds" and War Risk Insurance was reflected in the fact that for the Second Liberty Loan in November, 1917, there were in the 35th Division 8,497 subscribers to a total of \$1,029,375; and on February 12, 1918, insurance had been issued in the division to 23,951 men, in a total amount of \$230,470,500, or an average of over \$9,622.00 per man, in a total of 24,098 men then in the division.

The general health of the regiment at Camp Doniphan was good, except that for a time during the winter there was an epidemic of measles. For the most part the cases were not especially serious; but they involved not only the removal of the patient to the Camp Hospital, but generally also the sending of all his tent-mates to the Quarantine Camp until possibility of contagion was past. About the same time there was a threat of a similar epidemic of diphtheria, but the cases were not so numerous and were soon controlled.† The regiment was relatively free from pneumonia, of which the records show there was some in the division.

The men generally were able to keep warm and dry. Early in the spring, however, pursuant to one of those orders from above which seemed to have no foundation in reason or experience, the warm, effective "slickers" theretofore issued to and worn by the men, and which were in truth and in fact rain-proof, were turned in. In exchange the men were issued so-called rain-coats which were too short to cover the knees, and which did not effectively exclude the moisture in any part of them in a hard rain. Why, when they once had them, they were not permitted to retain the first issue, even though a new supply may have been impossible, was hard to understand.

A feature of the spring work was pistol practice. A target range was established over against the hillside northwest of Division Headquarters, near Heyl's Hill. Each man was equipped with a 45 calibre Colt's automatic pistol, and each man's scores were carefully recorded. The benefit of the drill given in the care and use of these pistols, however,

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†See Appendix E.

was neutralized by the fact that in France, shortly before the regiment's movement to the front, they were all taken up, and Colt's revolvers issued in their place.

As the rumors of approaching movement grew more definite, everyone became busy in preparation. Organization officers and supply sergeants worked to the utmost to see that every man was equipped to the last button; a feat which became possible through the efficient and business-like efforts of Captain Jobes, and the officers and men under him in the Supply Company.

The packing of equipment and materiel of every sort, boxing, painting, labeling, the fitting and exchanging of clothing, the constant checking and inspecting, the shifting of scheduled requirements, while all the time keeping up the daily drills and firing practice, combined to make the last days in Doniphan busy ones.

General Wright, Division Commander, left on April 6th for Camp Mills, followed by the infantry and engineers of the division. Every few days we would see long lines of troops marching under full pack across the prairie to the switch tracks in the center of the Horseshoe, where the waiting trains took them away, until at last only the Artillery Brigade was left. That this involved something more than a sentimental interest soon became apparent, when orders came out each day assigning the duty of policing and guarding the evacuated camps to the remaining troops, namely, the artillery. The effect was that whole batteries at a time were given over to such duties, and to work at the Quartermaster's warehouse. Without going into any detailed comparisons it is no more than due the 110th Engineers to say that by common consent their camp was voted as having been left in the best condition.

At last our turn came. The horses were all turned in to the Remount Station, after they had first been picked over by certain incoming regiments which were to occupy our camps. Travel rations were drawn, and final inspections made. On the morning of May 10th the band played "Over There" for the last time in Camp Doniphan and the regiment moved eastward in three sections. In the first section were Headquarters and Staff (under Col. Klemm, who had rejoined the regiment some weeks before), Head-



quarters Company, Supply Company, and A Battery; in the second section were Batteries B, C and D; and in the third section, Batteries E and F, together with Brigade Headquarters and Staff and its Detachment. A part of the Medical Detachment was with each section.

But through all the experiences we since have had, the changing scenes, the interesting travel, the hardships and dangers, the weariness and the monotony; and in spite of coming back to all the selfishness and sordidness and commonplaceness of life, of which we seem to see so much around us, and (to speak truly) in ourselves, still we can look back with satisfaction to, and be glad of, the life at Doniphan; where notwithstanding the strenuousness of training, the denial of the conveniences and the restraints on the freedom of our accustomed life, the cold of winter in our canvas tents, the wind and dust and discomforts all the time; yet we were filled, as never before and perhaps seldom if ever will be again, with the enthusiasm and glow of spirit which come from having a common purpose of high idealism, patriotism and the spirit of service; when all looked keenly forward to doing something for the world, our country and our lives, worth the while; for the doing of which each had sacrificed much and was willing to sacrifice much more; when the haunting, appealing strains of "Over There" (whatever its technical musical merit or the crudity of its words, and in spite of its torturing significance in our own regiment as an accompaniment of reveille) did in fact, in a wonderfully true way, express the spirit of the army; with a job to do—over there; waiting for us—over there; we were coming, the Yanks were coming—have a care! And it is a satisfaction to us all, and will be always, that we went; that we were part of an army and of a regiment that were "over there"; that with the job to do, the biggest of its kind in the history of civilization, that army of Americans did its work; it made good, as courageous, fair fighters and as representatives of American standards and ideals, and by the side of other men of other nations who for the moment represented our civilization and those ideals, carried it through; and that on the issue which we went to meet, "we didn't come back till 'twas over, over there."

## CHAPTER III.

### "ON THE WAY."

The route eastward did not go through Kansas City, where the majority of the regiment lived, but instead followed the line of the St. L. & S. F. Ry. to St. Louis. (The St. Louis regiment, the 128th, was routed through Kansas City.) At St. Louis great crowds greeted us at the station, and those whose homes were there had an opportunity for a good-bye, notwithstanding the handicap of a pouring rain. Moving on, after several hours, through Buffalo and Wilkes-Barre to Jersey City, we went by ferry and the Brooklyn docks and by rail to Camp Mills, on Long Island, near Garden City and Hempstead, where we arrived late in the afternoon of May 14, 1918. Camp Mills at this time was made up of pyramidal tents, laid out along unpaved streets. Recent rains had left mud and standing water, not only in the streets, but under some of the tents. The stay there, while not lengthy, was a pleasing variation from our previous life. Occasional permits to go to New York twenty miles distant, or to Garden City, Hempstead or Jamaica, accessible by trolley or jitney, were issued to the men. Even the military duties were a change, such as guard duty at the Pennsylvania Station in New York, and the like, for which details were frequent. Not so agreeable were the occasional details for road work in the camp.

Upon their arrival at Camp Mills our men were all wearing the uncomfortable and detested chin-straps under their campaign hats. This aroused critical comment from the members of some other divisions who happened to be there at the time, who dubbed our men the "chin-strap division" and threatened to "make them take 'em off." Forgetting their personal dislike for the straps, our men thenceforth while in camp were punctilious in wearing them, hoping something might happen, but were disappointed. All remained quiet.

After a very few days E Battery, under Captain Salisbury, was ordered to embark on the S. S. "Saxon."

They sailed on May 18th, 1918, landing at Liverpool on May 30th, whence they went first to Romsey for four days,



Old Mill between  
Brain and  
Andard.

and thence via Southampton across the Channel to l'Havre. Here they met the rest of the regiment, but their orders for movement were issued separately, and they proceeded in advance of the others to Angers. For four days they there occupied the Artillery Barracks in that city, from which they finally moved to billets in the regimental area east of Angers.

The rest of the regiment, except Battery F, sailed on the S. S. "Saxonia," May 20, 1918, via Halifax Harbor, arrived at Tilbury Docks, London, June 4th, and landed the next morning, entraining at once for Winchester. After two

days at Windel Downs, they proceeded to Southampton, and from there by boat, the "Viper," across the English Channel to l'Havre; where two days were spent at "Rest Camp No. 2." Leaving there the evening of June



Supply Co. Billet, Brain.

9th, they came late at night on June 11th to Angers, where the various organizations were distributed through the nearby villages. Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and Supply Company (and later Battery F) were at Brain-sur-

l'Authion, Batteries A, B

and C at Andard, D at Cremiere d'Argent (a cross-roads about a mile distant from Brain), and E between D Battery and Andard.

Battery F, the last of the regiment to leave Camp Mills, embarked on May 26th, 1918, on the S. S. "Khiva," a British boat of the P. & O. line, and sailed early next morning, all troops being required to remain below and out of sight till the harbor was cleared. The other troops on board were the 110th Supply Train, the 103d Supply Train, and some casuals. The crew of East Indians, and the dining-saloon stewards of Portuguese-East Indian half-castes, interested and amused the men very much.

On leaving New York each man was furnished with post-cards with the printed statement, "The ship on which I sailed has arrived safely overseas," which he might sign and address to whom he pleased. These were taken up and held in New York till the safe arrival of the boat was cabled back, and then were released for mailing.

The daily life on ship-board was as normal as could be expected. The men were quartered in large compartments under deck, with hammocks for bunks. Boat-drills, guard duty, and somewhat gyroscopic calisthenics on deck, in a sea which was sometimes not the smoothest, made up the routine. We were well out on the Atlantic before we could thoroughly shake off the feeling engendered by seven months at Camp Doniphan, that the next moment would bring up a storm of wind and dust.

A goodly number of the men were seasick; and after landing, some men on one of the other ships in the convoy told us that from their observation they considered the Khiva as the "rolliest" boat in the lot. The Khiva was one of a dozen or more troop ships convoyed by six or seven torpedo boat destroyers.

No submarines were seen, but the story went around that during one night there had been an alarm, in consequence of which our fleet had turned and run north at full speed for several hours. At any rate, we encountered fog and rain and cold; and had turned and been running southward for some time when in the early hours of June 7th (very early, for dawn began by 3 o'clock a. m.) the lights on the Hebrides Islands, on the northwest coast of Scotland, were sighted. From this it appears that our "farthest north" must have been not far from the same latitude as that of Cape Farewell, Greenland.

During the day the green hills of Ireland came into view, and the rugged coast of Scotland. Soon a big balloon came out and floated about us, watching for submarines, the possibilities of which were impressed upon us by the sight on our right as we passed, of a ship's masts protruding above the surface of the channel where she had sunk.

It was nearly 11 p. m., but still daylight, when the Khiva drew into dock. The men crowded on deck to see what could be seen of the new world they were entering and missed nothing of interest. To them, accustomed to the big trans-continental freight cars of America, not the least interesting objects were the little "wagons" standing on the tracks at the Liverpool dock.

Next day after lunch Battery F disembarked and marched to the train waiting for them. As they entered the yards and were assigned to cars, each man was handed an envelope inscribed, "A message to you from His Majesty King George Vth." Inside of each was the lithographed reproduction of an autograph letter from the King of England, extending a welcome on behalf of the people of the British Isles, and expressing their good will and good wishes.

Passing through England, the long daylight gave much opportunity for observation. All were impressed with its orderly neatness and well-kept beauty. All along the line, too, the troops received the cordial greetings of the inhabitants, with flags, waving handkerchiefs and smiling faces. No stop was made until arrival at Winchester about 3 a. m., when all unloaded and marched for an hour to camp at Windel Downs. Here fairly comfortable quarters were found, and a much appreciated sleep till nearly noon, June 9th.

On Monday noon, June 10th, 1918, Battery F marched back to Winchester, thence moved by train to Southampton, and embarked on the "King Edward." This was a fast, turbine-driven day excursion boat. No staterooms, no place to sleep or lie down, save on the floor of the deck; even the stairways were covered with sleeping men. A choice spot was up against one of the smoke stacks, for the night was chilly. A quick, safe run was made through a long lane of watchful warships of varying sizes and characters, but all giving a comfortable feeling of security.

Four days and a half were spent in camp near l'Havre. An officer one day met in the city a cotton merchant who spoke English, and who gave an interesting insight into the French point of view at the time. Taking his guest over to the Bourse to get the latest bulletins, which were then telling of the terrific German drive toward Amiens, he spoke of the daily arrival of American troops, and said that he had



Angers.

written to the authorities urging more of formal and elaborate welcomes with bands, flags, etc., as an expression of French appreciation of our friendship and co-operation. But in a deeply serious voice, he added, "I hope you will tell your men that we do appreciate their coming and want to welcome them; but tell them, if we do not seem to show all we feel, that at this time the French people are very, very anxious." His message was duly repeated to our men at their next formation.

Leaving l'Havre and traveling via Rouen and Le Mans, Battery F finally caught up with the regiment at Angers and was billeted in the village of Brain, on the Authion, a small stream running into the River Loire, and which constituted the village laundry.

## CHAPTER IV.

### "PREPARE FOR ACTION."

The villages where we were now quartered were well kept and the people friendly. Quotations from letters written from here at that time will show the impressions as then received better than they can be now reproduced in other form:

"There, and here, and everywhere, we find a most cordial and friendly attitude toward us by the French. And seeing them thus, away from Paris (which, I think, does not reflect the real France)



Rue de la Mairie, Brain.

one gets a most agreeable impression of the French people and character. They are warm-hearted, industrious, hard-working, substantial and self-respecting. At this time they are doubtless feeling the anxiety naturally to be expected when the enemy is thundering so vigorously at their gates; but they are self-contained, calm, and confident, as nearly as I can judge. Even if Paris should fall, which they do not expect, they would still fight on.

"We can see, even back here in western France, signs of the war in such things as German prisoners, hospitals for the wounded, orphan asylums, and the always prevalent uniforms. And the black dresses! The women of France have my profound respect. The signs of mourning are everywhere, in the sombre garb of the women; but on their faces not a sign of anything but courage, patience, and a steadiness of purpose which accounts well for the fine work of the men at the front. The spirit of France, as I interpret it from my brief observation, is steadfast.

"France in June! Think of quaint, clean-looking villages, with roses, daisies and other flowers in every nook and corner! (As one of the men said, "They grow flowers in their alleys instead of tin cans.") Wheat and rye fields nodding, almost ready for harvest, brightly spangled with the ever-present red poppies. Mustard fields and truck gardens, all cultivated and cared for so that hardly a weed can be found; each farmhouse with its stone-curbed well, and usually an open, stone-paved little pond, or reservoir, furnishing water for washing, and general domestic uses.

"This country is not so thickly wooded, nor with such large trees, as some of the more strikingly picturesque country farther east, but is more like a highly and closely cultivated Missouri or eastern Kansas. North of Paris was some wonderful country, with high straight trees, abrupt hills and valleys, park-like places which in the old days would have been vast estates of the nobility, and now have lost none of their own nobility with the political changes in their ownership. Meadows there seemed to predominate over grain fields, as though



Well-Sweep  
Near Andard.

live-stock rather than cereals were their dependence. And such meadows! One could almost envy Nebuchadnezzar if he had a chance to browse in them. Instinctively we were thrilled anew with a feeling of determination that the Hun should not lay his destroying hand upon them.

"Nothing is modern here, however, as we regard living at home. Water is brought in in a pitcher; and my bath is a choice between a small folding rubber tub which I carry in my baggage and a clear but somewhat cold stream (L'Authion) which runs past the village, the bathing pool being downstream about three-fourths of a mile. We can, if we wish, go into a little cafe here and order eggs and coffee (or stronger drink); but to avoid danger of so many men thus coming into the village *en masse* making too great inroads on the local supply of meats and bread, orders

restrict our purchases to poultry and dairy products, which are fairly plentiful. Cheese is pretty good here, and eggs are fresh. '*Deux oeufs, sur-la-plat,*' and a single slice of '*pain*' costs two francs.

"The people continue to be kindness and cordiality itself. There



The Authion River, Brain.

is a resiliency and buoyancy in them which is the basis, I think, for what has been mistakenly assumed to be frivolity. Coming out from the city to our village in a street car, filled with working-folk and the average people such as would be coming out to the suburban villages on a Saturday evening, they chattered pleasantly and cheerfully. One woman stuck her head out of the window and called excitedly to some passing old lady in a way which would attract

attention at home, but it seemed normal enough here. When some equally light-hearted American soldiers on board amused themselves throwing coppers out to the youngsters on the street, they bubbled and laughed and commented, '*Americans—reech.*' I assured them that it was more likely a case of too much '*vin,*' at which they laughed some more. A passing hay-wagon (and, by the way, they can pile a good big two-horse load on one of their little two-wheeled, one-horse carts) came too close to our car, and as it scraped along the open window, hay and hay-seed were sprinkled thickly over everyone's clothing and



hair. Did they grumble and growl? They did not. A shriek of laughter, not only from the more fortunately situated passengers across the aisle, but from the victims also, mostly women and girls, instead. But you could see in their faces, all the time, that they were hard-working, self-respecting, self-controlled, and industrious people; who, in spite of their hard lives and the hardness of the times, and the griefs and anxieties many of them were suffering, could be depended upon to 'carry on,' and not be moping and feeling sorry for themselves, either. They have the lightness of spirit of the Irish, without the tendency to morbidness so likely to be found in the background of the Irish character.

"There is an old church here, with a clock in the tower which strikes the hours and the half hours. Each time, too, when it strikes the hour, it repeats it in five minutes. No chance to say you didn't hear the clock strike. The church is, of course, Roman Catholic. France seems to be very solidly and devotedly of this faith, out in the provinces, so far as my rather limited observation can tell. They had a big special service the other day in memory of the soldiers, French and American, who had lost their lives in the war. A black muslin panel about 18 inches wide stretched all around the walls of the



Brain sur l'Authion.

church about 10 feet above the floor, with the names of various battles in white letters (presumably those in which the soldiers from here took part), La Marne, Ypres, La Somme, Reims, Verdun, and others. Flags and other decorations abounded, and a big banner over the altar in French, 'To the memory of French and American dead for their country.'


"I was interested and touched by an incident on the 4th of July. All France (as

well as the other Allied countries) celebrated the day. Across the doorway of the old church, which is the center of and biggest thing in the village, was hung a big red banner, with the simple words in large white letters, 'God bless America.'

"On the Fourth we celebrated by having a big field day on the grounds of a big old chateau, which is beautifully set in an opening within a big grove. Races, tugs-of-war, and other athletic events, and a baseball game (which F Battery won), with lunch and supper on the grass, constituted the day.

"Rural France is charming, and still simple enough to be natural. It's fun to see the little 'kids' take to the soldiers. They are quick to pick up English words and American ways. They all salute; and I saw a youngster of about seven or eight years go through a very good drill in facings, attention, salute, parade rest, etc. Most of the children wear wooden shoes, and the long smock-frock or apron, for work or play, which covers their clothes.

"We have discarded our campaign hats. All overseas men and officers, when not at the front (where they wear the steel helmet) wear a soft little vizorless cap, which looks very natty and feels very comfortable, save that it furnishes no shade to the eyes nor protection from rain.



## MAP NO. 2

### NORTHWESTERN FRANCE.

Brain-sur-l'Authion is a suburb on the east of Angers. Courcemont and Beaufoy are north of Le Mans. Camp Coetquidan shown west of Rennes.

"A custom which is usual in the army is also becoming frequent in other things, such as railroad time-tables, movie-picture notices, and the like—that is, the use of the twenty-four hour schedule. For instance, 1 o'clock p. m. is 13 o'clock; 4:30 p. m. is 16:30 o'clock, etc. It works well, when you get used to it.

"Our band, which is located in a chateau near our village, comes over two or three times a week and gives us a concert after supper, much to the pleasure of the natives.

"One of the biggest tasks I have is that of censoring the men's mail. With 175 men in the battery, if they average two letters a week apiece, and it takes an average of three minutes apiece to open, read, endorse, re-insert, seal, and endorse the envelope (fast work to do it in three minutes), how many hours a week does it take? I cleared up a bunch at nearly mid-night last night, and then began this letter, which I am continuing today. Meantime today 120 letters have been turned in for censoring."

As we look back and compare the conditions as we thus found them in Western France on our arrival, with the desolation and destruction at the front, and the dreariness, untidiness and general air of neglect which existed in the half-abandoned country and villages just back of the lines, we realize better what the German invasion meant, not only directly in the destruction of material things, but indirectly in the crushing of those more intangible but highly essential elements of existence which give grace, and beauty, and hopeful energy, and ambition, and the joy of life to human relationships; that the France we saw close behind the lines was not the normal France; that it was rather the worn, hungry, neglected, distracted France; lacking the benign, softening and brightening influences of schools, and churches, and happy homes, of busy farmers and bounteous crops, of active town and village life and well distributed prosperity from which kindly friendliness and a hopeful, happy, generous view of life spring.

Shortly after the regiment's arrival at the Angers area, it received its first issue of ordnance, the French 75 mm. guns and equipment, and some horses. The daily program was consequently a busy one. In the morning, drill of the battery; in the afternoon more drills, schools for officers and non-commissioned officers and special details; and in the evening more schools, and study.

A prevalent pastime in that part of France was a peculiar form of bowling, in wide, slightly concave alleys; with weighted, iron-bound balls, about the size of and resembling slightly flattened croquet balls. The objective was to

bring the balls to rest in position as near as possible to a master ball, first rolled; and the scoring was somewhat similar to that in pitching horseshoes. Not only was the game played out-doors, but nearly every village had its long, low, concrete-floored building for the purpose; and these furnished excellent billets for some of our men, albeit the floors were somewhat hard as bedding. Others of the men occupied vacant houses, or farm buildings.

On July 7th the regiment began moving from the Angers district to Camp Coetquidan, close to Guer in Brit-

tany, a few miles southwest of Rennes. This was a large permanent camp having a capacity sufficient for at least two brigades of artillery. The administrative buildings were of stone, and the long billets were of frame. Here we entered upon our final training before going to the



"F" Battery Billet in Brain.

front. Every officer was attached to one or more of the special schools there maintained, such as those in orientation, materiel, telephone, radio, etc. In addition all officers had daily class work in the intricacies of firing data, which the French artillerists had developed to a fine art, and half of each day was devoted to actual field work with the firing batteries. The military reservation was a large one, and even included some abandoned villages, and wind-mills and farms, woods and quarries; all of which furnished a great variety of targets for practice firing under conditions closely resembling those at the front; winding up near the close of the training period with a brigade problem in which the whole 60th F. A. Brigade, the 128th, 129th and 130th F. A., took part in an assumed attack, with heavy barrages of various sorts.

Our men took to the work readily, and with such intelligence and interest that when a few weeks later they



Interior of Billet, Camp Coetquidan.

were at the front they found themselves able to operate their French guns with a facility and efficiency (true of our



Camp Coetquidan.

American artillery generally) which bore high tribute to the native ability and enthusiastic zeal of our soldiers, as well as the unquestionable effectiveness, technically and mechanically, of the French artillery system and materiel. Our enthusiasm was given

fresh fuel while in this camp by the daily despatches telling of the brilliant work of the American divisions at Chateau Thierry, Belleau Woods and around Soissons.

A less enjoyable incident to the training was one required by brigade orders—that of wearing the gas mask at least one hour every day. An A. E. F. gas officer with supplies and equipment was stationed in camp; and while we were there, every officer and man in the regiment was re-

quired to go through the "Gas House" as a test of his mask. All men needing new masks were refitted; and horse respirators, and oil gloves for use in handling gas-tainted material, were issued.

While at Camp Coetquidan a considerable reshuffling of the officers was made. Captain Thacher of D Battery was assigned to his old position as Adjutant of the 1st Battalion; Captain Sermon became Regimental Personnel Officer; Captain Truman (promoted from First Lieutenant in April), who had been Adjutant 2nd Battalion, assumed command of D Battery; Lieutenant Dancy was promoted to Captain and assigned to command A Battery; Captain Fouilhoux (who, as his name indicates, was of French birth, and in his youth had been trained as a French artillery officer, but who had long been an American, and had been with the 129th since Doniphan days) became Operations Officer; Captain Paterson became Adjutant 2nd Battalion, and the line lieutenants were so rearranged that very few remained with their former batteries.

Early in August orders were received for the detail from the brigade of a considerable number of officers to return to the United States to help officer the new divisions being organized. From the 129th F. A. the following were selected: Captain F. L. D. Carr, 1st Lieutenant Eugene T. Rainey, 1st Lieutenant John A. Hatfield, 1st Lieutenant Lawrence J. Baldwin, 1st Lieutenant Winfield D. Jones, 2nd Lieutenant Francis M. Fenner, 2nd Lieutenant Percy B. McCoy, 2nd Lieutenant Wilkie M. Miller, 2nd Lieutenant Valentine J. Brown, 2nd Lieutenant Arthur W. Wilson.

These officers left for Brest, homeward bound, with general regret on their part, on the same day that the regiment left Camp Coetquidan for Eastern France. On arrival in the United States they were each promoted one grade and scattered to various assignments for their new duties.

The weather at that season and in that locality was for the most part very agreeable; with comfortable days, cool nights, and rather frequent but light showers, which did not interfere with the work. The country was more rolling than around Angers, but not rough; picturesque, old, and evidently little affected by the changes in the world.

The maps showed old roads between hedges; and com-

ing to them you might find the roads worn and washed so deep that they had been abandoned, and a new track used outside the hedges. The hedges themselves, which lined the roads and the different fields, were interspersed with trees at more or less regular intervals, many of them very old. Evidently the fields and roads were just as they had been laid out many years and perhaps centuries ago. At one cross-road was the ruin of a country chapel, now long abandoned, with the doors grated. Inside, the altar, broken and worn, still showed a few battered images of the saints, one apparently of the Virgin, and another which was probably of St. John, as the chapel appeared on the map as St. Jean Chappelle. The churchyard was overgrown with underbrush, and an old stone cross, defaced of all inscriptions, marked the burial space. The church, built of the flat, slaty rock common thereabout, had walls two feet thick, though the whole interior was only about 20 by 30. One could imagine some old nobleman in the centuries past, owning most of the land thereabout, as he rode by on a hunting trip, or in showing some visiting grandee his estate, stopping at this little wayside chapel to ease his conscience by formal performance of his religious duties, before going back to levy a little higher tax or to abuse some unfortunate tenant. But now the quiet, the rural aspect, the hedges and winding roads, or trails, the distant chateaux and occasional windmills, the escape from the routine, formality and gregariousness of camp, was a delight.

Many German prisoners were to be seen, even at this distance from the front. They were used for miscellaneous work about the camp and appeared to be well treated and well cared for, and passively cheerful.

On August 17th and 18th, 1918 (per G. O. 7, Hq. 60th F. A. Brig.), the regiment moved out in eight sections, a battery to a section, about an hour apart. The trains were loaded at Guer. To properly load guns, caissons, fourgons, chariots-du-parc and rolling kitchens, extra rations, barracks-bags, battery records, fire-control instruments, etc., and horses, harness, hay and feed, horseshoeing and saddlers' outfits, mechanics' tools, extra supplies of various sorts, and all that goes to make up the equipment of an artillery regiment, for a trip of indefinite length in time

and distance, on a troop train, was a task which looked formidable; but it was accomplished by each battery in turn in about an hour.\* The men traveled in box cars, of the same sort used for the horses, though nominally a bit cleaner, perhaps. "40 Hommes, 8 Chevaux," with variations in the relative figures, became a familiar legend, not only on the trains, but everywhere in the villages where troops were billeted, on houses, stables, and combinations of the two.

Moving eastward, the regiment passed south of Paris, in sight of the Eiffel Tower; then southeastwardly through Epernay and Epinal, and detrained at Saulxures, a picturesque village or town in the French Vosges. Most of the sections arrived at night, on August 19th-20th, 1918.

The horses were unloaded and watered in the stream, beside the bridge leading from the station into town; then hitched to their carriages, which were hauled to their respective parking places.

It was the regiment's first experience near the front, a fact that was brought home by orders to park the guns and wagons along the sides of the tree-lined roads leading into town, where they would be less likely to attract the attention of hostile aeroplanes.

This was one of the places of stoppage to which we look back with pleasure. It nestled among the mountains, or the beginnings of the mountains, on the banks of the Moselotte, and was clean, prosperous and attractive. Near the eastern end of the long main street was a large public fountain, with a big trough, rectangular and divided into compartments, in which, respectively, horses were watered, laundry done, and water drawn. Farther down was the substantial spired church, with its adjoining cemetery, and across from it the Mairie or City Hall, where our regiment had its headquarters. Pretty good stores, not large, but with a fair supply of necessities and reasonable luxuries, were to be found; and a hotel where a most creditable and appetizing meal could be had. The river wandered through the little meadows which skirted the village; and a factory, which was apparently one of the sources of its

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\*The R. T. O. at Guer officially advised D Battery that its time of loading, 48 minutes, was the best record time up to that date.



prosperity, obtained water-power from this stream. The men were billeted in hay-lofts, in frame barracks, in vacant store-rooms, and the like, which were reasonably clean and comfortable; and though not so elegant as the officers' quarters (which were in private houses) were for the most part a pleasant remembrance compared with some of their later experiences.

At dawn after our arrival came another experience which emphasized the fact that we were "au front." Away off over the hills to the east, perhaps five or six miles away,



Saulxures, Vosges.

though they looked much closer, we saw first a puff of white smoke high in air; then another, and another, till twenty-five or thirty were floating at once lightly and gracefully in the lazy zephyrs of the sky. Then we saw that an aeroplane was the cause of it all; and these were the smoke of anti-air-craft shrapnel fired at it as it passed over the Allied lines. Without consciously noting each of the bursts the observer was suddenly aware of their presence in increasing number, like huge birds, or like an ever-increasing flock of the aeroplanes themselves. Such sights became common enough later, on every front, but they never ceased to attract interest.

The town's main street rambled from east to west in a somewhat irregular parallel to the river, the intervening space, back of the line of houses, consisting of small green meadows; while on the other side, across the river, as well as above the village on this side, were the heavily wooded and increasingly abrupt ridges of the Vosges Mountains, here beginning to assume a size suggestive of their character as foot-hills of the Alps.

Here the men bade farewell to their barracks-bags, those big blue denim sacks with draw-strings of cotton rope, which were the carriers of all their extra clothing and of such personal articles as they could squeeze into them. Though often warned when leaving Camp Doniphan and on later moves, that their bags might never be seen again, our men could not help observing the fatalistic certainty with which the bags turned up when opportunity arose to load or unload a train or transport. Now when about to go to the actual front, and all surplus baggage must perforce be abandoned, they were not sorry they had these bags in which to store their belongings. But for the most part they never saw their barracks-bags again, nor their contents.



**Street in Kruth.**

## CHAPTER V.

### IN ALSACE.

On August 23, 1918, at 9 p. m. the regiment moved out to the eastward in this order: Headquarters Company, Batteries A, B, C, D, E and F, Supply Company; with ten minute intervals. The route lay through Cornimont and Ventron, and thence by a long, hard pull (over a good road, however) to the summit which was the dividing line between France proper and Alsace; thence downward again, arriving in the early morning at the village of Kruth.

In the eleven kilometers (about six and one-half miles horizontal distance) from Saulxures (elevation 1,364 feet) to the top of the divide (elevation 2,902 feet) the ascent was 1,538 feet; while in the four kilometers (about two and one-half miles) from the top of the divide to Kruth (elevation 1,640 feet), the descent was 1,262 feet.



Camouflaged Tent in Kruth.

At Kruth the carriages were parked in a meadow along the side of a stream, partially protected from observation by a thin grove of trees, and aided by a camouflage of underbrush and branches cut from the other side of the stream. Horses and men were camped wherever favorable loca-

tions could be found for them in the village. Regimental Headquarters was located in the Mairie, the floors of which furnished convenient sleeping accommodations for officers and men of the Headquarters Staff.

It was necessary to be cautious of speech here; for it was within what had been German territory since 1870, and there were many German sympathizers in the somewhat mixed population.



Kruth, Vosges.

On August 24th (pursuant to F. O. No. 1, Hq. 129th F. A., Aug. 22, 1918) one platoon each of Batteries E and F at 10 p. m. and of Battery B at midnight (followed the next night by their second platoons) moved up the winding mountain roads, to forward positions in the Gerardmer Sector, in relief of French batteries theretofore occupying them, as follows: B Battery at 8227, Munster C Map (elevation 3,345 feet); E Battery at Auf Rain, 7501 (elevation 3,837 feet); F Battery near Tete du Chein 9841, Guebwiller Map (elevation 3,870 feet). Batteries A, C and D moved up in similar manner to new positions as follows: Battery C at approximately co-ordinates 7037 (elevation 1,968 feet), in the Mittlach Valley, just south of the village of that name, in an abandoned French position; A Battery at about 6228 (elevation 2,952 feet) farther up on Mt. Herrenberg and back of C; and D battery still farther up, at 5122 (elevation 3,870 feet).

Regimental P. C. (with 70th Infantry P. C.) was located at Payrou, 7988 (elevation 4,133 feet); 1st Battalion P. C. at Gibrat, 9841 (elevation 2,230 feet); and 2nd Battalion P. C. at Larchey, 8774 (elevation 3,850 feet).

These places, though dignified with formal names, were merely huts or dugouts in the woods on the hill-sides. Being recognized and known points in the local military terminology, they were used by such organizations as successively occupied the sector. This usage was common to all fronts; and many names familiar in orders and reports, and even in accounts of movements or actions of considerable moment, were merely those of temporary P. C.'s or groups of dug-outs or camouflaged cabins.



Dressing Station of 137th Amb. Co. near P. C. of 2nd B'n, 129th F. A. at Larchey, Alsace. Note French Alsatian soldiers with the Americans.

The forward supply and ammunition officer, with other staff officers, was quartered in a little group of huts known as Boussat, at about 6876 (elevation 4,133), near the high point shown on the map as Breitfurst. This was close to the head (elevation 4,000) of the long cable by which the larger portion of our current supplies was transported up from the valley below. Boussat, with the cable-head below it and the cross-roads beyond at 7682 (near which the 130th F. A. had a battery) was subject to spasmodic shell-fire which did little damage, but gave those present their first impressions of what it was like to be under fire.

The regimental echelon and horse-line remained at Kruth.

A pleasant recollection of one of the rides up the beautiful mountain road from Kruth to Boussat, is of a tiny little log hut by the road-side at the top of a particularly stiff climb, about half way to the summit. While the horses rested, a Red Cross representative served refreshments, hot from a little stove in the hut. A more unexpected service at this out-of-the-way place could not be imagined.

Now for the first time the 60th F. A. Brigade was actually at the fighting front, and supporting the infantry of its own division, which had been occupying the sector for some



137th Amb. Co. carrying wounded over mountain roads in the Vosges.

weeks under command of Major General Peter E. Traub, who came to the 35th Division late in July. A new sense of responsibility was upon its members; a realization that they were at last taking part in the big game. The Gerardmer Sector, as it was officially designated, had a front of between 30 and 35 kilometers, an unusually long front to be covered by a single division. It was what was known as a "quiet sector," inasmuch as the character of the country made operations on a large scale very difficult, and no "drives" or extensive advances were attempted by either side. How-

ever, the ever present gray crosses, in groups large or small, and the large amount of wire entanglements on the open plateau on the mountain top, gave evidence that the French had already experienced, and were ready for more, action of an active sort even there. And at all times there was spasmodic, harassing artillery fire; while our infantry was constantly engaged, in its own way, in patrol work and exchange of fire.

Upon taking their positions our men rapidly made themselves as safe and comfortable as possible. All supplies except what could be slipped up the cable had to be brought up the long, steep and winding mountain roads at night. At first the ration supply was not over abundant, especially at the more advanced positions, but not absolutely lacking; and shortly this situation was met adequately and satisfactorily.

A battalion of the 110th Engineers, under Major Edward M. Stayton, was stationed close to Boussat, and cooperated efficiently with our regiment in furnishing material needed in properly equipping and safe-guarding the various positions.

Anti-gas guards were constantly maintained at all positions, with Klaxon horns and gongs for warnings, and where possible, dug-outs were made gas-proof, all under the immediate direction of the Gas Non-Commissioned Officers of the respective batteries, and with the aid of the battery mechanics.

Particularly efficient work of this sort was done at this time in C Battery, in E Battery and in F Battery. In the other batteries existing conditions did not permit as effective results without considerable labor in the construction of dugouts, work which was under way when the regiment moved.

In this connection it is opportune to speak a word of appreciation of the services rendered at all times by the various battery mechanics. Their work was undramatic in its nature; making repairs here, fitting out a safety appliance there; carpentering, tinkering, black-smithing; adjusting and caring for the gun parts; meeting emergencies of all sorts; like the stable-sergeants and their assistants in the responsibility for the horses, without display they per-



**MAP NO. 3**  
Gerardmer Sector, Vosges. August 24-31, 1918.



formed steadily, faithfully, loyally and efficiently the important duties which contributed to the orderly movement and working efficiency of the army.

On August 26th there was very little enemy activity, while our own batteries confined their firing to fire for adjustment and registration.

On the 27th there was some increase in enemy activity, Batteries B, C and E in particular reporting a harassing fire; that on B from direction north of Stein Berg (approximately 3510, some three miles to the east). That on E Battery seemed to be, in part at least, directed on the main road which ran parallel to its front some hundred and fifty meters distant. On the 28th spasmodic firing continued, and enemy observation balloons were seen.

On the evening of August 29th, beginning at 8 p. m., the brigade put over a special barrage, in which Batteries A, C, D and E of the 129th F. A. took part, while B and F remained on guard of the normal barrage, and to meet any special movements by the Germans. It was cloudy, rainy and very dark, which limited enemy observation of the terrain but not of the gun flashes, and greatly impeded movement of our guns. Battery E fired from its permanent position at Auf Rain. The other batteries, before daylight on the morning of the 29th, had moved to special positions for the occasion, as follows: Battery A at 8301, about 800 meters east of Auf Rain; Battery C at 7796, about 500 meters south and slightly east from Auf Rain; Battery D at 7602, immediately north of Auf Rain, close to E Battery.

Approximately 500 rounds per battery were fired by A, C, D and E, on the following schedule:\*

	Rounds Per Gun	Objective
"H to H plus 3 min.....	25	48-28
H plus 3 min. to H plus 8 min.....	0	Rest
H plus 8 min. to H plus 11 min.....	25	50-12
H plus 11 min. to H plus 14 min.....	0	Rest
H plus 14 min. to H plus 17 min.....	25	50-26
H plus 17 min. to H plus 27 min.....	0	Rest and Cleaning
H plus 27 min. to H plus 30 min.....	25	44-28
H plus 30 min. to H plus 33 min.....	0	Rest
H plus 33 min. to H plus 36 min.....	25	48-28

\*Addendum to F. O. No. 2, Hq. 129th F. A., 28-29 Aug., 1918.

In each period of firing the first eight rounds shall be fired with No. 4 Special Shell, the balance (17 rounds) shall be fired with No. 5 Special Shells."

These targets were a group of carefully protected and troublesome enemy batteries, some behind a peak (Petit Bailon-Kahler Wasen), and some in the woods to the north of it, about seven kilometers easterly from Auf Rain. The "special shells" referred to were gas shells, partly of a persistent nature, which would make the area in which they fell untenable for a substantial period of time.

This barrage was a good illustration of that form of counter-battery fire known as "fire for neutralization"; fire intended to suppress the activities of the enemy without special reference to the actual destruction of his positions (known as "fire for demolition"), or even of his personnel, who might avoid injury by seeking shelter or evacuating the position; but in either case ceasing to function against our own troops.

The barrage put on by our men on this occasion was the liveliest thing which had occurred in that sector in some time, we were given to understand; and we heard later, after we had moved out of the sector, that the Germans attempted a retaliation. Indeed, they did not wait that long; for beginning about 9:30 p. m. the positions of Batteries D and E were subjected to a combined high explosive and gas shell fire; of limited intensity, but continuing during the most of the night, and which fortunately resulted in no casualties. While withdrawing from its temporary firing position after the barrage, D Battery had four horses killed, and on account of the mud it was not possible to move two of the pieces with the horses remaining. Officers and men joined in running one gun back under cover, and the other was camouflaged with branches, and both were left until they could be returned for with sufficient horses the following evening, and safely removed back to the old position.\*

Some slight damage was done to the quarters in the woods adjoining the Auf Rain position. Regimental P. C.

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\*For their cool courage on this occasion Privates John Gordon, William O'Hare and Glenn Woods of "D" Battery were later cited in General Orders. (Citation Orders No. 9, G. H. Q., A. E. F., Aug. 1, 1920.)

at Payrou and 2nd Battalion P. C. at Larchey and Battery F position were also subjected to several gas alarms from a desultory fire of gas and H. E. No casualties were suffered in the 129th, but an officer at the near-by Infantry P. C. at Payrou was wounded. C Battery also was shelled during the early hours of the morning.

The same night, at 1:30 a. m., August 30th, B Battery was called upon, by the infantry, to fire a short barrage (116 rounds) on Le Kiosque, a dome-like knoll or peak which stood out by itself just east of Metzeral, where the opposing lines met closely; and F Battery, one of 150 rounds, on the Hilsen front (northeast of its position), which the 140th Infantry was facing.

In returning to its bivouac in Mittlach Valley during the night, one of A Battery's guns accidentally was overturned, killing one horse and injuring Sergeant Bohrer.


The region in which we spent this last week in August, 1918, was strikingly beautiful and picturesque. Save for the magnificent roads, which, even thus far from the activities of artificial modern life, evidenced the successful efforts of mankind on his constructive side; and the occasional bursting of a hostile shell, the ubiquitous dug-outs, and the defensive camouflage borders on the roadside, vivid reminders of the social chaos resulting from mankind let loose on his destructive side; save for these and a lonesome castle crowning a distant peak, the forest-covered hills were wild and untouched. Stately, straight trees, stretching proudly up to heights unmeasured, would have awakened the envy of our lumber kings; while about their feet, more modestly but abundantly, grew large and luscious raspberries for the grateful taste of the chance traveler.

On the evening of September 1, 1918,\* the 35th Division infantry was relieved by the 6th Division. The artillery at the same time relinquished its responsibility for covering the sector, and the 129th F. A. returned to Kruth, turning its mission over to the French Artillery, whose commanding officer assumed command on that day at 18 hour (6 p. m.). During the night A and C Batteries withdrew over the road Widenbachmur Valley-Huss-Kruth. D Bat-

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\*F. O. No. 3, Hq. 129th F. A.; G. O. No. 649, 33rd Army Corps (French). F. O. 33, 35th Div.





tery withdrew on the night August 31-September 1st, via Huss-Kruth; and one platoon of Battery E the same day. The other platoon of E, and Batteries B and F, withdrew during the day and night of September 1st, Battery F following the road Rauspach-Oderon. All ammunition, position fixtures, defense scheme maps, records of the position, telephone lines, and gas defense material, were ordered to be left in place for the incoming organizations. Caissons were ordered to be re-filled at Kruth.

The week at the front in Alsace was an important and interesting one to the men of the 129th. Important in giving them their first taste of being under fire, of taking precautions against observation, of living in dugouts, of night movements without lights and under other handicaps of wind and weather, of experiencing gas fire, and of handling supplies under difficult conditions; interesting in its initial excitement, in the sense of danger and constant expectancy; and also in the novelty of a new and strikingly impressive scenery. It was still early in the season, but already there were warnings of an early fall at that altitude; and on the night ride down to Kruth, overcoats were not uncomfortable.



Street Corner in Kruth.

## CHAPTER VI.

### DAY AND NIGHT MARCHING—ST. MIHIEL—ON TIME.

Once more united, the regiment stayed in Kruth over the next day and night. On the early morning of September 3rd, 1918, pursuant to Field Order No. 4, Hq. 129th F. A., it moved out of Kruth, up and over its former route by which it had come in over the mountain to the west.

We wore, as per standing orders for marching, our helmets, gas masks (at the alert position on our chests) and side arms. Because of the steep road (an ascent of over 500 feet to the mile), the heavy loads, and the relative shortage of horses, everybody walked except the drivers. Even the individually mounted men, such as officers and chiefs of sections, led their horses, which carried the saddles, saddle bags and blanket rolls, including shelter halves. We crossed the divide and moved down the other side, stopping only about once an hour for a few minutes' rest, and to water the horses in the middle of the day. Mostly neither man nor beast had any food until we reached our final destination in the evening. Passing through Ventron, past Cornimont, we came into Saulxures and would have liked to stop. But orders were to keep moving, and we followed on up the Moselotte Valley; and finally, pretty tired, pretty hungry, and pretty thankful to find the terminus of our scheduled march, we came at dusk to the several billets selected for us in and around the town of Vagney. Headquarters and Supply Companies and Batteries A, B, C and D were billeted in and close to Vagney; E Battery at Zainvillers, a mile to the east; and F Battery at a sawmill southeast of Zainvillers. The people generally treated us very kindly and cordially, as indeed was the case with almost all our hosts, wherever we went. These military guests, whether French or American, were not voluntarily entertained by the people; or at least, if they did not volunteer their quarters, they would be requisitioned. But their hospitality was very seldom wanting and

their spirit was steadfast. In Zainvillers one of us took his boots to a cobbler to have the heel nailed on. He found the cobbler was a substantial peasant woman, who, while she worked and her children of all ages hung about, tried to converse. "La Guerre" was very long, she sighed; but she was sturdy and patient in holding up her end of it. Let us hope that her soldier had no ill luck in the few weeks which remained of the war.

Passing along the roads in this district we could see the progress of the season's harvesting of grain and hay. The workers were old men, women, and little children, some of whom seemed hardly old enough for school; old grandmothers, with curious racks strapped to their backs, the high-reaching arms of which held masses of hay which would apparently be a sufficient load for a horse. It was literally true that the manhood of France was in the army. Only the very old and the crippled were exempt from the army, but not from work. On one occasion in the house where he was billeted, one of our men thought he had found an exception; a well-looking, intelligent man of perhaps forty. Next morning, however, in passing the living room of the house he observed the man adjusting his iron leg, and the secret was out.

On the morning of September 5, 1918, pursuant to Field Order No. 5, Hq. 129th F. A., the regiment left its billets in a pouring rain and entrained for a movement northward. Regimental Headquarters and Staff, 1st Battalion Headquarters and Detail, Batteries A, B, C, and D, the Medical and Veterinary detachments, the Supply Company and Headquarters Company started from Remiremont in five sections; while the 2nd Battalion Headquarters and Detail, and Batteries E and F, went from Saulxures in two sections. The horses were carried on the trip harnessed, and one day's travel rations were issued to the men. The sections moved out at four-hour intervals, the last one being scheduled to start at 4:42 a. m. of September 6th. The experiences of all were similar, save that some detrained at Bayon. 2nd Battalion Headquarters and E Battery's train under Major Gates moved out just before dark. About midnight it stopped somewhere, which proved to be a point near the town of Einveaux, six or seven miles southwest of Luneville. As soon as we unloaded we moved out in dark-



ness, in column, in silence and in the rain, and marched till day. Shortly after daylight we came to the village of Ville-en-Vermois, southwest of St. Nicholas du Port, and southeast of Nancy. We were now within the active area; and from that time on we were always ready to seek cover (from observation) such as a tree or doorway, when we saw an approaching aeroplane, or heard the bugler's warning note, "Ta-taa-ta-taaa!"

Batteries D and F, and Headquarters Company and Supply Company, were halted in the woods, the roads becoming blocked by units of the 5th Division. In the evening they came on up. C and D Batteries billeted in Coyviller, and the rest of the regiment at Ville-en-Vermois.

We were quartered in Ville-en-Vermois from our arrival on Sept. 6th till the 10th. It was a dirty, untidy, unattractive place, in which the barnyard element strongly asserted itself. In even greater degree than usual, the French farmer-villager here indulged his craving to have his belongings all about him; and living rooms, hay-loft, officers' and enlisted men's billets, and horses, all reposed under one roof.

Not all were as frankly social with their live stock as here, however. We had by now seen a good deal of different parts of France, first and last, except the southern portion. Some places were not unlike home except for the generally more intensive cultivation. Few waste spots existed anywhere, except for the area in or immediately back of the combat zone, and save in the more mountainous portions, where there was much natural wild beauty. A certain form of what appeared to be heather, grew profusely; with a reddish blossom which was very effective. Then there was a wild tree with a bright red berry or blossom which added greatly to the brightness of the landscape. The corners of the cross-roads, even when the junction was with little more than a trail, were always marked with sign-posts, making it almost impossible to lose your way. The roads everywhere, whether close to the cities, around the villages, or far up in the mountains, were kept in excellent condition.

Our men were now in fine physical condition, and experienced no bad results from a long hard day or night's march that a good sleep and a good meal would not remedy.

The next four days were our last under roofs for sev-

# DAY AND NIGHT MARCHING—ST. MIHIEL—ON TIME. 69

eral weeks. While here the band packed its instruments and turned them in for safe-keeping, and other equipment was salvaged or re-inforced, as occasion demanded, in contemplation of rapid movement and probable combat.

The following field order, issued on September 10, 1918, is of interest as showing a typical order of march:

"Headquarters, 129th Field Artillery,  
10 September, 1918; 2:00 p. m.  
Ville-en-Vermois.

SECRET  
Field Order  
No. 6

Maps, Nancy, 1/80,000

I. This Regiment will march to woods southeast of TOMBLAINE where they will bivouac.

II. (a) The march will begin on the night of 10-11 September, 1918, at 20 hour.

(b) The route will be ST. NICHOLAS-du-PORT-Sur-MEURTHE.

(c) The Regiment will be under cover by 4 hour, 11 Sept.

III. (a) The order of march will be as follows:

Regimental Headquarters and Detail  
1st Battalion Headquarters and Detail  
Battery A with Combat and Field Train  
Battery B with Combat and Field Train  
Battery C with Combat and Field Train  
2nd Battalion Headquarters and Detail  
Battery D with Combat and Field Train  
Battery E with Combat and Field Train  
Battery F with Combat and Field Train  
Part of Headquarters Company not included in details, Medical Detachment, Veterinary Detachment, and Supply Company.

(b) Battery C and D will leave their billets via MANONCOURT in time to report at the fork of the roads VILLE en VERMOIS-ST. NICHOLAS and MANONCOURT-ST. NICHOLAS at 20 hour 30. They will take their proper place in the column.

(c) The Regimental Orientation Detail and One N. C. O. from each organization will report to these Headquarters at 16:30 hr. and report to 1st Lieut. Crenshaw. This detail will locate the bivouac position and take all necessary measures to insure the safe arrival and conceal bivouac of the Regiment at the position.

(d) One motorcycle orderly and the side car will ride at the head of the column, and one motorcycle orderly will ride at the rear of the column.

IV. (a) The Regimental Surgeon, the Regimental Supply Officer and 2nd Lieut. Carl Parker, V.C., will ride with the detail at the head of the column.

(b) Two Medical men shall be attached to each organization.

V. (a) The Regimental Commander will ride at the head of the column where all urgent messages will be sent.

(b) As soon as an organization arrives at its destination the commander will so report to Regimental Headquarters.

By order of Colonel Klemm

J. A. Fouilhoux

Captain, 129th F. A. Operations Officer."

Pursuant to this order the regiment formed and moved out at dusk. The rainy season had now definitely set in; and from this time on conditions varied from light, short sprinkles to heavy and long-drawn-out downpours, intermingled with periods of evanescent sunshine or moonlight as the case might be.

The column reached its designated camping place in Tomblaine Woods, east of Nancy, at about 4 a. m. Our baggage was cut to the minimum. Each man had his blanket roll and his shelter-half (with folding poles and stakes), carried either like a sausage over his shoulder, or in a pack on his back. Each driver\* and mounted man had a pair of saddle bags, and each cannoneer and unmounted man a haversack and pack carrier, in which were stowed toilet articles, a towel, a change of socks and underwear, mess kit, and an issue of "emergency rations" (usually a can of beef and five or six hard biscuit, with a small amount of coffee and sugar). All the above, with overcoat and rain-coat, gas-mask, canteen of water, steel helmet and revolver, aggregating 60 to 70 pounds, almost half his own weight, constituted the minimum load for each soldier. Each horse, beside his normal harness, carried hung on the bridle a horse anti-gas respirator, and either on the carriage or on his saddle one or two feeds of oats and a grooming kit. As the "irreducible minimum" no soldier objected to such a load, even on the long forced night marches of twenty, thirty, or sometimes even thirty-five or forty kilometers at a stretch; with no midnight lunches, and with broken and often shortened periods of rest and sleep between marches. Not even the cannoneers or alternate drivers, who found the slogan of recruiting days, "Join the artillery and ride," was to be construed in a somewhat Pickwickian sense. Neither did their comrades of the infantry who, while relieved of the revolver and of any part of the horse equipment and had a slightly lighter shelter tent with no poles, made up for it by having a nine pound rifle, bayonet and ammunition. All realized, and cheerfully rose

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\*An artillery "driver" is really a rider. Each gun and caisson carriage is drawn by six horses (three pairs known as the "lead," "swing" and "wheel" pair, respectively). On the near-horse of each pair rides a driver who guides this horse with his left hand, while with his right hand he manipulates the rein of his off-horse. A rather wearying process when extended through an all night march.

to it, that there was an emergency; that they were engaged in one of the big events of history; that for the moment their task was to "get there" in time and in condition to fight the Germans. And they did it.

So it was a little bit annoying, after the Armistice, to hear, as we once did, a Corps Inspector, in private conversation, bemoaning the action of troops of various arms who in the forced marches immediately preceding the big drive had left behind them (though done in an orderly way, under guard or duly salvaged) all articles not absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of the big result, and which the event entirely justified. His attention being called to these facts, that it was more important to "arrive" than to observe the accepted routine of peace-time maneuvers, he replied, "The whole supply system of the army breaks down if the men don't carry that extra pair of shoes." He was a good officer, well trained, conscientious and energetic, of an army family; but his experience with the world of affairs was limited; he had arrived in France after the fighting was over (no doubt to his own great regret), and could not realize that a sense of proportion and of relative values is as important in an emergency as a familiarity with "paper work" or theoretical administration.


Such justification as he may have found in the undeniable fact that some organizations did have temporary difficulty in re-equipping their men with proper shoes (though there was little if any actual hardship or suffering in consequence), so far as that condition was the result of lightening the burdens of the march before the drive, was far outweighed by the fact that they did get to the front on time, and the war was ended with their aid within six weeks; and not a man would have exchanged his experience in being there for a new pair of shoes.

The 129th resumed its march at 19 hour (7 p. m.), September 11th, but had not gone many kilometers till it was halted, to wait for the 130th F. A., which was scheduled to precede it, to pass and clear the road. After a considerable wait, it moved forward, only to stop again and again. Hardly would the movement get well under way, when down the line would come the command, "Ha-a-a-l-t!" And a moment later, "Dismoun-n-t!" With the necessity of each

driver standing by his horses, and the fact of there being nothing to sit on anyway but a muddy road or the rain-soaked weeds and grass beside it, such stops are very trying. Presently, perhaps after what seems an interminable wait, in the far distance forward are heard hopeful sounds, which as they are taken up towards the rear, become distinguishable as the rattling and rumbling of artillery carriages; and above them, at last, from our own commanders, "Moun-n-t!" and "Forwar-r-r-d Mar-r-ch!" The drivers spring to position and "gather" their horses; the foot-soldiers straighten into column; the tired and dozing horses, with a startled shiver, lean into their breast straps, the traces tighten, and the column of carriages rumbles heavily into motion. As often as otherwise this is a "fluke," and after advancing only a few rods, again comes the inevitable "Ha-a-l-t!" and the experience is repeated.

Literally hours were spent at a halt that night, due to obstructions or difficulties ahead that we could tell nothing of. An artillery brigade in column occupied at best three or four miles of road space, and with muddy, slippery, crowded roads the opportunities for delay were manifold. To add to the discomfort of the trip, heavy showers came up through the night; and not the least of the annoyances, as any driver will testify, was the fact that to resume the march after a halt and a dismount in the rain, meant doing so on a wet saddle. And even when riding, the short, skimpy rain-coats which had been substituted at Camp Doniphan for the really effectual "slickers" first issued, were no protection whatever for the knees and thighs. However, our men did no more than their constitutional and legitimate amount of grumbling, such as there was being directed chiefly at the unknown causes of delay toward the front.

So slow was our progress that after six hours we had only advanced three or four miles, and were standing at a halt in the dark, mysterious streets of Nancy, when precisely at 1 a. m. of September 12th the whole front to our north broke out in flame, and a tremendous, continuous and awe-inspiring roar of artillery began; while huge searchlights, interspersed with many-starred signal rockets, shot their shafts like the Northern Lights constantly across



### MAP NO. 5

Concentration Movement of American Divisions for the St. Mihiel Offensive.  
 The Successive Stations of the 35th Division are: Gerardmer—West of Luneville—  
 Southeast of Nancy—Northwest of Nancy.  
 The irregular shaped numbered areas shown in the lower half of the map are  
 training areas.  
 (From Map prepared by G-3, 1st Army.)

the sky. We had heard or seen nothing in our experience like it; and though we had had no warning of it, we realized with a sombre enthusiasm that an event big with importance, in which we might well be called upon to participate, was taking place. As we learned soon after, it was the opening of the St. Mihiel drive, in which the salient which for four years had threatened the heart of France was wiped out—the first of the sharp, fierce attacks in the new offensive plan, which broke the German defenses and German morale, and ended the war.

Moving forward at last, but never freely, daylight found us only a few kilometers beyond Nancy. Turning to the right from the main road near Les 5 Tranchees, we passed for a mile or so over a veritable soup of mud, to our camping place in the Foret de Haye. Here the regiment assumed its character (along with the rest of the 35th Division and the 91st Division) as Army Reserve for the St. Mihiel offensive. The horses were kept harnessed and hitched, caissons and limbers loaded with H. E. normal and shrapnel, all ready for instant movement if needed. At 19 hour (7 p. m.) orders were received to go into action, but were revoked. The troops who started the St. Mihiel drive did so efficient a job that the reserve was not needed; and at the end of the first day our horses were unharnessed, and we remained in bivouac through the 14th and 15th, still ready for an emergency call, and preparing for our next movement.

With the successful reduction of the St. Mihiel salient the Allied command entered actively into preparation for the great combined offensive, of which the St. Mihiel drive was a preliminary first step.

With this new objective now definitely in view, orders for the concentration of troops were quickly determined and issued. It is necessary to have in mind the large number of troops involved, the denseness of the concentration and the comparatively small number of roads for the demands which were to be made upon them to at all appreciate the magnitude of the task, and the necessity for the highest possible degree of co-ordination of all units. The movement of the 60th Field Artillery Brigade and the divisional animal transport (the latter as a separate train), was cov-

## DAY AND NIGHT MARCHING—ST. MIHIEL—ON TIME. 75

ered by F. O. No. 4, Hq. 60th F. A. Brigade, Sept. 15, 1918.\*

Leaving the Foret de Haye soon after sunset of September 15th, in accordance with this order, our march brought us before daylight to a woods near Toul, Regimental Headquarters being at Gondreville.

Who can ever forget the impression of those night marches! We sometimes went as far as 30 or 35 kilometers in a night; which wasn't so bad except when, as so often happened, obstructions or congestion in the road caused those long and tiresome, or frequent, fretful stops and starts. The wondrous fact of all these men over there made a vivid and solemn impression, whether marching in the moonlight, with the long line of horses, limbers, guns, caissons and men stringing out interminably before and behind; or



Sketch by John H. Bell, of C Battery.

in the dark, cloudy, rainy nights, with only vague shadows immediately in front, and vague noises beyond; and in either case the silent, monotonous, steadily forward movement of thousands of men, all alike in outward appearance of round-

\*I. The 60th F. A. Brigade will move by marching as indicated Field Order No. 38, Headquarters 35th Division Sept. 15th, 1918.

II. Order of March. \* \* \*

(Enumerates regiments of brigade.)

All animal transports 35th Division. \* \* \*

III. Lieut. Colonel Fitzpatrick, 110th Ammunition Train, will be in command of animal transports of the division and will assemble the various units in time to take their proper places in column. All truck transportation will assemble at Les 5 Tranchees at 8:45 p. m. The head of the column will leave Les 5 Tranchees at 9:00 p. m.

IV. One billeting officer from each unit will proceed at once to Dommartin les Toul to arrange for billets for the artillery and animals transportation. Captain Lorrel, French Mission, and 2nd Lt. E. R. Jones, 60th F. A. Brig., will be in charge of the billeting for the brigade and for the animals transportation of the division. \* \* \*



topped helmet and army raincoat; all with a common purpose and determination, but each occupied with his own thoughts; silent, spectral, inevitable. Once in a while one will address you; and the contrast, the sharpness of the break, almost startles you. Finally comes a stop, like all the rest at first; but shortly you find that those in front are turning off; that with alternate movements and stops, you come to your turn, and wheel to the side of the road into a mysterious forest. All the carriages are finally gotten in



A typical bivouac in the woods.

and arranged in some rough order; the horses are unhitched and unharnessed and tied to a picket line stretched between trees; a few shelter tents are pitched, but mostly, as it is near morning, the men lie down on the ground, rolled in their blankets, with their "shelter halves" spread under them to keep them off the mud; and the sleep they have been longing for comes quickly.

But it does not last long; or if daylight is breaking, it does not even yet begin. Details must dig necessary ditches; the cooks and their assistants must find fuel and prepare

breakfast; guards must be posted; drivers must clean the horse-collars and bits; water call brings all men not otherwise engaged to the picket line whence the horses are led to water, and on their return are fed. Grooming and the cleaning of materiel may be postponed till later, in which case there is nothing more to do till after breakfast.

During the morning of September 16th, while we were bivouaced near Toul,\* a large detachment of freshly taken German or Austrian prisoners, evidently just captured in the St. Mihiel offensive, were marched past us. They were by far the sorriest appearing bunch of prisoners we had seen; of all ages, ignorant looking and ill kept. For the most part, the prisoners we saw theretofore and thereafter were of a fairly intelligent, well cared for, soldierly type.

That night, September 16th, the regiment made another all night march. About daylight we crossed the upper waters of the Meuse near Ourches and began to ascend a long, winding, up-grade road in the open. As we advanced we passed on our right a series of aeroplane hangars, from which, from time to time, like wild birds waking with the dawn, one aeroplane after another, after a period of preliminary preening and buzzing, would rise and swing lazily about in great circles as if for a morning constitutional. But our men were more interested in the woods outlined against the sky ahead of us, into which, after a long and trying pull, we finally turned, and made camp in the Forêt de Vaucouteurs, between Ourches and Void; only to find, after unhitching and unharnessing, that the nearest watering place for the horses was a mile or more back at the stream we had crossed; so our drivers restrained their sense of weariness yet again, and rode the animals there and back, after which came their own breakfast and welcome sleep.

We remained in that camp all during the day and night and next day, till 7 p. m. (September 18th), when we pulled out on what proved to be one of our longest marches. All night we marched and next morning, without stopping for

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\*While in this camp Captain Spencer Salisbury, who had been absent for several weeks on detached duty, resumed his old command of E Battery, which during our Vosges experiences had been commanded by 1st Lieut. (later Captain) Kenneth Bostian. Captain Salisbury continued in command of the battery during all its further activities at the front.

breakfast, on and on, till 11 a. m. That morning we shared the road with a regiment of French artillery, with huge, long-barrelled guns of large calibre, moving forward in the same direction as ourselves—one more bit of evidence of the big event to which all signs were pointing. These French guns, notwithstanding their size, were horse drawn. Their drivers had a considerable knack of getting the most out of their horses. "Allez! Allez!" in native French accent seemed to be understood by the poor beasts, who "allezed"



Flying Field and Vicinity Near Ourches. Note the small farms and sloping hill sides. The 129th's camp was just beyond where road leaves picture at upper left-hand corner.

with a surprising will and unison. The French finally halted on the roadside for their meagre breakfast, a feature of which was a thick, black, syrupy coffee; not at all appetizing-looking to Americans, but which seemed to hit the French taste. Even with them, however, a little bit went a long way; for each man's portion was served him in a little tin cup of perhaps one-fifth the capacity of our army canteen cup.

We finally stopped at 11 a. m. (September 19th) about a mile east of Nançois-le-Petit, at a place where the road ran along the slope of a hill, with little meadows on each side, above and below, where pup-tents were quickly set up in advance of one of the inevitable showers. When possible to do so, when the marches extended into daylight, our forehanded cooks upon whom rested so much of the responsibility for the maintenance of army morale, would start the fires in their rolling kitchens while still in movement, to facilitate a prompt service of breakfast; a ceremony of more than formal interest after an all-night march with nothing to eat since the evening before.

This camp lasted only till 8 p. m. (September 19th) when we were again on the march. Following the road northwesterly, we were halted about 2 a. m. just north of the village of Loisey, between it and Gery, where we bivouaced; the most of the regiment being on the right of the road, in a damp field which sloped down to a small creek, on the other side of which the picket lines were strung.

During the following day, September 20th, rumors went about that we would billet in the villages, and in fact some quarters were actually assigned. After supper (officers and men ate together in the field) we returned to our quarters and contemplated with satisfaction the prospect of a good night's rest. We were pretty tired, not having rested much or effectively during the day, and most of the men proceeded to retire early. But at about 9 p. m. came orders to get under way at once. So goodbye our hopes! By 9:30 the column was in motion; all night long, on roads which were slippery. That would generally be voted one of our hardest marches. Mounted men sat their horses and in spite of themselves dozed; or at last, afraid of going to sleep, they would get off and walk. Dismounted men moved along in a daze, actually finding themselves napping and wobbling from side to side of the road as they walked. Towards dawn this overpowering drowsiness (but not the heavy-footed weariness) partially passed away. As it grew lighter we hopefully searched the vista before us for good camping places, but with little success, till at last we saw a beautiful heavy forest ahead and we took courage. The two or three kilometers intervening were long, but finally


traveled, and we entered the woods. But on and on we went, clear through the wood, and still no stop. We came to a village or town, Rembercourt, in ruins. This was our first sight of those spectral villages which lay in a wide swath between the farthest reach of the Hun's advance and some point which we had not yet fathomed, in his rear.

Turning abruptly to our left in Rembercourt, we passed about a mile outside, and made camp, or halted, rather, on the roadside, slightly camouflaged by the somewhat skimpy trees which lined the road. Here we ate breakfast (September 21st). It was open, exposed country, and a bitter wind came up, which cut deep, chilled as we were with the drizzle and mud. But we fixed up such shelter as we might with pup-tents, paulins and blankets, and were soon in a sound sleep, when in about an hour came a new order to half the regiment, chiefly the 2nd Battalion, to move. This time, however, it was for only about a mile to a somewhat more camouflaged position along a hedge.

On the night of September 21st-22nd, the regiment moved on again through or near Vaubecourt, Triaucourt, Foucaucourt, and Froidos, to a camp in the woods on the west side of the road, opposite Rarecourt, where it went into bivouac in the early morning of September 22nd. The unimproved, rain-soaked trail leading into the woods, on an up-grade, was a hard pull for our horses, and the camp positions themselves, though well protected from observation by the fine overshadowing forest, were soft and miry from the heavy rains. The other regiments of the 60th F. A. Brigade were bivouaced in the same woods, and Division Headquarters were close by, in a chateau called Grange le Comte. This position was in the immediate rear of what was to be the 35th Division's sector in the impending drive. It remained the regimental rear echelon for two days, till it joined the forward echelon at Aubreville.

The arrival of the 60th F. A. Brigade at this point, and its going into position that night, marked the successful accomplishment of a noteworthy achievement. At the time when plans were perfected for the Argonne Offensive and the troops selected for their various assignments, the 35th Division was in the vicinity of Nancy. It, like the other divisions at a long distance from their prospective positions





**MAP NO. 6**

Concentration of American troops for Argonne-Meuse Offensive of September 26, 1918. (From map prepared by G-3, 1st Army.) See also Appendix Y.

Rectangles show location of the various divisions (numbers shown in circles) on the dates before their movement began.

The 60th F. A. Brigade began its movement on September 10th from point indicated by black spot, S.E. of Nancy and W. of 37th Division area.

Left to right: 1st Corps (77th, 28th, 35th); 5th Corps (91st, 37th, 79th); 3rd Corps (4th, 80th, 33rd).

in the line, was to have been carried to the rear of its sector by rail, the train to be furnished by the French. In the congestion caused by the tremendous movements going on at this time, of men, equipment and supplies, the promised trains were not forthcoming, and the 35th proceeded overland by road.

This involved a longer road movement than that of any other division which took part in the opening drive. (See map of troop concentrations by G-3, 1st Army.) But even in the 35th, the infantry were transported most of the way by truck. But the artillery brigade, from its billeting area south of Nancy, twenty kilometers (12 mi.) even farther south than 35th Division headquarters at Liverdun (shown in square on the map), with the animal transport, covered every inch of the distance by marching; by forced marches over congested roads. The strain on the men, each carrying the maximum on his back to relieve the animals, or in the case of the drivers, each guiding and steadying two weary, tugging horses through the long nights, was great but incidental. They were willing to undergo it for a purpose, as part of the job, and they look back to it with satisfaction as an instance of making good. But the drain on our animal power was serious. All along the road were pathetic instances of horses which had given out, no longer able to drag forward even their own weary bones. But it is a matter for justifiable and honest pride that when thus suddenly confronted with an emergency all their own, an emergency caused by unusual conditions and not by any avoidable fault, our men met it successfully, and arrived at their objective on time to the dot. For General Pershing took command of the Argonne front at noon of September 22nd.\* In the early morning of that day the 129th and its companion regiments of the artillery brigade arrived at Rarecourt in the rear of their final positions, and moved into those positions at dark the same day—the first moment, in fact, that they would have had a right to enter the sector save under French command.†

\*See Appendix G, F. O. No. 21, 1st Army, Sept. 21, 1918.

†Owing to the general shortage of horse-power in all the armies engaged, after four years of drain on the available supply, and owing, too, to the magnitude of the movements involved, at first by night, and at all times over congested and slippery roads, there was general difficulty in all divisions in their artillery movement. In numbers of cases

The movement forward of the firing batteries that night (September 22nd) was in the lightest order possible, leaving behind everything not needed for active fighting and movement. That last night's march was somewhat different from the others, in that instead of creeping along as part of a brigade column, subject to repeated tiresome stops and starts and stops, on this march we went only as a regiment, free even from our own supply train; and we moved along rapidly, much of the time at a trot, passing ammunition and engineer trains along the road and covering the whole distance in not much more than half the normal time.

Passing near Clermont-en-Argonne, through Aubreville and Neuville, we followed a camouflaged road northeasterly from the latter place for a kilometer or two, then turned abruptly to the right on an unimproved road or trail to positions at approximately X-07, Y-67, on the side of Hill 290, in the edge of the Foret de Hesse.

It was a rainy, sloppy night, dark as pitch, and when we turned off the main road towards Hill 290, the dirt road was about as bad as it was possible to pull through. Our horses, worn with the hard service of the past weeks, did their best; and after heart breaking delays and difficulties the guns were all placed in the positions toward the attainment of which all the previous efforts had been directed; the positions from which, three days later, they contributed to the big "show" which began the Germans' rout of the next six weeks.

It was late in the night when the batteries were all in position, and the horses, relieved of their load at last, were taken back to Aubreville, at which place the forward echelon of the regiment was at the time established. This echelon position, was, strictly speaking, within the 91st Division sector lines; but Col. Klemm had secured the consent of that Division's commander to install it there. The direct road from there to Hill 290 was in the 91st's sector, and was not

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divisions did not have their own artillery with them at all, or kept it for only a part of the time, using instead, when they moved, artillery brigades already on the ground or more readily moved into their sectors. The 60th F. A. Brigade was in support of its own division in every action and position of that division after it first joined the division in Alsace, besides the additional service it rendered with the 1st and with the 81st Divisions. (See also Appendix W, Lecture of Gen'l Cruikshank.)



available, except for very limited use, by our transport, which chiefly followed the Neuville road.

All of the towns in the fighting area, here and elsewhere, were mere geographical expressions; heaps of ruins, absolutely barren of inhabitants or of even the slightest trace of ordinary industry or activity, save a few weather-beaten signs, such as "Boulangier," "Epicere," "Boucherie," or "Chocolat Menier," clinging above some gaunt doorway which led into a heap of nothingness; or where, as at Neuville, a church, with gaping walls and broken spire, bore mute witness to the relentless defiance displayed by war to the most elementary social relationships and aspirations of man.



Ruined Church in Neuville. Used as  
Field Hospital.

At the railhead near Aubreville, across the main highway from our echelon, was placed an American battery of high caliber railroad guns, which rendered good service a few days later. Meantime, being in the open, they were evidently located by the enemy

observation planes or balloons; and our men shared with them the daily greetings of German shells which followed, until the advance of the American troops and the counter battery work of the big guns themselves put a stop to it.

## CHAPTER VII.

### "ALL SET."

Hill 290 was one with a somewhat gradual slope, as approached from the west, forming one of the succession of hills and ridges which made up the rolling country south and east of the Argonne Forest. The batteries were scattered about in various positions within a total area of what would be perhaps four or five city blocks. Following the trail, the first battery position was that of Battery F, along a hedge or line of trees and brush which furnished the basis for a fairly effectual camouflage. A little farther up the slope, perhaps thirty meters distant, was C Battery, occupying an old French position, and with them 1st Bat-



F Battery's 4th Section Gun Position  
on Hill 290.

talion P. C. Two old dugouts in connection with this position gave a partial protection from ordinary fire. Some distance still farther east was A Battery; and above and beyond it, in the ever increasing woods, was B Battery, also in an old French position.

Back of F Battery about 150 meters, in a similar hedge of brush and small trees, was E Battery; and about the same distance back of E, and a little more to the east, was D Battery, in a considerable clump of underbrush and saplings. The gradual slope which began its ascent at F Battery's position, and continued on past C Battery, was along a ridge (extending westward from the main peak of Hill 290) the south slope of which dropped somewhat abruptly. This left the positions occupied by E and D on the lower level, partially defiladed from the direct north by this ridge, and from the northeast by Hill 290 itself. On the knoll of this ridge, close behind and slightly above C Battery, were two or three dugouts, where the regi-

mental P. C. and communication center was established, and near them 2nd Battalion P. C. A dressing station was set up in the woods some two hundred yards east of D Battery, back of the big hill. The advanced P. C. of the 91st Division, our neighbors on the right, was also on Hill 290 further up and to the south.

On the morning of September 23rd General Traub called a meeting of all staff and field officers of the division at his headquarters in the Chateau near Rarecourt. At this meeting he outlined the proposed advance, described the nature of the enemy positions, mentioned the "strong points" at Vauquois Hill and Boureuilles as ones the Germans were ordered to hold at any cost, and gave general instructions on incidental matters.

The next three days were spent in preparation and waiting. Waiting for "D" day and "H" hour. Tired with their long, forced marches, and with their final efforts in getting their guns into position, the men were stirred with a fresh enthusiasm and spirit at the realization that they were to share in one of the big events of the war; that all their months of training and work, of movement and of waiting, were to bear fruit; and by the sub-conscious feeling that it being now "up to them" they would make good.

With a very few exceptions the batteries were unprotected from the enemy fire, except as they were able to prevent accurate observation. On the morning of September 25th, beginning about 4:30 o'clock, they were subjected to an hour's shell fire. Our time for action had not yet come, so the regiment merely lay quiet, and took what came. What information the Germans had, of course, cannot be known; but evidently they knew of the old positions there, and knew or suspected that they were now occupied by American artillery. During the bombardment a shell struck an ammunition dump in E Battery. Shortly afterward one of the battery officers, walking down the lines to see how things were going, saw a shadowy form in the dark from which came a voice, "Somebody come and help." Hurrying forward, he found it was Corporal Harold B. Hokanson, staggering along and carrying in his arms the helpless and apparently unconscious body of Corporal Edward J. Cantoni. On an impromptu stretcher Corporal Cantoni was

carried quickly back to the dressing station, where the end soon came to him—the first man of the regiment to make the supreme sacrifice in action.

But the enemy could fire only by map, having no direct observation of the effect of their fire; and the result, though nerve-testing to our men, was fortunately not so serious as it might otherwise have been. The batteries were separated sufficiently so that the greater part of the bursts fell harmlessly in the unoccupied intervening spaces; and though there were many "narrow escapes," and some shells fell directly on the protected dugouts, one could not fail to be impressed then, and in any considerable bombardment, that compared with the tons upon tons of shells which came over and hit nothing but the ground, the actual casualties were relatively small.

Nerve-testing the experience most certainly was, without the counter-inspirational effect of action on our own part. Lying on the ground in the darkness, with no shelter but a bough-covered "pup-tent," or less, with shells flying above and about, and bursting on every hand, there was a curious absence of anything like undue excitement, much less of the fear which produces panic. Lying so, one could even come to feel or imagine a sort of personal acquaintanceship with certain specific hostile guns. Through the general uproar of distant firing, of the resultant whirring projectiles, and of near-by bursting high explosives, one would suddenly be aware of a shell coming straight in his direction. B-r-r-r! Closer, and louder, and shriller, each second more unmistakably well-aimed. B-r-r-r! Each time you could only wonder in an uneasy sort of a way if the gunner had shortened his range; and each time, as the arc of sound finally seemed to rise and pass overhead, and the "Crash!" of the burst sounded beyond and behind, a perceptible sense of relief was perhaps excusable. But except for this, neither then nor at any time when under shell-fire was there apparent in our men anywhere any impression of over-wrought excitement, either mental or nervous. Whether due to natural American temperament, which did not get worked up when the dangerous situation was a general one, common to all, and to an unconscious poise arising from the realization that this was part of the game, and

which was not disturbed by the very real but quickly passing danger of an individual shell; or to a deliberate self-control; the effect was certainly not a disconcerting one. Rather the feeling was more a sub-conscious speculation as to what the next one would do; but from the undeniable element of vague uneasiness there was not absent a tendency to even joke about the situation. Those who had duties to perform, did them determinedly and coolly, even though with a legitimate sense of satisfaction when they were safely ended, and it is a pleasure to record the fact of never having seen among our men a single instance of neglect of or shrinking from duty under fire. In passing it may be worth while noting the common belief that "you don't hear the shell that hits you." It is doubtless true that in such case the fatal effect would be so nearly instantaneous that the victim of a direct hit would not hear the sound of the burst itself; but it is not true that any ordinary shell would so far out-race the sound of it that he would not hear it coming. Even in the case of a shell which bursts "short" (i. e., in front of its target) the sound of it whirring through the air can be heard prior to the burst.

The bombardment by the enemy ceased soon after daylight, and the remainder of the day was relatively quiet. It was spent in improving the positions, camouflaging where needed, digging trail-pits for the guns, and shallow shelters for the men which would to some degree protect from shell splinters and shrapnel, clearing the "field-of-fire," and laying in ammunition. A dump was established by the Ammunition Train just off the main improved road from Neuville, from which point it was brought to the battery positions at night by horse-section of the Ammunition Train, and distributed by man-power, two shells per man constituting a load. While guarding this dump on the night of the 25th, Private Chandler P. Wright, of F Battery, was wounded by a fragment from a German shell, which cracked his steel helmet, and severely injured his head. He was carried back at once to the Field Hospital, and it was long before we finally learned that he did not recover. He was a good soldier, always cheerful, willing and dependable.

On the evening of the 25th the battery commanders were told that next morning was "D Day," and that 5:30

a. m. was "H Hour," and were given their respective missions. About 5 o'clock that afternoon an officer was sent from the 129th's P. C. to get some final instructions in reference to a phase of the next morning's fire, from the Brigade P. C., supposed to be located northwest of us, beyond the 130th F. A. position, in the woods on the hillside of the Cotes de Forimont (in the southern edge of which woods the Division P. C. was now also established). On the way over the officer passed two enlisted men of the



60th F. A. Brigade P. C. on Les Cotes de Forimont.

138th Infantry, just out of the hospital or some detached duty, who were hurrying forward to find their regiment. They had heard that their regiment was to "go over the top" in the morning and were most anxious not to miss it; an unimportant incident by itself, and doubtless duplicated times without number; but illustrative of the spirit which animated the

men of the whole army. It was because of the contrast to this spirit, that when after the Armistice a few stragglers in the army (and they were few, carried on their organization records as A. W. O. L. during all the fighting period) began coming in with vague tales of having been lost, and unable to find their regiments, they were treated with scant consideration if their stories proved untrustworthy.

The officer mentioned, searching for the Brigade P. C., could not find it at first, though there were many troops of all sorts around there. Finally he found a Signal Corps man who had just been laying their telephone line. At his suggestion the officer followed a double-twisted wire (among the many wires running in all directions) for a half mile through the woods around the hillside, till it finally wound up in a semi-underground billet or dug-out; one of several alongside, opening on a common platform. In front, soldiers of some detachment of the 138th Infantry were crowd-

ing all about, drawing their rations and other equipment preparatory to going to the front line that night ready for the advance in the morning. It was now nearly dark, but the only officer at Brigade Headquarters was Lieutenant Floyd B. Gill, brigade telephone officer, who was "on the job" with communications completely established. About 9 o'clock General Berry and the rest of the Brigade Headquarters Staff arrived.

The sector assigned to the 35th Division was from a line extending from the edge of Boureuilles, northwardly through Varennes, and along the river Aire, on the left, to a line on the right roughly parallel to the left line, from the east side of Vauquois, northerly to the right of Very, and beyond.\* On our immediate left was the 28th Division ("Keystone Division," Pennsylvania National Guard), and to their left was the 77th Division (N. Y. National Army), the three divisions constituting the front of the 1st Corps under Major General Hunter Liggett.† On our right was the 91st Division ("Pine Tree Division," National Army from the northwest Pacific coast), and beyond them the 37th Division (Ohio National Guard).

The artillery directly assigned to the support of the advance of the 35th Division (not including the Corps or Army artillery which was in general support of the Corps‡) was as follows:§

The 60th Field Artillery Brigade (Division Artillery), consisting of the 128th F. A. (75 mm.), 6 batteries; the 129th F. A. (75 mm.), 6 batteries; the 130th F. A. (155 mm.), 6 batteries; the 110th Trench Mortar Battery (6 inch); and the 110th Ammunition Train; and with them these French organizations:

The 219th Regiment Artillerie d' Campagne (75 mm.), 9 batteries; one battalion 282nd Regiment Artillerie M. T. R. (220 mm.), 2 batteries; the 3rd Groupe 317th A. L. C. (155 mm.), 3 batteries; the 451st R. A. L. (105 mm.). 3 batteries.

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\*F. O. No. 44, Hq. 35th Div., Appendix H. Certain pamphlets issued by the American 1st Army Corps at this time give a general description of the German defenses which the 35th Division and its fellow divisions had to face. (See Appendix P.)

†See F. O. 20, Hq. 1st Army—Appendix I.

‡See Appendix J.

§F. O. No. 9, Hq. 60th F. A. Brig., Sept. 25, 1918, Appendix K.

The plan of attack provided for two phases: first, an artillery wire-cutting and demolition barrage, on Vauquois Hill, Boureuilles and the front lines, by the 129th F. A. and 110th Trench Mortar Battery, assisted by the 282nd M. T. R. on two or three designated strong-points, preceding the hour set for the attack (called H hour in all orders, and only revealed when necessary to put into execution);\* with the other artillery meantime firing at targets behind the front lines.† This was to be followed by a rolling barrage beginning at H hour by the 129th, 128th and 219th, under cover of which the infantry were to go over the top and advance.‡

For the first phase the 129th F. A. was given the mission of destroying the barbed wire and the permanent defenses from the western limit of the sector to L 5009; the 110th Trench Mortar Battery§, those from Vauquois to the eastern limit of the sector. This mission was carried out, fire beginning at 4:20 A. M. and ceasing at 5:20 A. M., followed by a ten minutes' intermission for cleaning and cooling the guns and preparing for the rolling barrage.

For this rolling barrage the mission given the 129th F. A. was to cover the ground on the right side of the brigade sector for a little less than a kilometer, or approximately half a mile, in width; beginning at Vauquois, for twenty-five minutes, and then increasing the range by steps of 100 meters every four minutes for a distance forward of about 2½ kilometers till it reached the "hostile intermediate position"\*\*\* (on a line running east from Varennes), where it would continue for ten minutes (7:31 to 7:41 a. m.). At this point the mission assigned to the 129th terminated for

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\*"Headquarters Army Artillery, 1st Army A. E. F., France. 25th Sept., 1918. Field Orders No. 8.

H hour will be five hours thirty minutes (5:30 a. m.).

E. F. McGlachlin, Jr.  
Major General U. S. A.  
Chief Artillery."

†See Barage Map No. 8.

‡F. O. No. 9, Hq. 60th F. A. Brig., Appendix K. See Rolling Barrage Map No. 9.

§The 110th Trench Mortar Battery had done an especially creditable piece of work in placing its mortars in a so-called "Surprise Trench" on the crest of Hill 267, facing Vauquois Hill, and within a short distance of the enemy trenches. Working night and day for two days, their heavy 6-inch mortars, emplacement material and ammunition (1,000 rounds) were all carried by hand for a kilometer and a half from their sub-base in the rear.

\*\*See Map No. 7.





MAP NO. 7  
German Defensive Positions and "Stellungen."

the present and was ordered to be assumed at H plus 131 (7:41 a. m.) by the 219th A. C., and by the 128th F. A., who were meantime with one battalion to cover with their barrage a part of the sector west of that in the 129th's mission, and with the other battalion were to fire on fugitive targets, on the south exit of Varennes, on the south exit of Cheppy†, and on the cross-roads (L 5937) east of Cheppy†, and (by telephone order issued at 3:30 a. m.) a smoke screen intended to cover the advance of our tanks. At H plus 150 (8 a. m.) the 219th was to assume the barrage for the whole sector, while the other regiments moved forward.

Everything was now in readiness, with the quiet which precedes the storm. Late in the afternoon Capt. Roger T. Sermon, Regimental Personnel Officer, paid the men, according to routine, a ceremony that never failed to arouse general interest, even on so eventful an occasion as this.

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†F. O. No. 9, Hq. 60th F. A. Brig., Appendix K. See also Barrage Map No. 8.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### "D" DAY.

We went to bed, in our blankets on the ground, at the usual hour, about 10 or 10:30 p. m., September 25th. At 11 p. m. we heard the prologue, the boom of the big guns some distance in our rear, opening their preparatory fire, and those to the eastward toward Verdun.

At 2:30 a. m., September 26th, we were up again and were served with breakfast. All was ready, and at 4:20 a. m., according to schedule, our guns opened up. And not ours only. From every knoll, and every cluster of woods, it seemed, burst forth tongues of flame. Bang! bang! boom! boom! from every direction, a thousand 4th of July celebrations in one. No trace of the hardships and fatigues of the past two weeks was visible. Keen and ready, our men threw themselves with eager energy into the work. One, a chief mechanic of long service and of steady mold, grinned as his captain came by, and greeted him: "Sir, this is what I've been looking forward to all these years," and returned to his work with a vim.

At 5:20 a. m., as ordered, our guns ceased firing on their barbed-wire and position targets, and at 5:30 (H hour) they opened up on the rolling barrage. We could see, in imagination, our "dough-boys" in their trenches, ready to go up and over as our fire lifted in its 100 meter steps. The enemy, whether overpowered with the intensity of the artillery fire, or too busy elsewhere, did not send any return fire on our positions during this time. As per schedule, the barrage dwelt for 25 minutes on the front line, then continued, in increasing ranges, till it reached the designated line, stopping at 7:41 a. m., when under the brigade order responsibility for its mission was assumed by the 128th F. A.


This fire had accomplished and made possible the impossible. Vauquois Hill, fortified, mined and tunneled in

four years of German occupancy, was to human calculation impregnable. The artillery fire swept it bare, and tore its defenses to fragments, and its defenders were driven back or into their concrete dugouts. Our infantry, the 138th leading on the right and the 137th on the left, relieved of the necessity for a direct attack, passed the hill on both flanks, leaving a battalion of the 139th Infantry to "mop




**Vauquois Hill, from the east.**

it up," a task they performed with efficiency and dispatch. The fortress that had been a thorn in the side of the Allied defenses for four years was demolished and captured within an hour of the "jump-off." The same treatment was accorded the Bois de Rossignol, half a mile further forward, which with the Ouvrage de Geneve (at 5822), the 130th F. A. had effectually bombarded in their opening fire from 4:20 to 5:55 a. m., supplemented by the 317th for 35 minutes beginning at 6 a. m., and by the rolling barrage of the 129th as it passed over it. And our infantry swept forward over wire-strewn fields, under the rolling barrage which extended to Varennes and Cheppy, the 137th and 139th on the left of the sector, the 138th and 140th on the











Vauquois.



Northwest from Vauquois, showing Rossignol Woods and Hill 221.



right. By destroying Vauquois Hill, on the right edge of the 35th Division sector, our guns had not only removed an obstruction in their own division's front, but had also relieved the 91st Division, advancing through the Bois de Cheppy, on our right, of a source of heavy flank fire and observation. (See Appendix P.)

Pushing on in the still heavy fog, the 138th reached La Forge Min. at 11:30 a. m., then met a vigorous resistance in and around Cheppy; but by shortly after noon they had taken that town, with numerous prisoners, and had passed



German trenches west of Boureuilles (302.4-270.1) looking northeast.


on over the high ground toward Very, which they occupied late in the afternoon,\* and where they made contact with the 91st Division. Here with the Buanthe on their left, they dug in for the night, with the 140th, which had followed them in support all day, close behind them.†

Barely less formidable than Vauquois, the steel and concrete strong-points extending from Boureuilles eastward, with its field of wire entanglements and trenches in front, had been demolished by the 129th's guns, and had

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\*War Diary, 138th Inf.

†Message No. 5, R. I. O. 140th Inf. to Division Intelligence Officer 35th Division, dated at 1:10 P. M., Sept. 26, from 05.9-71.7; and Message No. 6, Same to Adj. 70th Brig. at 6:30 P. M. from 04.8-75.1.



**Aeroplane View of Boureuilles after bombardment. The straight north and south road shown is the Route Nationale.**

early in the morning been captured and passed by the 137th Infantry. Moving steadily forward, passing on their right Vauquois Hill and the Bois de Rossignol, in the neighborhood of which one battalion paused to punish some still remaining machine gunners and take some prisoners, the 137th followed on into and past Varennes,\* on the extreme left edge of the division sector, to a line about a kilometer north of that town, running through "La Grotte" (03.7-74.1, on a curving hillside rising from the river), and across the Route Nationale to the eastward of it, on the plateau known as Hill 201.† Here they paused to form and re-adjust their lines, during which a part of the 139th Infantry, which had been in support, passed through their right and dug in just beyond them, southeast of La Forge, about a kilometer south of Charpentry.‡§

Return, now, to the story of the artillery. Upon completion of their rolling barrage mission at 7:41 a. m., the brigade field order specified that the 129th F. A. would be ordered to move forward. In accordance with this, orders had been sent down the night before to the echelon to have the horses and limbers, with all necessary individual mounts, brought up and ready to hitch at 8 a. m. As soon as the firing ceased they were on the ground, those of each battery under its first sergeant. No time was lost in hitching up and announcing readiness to move. At this time Col. Klemm received word from the Brigade Commander that he had information to the effect that the "Engineers

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\*The Aire River, which constituted the left edge of the Division Sector, runs through Varennes. This accounts for the fact that the 28th Division also takes credit for the capture. In his letter dated Feb. 20, 1919, set out in General Order No. 19, Hq. 35th Division, Feb. 25, 1919, General Pershing credits the taking of Varennes to the 35th Division.

†War Diary, 137th Inf.

‡War Diary, 70th Inf. Bgde.

§"Headquarters 35th Division  
26th September, 1918.

From: Oklahoma 6

To: G-2, 1st Army Corps:

1. We hold Varennes. 69th Brigade held up at Cheppy. 70th Brigade has been ordered up to help clear the town.

2. Number of prisoners counted at present time at Division Headquarters are 412, including 5 officers.

3. Communication from front has been very limited.

4. Casualties reported this morning very light. Have no report on them this afternoon.

5. Tanks held up on right flank by mud. Have been ordered forward to front line by any course possible.

P. C. Kalloch  
Major, Infantry  
G-2 35th Division"



Aeroplane view of Varennes and vicinity. Wooded hillside known as The Grotto at upper right. The first position of the 2nd Battalion of the 129th F. A. was as indicated, F Battery being just east of E. The Battalion moved on the evening of Sept. 27th to along the road on lower right, extending towards Cheppy.

report road open through Boureuilles" and to "move forward through that town and take position to support infantry;" and the following written field messages were exchanged:

*"From Adjutant, 129th F. A.*

*At P. C. 129th F. A.*

*Date 9-26-18, Hour 8:15*

*To Operations Officer 60th F. A. Brigade*

*Our mission completed. All ready limber up move. Wait orders.*

*N. T. Paterson*

*Capt. 129th F. A. Adj."*

*"From C. G. 60th F. A. Brigade*

*At Bracieux*

*Date 26 Sept. Hour 8:15 No. 1*

*To C. O. 129th F. A.*

*How sent*

*Runner*

*The 129th will move forward at once via the main road through Boureuilles. Further advances will be made at discretion of C. O. 129th F. A. to keep pace with infantry advance. You will inform these headquarters of your new positions as soon as possible.*

*Berry."*



**Another Aeroplane View of Varennes.**

The regiment moved off promptly, northerly across the field toward the Neuville road. As it left its old positions on Hill 290 they were already being occupied by Troops B, D, F and H of the 2nd Cavalry, the first of the rare occasions that any of that branch of the service happened to be brought into contact with us during our experience in France. They continued with the 35th Division during the latter's service in this drive, patrolling the division's flanks, and performing liaison duty between the 35th and the adjoining divisions.

An examination of the map shows that from the artillery position there were but three roads leading northward. On the left was the main Neuville-Varennes highway, or Route Nationale. This was well to the left of the 129th's position, and if open was immediately needed for ammunition and auto-truck supply traffic and for the batteries of



Route Nationale between Clermont and Neuville.

the other artillery regiment whose positions were near it, and would soon be crowded. To the right a road led northward by the east side of Vauquois Hill; but the part of it close to the hill was shattered by four years of shell-fire; then it swung well into the sector of the 91st Division, which would involve confusion and delay. Between these two, however, was a road which angled across the sector, reaching Boureuilles at a point on the Route Nationale north of the big shell crater which had wrecked that highway (and which the engineers were to build a trail around), thus avoiding that obstruction.

Passing east of Les Cotes de Forimont, therefore, thence northwesterly to the left of Buzemont toward Bourreuilles, at about 1 p. m. the 129th reached the open road south of that place, near the junction with the main Neuville-Varennes Highway. Here it was halted by reason of the bridge over the ravine just south of the town having been destroyed by the retreating Germans, and not yet having been repaired. Army (or Corps) engineer officers were found at this point inspecting the roads, and they advised

Col. Klemm that it would take many hours to make the bridge passable. Further advance by the gun carriages was impossible on that road. Turning eastward, therefore, off the main roads (now crowded, too, not only with the advancing artillery, but with long, pushing trains of ammunition and supplies), the 129th followed the trail left by the tanks across the open fields, to the west of Vauquois Hill.

So narrow and crowded was the road we were leaving that it was necessary in some instances, in making the turn,



Wire-field in front of Boureuilles. Looking northwest.

to unlimber and turn the guns and caissons by hand; this, too, while the road (which was entirely in the open) was being subjected to a hostile shell fire, in which the column was at one time enclosed in a narrow bracket, but whether because of lack of observation, or because of the activity of our heavy artillery's counter battery work, they did not press their advantage at this point. However, spasmodic firing continued for some time, in which several men in A, E and F Batteries and in Headquarters Company were wounded. Some damage to materiel was also suffered. Several men in A Battery were wounded by the explosion of a hand grenade which was run over by the carriage in front of them, and which also killed one of the horses. One of the men, Private Fred J. Nies, later died from his wounds.

Meanwhile D Battery was ordered into action here at between 1 and 2 o'clock p. m. and took position in a hedge at point 3903 just south of Boureuilles, with directions to support the infantry and tank corps, especially in the suppression of hostile machine gun nests.

Captain Harry Truman, with Major Gates and Lieutenant Jordan, then proceeded on foot in reconnaissance northward along the Route Nationale, almost to Varennes, but without success in securing any authoritative informa-




**Looking north from Boureuilles.**

tion from either infantry or tanks. A lieutenant from the tanks, however, advised them that there was nothing he could tell them that they could do at that time, and they returned to the battery at about 3 p. m., where they found orders to join the regiment, which had swerved to the northeast, passing into and through what had been "No Man's Land." "No Man's Land" it had ceased to be very early in the day, for following the destructive artillery fire the 35th's infantry had pressed through rapidly and thoroughly, and were well within the German defensive lines.

The difficulty, amounting to an impossibility, of securing accurate information as to the exact location of our front lines (which until the fog cleared were not at all times,





Balkan Trenches and Bois de Rossignol looking north.



Aeroplane View Looking North from Above Vauquois.

in fact, definite lines, but a series of forward pushing groups, of battalions, companies and even platoons) is well illustrated by the following message sent back by the Division Commander at 2:38 p. m. from his advanced P. C. some 300 or 400 yards northeast of Hill 221:

"From Okla. 1, at  $\frac{1}{2}$  k. S. of LaForge Min. 200 m. W. of Cheppy-Vauquois Road, 9/26, hr. 2:38 p. m.

Just arrived here and taken charge. Right of 138th Regt. beyond Cheppy, probably now on Corps Objective. Left Regt. exact position unknown, but probably near Varennes. Have ordered advance to Corps Objective all along the line, with liaison throughout. Leading bns. of Regts. became disorganized in fog resulting in loss of touch and enabling M. G. nests to remain undiscovered. Tanks have done good work. Am sending French tanks to attack between Cheppy and Varennes. Amer. tanks from Cheppy to Varennes. As soon as we reach Corps. Obj. will let you know. Div. P. C. cannot be placed at La Forge Moulin, too heavily shelled. Enemy now putting down shells on line S. W. of Cheppy. When I know definitely just where our advanced troops are will call for Art. barrage. In meanwhile Art. should move up and take position in Bois de Rossignol. They can get around on road to E. of Vauquois. They should be well supplied with ammunition, and trench mortars ammunition should be brought up. I ask for aviation protection between Varennes and Cheppy as Boche machines have been flying back and forth between these points at an altitude of a few hundred feet only. Telephone wire badly needed. Repeat to Corps Commander.

Peter E. Traub."

When the Division Commander himself, from his position a mile ahead of the most advanced section of the artillery, was unable to maintain accurate liaison with the rapidly advancing infantry, the problem before the artillery may be appreciated. They were in constant readiness, however, consistent with their more immediate task of getting forward. In addition to D Battery, as above mentioned, both Batteries A and F unhitched and took position in the open during the afternoon for such targets as might be given them, but got no information upon which to base a fire, and so resumed their advance. At the time of the dispatch from General Traub the 129th was well on its way through the fields between Boureuilles and Vauquois, a good kilometer nearer their prospective position in front of the Bois de Rossignol than the road he suggested east of Vauquois.

The movement forward was steady, but rendered difficult by the ever present mud; by unbridged gullies and trenches (to cross which, in addition to the customary "Everybody get on the wheels and push," it was often nec-

essary to use extra horses borrowed from other gun carriages, which in turn were aided over by the horses from those earlier across), and the barbed wire entanglements, which restricted movement over much of the higher ground. Not infrequently, too, our drivers were obliged to guide their teams carefully to avoid the half-buried mines which the Germans had hastily laid in the trails over the fields, to strike one of which would have meant instant death to all around. At least two such mine-fields were crossed, one having fused shells of about five inches caliber, and the other with a box type of mine. A French transport wagon was destroyed by the explosion of one of them as our troops were passing through.

As we moved forward we began to see the ghastly effects of the battle. All along, through No Man's Land and beyond, were the still unburied dead. Sometimes a lone soldier, lying where he had met the issue by himself; sometimes small groups, where a single bursting shell had reached out and gathered its toll of death; Americans chiefly (for the retreating Germans carried most of their dead and wounded back with them). Again, from the front came lines of German prisoners under guard, sometimes carrying their own and American wounded on litters, all headed for the rear.

At 4:15 p. m. the Regimental Commander had established a P. C. well to the front near the Division P. C. and as senior artillery officer at that point sent the following message to Lt. Col. Warner, commanding the 128th:

*"From C. O. 129th F. A.*

*At Hill 221*

*Date 26 Sept. 18. Hour 16 h—15 min.*

*To C. O. 128th F. A.*

*Bring your regiment forward and go into position between S. W. corner L 4020 toward Hill 221. I will be at Hill 221.*

*Klemm."*

And at 6 p. m. the following report was made to Divisional Headquarters:

*"From C. O. 129th F. A.*

*At Hill 221, Map Verdun  $\frac{1}{20,000}$  Square L 42.*

*Date 26 Sept. 18. Hour 18h.*

*To G 3 35th Division.*

*129th F. A. Batteries in position S. and S. E. of Hill 221 and approx. 1 km. S. of La Forge.*

*J. A. Fouilhoux  
Capt. 129th F. A., O. O."*

The position of the regiment the night of the 26th was in the north edge of the woods, the Bois de Rossignol, and in the narrow plain between that and Hill 221, which sloped gradually upward to the north. In our rear, at the top of the wooded hill in the Bois de Rossignol, were the Zurich Trenches, just abandoned by the Germans under the urging of our artillery and the infantry "moppers-up"; a very finished and elaborate system of dugouts of concrete, with walks, storehouses, bulletin-boards, and the like, indicating an extended occupation, past or contemplated. A small amount of materiel, tools, and the like, was left; but on the whole it had been pretty thoroughly evacuated.

Our men, such as were not on duty, were glad to snatch a little sleep and rest, even though, for many of them, they lay down hungry. A piece of good work in E Battery is worthy of mention. The day's rations had been issued to the batteries at 1 a. m. While on the advance E Battery's ration-wagon had been struck by a shell and perforce left by the roadside. During the night, First Sergeant Wallace Cameron and a small detail of men from the battery went back on foot and brought up rations on their backs for breakfast. It included a quarter of fresh beef; and in the morning the men of E Battery were each served with a "beefsteak" (cooked on the field range) almost as big as a plate, their first bite to eat since 3 a. m. the day before. Who can forget it?

I cannot refrain from using this incident as the text for a commendation of the supply system in general in this emergency. It was by the personal efforts of a few of our men that these rations were produced on the spot when most needed; but the big fact stands out that within obtainable distance it was available for them; which argues that the supply must have been generally ample. For any man who has been at the front knows that anything needed or coveted along the way seldom gets very far up. So let us not forget to thank, not only our own supply officers and men, but also the supply men in the S. O. S., many of whom worked hard and cheerfully for twelve, fourteen or sixteen hours a day "backing the boys at the front" while the drive was on, for their loyal, whole-hearted, and undramatic but highly essential support.



Turnout at Crater on Neuville-Varennes Road. (Picture taken later.) Vauquois Hill in distance to the northeast.

Meantime a part of the regimental combat train (consisting of the extra ammunition caisson sections of the several batteries, each under its battery officer or non-commissioned officer) had moved forward. Under the general command of Lt. Col. Elliott they had left the echelon at Aubreville early in the morning and proceeded northward, pursuant to the following:

*"From* O. O. 129 F. A.

*At* Hdqrs. 129 F. A.

*Date* 26 Sept. Hour 8.45. Courier.

*To* Lt. Col. Elliott.


Proceed by best route to Boureuilles, where agent will meet you.

J. A. Fouilhoux,

Capt. 129 O. O."

They advanced along the Route Nationale directly north through Neuville. Already the Engineers' trucks of rock were going forward; but the 129th men were evidently the first mounted combat troops on the road. At 11:30 a. m. Lieut. E. C. Kennedy, with the rest of the combat train, and part of the ration and forage wagons, left Aubreville and joined Lt. Col. Elliott's train at 6 p. m. at its





MAP NO. 10

Positions of 35th Division  
night of Sept. 26, 1918.  
Black line shows route of  
129th F. A.

bivouac in the woods on the right of the Varennes road, at about co-ordinates 48-80.

After ending their rolling barrage, the 2nd Battalion of the 128th F. A. limbered up, and at 10 a. m. moved forward over the Neuville-Varennes road (Route Nationale), but because of the shell-crater in the road, at about point 41-94, a kilometer south of Boureuilles, turned to the northeast across the fields to the area southward of Boureuilles, where it placed a battery in position for use if called upon.

The 1st Battalion of the same regiment (128th) had moved up over the same road as the 129th toward Buzemont, thence northward. Both battalions of the 128th were here held up by mud and congested roads till about 7:30 p. m. when they were able to move forward to a position south of Hill 239 (in Bois de Rossignol), where they remained over night.\*

The 130th F. A., with its heavy howitzers, was of necessity confined chiefly to the better roads. Following the Neuville-Varennes highway, it was held up by the condition of the road, at the shell crater above referred to, until further repairs could be made, and was unable to make any further substantial advance during the day.

Meantime the French batteries attached to the brigade remained in position for use as called for; and during the night the 219th R. A. C. assumed the mission of protective barrage.

General Berry's directions to one of the French artillery commanders were to move his guns whenever he wished, upon which the officer in question remarked, in French, to one of his fellow French officers (as reported by one of our men present): "The General tells me to move whenever I am ready, but I understand the road to be blocked, and a gun on the road is no more useful than a cart, while a gun in position can do its work. So I think I will remain in position a little while longer." This he did, ready to repel any possible German counter-attack during the day, while the other regiments advanced.

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\*Operations Report, 128th F. A.



## CHAPTER IX.

### ON THE HEELS OF THE INFANTRY.

September 27th.

Sometime after Colonel Klemm's arrival at the forward Division P. C. above mentioned on the afternoon of the 26th (in the Eunuque Trenches northeast of the Ouvrage d'Aden, near Hill 221), General Traub left, leaving his Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Hamilton S. Hawkins\*, with instructions to meet the infantry brigade commanders, whom he stated he had directed to rendezvous at a tank gasoline dump nearby. The commanders did not appear, but during the evening Major Norman B. Comfort, of the 70th Inf. Brigade, reported. With the information at hand Colonel Hawkins, as Chief of Staff, in conference with Colonel Klemm, arranged plans for a general advance of the division at 8:30 next morning, September 27th, to be preceded by an artillery barrage. The hour was selected with a view to assuring full notice to all infantry commanders, of allowing them some daylight in which to secure order in their lines, and with each other, and to not only insure the maximum number of artillery organizations being available, but to permit them to definitely ascertain the infantry alignments and to adjust their barrage thereto, and to make possible the accurate observation of fire which the irregular positions of the advanced troops made desirable.

This order was dictated to Major Comfort, who was given the responsibility of delivering it to the two infantry brigades.

It was long after midnight when these plans were completed and the missions of the various artillery units determined. Orders had gone out for both infantry and ar-

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\*Division Headquarters and Staff were still on the south slope of Les Cotes de Forimont, but Gen. Traub had gone forward for personal observation. As direct communications with the front had been severed and active operations for the day were slowing up, the Chief of Staff, with the assent of General Liggett, who was at the time present at the P. C., also proceeded forward, leaving the Operations Officer and G-1, Assistant Chiefs of Staff, in charge until Gen. Traub's return some two hours later, after meeting Col. Hawkins and giving him the instructions referred to.

tillery in preparation for this plan, and for the battery commanders to report at 6 a. m. for final instructions as to the exact co-ordinates of their barrage, when in the early morning (Major Comfort gives the hour as 4:20 a. m.) orders were received at the 70th Brigade P. C. at Cheppy, from General Traub, directing the attack at 5:30 a. m.

The impossibility, within the time remaining, of satisfactorily getting out the new orders, revoking the old ones, and of perfecting arrangements under the new plan for the infantry's own movement, and for proper and effective artillery support, was apparent on its face; and a messenger was hurriedly sent to the Chief of Staff, at his forward P. C. in the Eunuque Trenches, for instructions. Convinced that under the circumstances only misunderstanding and confusion could result from an attempt to change the orders, Colonel Hawkins sent back word that the original order would stand.

About this time, in the neighborhood of 5 o'clock, General Traub appeared in person at the 70th Brigade P. C. in Cheppy and directed that the advance should begin at 5:30; that this hour was fixed by higher orders,\*\* and that they must be followed. Orders or no orders, it was late to change plans already made (affecting units some of which were separated by miles), at night and by runner, and utterly impossible to obtain the close co-ordination which paragraph (d) of General Traub's written order†

\*\*See F. O. No. 25, 1st Army, paragraph 2, Appendix L.

†"35th Division, France. 27th September, 1918. 1:00 A. M. Field Order No. 47.

1. The 35th Division will attack at 5:30 A. M. this morning and advance to the Combined Army First Phase Line, east of Fleville.

2. (a) The attack will be made by the 70th Brigade with two battalions of each regiment in the front line and the third battalion in support.

(b) (c) . . . . .

(d) The 60th Field Artillery Brigade will support the attack by barrage fire on lines to be determined by the commanding officer of the leading infantry brigade in the attack.

(e) (f) . . . . .

Peter E. Traub  
Major General U. S. A. Commanding."

This order, though dated 1 a. m. at Division Headquarters (at the Cotes de Forimont) was not received at the advanced P. C.'s until the substance of it, as stated, came to the 70th Brigade between 4 and 5 o'clock.

seemed to recognize as necessary. It was finally agreed that in fact the infantry should not move till 6:30, the artillery to begin at 5:30 as scheduled. It was after 5 a. m. when a runner appeared at Colonel Klemm's P. C. in the Eunuque Trenches with the order.

To get the word to the battalion commanders, and from them to the individual battery commanders; to assign them their respective missions, and for them to compute their firing data and make proper settings, when the orders were not received till that late hour, was humanly impossible, by 5:30, so that the preliminary fire on the initial position was of necessity limited; and in the absence of the expected advice as to the exact positions of the infantry lines it was necessary to lay even such fire as they could deliver, at a greater distance ahead than was most effective.

But in a very short time the guns were at work, picking up their targets at the correct point for the particular minute, and continuing on to the close, as per schedule. According to records now available, at least three batteries of the 129th, A, B and E, participated to the extent of something over 500 rounds in this barrage; which called for a fire beginning along a line just south of Charpentry, and extending from the hillside on the left of the main road down and across the basin of the little stream Buanthe, the range at three minute intervals to increase one hundred meters, at the same time gradually moving westward; covering in its effect the town of Charpentry and the valley and hillsides between Charpentry and Baulny, and resting at its close along a line extending northeastwardly, from a point west of Baulny, for a distance of approximately one thousand meters to the high ground northeast of that town.

Some of the ranges required on this somewhat indefinite information were such as to be unattainable on level ground without time for sinking trail pits. A and B Batteries were on sloping ground, and were able to get the elevation; and E Battery resourcefully took advantage of a convenient shell-crater for the purpose.

Incomplete though this fire was, and entirely inadequate for an entire division front, it was only lack of sufficient notice and accurate advice that limited its efficiency; and it is not too much to assume that had the origi-

nal plan been followed a rolling barrage would have been delivered of essentially the same character as that under which the first day's advance was made; and the 128th F. A., the 2nd Battalion of which moved up to Hill 221 at an early hour in the morning, could have taken part.

The records of the 140th Inf., who had been in support all the previous day, and were now to lead out on the right, state that they received the orders at 5:05 a. m., for the advance at 5:30 a. m.† They advanced through the 138th at 6:30 a. m.\* and at the same hour the 139th moved out on the left, advancing about 800 yards to a line opposite Montblainville, the 137th in support at about 1000 meters.§

The following field message explains itself (the code designations being here explained in parenthesis):

"From O'Riley 1 (69th Inf. Bgde.)

At Hill 201 W of Cheppy

Date 27/9/18

Hour 6:15 A. M.

Runner.

To C. O. Obispo (137th Inf.)

Corps orders direct an advance this morning as far as American Army Objective when entire division will dig in.

139th Regiment will pass through your lines at 6:30 A. M. and will make the attack on left half of division sector. 138th Inf. and 137th Inf. will form second line and will follow 1000 meters behind the 140th and 139th Inf. respectively in column of battalions and in such formation as will best avoid artillery fire. Each regiment will guard the outer flank and maintain liaison with flank divisions. Combat liaison groups of the 137th Infy will consist of not less than two companies with two platoons of machine guns attached. Upon arrival at objective 69th Brigade will dig in 1000 meters in rear of rear elements of the 70th Brigade and will be prepared to reinforce position of resistance which must be held. Brigade P. C. will move forward in general along the division axis of liaison.

Regimental commanders must keep in communication with brigade headquarters.

O'Riley 1."

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†War Diary and "Chronological Record," 140th Inf.

\*War Diary, 1st B'n, 140th Inf., Sept. 27, 1918. "From Bivouac 1000 yds. S.W. of Vervy, 6:30 a. m., to point in valley 1000 yds. S.E. of Charpenry, 8 a. m., 2 k. \* \* \* The 140th passed thru the 138th and advanced to the attack on the morning of this date with 1st B'n on left and 2nd B'n on right in first wave."

§War Diary, 70th Inf. Bgde.



Division, Brigade and Regimental P. C.  
in Cheppy, looking southeast.

On this morning (the 27th) the 1st Battalion of the 129th (A, B and C), under Major Miles, was in the position described above on the south slope of Hill 221; the 2nd Battalion (D, E and F), under Major Gates, was at the edge of the woods in its rear. The 1st Battalion, as a whole, was ordered to remain there in position on Hill

221, and the 2nd Battalion was directed to be in readiness for further movement. Early in the forenoon Colonel Klemm started forward, leaving word for Major Miles and Major Gates that he had done so, and that his P. C. (post of command) would be at Cheppy. These headquarters were in a line of shelters on the side of the hill, on the north of and just below the road entering Cheppy from the southwest; shelters dug into the hillside by the Germans and constituting good protection against the Allied fire from the south, but vulnerable to direct hits from the north. Here not only the 129th Regimental, but also 35th Divisional and (shortly afterward) 60th F. A. Brigade Headquarters, were established, and maintained during the remainder of their participation in the Argonne offensive.

A divisional triage, or field hospital, was also soon afterward established near the cross-roads entering Cheppy from the south, through which, during the time the 35th Division was at the front, over 6,000 cases were passed.

Meantime, the infantry lines were driving forward. Word came back of enemy machine-gun and artillery fire from east and northeast of Charpentry. At 11:35 a. m. the following order was issued:

"From: Col. Klemm.

*How sent*  
Mounted Mess.

To: Major Miles.

Commence firing immediately on Ravine de Mollevaux.  
Distribute fire over full extent of ravine.

At: 35th Div. H. Q. Cheppy.

Date: 27/9/18 Hour 11:35

Klemm."

Pursuant to this order, fire lasting about half an hour was opened on the designated target by the whole 1st Battalion. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 128th F. A. (one of our companion regiments of the 60th F. A. Brigade) had during the morning established itself on Hill 221 and to them the following order was issued, Colonel



Cheppy, Looking North from Triage. Division and Regimental P. C. was about 100 yards to left.

Klemm being at the moment the senior artillery officer present at Division Headquarters:\*

"From: Col. Klemm.

At: 35th Div. P. C. at Cheppy.

Date: 27/9/18. Hour 11:35.

To: Lt. Col. Warner 128th F. A.

Have guns you have in position Hill 221 commence firing immediately from Min. de Baulny to L 3080 and to L 4090. Method of fire zone fire over the N.W. slope the ravine.

Klemm."

The Ravine de Mollevaux, and the succeeding ravine northwest of it, upon which the 129th and the 128th were

\*"26th September, . . . Brigade P. C. remained . . . on Les Cotes de Forimont all day.

"27th September, . . . Brigade P. C. moved to Cheppy at 16 hours."—Report of Gen'l Berry, dated Oct. 8, 1918.



Aeroplane view of Cheppy. 2nd Battalion, 129th F. A., along road at upper left (just off of picture). Buanthe River shows as dark line between north and south parallel roads, north of the triage.



The Triage at Cheppy.

now concentrating their fire, were just north and northeast of Charpentry in the line of advance of the 139th and 140th Infantry.

The position of the 138th at this time, about noon of the 27th, as indicated by reports coming back to headquarters, was along a line in the wooded ravine running east and west of Very.

And from other sources the line of the 140th, which early in the morning had leap-frogged the 138th, is given at 1:10 p. m. of this day (September 27th) as about 1,000 yards southeast of Charpentry, extending westward from the Very-Charpentry road,\* just in advance of the 138th.

At 13:35 hour (1:35 p. m.), on information which came back through the Division P. C. by runner from the 140th Infantry† dated from a point a kilometer west of Very, that they were being held up by machine gun fire from the points indicated, this order was issued:

"To Major Miles: M. G. co-ordinates just received 03.8-76.6 and 04.6-76.7. Concentrate 1 Btry. on each for 15 minutes.

By order of Col. Klemm

J. A. Fouilhoux

Capt. 129th F. A., O. O."

These machine gun nests were directly east of Charpentry, one about 500 meters distant from that town and just south of the Very road; the other on Hill 210 about 800 meters farther east. The 1st Battalion responded promptly, and continued its fire during the day on various targets.

At 15:35 Hour (3:35 p. m.) the following message was received:

"From C. O. 128th F. A. to C. O. 129th F. A.:

P. C. of 128th F. A. on Hill 221 until further notice. Telephone connection through 1st Bn. 129th F. A.—2nd Bn. 128th F. A.

Warner, Lt. Col."

In a general way, the 128th F. A. was expected to support the right of our sector, and the 129th the left, though

\*Message No. 15, Regt'l Intell. Officer, 140th Inf. to G-2, 35th Div. War Diary, 1st Bn., 140th Inf.

†Message No. 12 from 140th R. I. O. to G-2, 35th Div.





Looking northeast over Charpentry from ridge southwest of that town.

this was not an absolute rule, and both regiments were given a free hand as emergencies demanded. The 130th



Cathedral in Varennes. 130th F. A.'s position Sept. 27-Oct. 3.

F. A., with its higher-power howitzers, was fitted for counter battery work at greater ranges and for targets hidden behind steeper angles of defilade. On the afternoon of the 27th, the 130th had moved up into Varennes, back of and in the vicinity of the ruined

cathedral, on the east side of the Aire. At hour 17:20 (5:20 p. m.) the following message from Capt. Paterson, Adjutant of the 129th F. A., at the combined Division and Regimental Headquarters, was transmitted through the P. C. of the 129th's 1st Battalion at Hill 221, to the commanding officer of the 130th:

"Major Miles:

Send mounted scout at once to Major Thurston and have him

place his guns in position at once with line of fire due north. Also report location of his positions. N. T. P."  
 "Recd. 17:20."

Our infantry had advanced brilliantly on the 26th and on the morning of the 27th; but by noon the Germans had concentrated their defense (of which the machine-gun nests mentioned were typical) along the Baulny-Charpentry-Hill 218 line, and our men had "dug-in." Late in the afternoon orders were issued (said to come from 1st Army Headquarters) for an advance by the 35th Division at 5:30 p. m.



Hotel and Bridge at Varennes.

Though the order was not received by the 129th F. A. till within a few minutes of the time set (the 1st Battalion records indicate the hour of receipt as 5:16 p. m.), no time was lost, the necessary data was prepared, and our first guns fired promptly at the hour named—a creeping barrage in support of the infantry advance, northwest of Charpentry; in which between 700 and 800 rounds were fired by the 1st Battalion, and some 500 rounds by the 2nd Battalion of the 129th.\*†

\*FROM WAR DIARIES, SEPTEMBER 27, 1918.

137th Inf. Hq. "5:30 p. m. Friendly artillery barrage. Regiment advanced passing through Baulny and reached a point  $4\frac{1}{2}$  N.W. of that village. Rainy. Muddy."

139th Inf. Hq. "After 10 minutes artillery preparation, Third B'n. advanced in support of 2nd B'n."

139th Inf., 2nd B'n. "B'n. advanced at 5:30 p. m., taking Charpentry. Took Chaudron Farm at 7:00 p. m.; moved to the east of Montrebeau Woods and dug in for the night."

139th Inf., 3rd B'n. "We advanced with barrage in support of 2nd Battalion about 1 kilometer and took the town of Charpentry."

140th Inf., 1st B'n. "Rolling barrage furnished at 5:00 p. m. and advance resumed at 6:00 p. m. (order to advance received at 5:50 p. m.) To woods 1,000 yards N.E. of Chaudron Farm, 8:00 p. m. 4 K."

70th Inf. Bgde. Hq. "At 5:30 p. m., after artillery preparation, Regiment (139th) again advanced. . . . At 5:30 p. m., 140th attacked again, two battalions advancing to ravine just south of Charpentry-Eclisfontaine road, and 1st B'n. advancing about 1 kilometer north of Charpentry."

"The 2nd Battalion of the 139th headed the attack and with the assistance of splendid artillery support in the form of a barrage, the enemy lines between Charpentry and Baulny and eastern were taken. The 2nd Battalion took Charpentry and advanced to the northwest; the 140th Regiment taking the line to the east of Charpentry. Portions of the 139th advanced on the 27th to the Montrebeau Woods and dug in. The 137th was north of Baulny, with two battalions of the 139th, and the 140th was to the east of Chaudron Farm." From account of battle by Major James E. Rieger (later Lt. Col.).

†See Map No. 11.



Their work had its effect, for with its aid and their own intrepid courage, the division infantry, the 140th on the right, with the 138th in support, the 139th and 137th on the center and the left, swept forward over ground which the Germans had held firmly in the morning, cleared Hill 218 and the Buanthe ravine, took Charpentry and Baulny, and occupied the high ground beyond, the "Hostile 2nd Position," the "Giselher Stellung."\*

The 1st Battalion of the 129th F. A. remained in its position on Hill 221 that night, with guns laid for its normal barrage, and ready at all times for any new targets assigned it. Major Miles established his P. C. and O. P. at the old German headquarters at the top of the hill behind, in the Zurich Trenches.

Meanwhile, as stated above, the morning of the 27th had found the 2nd Battalion (Batteries D, E and F, under Major Gates) in position in front of the Bois de Rossignol with guns laid on Charpentry. Early in the morning it received orders to go forward, which it did, moving through Cheppy, past the Regimental P. C. above described, and passing north along the right bank of the Buanthe, on what had once been the town's main street, now bordered only with heaps of ruins; then turning west and north across the little bridge and up the hill, it took position at about 1 p. m., September 27th, along a hedge skirting the east and west road some six or seven hundred meters northwest of the town. E Battery's position was at 4337, with F Battery just east of it. D Battery went a little further west and established itself at point 4137 in an orchard on the west side of the main Varennes-Baulny road, or "Route Nationale," on a line with the other batteries. Save for a small and very inadequate dugout which furnished protection only from observation and fragments, used as Battalion P. C., the battalion was here entirely in the open; hidden but slightly by the back-ground of hedge and trees with which the artificial net camouflage only partially blended.

This position of the 2nd Battalion was about seven kilometers north and about two kilometers west of that occupied on Hill 290 at the opening of the drive the morning

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\*See Appendix M, and Map No. 7.

before; about five miles as the crow flies, and half as far again by the route actually traveled. When the battalion moved into this position it was close on the heels of the infantry, which was then extended before them across the valley of the Buanthe and the high ground known as Hill 201 to the west of it; the German front line being then still south of Charpentry. It was, in fact, practically within speaking distance of the 137th Infantry, which was barely ahead of it along and across the Route Nationale. Captain Harry S. Truman, of D Battery, with Lieut. Leslie N. Zemer, in making a reconnaissance in front of his guns upon their first taking station, went through the 137th and 139th Inf. lines, where they were shifting and straightening their position, to a point on the crest of the hill about 700 meters south of and overlooking Charpentry, in which he could plainly observe the effect of our artillery fire falling at the time, and could see our tanks, withdrawing from one of their attacks.\* The German front lines appeared to be about 100 meters south of the village, at the foot of the hill. Our infantry there finally formed their line some 200 yards back of where Captain Truman was standing and he fell back with them, and finally established an O. P. (observation post) at L 3252, on the left side of the Route Nationale, about 1,500 meters south of Charpentry. This was almost on a line due west from the P. C. of the 140th Inf., which by that time had advanced through the 138th with their front about 1,000 meters southeast of Charpentry, on the right of the sector front, and their P. C. at 4851 (04.8-75.1).† Great difficulty was experienced at first in preserving his telephone communication with the battery, due to destructive shell fire and the tramping over the wires by the infantrymen, but the telephone detail, as always, stayed on the job and made repairs as fast as needed.

The mission of the 2nd Battalion of the 129th on taking position was outlined in the following order:

"From Adjutant, 129th F. A. At Reg. Hdqs.

Date Sept. 27, 1918. Hour 11:00.

To Major Gates.

As soon as you get into position you will notify these hdqs. Do this by battery. As soon as one battery is ready, notify at once.

Points of concentration of fire for your battalion are BAULNY-

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\*See Appendix N.

†Message No. 15, R. I. O., 140th Inf. to G-2, 35th Div.



CHARPENTRY-EXERMONT-MONTREBEAU—and what other targets you may find.

N. T. Paterson  
Capt. Adj. 129th F. A."

Immediately on taking position, about 1:30 p. m., and "laying" its guns, the battalion opened fire. Its first target was at 3,000 meters, in the south edge of Charpentry, where the Germans were making a stiff defense against our infantry. Fire was continued during the afternoon at this and other objectives, including harassing fire at Charpentry and Baulny, and fire at machine-gun nests. If a counter-attack was contemplated by the Germans, as suspected,\* it was effectually discouraged. At 17:30 hour (5:30 p. m.) the 2nd Battalion participated in the barrage referred to above, laid northwest of Charpentry, which assisted in capturing that town and Baulny.



Cross-roads in Baulny.

At about 6 p. m. Captain Truman, of D Battery, on the battalion left, saw an American aeroplane drop a flare off to the west;† and turning his glasses on the spot, he detected a German battery at about point L-1455, just east of Montblainville, scarcely more than rifle distance away. This was across the Aire River in the adjoining sec-

tor (that of the 28th Division), but was so situated as to not only oppose that division, but also to drop shells into the flank and rear of the 35th Division Infantry. Balancing the importance of effective results against a formal adherence to supposed orders to fire only within our own sector,

\*"From C. O. 1st Bn. 140th Inf. at 04.2-75.9, to C. O. 140th Inf. Date 27 Sept. Hour 11.50 A. M. Runner.

Information just received Boche troops are being moved into town of Charpentry. Advise heavy shelling of town. Our troops have not been able to advance closer than 600 yards of town. Troops on our left are greater distance from town. Impression is that enemy is planning counter-attack. Lemmon."

†This was in accordance with the plan for co-operation between the artillery and the air service provided for in paragraph 10, F. O. No. 9, Hq. 60th F. A. Brigade (see Appendix K); though D Battery had not been specially designated for this work, and delivered the fire on this occasion on its own initiative.

the guns of D Battery were quickly turned on it, and it as quickly ceased to operate, the effect being directly observable from Captain Truman's O. P.

During the afternoon German aeroplanes were active over the 2nd Battalion position, not only in observation, but in the use of machine guns and bombs, which did some damage. It was evident that they had the batteries spotted. Major Gates, ever-watchful of the welfare of his men, promptly reported the situation to Regimental P. C. and received permission to move his batteries. As soon as it was well dark they withdrew about three hundred yards to a hedge along the Cheppy-Varennes road, a position just as effective for firing as the one left, and slightly better defiladed from the enemy. It was none too soon, for a heavy bombardment of the abandoned position followed soon after the movement. Both Major Miles of the 1st Battalion and Major Gates of the 2nd Battalion always knew at first hand the condition of their men, their difficulties, their hardships, their dangers and the way they met them; for they were at all times, whether on the road, in camp or on the field of action, actually on the spot with them.



"D" and "E" Battery Positions at Cheppy. Looking west, Varennes in distance.

The new position of D Battery was 4435; of E Battery just east of D, at the crest of the hill between Varennes and Cheppy; and of F Battery at 4635, east of E. A few rods east of F Battery a branch road forked off to the northwest, leading to the battalion's first position; and another road, or trail, led to the southwest. Some distance along this last was the dressing station, where Major Chas. E. Wilson, regimental surgeon, made his headquarters; and still farther along, F Battery's horse-line. The Battalion P. C. was just back of D Battery in the edge of a hedge. At the cross-roads mentioned stood what remained of a roadside shrine, in the center of a small circle of what once had been beautiful, overhanging trees, now damaged by shell

fire, but still living. Near this cross-roads, on the following morning (Sept. 28th) the Horse Battalion of the 110th Ammunition Train established its headquarters and artil-



Looking west toward Varennes across rear of 2nd Battalion position near Cheppy. Battalion P. C. in middle distance.

lery ammunition delivery dump, from which it served the 129th F. A., getting its supply for the purpose and for the 128th F. A. from a Corps or Army dump in the ruined Cathedral in Varennes.



Tree used as "F" Battery's O. P. at Cheppy. Maj. Gates' first P. C. was under this.


A high, lone tree, standing near what had been Major Gates' first P. C., supplied an excellent O. P. for Captain Allen of F Battery. Perched high in its branches he could see far toward the front and flank, while the shells from his own battery, in its new position just to the rear, whistled sharply about him as they flew over, barely clearing his head.

In all, the 129th F. A. records show that it alone fired 2,445 rounds on the 27th, between midnight and midnight.



During the night the guns were kept laid on their "normal barrages," (except as temporarily shifted to specific targets called for), ready for instantaneous response in case of a German counter attack or other emergency.

In their rapid withdrawal from Charpentry and Baulny under the pressure of the American attack this afternoon, the Germans left one of their 105 mm. guns near the latter village. The 129th F. A. being requested to send up a gun crew to handle it, Sergeant Herbert C. McClure and a squad of men from E Battery were sent forward for the purpose. The gun was being manned effectively against its late owners, when Sergeant McClure was severely wounded in the thigh by shell fire. He stayed in command of the gun, however, until his detail was relieved by men from the 130th F. A. Upon returning to his battery he remained on duty until ordered to the hospital. The matter of fact efficiency and self-forgetful devotion to duty which he displayed on this occasion were later recognized by the award to him of the Distinguished Service Cross.



Looking North into Baulny, Across Ravine.

## CHAPTER X.

### INTO CHARPENTRY.

The morning of September 28th found the 1st Battalion in position at Hill 221, the 2nd Battalion along the Varennes-Cheppy road, while the infantry occupied the high ground north and northeast of Charpentry and Baulny.\*

At 4:15 a. m. from the 129th Regimental P. C. this order was issued:

"From C. O. 129th F. A.

At Cheppy

Date 28 Sept. Hour 4:15

To C. O. 2nd B'n 129th F. A.

Concentrate fire of 1 Btry. on Hill 231, 3 km. N. of Very. Fire to last from dawn until 8 H. Use direct observation. Own troops approaching from S.

J. A. Fouilhoux

Capt. 129th F. A. O. O."

As per this order, beginning at 6:00 a. m., F Battery fired 180 rounds at Hill 231; and followed it with fire on the trench (16-04 to 18-07) in front of Exermont, in which town, and on Hill 240 behind it, the Germans had substantial concentrations of troops and guns, and far-reaching observation of the front. The east limit of this fire was at the point where the trench and the narrow gauge railway, coming up the ravine, meet.

Our infantry was meanwhile making a sturdy advance over the Baulny plain, toward Montrebeau Woods, from which the enemy poured a vigorous machine-gun fire. Early in the morning the 139th Inf. was transferred to the 69th Inf. Brigade, and the 138th Inf., of that brigade was transferred to the 70th Inf. Brigade. Without changing the rela-

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\*Messages Nos. 18 and 19, R. I. O. 140th Inf. to Adj. 70th Brig. at 7:30 A. M., and to G-2, 35th Div. dated 8:20 A. M., Sept. 28, from 02.9-78.7. War Diaries 137th, 138th, 139th and 140th Inf.

"139th Inf. Sept. 28, 1918. Operations report from 12 noon 9-27, 1918. Map reference Montblainville 1/10000. From noon to 5:30 p. m. the 139th Inf. held line approximately 37.54 to 43.63 where they were held by enemy machine gun fire and artillery. At 5:30 p. m. advanced and took town of Charpentry and held line approximately 15.73 to 39.80 and dug in. At 4:00 a. m. enemy opened a heavy artillery and M. G. fire. Advance was resumed at 5:30 a. m. 9-28 and the Montrebeau woods were entered. Have not reached the north edge of woods. Casualties heavy. Enemy line held by M. G. and artillery, apparently no infantry. Have taken a number of prisoners.

John Heiny, 1st Lieut. 139th Inf."

tive regimental positions, this brought the whole right advance and support under the 70th Brigade Commander, and the whole left to the 69th's.

At 6:30 a. m. the 2nd Battalion of the 138th Inf., on the right, advanced to the furthest edge of Montrebeau Woods, but were compelled to withdraw. On the left, the 3d Battalion of the 139th, with the aid of tanks, occupied these woods, while their 2nd Battalion moved across to the right and took position east of them, in contact with the 140th, which had forced its way forward to a line approximately 1,000 yards north of Chaudron Farm, at about 21-95 to 29-96, and dug in.\*



"F" Battery Position Looking East  
Toward Cheppy.

Artillery fire was continued by the 2nd Battalion of the 129th during the day on varying objectives called for as the infantry advanced, and in harassing the enemy supply and reinforcement approaches, and with repeated fire on Montrebeau Woods, which our troops stormed and held, and on the region north of it. Barrages, on

hurry calls, were delivered along the line X01-02, Y 80. This was along the crest of the hill north of Montrebeau Woods, overlooking the town of Exermont. At 15 hour (3 p. m.) the Battalion fired for an hour and fifteen minutes at the vicinity of point 9797, a cross-road near the Ferme des Granges north of Apremont, close to the Route Nationale leading north towards Exermont; and on a large munition dump near 8989, northwest of Apremont.

This was a phase of the artillery work which was of vast importance. It was a part of the constant mission of the 129th to stand guard against the enemy's effective use of this Route Nationale from the north. An examination of the map shows the strategic importance of that road. Along it all main channels of supplies, of men, munitions, artillery and maintenance must operate from the German

\*War Diaries, 138th, 139th and 140th Inf.

bases in their rear, from Fleville, St. Juvin and Grand Pre; along it were their supply dumps; and near it, whenever possible, were established their artillery positions.† The destruction or neutralization not only of enemy batteries, but of ammunition dumps and reserve stations of men and supplies, and the protection of this exposed flank of our division advance was constantly being sought by the artillery; but in the nature of things the effect was not so clearly or dramatically observable by the front line infantry as the direct barrages under which they advanced. Moreover, in their steady advance northward, the 35th Division became more and more threatened on its left from the open country between it and the Aire River, which swerved westward from Apremont toward Chatel Chehery.

Captain Harry S. Truman of D Battery, from his O. P. (observation post) at point L3252, by the side of the Route Nationale between Cheppy and Charpentry, had an excellent field of view. Early in the morning of the 28th he discovered an enemy O. P. in an abandoned mill, Chene Tondou (8967), on a hill about two kilometers southwest of Apremont. Directing the fire of his battery on this target at 9:30 a. m., it was promptly abandoned by its occupants, who could be seen scurrying from it. Again at 11 a. m. Captain Truman observed a German battery moving out of position at point 8666, near the same place, upon which he delivered 43 shells in the space of two minutes.\*

This incident, like the one on the day before described above, and the ones in A and B Batteries the same day, illustrates a situation which was constantly being met. A shell fired by a hostile battery such as this one near Montblainville, almost directly from the south, coming thus apparently from behind them, would naturally be a source of disturbance to our infantry, and, in the absence of more accurate knowledge, might even make them feel that their own artillery was firing "short." In this particular situation there was ample opportunity for such misunderstanding-

†See Appendix R, Summary of Intelligence.

\*By a curious co-incidence Captain Truman, some weeks after the Armistice, happened to meet a colonel of the 28th Division, and in the course of their conversation one of the above described incidents was mentioned. The colonel asked the location of the battery fired on, and on being told, said, "You got 'em all right; for when we later came up that way there were six abandoned guns beside the road." Whether or not these were the identical guns in question, they unquestionably represented the result of somebody's good work of the same sort.

ing. The 28th Division was fighting along the edge of the woods of the Argonne Forest proper, which was honey-combed with machine-gun nests. Against these the 77th Division, in the forest itself, was making very slow progress, and a rapid advance by the 28th seemed to be impossible. With the most heroic work on their part they fell far behind the line of the 35th Division front, and our infantry was never at any time during the advance entirely free from flank fire. The 91st Division, on our right, was also slightly behind the 35th at first, but advanced rapidly, and was soon on substantially the same line. It was the impression that there was a standing order, from somewhere up above, against our artillery firing outside its sector; but the records show that our battery commanders repeatedly violated the letter of this rule (if it ever was issued) in the existing emergency, when our infantry were being so mercilessly assailed by the enemy batteries on their western flanks.

How many of our men of the infantry, "digging in" on the open hillsides overhanging Charpentry and Baulny, owe their lives to the alertness, initiative and efficiency of Captain Truman, and in similar instances of other battery commanders, in bringing them this unseen support; and no less, as well, to the quick responsiveness and trained efficiency of the men at the guns, whose months of tedious preparation were now justified!

Meanwhile, on the morning of the 28th, following a reconnaissance at day-break by Colonel Klemm and Captain Foulhoux to Charpentry and Very, the 1st Battalion (Batteries A, B and C) had received orders to "push forward to Baulny or Charpentry, using the Route Nationale and avoiding Cheppy, and firing on whatever targets could be found." They accordingly limbered up at about 7 a. m., and leaving their old position on Hill 221 moved forward past Cheppy. Passing to the right of the 2nd Battalion position, they followed the northern cross-road (which had formed the 2nd Battalion's line the day before) over to the Route Nationale, thence along that road to the north. About a mile further along this road it forks, the left branch following the general direction of the Aire, to the northwest, and leading down the hill-

side into the valley of that stream to the foot of Baulny hill. The right branch of the road (the one taken by the battalion) follows the tree-bordered course nearly north along the high ground till it gradually descends on the east slope to Charpentry. Here it crosses the Buanthe, which, flowing from the south, curves to the west, finally running into the Aire at Baulny. The high ground between the Aire and the Buanthe, along which the roads from the south run, terminates abruptly at the ravine through which the Buanthe thus runs westward, and another range of

hills rises to the north, on top of which a new plateau, or ridge, which we knew as Baulny Hill, extends northward and northeastward. The valley of the Buanthe is perhaps two or three hundred yards wide in its basin.



Road from Cheppy to Charpentry.

Along this road toward Charpentry the battalion passed a machine-gun company, or detachment, with

their guns set up and covering the Aire Valley to the westward.\* Hostile shell fire was encountered by the battalion on the way up, following an attack by two German aeroplanes which fired on the batteries with machine guns, then withdrew and evidently reported, for the shells began falling soon afterward. A shell struck one of C Battery's four-gons, killing the horses and wounding Robert K. Mayfield and two or three



German Dugouts left in Charpentry.

\*That the work of the machine-gun battalions in this battle was of more than ordinarily heroic and effective character is shown by the fact that their casualties averaged nearly 25 per cent of their total strength. In some of their companies the losses were considerably higher than that.

others. Captain Marks had gone ahead, and Lieut. Harry B. Fraser, in immediate command, dismounted and hurried to the spot. "Don't bother about me," said the dying Mayfield. "I'm finished; don't stop."

The village of Charpentry, or what was left of it, lay chiefly on the northeast side of the Buanthe, where it turned, leaving an open space on the left side of the stream, between it and the hill, in which A and B Batteries took position. C Battery crossed the stream into a little grove of trees on the right bank.

The batteries arrived in their new positions about 10:30 a. m., September 28th, and opened fire immediately. Lateral O. P.'s and liaison with the 70th F. A. Brigade P. C. nearby, about 50 feet distant, were at once established by



1st Battalion P. C. in Charpentry.

the battalion commander, Major Miles, whose P. C. (after trying an unsatisfactory location at 03.4-76.65, on the Very road east of C Battery), was at 03.24-76.50 on the hillside, in the old railway station of the narrow gauge railway running up the valley on the west side of the stream. At 10:50 a. m. Major Miles sent this message to Colonel Klemm at Cheppy:

"I am here at Charpentry and am in action. Am under fire and must have ammunition at once."

The batteries had only with them the ammunition they could carry in their limbers and caissons, and naturally



Very.

their first thought was for a sure supply. But it was already on the way. Captain Henry M. Brown, of the 110th Ammunition Train, had left Cheppy at about 9:30 a. m. with 2,000 rounds of H. E. in 17 caissons and limber chests, with 250 rounds of shrapnel piled on the foot-boards, over the road through Very. From that village the road to Charpentry, after dipping through a depression, rises on a rather steep slope to the high ground known as Hill 218. With their heavily freighted carriages his almost exhausted horses were finding it hard to make the grade. A battalion of the 138th Infantry, lying under the hill in support, volunteered their services, and "pushed them up the hill so fast the horses had to run to keep the caissons

from bumping them." At the top of the hill he was warned by ambulance men whom he found there searching for the wounded, that the road was under fire. Dividing the train into three platoons, with 100 yards between, they made the dash across and down the hill with a loss of one man wounded and one horse. Arriving at



Graves of 129th men at Charpentry. Note shell-craters in back-ground. Dressing station on right.

Charpentry at about 11 a. m., Captain Brown turned his wounded man over to the dressing station which the 137th Ambulance Company had already established at Charpentry\*, and reported to Captain John H. Thacher, Adjutant

\*No record of acts of heroism which involve the qualities of personal courage in the face of danger, fortitude under physical and nervous strain, and untiring devotion in the rescue and relief of their stricken fellows, would be complete without reference to the work of the hospital and ambulance men during this time. The following description by Major W. L. Gist, commanding the Field Ambulance Section of the 110th Sanitary Train, gives a vivid picture of conditions under which they worked at the front at this time:

"On September 28th, at 10:30 a. m., Ambulance Company No. 137 proceeded from Varennes to Charpentry via Cheppy and Very, arriving there at 11 a. m. They, with their supplies, were transported in six trucks. Upon reaching the summit of the hill beyond Very, they were shelled by enemy artillery. Upon arriving in the valley of Charpentry, I saw many wounded horses and men. Also several dead on the above mentioned road. A dressing station was established in Charpentry in an old frame house, which had been used by the Germans as an engineer's dump. Captain Ted Marks' battery of the 1st Battalion of the 129th



of the 1st Battalion, with the ammunition (the supply of which continued thereafter to be delivered in ample quantities at all times).

The 1st Battalion, like the 2nd Battalion the preceding day, was now close behind the infantry, on ground which had been its own advanced target the morning before. The infantry front line, as we have seen, was on the high ground just over the brow of the hills, north and northeast of Baulny. By noon they were advancing under heavy artil-

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F. A. was in position about 150 feet behind us in an old orchard. Guns of other batteries were in position to the west of them. They opened fire, shooting almost directly over the dressing station. The concussion of the guns so close was terrific and we had to stuff our ears and the patients' ears with cotton for protection. Shortly after the artillery began firing, the enemy began shelling them and many of the shells fell short, bursting over and into the dressing station. The casualties of the infantry were very heavy during the day, and by 6 p. m. there were 300 litter cases in the dressing station and we were out of litters and blankets, and many wounded were yet upon the field and in the regimental aid stations. Fourteen ambulances had been loaded and sent to the rear, but, owing to blocked roads, had not returned. The 139th and 140th Ambulance Companies arrived at Charpentry at 4 p. m. on the 28th. The transportation section of the 138th Ambulance Company came at 1 p. m. on the 28th; the rest of the company was operating the triages at Neuilly and Cheppy during the entire engagement.


"On September 29th, in the early morning before the fog lifted, six or eight mule ambulances were sent upon the open field north and east of Baulny to collect wounded and haul them back. They were in two sections, with thirty litter bearers each, in command of First Lieut. R. T. Speck and First Lieut. E. V. Bates. They collected many wounded and brought them back, but were subjected to heavy fire. One driver was killed, six wounded and five mules killed. Lieutenant Bates afterwards was decorated with D. S. C. for his cool and heroic work that forenoon.

"The afternoon of the 29th of September the artillery and dressing station were subjected to extremely heavy shelling, wounding and killing several artillerymen and disabling several guns. A number of wounded from the 129th F. A. were brought into this station, and Major Chas. E. Wilson, senior surgeon of that regiment, came over from his own dressing stations at Cheppy and Charpentry, looking after the condition of these men.

"During the forenoon of September 30th, Chaplain Tiernan appeared at the dressing station and buried the dead under shell fire. The cooks at the dressing station opened three kitchens and fed thousands of men, both wounded and others, procuring their supplies at the ration dump nearby. The spirit of the men and officers was wonderful. Hundreds of men sent back as casualties, after being fed and gaining rest, re-equipped themselves at the salvage camp conducted at the dressing station, and went back to the front line. I have seen officers talking to slightly wounded and gassed patients, who would arise from their litters or seat and follow the officers up to the front into the fight again.

"Such are examples of the fortitude and heroism of the entire division. I have seen litter bearers work until they themselves sank to the ground with exhaustion and became casualties.

"On September 29th, the 140th and 139th Ambulance Companies were relieved and sent to near Varennes. On September 30th, detachments of the 140th and 139th Ambulance Companies were sent back to Charpentry to reinforce Ambulance Company 137. On October 1st, during the night, the artillery positions and the dressing station were severely shelled with gas and H. E., killing about ten patients in the dressing station and five of the Ambulance Company men, and wounding ten and gassing many, including the doctors. Ambulance Company No. 137 was relieved on October 2nd and was marched back to Cheppy, having lost as casualties over fifty men and all the officers."



lery and machine-gun fire beyond the road east and west from Chaudron Ferme, into Montrebeau Woods and east of it; and various targets in that area, designated by the infantry P. C., were fired upon by the battalion in their support.

An incident of the day's occurrences is related by Lieutenant (later Captain) John D. Heiny, then acting as Intelligence Officer for the 139th Infantry. His men were in Montrebeau Woods, holding under a heavy shell fire from two German batteries, one of which he located as being in the rear of Exermont, and the other on Hill 240 to the north and a little west. Unable to get back communication as to the situation, Captain Heiny, though suffering from gas and exhaustion, started back himself for assistance. In doing so he was forced to go through a heavy German artillery fire falling between Montrebeau Woods and Baulny. Arriving safely at the latter place, he met Captain Sweet of Division Headquarters, who told him that the artillery was at Charpentry. Together they went down the road to Charpentry, where they found Major Miles. Captain Heiny had his maps with him and designated the locations of the hostile batteries. Major Miles called in his captains, the data was quickly figured and the guns got busy at once. Captain Heiny then returned to his regiment at Montrebeau, again escaping injury, and found that our guns had already taken effect.

About 1 p. m. an infantry officer reported the presence of an active hostile battery in a small clearing in the Argonne Forest, across the Aire from Baulny. Lieutenant Thomas C. Bourke, of the 1st Battalion staff, was ordered to take a position where he could observe and direct fire against it. A very graphic account of the incident written by him some weeks later is worth quoting:

"P. C. Maubois, Hq. 1 Bn. 129 F. A.  
3 January, 1919

The three Batteries of the 1st Bn., 129 F. A., arrived at Charpentry at about 10:30 a. m., 28th Sept., 1918, and ten minutes later were firing at targets given them by the Infantry. Later on in the day, shortly after noon, a First Lieutenant of Infantry came to the Bn. P. C. and reported to Major Miles that he had seen a Boche 77 battery that was firing out in the open, in a little clearing in the Argonne Forest, just across the Aire River Valley from Baulny.

The Major designated Battery 'B' to take the 77s under fire, and

the Infantry Lieutenant, who was a Corps Observer, went with a telephone man (Cpl. Mercer of the 1st Bn. Detail) and myself, to a position on the hillside to our right, among some ruins, from which we could see westward past our position and across the valley.

Sure enough, there was a Boche gun and its caisson, visible on the other side of the broad valley. Hardly had we set up our monocular telescope and connected our 'phone, than we got word that the Battery was ready to fire. Capt. McGee opened with shrapnel, a few rounds were fired for identification and adjustment, and then the Battery opened with shell. The dirt began to shoot up in little splashes. The initial data had been almost perfect. An increase in range of 200 meters is the only appreciable change I can remember. Up the slope and back down again the Battery fired, changing the range by increments of 25 meters; then, at the most effective range, going to the right 5 mils, left 10 mils, then right 5 mils again. Only one section of our target was visible, and we did not know if it was the right or left or center of our enemy battery, hence the changes. After a pretty thorough 'strafing,' we ceased fire and about this time another man (Private Shaeffer) from the 1st Bn. Detail, arrived at our O. P. with our French scissors telescope. We had sent for this because the Corps Observer and myself couldn't both see through the monocular at the same time, and of course the one who wasn't looking through the glass was eaten up with curiosity and excitement by the exclamations of the other, who could see it all.

Apparently our fire had been effective, and after it ceased we both kept our eyes glued to our glasses to see if anything further could be observed. The Battery remained laid on the same target and ready to fire again at the word of the executive. Lieutenant Eckberg had been on the other end of the wire during the engagement, and I heard joyous yelps and whoops mixed in with his recital of my observations that I gave him over the 'phone for Captain McGee.

But we had not long to wait. Less than five minutes after we ceased firing, we began to see Boches hurrying around in the open, near the gun. That was enough, and 'Fire' went down to our guns. This time the target was even more thoroughly covered. Up and down, back and forth, opening and closing our sheaf of fire, we made sure there was no part of that area that escaped that raking fire. Twice Eckberg let out a whoop as I told him of a big, fluffy cloud of white smoke rising from the woods near the clearing, where a caisson or ammunition dump had been hit. Finally, when the zone had been thoroughly searched, I closed the sheaf, concentrating on the visible section. Splashes of dirt went up on all sides of it, and finally one splash directly between the gun and caisson was followed by another one of those fluffy white clouds of smoke, and when it had cleared away we could see the gun had been blown around in a different position, and the caisson appeared quite changed. After fire ceased we watched and waited for a long time, but neither then nor during any of the times afterwards, when we looked at that spot, did we ever see any sign of life. The Corps Observer was so delighted that he asked to talk to Captain McGee, and compliment the Battery, saying that it was one of the most effective and exciting pieces of work he had seen in the war.

Thos. C. Bourke."

An interesting illustration of what can be done in the way of co-operation between infantry and artillery even with new and out of the way targets when the former is able to give definite and specific information of what is needed, is shown by the following message and the notations thereon. It was sent by Colonel Kirby Walker, commanding the 70th Infantry Brigade, at Hour 16:40 or 4:40 p. m.:

"4:40. Hostile battery reported at 99.3-77.4 firing on our line north of Montrebeau Woods. Walker."

Then below, in the handwriting of Captain Thacher, our 1st Battalion Adjutant, is the following:

"Recd. 16:45 September 28."

"Fired by A at 4:58."

4:58 p. m. would be 16:58 Hour, or 18 minutes after the message was dated, and 13 minutes after it was received, which included the time used in calculating the necessary data for firing by map. The position of the German battery fired upon, 99.3-77.4, was southwest of Apremont, about half-way between that town and Chene Tendu, and about 600 yards southwest from the one fired on earlier in the afternoon by B Battery.



P. C. of Batteries "B" and "C" in Charpentry.

At some time during the morning of this first day in Charpentry, two Allied aeroplanes were reported by the 1st Battalion radio operators, as answering the panels they had set out calling for aerial assistance. One plane answered that he was busy then with a problem of his own, and the other said that he would return later on. This was the last heard from an Allied plane by the 1st Battalion radio.

On the afternoon of the same day, first one and later two planes, bearing Allied insignia, flew low over the battalion position, circling and dipping when directly above. They did not respond in any way to the battalion's panels,

but after a few minutes flew away, and were hardly out of sight when shells began falling on the battalion position, coming from the direction of Apremont.



Charpentry, looking northeast.

At midnight Major Miles made the following report:

"From C. O. 1st Bn. 129 F. A.

At Charpentry

Date 9:28

Hour Midnight 28-29

To C. O. 129 F. A.

Advanced to Charpentry—shelled on way. One man killed one injured Btty C. Went into position and opened fire on hostile batty, which was firing effectively on our infantry. Put out reconnaissance officers and observers and fired on bty. at crossing of 99-77. Observed fire and put hostile bty out of action. On reports in liaison established with Inf. 70 Brigade, opened fire on Exermont and Hill Bois du Boyon—240—where heavy artillery fire reported. On request of C. O. 139 opened on Btty 99.3-77.4. Fired on Apremont. Under light shell fire. 2 horses killed. One man missing. Inf. reported holding to front edge woods Montrebeau Wood south of Exermont. Kept up fire on Exermont, on information of heavy hostile fire from there. Radio station up all day. Station coordinates 303640

276650

Miles

Major."

The position was under intermittent hostile shell fire through the day, and even more so during the night, with high explosives and gas, both chlorine and "mustard." Some dugouts in the hillside on the left of the road furnished shelter for a part of the men not on duty; others took their chances in the ruined huts in the vicinity, or slept on the open ground. About 50 yards to the south of the Battalion P. C. was located the battalion dressing station, in a hillside shelter. Sergeant John B. Anthony, of the regimental Sanitary Detachment, was the senior enlisted man at the



**Aeroplane View of Baulny and Charpentry.**

station, and with the men under him did signally good work under trying conditions.

In the great drive now going forward, General Pershing was in personal command of the American First Army, and on September 28th the following communication came down through Corps and Division headquarters:

"Headquarters, First Army, U. S.

From: Commander in Chief

To: Commanding General, 1st Corps U. S.

Subject: Results Expected.

The Allied troops are now engaged along the western front in the largest combined movement of the war. It is of extreme importance that the First American Army drive forward with all possible force. There is evidence that the enemy is retiring from our own front. Our success must be followed up with the utmost energy and pursuit continued to bring about confusion and demoralization and to prevent the enemy from forming its shattered forces. I am counting on the splendid spirit, dash and courage of our Army to overcome all opposition. Our country expects nothing else.

John J. Pershing."

During that night, and this was true practically every night while up there, the enemy continued a harassing fire



Dugout at Charpentry.

on the positions occupied by the different organizations of the regiment. Gas alarms were frequent; and while not always well founded, so far as that meant a heavy or proximate concentration of gas, it was in the use of the gas-masks a case of "safety first." In such cases, after the men had donned their

gas-masks and were vigorously (but under the circumstances in somewhat muffled manner) calling down imprecations on the head of the man who first devised that method of warfare, the Gas N. C. O. had the duty, when the immediate danger appeared to have passed, to cautiously let into his mask enough of the outside air to give him a sniff. If all then seemed safe he would report "Gas Clear" to the officer in command at the particular station, who would then give the order, "Remove masks." These Gas N. C. O.'s were all men who had been specially trained



at the A. E. F. Gas Defense School at Langres. They were responsible, in their respective organizations, under the supervision of their captains, for seeing that every man had a well-fitting mask, in good order; for training the men in their use and care; for looking after the gas defense in each position, such as gas-proofing of dugouts, installation of gas alarms, keeping on hand a supply of lime for neutralizing mustard gas and of gas-proof gloves for handling gas-infected materiel, and of all the other equipment for gas protection; and lastly, the highly important duty of constantly, night and day, maintaining gas guards, who would give the alarm when occasion demanded it.

## CHAPTER XI.

### "OBJECTIVE ATTAINED."

"We are not many, we who pressed  
Beside the brave who fell that day;  
But who of us has not confessed  
He'd rather share their warrior rest  
Than not have been at Monterey."  
(*"Monterey," Charles Fenno Hoffman.*)

In the early morning of the 29th our infantry was holding the high ground north of Baulny, extending into Montrebeau Woods and the woods to the east. The 137th with two battalions of the 139th were on the left, and the 140th, with the 138th in support, on the right. Alongside the 140th was the 2nd Battalion of the 139th, which had been moved across the rear of our front line to effect liaison with the 91st Division on the right; for in the slightly westward movement of the 35th's advance there had been a tendency to draw away from the 91st. That division, driving forward through Eclisfontaine and Epinonville, with the hostile Montfaucon defenses on its right, was having troubles of its own from the direction of Cierges and Gesnes.

The 60th F. A. Brigade was located in the positions it had established; with the 2nd Battalion of the 129th northwest of Cheppy, 1st Battalion of the 129th at Charpentry, the 1st Battalion of the 128th some 300 or 400 yards behind it, the 2nd Battalion of the 128th near Very, and the 130th in Varennes. Of the French batteries, the 317th A. L. C. was southwest of Cheppy, and one battalion of the 219th A. C. was back of the Romagne road, just out of Charpentry, with its other two battalions advancing via Varennes, and the 451st A. L. (105 mm.) back of Hill 221.\*

The German defense along the American front was now putting forth its maximum efforts. With their front line broken and their first defensive positions left far behind by the steadily advancing American drive over the whole

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\*Operations Report Hq. 35th Division.

front, it was evident that their resistance along their successive "Stellungs"\* was desperate. Already driven back from the St. Mihiel salient, the continuance of their retreat along the Argonne-Meuse front meant more than a threat to their main line of communications which connected their big base at Metz with their armies facing the French and British farther west. It meant, as well, the probable loss of the iron fields of Lorraine, and the flanking of Metz itself. Into their defense, then, at this point, were hurried some of the best of their troops. From prisoners taken on the 35th Division front at least the following German troops were identified as being engaged:

1st Guard Division,  
5th Guard Division,  
37th Division,  
52nd Division,  
2nd Landwehr Division.

Except the last named, these were from among the best of the German divisions.

Faced with this defense, our divisional infantry, already some 10 kilometers from the original front line, had paused to strengthen its own lines. Constantly under fire from the west as well as from the front, they had resolutely pushed forward against the heaviest of fire, and had "accomplished their mission," (that is, had reached their previously designated "Corps Objective") within the time set for the purpose and were close to the "American Army Objective."† In so doing their losses had been heavy in both men and officers.

Reports now began coming back of an impending German counter attack. To meet it, and to reinforce the sorely-tried men on the front line, the 110th Engineers had on the evening of the 28th been ordered into position as infantry reserve,‡ one battalion in the rear of each infantry brigade, north of Charpentry and Baulny.


At 10:40 a. m. of the 29th Major Edward M. Stayton,§ who was in immediate command of the Engineers, received orders to consolidate a position near Chaudron

\*See Appendix M, and Map No. 7.

†See Map No. 13.

‡F. O. No. 48, 35th Div., Appendix O.

§Major Stayton was promoted to Lieut. Colonel during the battle.



### MAP NO. 13

American 1st Army Objectives, September 26, 1918.

----- Objectives.

————— German Defensive Positions.

Farm. Moving up under a heavy fire, in which they suffered more than a hundred casualties inside of an hour, they formed a line along the plateau extending northeast of Baulny, a short distance south of the L'Esperance-Chaudron Farm road. Here they "dug in" and soon had a substantial line of defense in support of the infantry regiments in front of them.



110th Engineers' Trenches on Baulny Hill.

Meanwhile, by Corps orders a Divisional advance had been set for 5:30 a. m. on the 29th.\* The part of the sector assigned the 129th F. A. for a barrage, covering this advance, began along a line running eastward from 0006 to 1506 (the 1st Battalion having the left half of this line,

\*"28 September, 1918.

"From Buster 3 to Oklahoma 3.

"Received 10:31 P. M.

"Plans for tomorrow exactly same as for today, except no definite objective. Division will push forward at 5:30 a. m. without regard to Division on right or left. Maintain liaison with detachments between flanks. LIGGETT, by Craig."

"Buster" was the code word for 1st Corps Hq., and "Oklahoma" for 35th Div. Hq.)

See also F. O. No. 48, 35th Div., Sept. 28, 1918, Appendix O.

and the 2nd Battalion the right), and progressing by bounds of 100 meters every four minutes.† This barrage covered the left flank of the advance, the 137th and part of the 139th Infantry, and included not only the enemy positions on the hillsides of the Ravine de Exermont, but also the railroad through that ravine (which extended from Gesnes and the German bases to the northeast all along this front) to Chatel Chehery on the northwest; and the highways which with that railroad constituted the main, or only, channel of communication for enemy re-inforcements and supplies coming up from St. Juvin and Fleville by the Route Nationale. Intelligence reports showed that such re-inforcements were being brought from as far as Flanders.§ The other regiments of the 60th F. A. Brigade were assigned appropriate portions of the sector.

The batteries of the 129th opened fire promptly and except for the temporary interruption in C Battery caused by its move toward Baulny, later in the forenoon, continued to fire as called for as the attack progressed.

†The beginning of this barrage, as given in the first order issued for it the night preceding, was to be along the line X-80, just in front of Montrebeau Woods. In the early hours of the morning the following change in the order was received:

"From C. G. 60th F. A. Brigade, at Cheppy.

Date 29 Sept. Hour 0.30 a. m. No. 12, Runner.

To C. O.'s 1st and 2d B'ns 129th F. A.

1. There was a mistake in first barrage order.
2. The barrage will start on the X-line 80.6 instead of on the X-line 80.0.

By order Gen'l Berry.  
By A. R. Watzek."

"Forwarded Approved:

Arthur J. Elliott for Col. Klemm."

(Rec'd 2nd B'n 3:10 a. m., 1st B'n 3:20 a. m.)

This change of orders, evidently made to conform to the Division order (F. O. 48, par. 3-d; Appendix O, p. 282, post), had the effect of throwing its initial range 600 meters further forward, over the brow of the hill into the Exermont Ravine. This, especially on the left, was nearly three-quarters of a mile ahead of the 137th's line in the edge of Montrebeau Woods.

This distance, constantly increasing as the barrage moved forward in 100 meter intervals, and the fact that the bursts were out of view in the ravine, might easily have raised an uncertainty in the minds of Major Kalloch and his men of the 137th as to their artillery support. If so, it but adds to the credit due them that they started promptly at the hour set—the first of the division, in fact, to move; and in consequence they received the full force of the enemy's defensive fire from several directions. (See page 155, post.)

§See Appendix R, Sept. 28th, III (p. 297), and Appendix T, Sept. 29th-30th, (p. 307). The German 52nd Division referred to was of first class troops, from Baden. It had served at Arras in 1915, the Somme in 1916, the Aisne and Malmaison in 1917, and again at the Aisne, at Lys and at Bapaume in 1918. (Summary of Intelligence, 1st Army, Sept. 29th.)

At 6:30 a. m. the following order had been issued:

"From: C. O. 129th F. A.

At: Cheppy.

Date: 29/9/18. Hour 6:30

To: C. O. 1st Bn. 129 F. A.

*How Sent*

*Messenger*

Have Battery C move forward to Baulny and report to Col. Nuttman Infantry Brigade Commander for orders.

By order of Col. Klemm

J. A. Fouilhoux, Capt. O. O."

The road along the face of the hill leading up to Baulny was at that time under a heavy shell-fire; but as soon as there was an apparent lull C Battery moved out, following the road on the northern slope of the ravine toward Baulny. It was evidently under observation, however, for a heavy fire began again along the road in front of the battery, to attempt to go through which would have meant the neutralizing of the battery in mid-movement through loss of horses, aside from any loss to the personnel. Turning the battery under the crest of the hill, therefore, Captain Marks returned it to its position of effectiveness in Charpentry, where it had a clear range of fire on the whole front;\*


\*This incident showed the practical difficulties, in this kind of fighting in rapid advance, of having so-called "accompanying batteries" or guns; that is, artillery batteries to accompany the infantry command, subject only to its direction and entirely separate from the artillery brigade. An artillery battery, in the nature of things, with its heavy, cumbersome gun carriages and ammunition caissons, is much less mobile than the infantry. If it attempts to advance with the infantry, it cannot fire while moving, and it becomes hopelessly and helplessly stalled if its horses are killed or its motors damaged.

The chief value claimed for accompanying batteries is that it strengthens the morale of the infantry to see and hear the big guns beside them. But such batteries (especially in an advance against a retreating enemy, who is familiar with the evacuated area) draw hostile fire, and soon become unpopular with their neighbors; while the blow to morale caused by a battery being suddenly silenced by concentrated fire, or by inability to bring up the heavy ammunition supply, or stalled by the destruction of its motive power, whether horse or motor, would be wholly adverse. Imagine, for instance, the effect of the occurrence later in the day in C Battery, where two gun sections were practically annihilated.

Moreover, artillery firing requires the accurate determination of positions, both of gun and target, and the correct calculation of the firing data thereon, in order to have the shells fall where they are intended. For a high explosive shell is as harmless as a snow-ball if it falls a hundred yards off from its target; or is worse than harmless if it falls "short" among our own advancing troops. The artillery's most effective advances are by accurately increasing its range from a fixed and understood position; and as the engagement progresses, making, from time to time, substantial moves to new forward positions from which it can begin new series of range increases. With a fixed position, known to the Division P. C. and to the infantry commanders, it becomes merely (not "merely," but all-importantly) a question of accurate liaison and maintenance of communication to get prompt and dependable assistance from the artillery at any time or place. By "leap-frogging" its organizations (as the 129th did with its 1st and 2nd Battalions) as occasion demands, there is no time at which at least a part of the artillery is not available; and the time lost in moving, a period necessarily of ineffectiveness, is reduced to the minimum.









The 35th Division Salient on Sept. 29, 1918.

The German line is shown as of about noon, after its withdrawal (from its original early morning line south of Exermont) under pressure of the American artillery barrage and the infantry drive which followed, in which Exermont was taken and the German 1st and 5th Guard Divisions had their contact broken. (Appendix T.)

The position of these advance elements of the 35th in this salient exposed them to German artillery and machine gun fire not only from their direct front and right front, but also to an enfilading fire along their entire left flank and left-rear. (See Appendices R, S and T.)



MAP No. 13-A



while Lieut. Harry B. Fraser and Sergt. Clay Cushwa rode ahead to Baulny to report to Col. Nuttman. When they reported to the Infantry P. C., Col. Nuttman (who, it seems, had gone personally to the front lines) was not there; and the officer in charge directed them to return to Charpentry, as there was no suitable artillery position in Baulny, a fact that was very evident on its face.

Meanwhile the forward movement was developing all along the line, culminating in one of the most dramatic incidents (if so daring, so important and so tragic an event can be called an incident) of the drive.

On the left, following the opening barrage, but still under heavy machine-gun fire from Exermont, a battalion of the 137th Infantry, under Major P. C. Kalloch, started the advance at 5:30 a. m. through the west side of Montrebeau Woods as far as the ravine, where they were checked. The movement on the right, however, had not yet progressed so far, and the Germans were able to concentrate the intensity of their fire upon the 137th. Their own supports were held up; and after a short but gallant stand Major Kalloch's band were compelled to withdraw at 8 a. m. with considerable losses.\* They withdrew to the edge of Montrebeau Wood, where they formed and held their thinning line, while the Germans followed and attempted to flank them, moving up from the northwest.

It had been planned that the 138th, which had been in support, should take the lead on the right on this morning's advance, but for some reason the order for the movement was delayed.† As a result the benefit of the artillery barrage at 5:30 was lost or neutralized.‡ Whatever caused the delay it was not a lack of spirit in the personnel.§

\*"Advanced on Exermont at 6 a. m. and gained line about 500 meters north of Montrebeau Woods, holding same until about 8 a. m., when forced to retire account lack of support. Detachment making the attack consisted of 150 to 200 men."—War Diary, 1st Bn., 137th Inf., Sept. 29, 1918.

†"From R. I. O., 138th Inf., at 02.4-77.9; 29 Sept., 9 A. M. "To G-2, 35th Division.

"138th Inf. moving to the attack. Orders to advance through 140th received at 6:45. Men in very poor condition. In some cases companies average 30 men. \* \* \* R. R. R."

‡"Our barrage started promptly at the hour, but for some reason the 138th did not approach and the barrage passed on with no troops following."—Account by Col. Rieger.

"1st Bn. advanced in first wave on Exermont, following rolling barrage which preceded the line by 1½ to 2 hrs."—War Diary, 1st Bn., 140th Inf.

§"Morale high. 7:00 a. m. advanced 2 km. to woods south of Exermont and N. E. of Charpentry. Heavy shelling. Few casualties."—War Diary, 1st Bn., 138th Inf.

Lieut. W. H. Leahy, in command of the 2nd Battalion of the 138th, received orders at 6 a. m. to await at Chaudron Farm for the other battalions of the regiment. At that place they were ordered by Col. Nuttman, commanding the 69th Brigade, to go ahead through Montrebeau Woods without waiting, which they did, starting about 7:30 a. m., and moving diagonally across the front.

In the face of a heavy machine gun fire they entered the Exermont Ravine (evidently to the right of the 137th and somewhat later), crossed to the northwest to the high ground north of it, and west of Exermont. Here Lieut.

Leahy was wounded at noon, and soon afterward the battalion withdrew.‡



Exermont.

Following the 137th's push forward on the left, the 140th with the 2nd Battalion of the 139th, on the center and right, without waiting longer for the 138th, moved out of the woods toward Exermont at 6:30 a. m.† The first ad-

vance was held up by heavy fire, but it was renewed at 8:30 a. m. A detachment of the 140th under Lieut. Eustace Smith, joined shortly afterward by further detachments of that regiment, early penetrated the town, and passed on through and 200 or 300 yards beyond to the westward, to the foot of the slope leading up to Hill 240. More of the 140th under Capt. J. L. Milligan went through and about 200 yards north of the town, where they secured touch with the 139th's battalion, occupying the trenches on the north edge of the village.\*

Keeping farther to the right, Major J. E. Rieger, of the 2nd Battalion of the 139th, led his men forward at 6:30

‡"Advanced at 7:30 a. m. to farthest edge of Bois de Boyon, north of Exermont. Retired by Division order to position on ridge east of Baulny."—War Diary, 2nd Bn., 138th Inf.

†War Diary, 70th Inf. Bgde.

\*1st Bn. advanced in first wave on Exermont following rolling barrage which preceded the line by 1½ to 2 hrs. Ground fiercely fought over in face of heavy hostile shelling and M. G. fire, and town of Exermont taken and held until retirement was ordered about 3 p. m.—War Diary, 1st Bn., 140th Inf.

a. m. through the ravine, passing to the right of the village, and "dug in" about 500 yards to the northeast, and a similar distance from the fringe of timber stretching out from the woods (Bois de Boyon) covering Hill 240.†

This capture of Exermont by these detachments under the terrific fire encountered was brilliant,§ and their efforts to hold their advanced positions were heroic; but their numbers were insufficient, without support on their flanks, to maintain them. Repeated frontal attacks by the Germans



Looking North from Montrebeau Woods. Hill 240 in left distance.

from Hill 240 were driven off; but gradually the enemy, in evidently increasing numbers, sought to encircle them, meantime continuing this pitiless fire on their positions. No further reinforcements arrived, and they held on; but shortly after noon came orders to retire to the entrenched line established by the 110th Engineers on Baulny Ridge. This they did, skillfully and in good order, under cover of a protective artillery fire, but with a toll of dead and wounded which only emphasized the audacious courage to

†War Diary, 2nd Bn., 139th Inf.

§See Appendix T, for German report of this attack.

do well what they were there to do, into whatever danger it might lead them, which was the animating spirit of our men.\*

\*The following is from an account of the battle by Major James E. Rieger, of the 2nd Battalion of the 139th Infantry:

"On my immediate left was one battalion of the 140th, and to the left of the 140th was the 137th. The 138th was in support just north of Charpentry and two battalions of the 139th were north of Baulny. At 5:30 on the morning of the 29th the order came to attack, with the 138th passing through the lines of my battalion and also the 140th, and the two battalions of the 139th were to pass through the lines of the 137th for a united attack on Exermont. Our barrage started promptly at the hour, but for some reason the 138th did not approach and the barrage passed on with no troops following. About 6:30 the order was to attack without the 138th, that is, the 140th, the 2nd battalion of the 139th and the 137th were to attack Exermont. An effort was made to dislodge the machine gun nests in our immediate front by means of a chemical warfare platoon and four 4-inch Stokes Guns were planted and opened fire. This failed because the chemicals did not reach the enemy positions and the results of the attack were that the enemy discovered our position and we suffered many casualties. The attack then was finally ordered with infantry alone, which was begun about 7:30 a. m. The 140th moved to the northwest, while the 2nd battalion of the 139th moved directly north and after passing through a terrific fire from machine guns and artillery, including a gas barrage, our troops forced their way towards Exermont. The 140th, having a longer course to take, arrived upon the line 30 minutes after the 2nd battalion had taken the east portion of Exermont and advanced about one kilometer to the north and east of that village. Three companies of the 140th immediately to my left under Major Murray Davis, with Captains Milligan and Campbell, moving to the northwest, took the trenches to the south of Exermont and moved into the city proper, a short time after (30 minutes) the 2nd battalion had reached the crest of the ridge to the northeast of Exermont. Our losses were very heavy in this attack and so was that of the 140th, Major Murray Davis being killed on the ridge to the southeast of the village while leading his troops. The 2nd battalion of the 139th lost Lieutenant Mosier killed. The sergeant in command of F Co. and the Sergt. in command of E Co. (2nd Bat.) were also killed. The bravery of the men of all organizations making the attack on Exermont was of the highest order. The first thin skirmish line in our advance was completely wiped out.

"Our lines were quickly reorganized and dug in and beat off three different attacks made by the enemy from Hill 240. The enemy guns near Apremont were in a position to subject us to great loss and our positions were constantly shelled, the buildings in Exermont knocked down and those combustible were set on fire. I have always thought that this meant that the Germans had intended to abandon the town permanently. Colonel Delaplane came with a portion of the 140th and arrived after the battalion of Murray Davis had reached the line. In spite of all these attacks we held our line, though our loss was very heavy. The 137th had first attacked Exermont, but failed in the attempt. They and a portion of the 138th attacked directly from the south and southwest, while the attack of the 139th and 140th were more from the southeast. An American plane came over and we spread a towel and some papers out as a signal of our line, and following this the friendly artillery fire assisted in keeping the enemy off our front lines. We observed that the enemy was being largely reinforced and we realized that our position was critical. At this time I sent for reinforcements and after about two hours the order for retirement came. The 140th retired first and the 2nd battalion of the 139th was to cover the retreat. We received assistance from our artillery and some heavy caliber shells passed over us and we heard the explosions to the north of Hill 240. Our lines were much broken in the retreat, because of the movement of German troops to flank us on our right, but our men returned the fire so effectively that the enemy could not close with us or outflank us, and in this way our lines fell back to the prepared trenches on Chaudron Farm. The 138th and 137th had retired from Montrebeau Woods prior to our retirement.

"Our most advanced line 500 yards southeast of the fringe of timber on Hill 240. I saw the German lines forming in this timber very distinctly."

Among the 140th's killed was Major Murray Davis, who fell between Montrebeau Woods and Exermont.

It is now evident that in these movements the American advance on the right and the German counter-advance on their own right overlapped each other to some extent. This is shown by Major Kalloch's report of the German pressure on his front and flanks, and the calls for artillery



**Exermont. Looking Northwest.**

support to oppose it, while at the same time the detachments on the 35th's right were entering Exermont, where they found themselves in a salient under fire from both flanks.\*\*

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\*\*\*"Meanwhile the Bosche launched a counter attack with fresh troops, compelling our diminished and overreached line to tighten and draw back for concentration. The Bosche had been left behind by the troops going to Montrefagne north of Exermont, and inflicted heavy casualties from the rear. Counter attacks, infiltration and fire from four sides reduced our salient and gradually the lines straightened along the northern edge of Montrebeau and the wood to the east."—From account of the battle by Major Norman B. Comfort, 138th Inf., attached to Division Staff.

See also Appendix T, Sept. 29.



Exermont, from aeroplane. Hill 240 is in the woods on upper left.

While this movement by the infantry was going on, the artillery was bending its efforts to keeping in close communication with them and giving them its vigorous co-operation and support.

The 1st Battalion had established an Observation Post in Baulny Church, to which battalion wires were promptly laid. This O. P. was under the church in a big dugout, where the 110th Field Signal Battalion had also set up a switchboard and where, during the morning, Capt. John H. Thacher, Battalion Adjutant, met General Traub in person, who gave him a target for the battalion. Great difficulty was experienced in maintaining the battalion



Divisional Telephone Center and Temporary Division P. C. at Baulny.

wire, by reason of the constant shell-fire.\*


Early in the morning Lieut. Thos. C. Bourke, who had been sent to Baulny by Major Miles for observation and liaison with the infantry, had selected a new O. P. in an abandoned trench at 01800-77200. He then reported to Col. Kirby Walker, C. O. of the 70th Inf. Brigade, at his P. C. at Chaudron Farm. At Col. Walker's request Lieut. Bourke sent back the following message at 10:04 a. m.:

"To Major Miles:

Heavy shelling on our men on reverse slope Hill 224. Recommend heaviest possible fire on Exermont N. W. Suggest radio station try to get location Boche battery from airplane. Not safe to fire back of north edge of woods Hill 224."

\*"I was in charge of the detail arriving at Charpentry on the 28th. We at once laid our lines to the batteries and in course of the day we also had communication with Regimental Headquarters. We had trouble from the start in keeping the line intact on account of the heavy shelling, and repaired same about a dozen times a day. The next day we laid a line up to the O. P. at Baulny and to Regimental Headquarters. Those lines were shot up at times in twenty places and it was under great difficulties they were kept in order. In the meantime 1st Bn., 128th, had gone into position some 300 yards behind us and as they had no communication with their regiment I allowed them to lay a line to us so that they could get communication with their regiment. The 110th Signal Corps was also at Charpentry, and as they left, we picked up their lines, putting in a 4-drop switchboard. We in that manner had double communication with Division Headquarters and also kept the tank line in order."—From account by Sgt. Frank E. Wilson, 1st Battalion, 129th F. A.





MAP NO. 14

The attack on Exermont Sept. 29th, showing approximate routes followed by each attacking battalion. Note lines indicating geographic and magnetic North.



Early in the forenoon the following message was received at the 129th Regimental P. C. through the 130th F. A.

"Logan 8:33  
Lt. Hiney, acting Adjutant 69th Brig.  
69th Brig. Hdq.  
Sept. 29-18 8:35 A. M. Fone.  
Col. Klemm.

Infantry requests barrage 600 meters north of Montrebeau Woods between points 1105 and 1704.

Omelett 8." (130th F. A.)

Already, however, the following order had been issued from the 129th P. C.:

"From C. O. 129th F. A.  
At Cheppy.  
Date 29/9/18. Hour 7:45  
To C. O. 2nd Bn.

Fire protective barrage on a line 600 m. N. of Montrebeau Woods, between points 1105 and 1704. Rate 3 R. P. G., length 15 minutes.  
By order Col. K.  
J. A. Fouilhoux, O. O."

Following this request, the 2nd Battalion fired a barrage covering the target designated, and repeated it as called for. This was a line of German trenches just over the brow of the hill immediately southwest of and overlooking Exermont, in front of the line of the 137th and the 1st Battalion 139th.

At 12 o'clock, noon, on orders from Regimental Headquarters, the battalion fired near Exermont at the rate of one round per minute per gun; then increasing the range 500 meters, the fire continued until 13 o'clock (1 p. m.). At the same time the 1st Battalion received the following:

"From C. O. 129th F. A., At Cheppy.  
Date 29-9-18. Hour 12:40  
To C. O. 1st Bn. 129 F. A.

Lift your fire to a zone 500 m. north of Exermont.

J. A. Fouilhoux.  
Capt. O. O."

The men of the artillery could not know at the time, of course, just what the conditions were at the front which called for a particular fire. Always ready to do their part to back up the work in the front line, it was necessary, to enable them to give substantial assistance, to furnish them with definite and intelligent information, not only of the enemy positions, and of points of danger or attack, but of

the extent of advance of our own troops. When orders came to fire at a given range and direction they responded with untiring enthusiasm, even though they could not see the result of their work or know its immediate purpose. It is a satisfaction, now that the history of that day is available, to know that our guns were doing their utmost to support



Chaudron Farm, looking northwest.

and protect those little bands of courageous men who set our lines in Exermont; an accomplishment which, with the similar drive the same day by the 91st Division on Gesnes, and from which they similarly found it necessary to withdraw, was apparently the farthest advance, up to that time, in number of kilometers from their starting point, made by any troops in the whole American Army since the opening of the drive. (See Map No. 16A.)

The withdrawal of our advanced units from Exermont and from its immediate front evidently encouraged the Germans to a new effort, and a heavy artillery fire was experienced, which our artillery returned. Following fire on the targets designated by General Traub, the 129th continued its fire on objectives designated from Regimental P. C., and from the infantry direct. The German counter-attack was developing, and our infantry was suffering from a severe fire.

During the afternoon, one of the most critical of the battle, vague reports continued to come in that our infantry was losing ground. The known fact of their withdrawal to the new line, together with the string of stragglers which continued to come back, gave an appearance of verity to the reports which naturally caused some anxiety. When, therefore, a barrage was suddenly ordered for the terrain north of the Chaudron Farm road, our men entered into it with the keenest zeal. Ordinarily 6 shots per gun per minute is considered good artillery fire. But ordinary rules were forgotten. Faster and faster the men worked their guns, fusing, loading, firing; each gunner's eye on his sight and his hand on the regulating wheel, ever increasing his speed—Bang! Bang! Bang! With three batteries at work, of four guns each (less the one which from time to time in turn was stopped for cleaning and cooling) the effect, in actual fact, was like a huge machine gun working. The guns worked up to twelve rounds per gun per minute—or for the whole battalion, one gun every half second. Captain Dancy, of A Battery, states that for a time two of his guns reached a rate of twenty-one rounds per minute, each. An idea of the volume and rapidity of the fire may be gotten from the fact that A Battery alone fired twelve hundred and fifty rounds in that afternoon, which would mean an average of 375 shells per gun. To cool the tubes wet blankets were kept on them, constantly renewed from the creek near by. To open the breach for reloading was like opening an oven door.

The artilleryman cannot often see his target, and he has not the stimulus of fighting face to face; nor even of

feeling, in most cases, that he is fighting his own direct foe. Though shells are bursting all about him,



German Shells.

though his comrades may be falling at his side, the word has come that a protective barrage is wanted, and he enthusiastically and tirelessly continues the fire of his own guns, directing them, not on the hostile batteries which are

firing at himself, but on the enemy troops which are advancing on his own infantry up ahead.

The enemy's batteries were fighting hard. His 77s burst in increasing number. In C Battery a shell went through one of the caissons, exploding 12 rounds of ammunition therein. Another, falling behind the trail of the 1st Section gun, instantly killed the gunner, Corporal Ralph B. Kyle, and Cannoneer John A. Gersic, and wounded several others. Another shell burst in front of the 2nd Section, and put the whole gun crew out of action, mortally wounding Sergeant Tirey J. Ford and wounding most of the rest of the crew, among them Cannoneer Arthur H. Bell with sixteen separate wounds, while the shock temporarily incapacitated several others. Private Selmo Fulton, of the 3rd Section, saw his comrades fall, and, though himself wounded, hurried over and operated the 2nd Section gun by himself, while a new gun squad was made up from the reserve cannoneers waiting in readiness in a nearby trench. For this act he afterward received the Distinguished Service Cross.

In the movements of the front line troops this afternoon, with some advancing through Exermont and retiring again, with the whole front struggling forward under difficulties, with many officers disabled, so that the units at the immediate front were to a certain extent acting each "on its own," advancing and withdrawing as the situation permitted or demanded, followed by the general reorganization on the newly intrenched line marked by the En-

gineers, it was natural that a certain amount of confusion and uncertainty arose among the infantry troops.

Individual soldiers and small groups, detached from their organizations, seeing troops withdrawing, could no more than do the same. Soon a considerable stream of stragglers was pouring back over the hills through Charpentry; quiet, orderly, but unorganized and uncommanded. But this continuing stream of stragglers coming back (one of the most disheartening sights imaginable) produced some anxious moments. Did it mean that the enemy was passing the front line, overcoming our infantry, and would at any moment appear over the hill immediately to the north?

The French batteries of the 219th, in position back of the "Roman Road," evidently acting under the somewhat indefinite discretion in the orders under which they had moved forward, and with a perhaps pardonable uncertainty as to what American troops would eventually do when they were apparently under a severe strain in holding their ground, followed the commonly recognized rule of saving their guns before it was too late. They temporarily withdrew through Charpentry, past the American batteries.

This but added to the tenseness of the situation. No word came. "Well, men," said Major Miles, his face grave, anxious, but calm; "get ready and we'll give 'em direct fire." And direct fire it would have been if the occasion had demanded it; for no thought of weakening was there, in men or officers. But the occasion did not arise. The barrage had had its effect, and our new line was holding firm. The stragglers showed no panic, no evidence of running away, but rather had become detached and lost in the reorganization at the front, and were readily checked. The sight of the artillery in action in their support gave them new heart and morale. Lieutenant Thomas C. Bourke, Lieutenant William I. Smith and Lieutenant Andrew D. Wilson of the 129th F. A., respectively, formed and led back to the front groups of men among the stragglers.\* And at the side of the road in Charpentry, those there saw

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\*For this these officers were later cited in orders, as was Chaplain Tiernan, for his work with the wounded. (G. O. 83 and 100, Hq. 35th Div., Oct. 17 and Nov. 15, 1918.)

an infantry non-commissioned officer (who he was or where he came from was not disclosed) coolly and energetically organize a bunch of men to form and follow him, and with them set off up the road to the front.

In one of those pauses in events which often occur, a detail of our men was busy back and forth, bringing up ammunition from the dump on the west of the road, for the next barrage. Suddenly, Whir-r-r-Bang! and a shell burst in the center of the road just where the narrow gauge track crossed it diagonally. Private Evert R. Bean, of A Battery, was killed almost instantly, and others were wounded. In B Battery, near the same time, several men were wounded, among them Private Corda Munday, who died a few hours later in Mobile Hospital No. 2.

In a short time more accurate reports came in as to the situation; the arrival of the Engineers had stiffened the line, and close liaison was established with them and with the 69th Brigade P. C.

An artillery battalion in position, when close pressed by an infantry attack, has but two alternatives—to give direct fire (that is, point-blank) as long as possible, and then to stand by the guns (too unwieldy and massive to use in close defense against an enemy attacking in open order or from various directions) and die or be captured, with only pistols as a final weapon; or to abandon the position (or, if the horses are killed, the guns themselves) with all that that implies. To abandon the guns, and with them the support of their comrades of the infantry who depend on them to cover their defense of the front line, is unthinkable. The coolness, the steady courage, the readiness to stand fast to the last, evidenced by Major Miles and his men on that anxious afternoon, were none the less inspiring that they were not pressed to the final sacrifice. An officer not belonging to that battalion, whose duties had brought him to Charpentry, who saw and was impressed by the events of that day, went in person to the P. C. at Cheppy that evening and reported them to the Regimental Commander.

How often, in looking about us at the shortcomings of the world, when we see greed, and selfishness, and unscru-



pulousness, and intrenched evil at work; when some mighty wrong seems to be eating its way into society, threatening not only society as a whole, but each of us individually, and we see no hope of stopping its advance; how often, then, we feel that we would like to throw ourselves in one mighty blow against it, and how weak, how futile we feel to do it!

The nearest most of us will ever come, probably, to the thrill of realizing that desire was on that September day at Charpentry. When the whole world was recoiling from what seemed to be a threat at its foundations; when for four years pillage and rapine and terrorism and the lust of power had been gnawing at the vitals of France and her allies, and our own civilization and national standards were threatened, and for a moment the world held its breath for fear we would not arrive in time; then at last we were met face to face with the foe. No longer was it merely reading of what "the enemy" did and what "the Allies" did, of advances and retreats, of successes and failures, of high hopes and deadly fears, but with the sense of perspective and detachedness always present. Now it was "we," our concrete selves, and "now" on this autumn afternoon, while before us, just over the brow of the hill, was the enemy in person, armed, confident and aggressive. There was nothing anywhere more definite, more large, more critically decisive in importance, for the whole front was merely an extension and duplication of the actual situation before us. "We" were America, and home and our civilization; those confronting us were the invaders of Belgium, the pillagers of France, the coldly calculating annihilators of Serbia, the ruthless destroyers of women and children on sea and land. But that was not all, for Americans are of good-natured temperament, and soon forget to hate. Those invaders in front of our guns represented the German Junker's lust of power, his threat to humble the world by force of might, a black shadow against all that we held dear in civilization of civil liberty, of mental and moral idealism, of individual development and of good faith between men; unbridled national ambition run amuck, even against its own better self.



So, with the whole world sitting in judgment, with our people at home breathlessly waiting the outcome, the batteries spoke. Bang! Bang! Bang! Back! Back! Back! Blow on blow, and again: Back! Back! Back! Boom! Boom! Boom! All America struck with fullest strength in every blow; all Prussianism felt the blow, and staggered.

Hostile fire continued off and on during the night, but with no further casualties in the battalion. Evidently the enemy counter-attack had been given up, for the present, and our front lines continued to strengthen themselves.

Some time after the Armistice, while still in the Commerce area, the following letter was received from Chaplain Evan A. Edwards,\* of the 140th Infantry, in which he makes reference to the work of the batteries of the 129th F. A. at Charpentry:

"March 7, 1919.

"My Dear Lt. Lee:

"In addition to what I have already told you, we have Lieutenant —'s grave now identified. Major L—— has seen it duly marked. As I have not the address at hand, will you please let his family know I have given you this information for them.

"As I have been writing the history of my regiment, and really getting an outline of our whole movement in the Argonne, I have come to appreciate our artillery. The only artillery of our own I saw in action was near Charpentry. I think they had A, B and C of the 129th. Several times I passed from dressing stations into Charpentry, and each time they attracted and held my attention. Once I saw a gun apparently hit directly, but in an incredibly short time it was in action again. The guns were fired as steadily as if they were on the range back at Fort Sill. Of course I am not competent to judge of artillery fire, but I do know men, and they surely had men at those guns on September 29th.

"Personally, I feel that those batteries near Charpentry had a good deal to do with checking the flurry we had on Sunday, for there was little trouble in sending men forward after they saw this bunch on the job—as it was on the job.

"When the real history of that movement is written, we are going to hear a great deal more about the artillery. And I for one shall always have a much higher appreciation of it because of the nerve, steadiness, teamwork and speed shown by these men of the 129th.

Faithfully yours,


"EVAN A. EDWARDS,

"Chaplain 140th Inf."

At 19:30 hour (7:30 p. m.) Lieutenant Bourke, of the 129th, in liaison with the 69th Infantry Brigade at its

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\*Chaplain Edwards was cited in orders for his own work with the wounded. (G. O. 100, Hq. 35th Div., Nov. 15, 1918.)



P. C. in Baulny, sent the following to Major Miles at Charpentry:

"To C. O., 1st Bn., 129th F. A. (to be relayed to C. O., 129th F. A., C. O., 60th F. A. Brig.)

"69 Inf. Brig. Hq. informs me the outpost line runs from 14-87 thru 20-88 thru 22-92 to 24-93 (hectometric). The hect. co-ords. of main line of resistance runs from 24-75 thru 28-83 thru 33-86 to 35-85. Believe this is not far from line drawn on Major Miles' map, possibly 200 meters shorter range. A strong outpost, however, will be kept in Chaudron Fme."

Late that evening Lieutenant Homer F. Kennady, 129th Regimental Liaison officer on duty with the infantry, was found at the Divisional Central, under Baulny Church, stretched out in a semi-conscious condition from the effects of gas. He had collapsed after getting through to the P. C. at Cheppy this message, timed 23:00 hour (11 p. m.):

"To Ogee (Commanding Officer, 129th F. A.):

"Counter battery barrage satisfactory. German battery out of action. Two German 150 tys located 500 meters Flaville on crest range 8,000 meters. Guns have not been firing for last hour, so cannot observe effect of fire tonight. KENNADY."



Exermont. Looking Northeast From About the Advanced Position of the 137th Infantry.

## CHAPTER XII.

### THE LINE HOLDS.

During the night of the 29th-30th our guns were kept laid on their normal barrages. Night and day a gun-crew was on duty at each gun, ready instantly for any call. German 77s and 105s fell at intervals in front of our 2nd Battalion position, but no casualties were suffered. Hostile shell fire continued a large part of the night, and C Battery in particular suffered from a mustard-gas attack



An Artillery Battery in action, in gas-masks. Battery A, 108th F. A. (28th Div'n) at Varennes, just west of 2nd Battalion, 129th F. A. (U. S. Official.)

which badly infected the swampy underbrush in its rear, where it could not readily be treated with lime. Several men were gas-burned. The masks, however, as usual, gave good protection to the eyes and lungs, and only one man was seriously gassed.

The enemy was now evidently concentrating all along the American front in this sector. Our infantry and engineers, firmly occupying the new line they had established along Baulny plain, extending northeastwardly along the ridge just south of Chaudron Farm, confident of their ability to hold, were alert for any move. The 129th was maintaining close liaison with the front line, and our 1st Battalion had established a new forward O. P. in the shattered steeple of Baulny Church.

At 4:30 a. m. on September 30th, the 1st Battalion delivered a normal barrage\* along the general line northward from L'Esperance toward "Drachen," on the south edge of Montrebeau Woods, to the north and west of Chaudron Farm. This was to the left of the infantry outposts as outlined from 69th Brigade P. C., and covered the slope of the hillside leading up from the Route Nationale to the higher ground toward Montrebeau Woods. Early in the morning the Germans formed for an attack out of these woods, but a hurried call for artillery barrage from both battalions of the 129th was delivered with a promptness and accuracy which effectually stopped them, and drove them back in disorder.†

Our fire continued along the edge of Montrebeau Woods all the forenoon. At 10:25 a. m. the following

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\*A "normal barrage" is one for which the artillery has the data figured upon which the guns are kept "laid" when not actually firing elsewhere; covering usually the terrain over which the enemy may be expected to advance, or protecting our own lines or some special point therein; so that the barrage can be fired at the desired spot without delay whenever called for. Its importance is well illustrated by this barrage at 4:30 a. m., and the one later the same morning, in repelling the German counter-attack and in protecting the dressing-station at Chaudron Farm, a little to the east. The following extract from an account by 1st Lieut. Otto L. H. Hine, of the Dental Corps, on active duty caring for the wounded at the front, is of interest:

"On September 29th-30th, 1918, I was in charge of the Second Batt'n 139th Inf. dressing station at Chaudron Farm. At 2 A. M. on September 30th I applied to the 129th Field Artillery for artillery protection for Chaudron Farm, where 94 patients lay. This was done because there were only 25 infantrymen in front of the place, the main line having been drawn back on the hill between Charpentry and the Farm. I was referred to the Observation Post at Baulny, which was also the temporary Brigade Headquarters for the 70th Inf. Brigade. There I met an artillery lieutenant, and I received the promise of a barrage over the Farm and across the road about 25-50 yards in front of the Farm. The barrage was to start at 4:30 A. M. Sept. 30th. I left the O. P. at Baulny and returned to the Farm, and withdrew the infantry protection just as the first shells of the barrage whistled over. The barrage continued until the time, about 1:30 P. M., when I left the station to accelerate the action of the litter-bearers; and as the evacuation was soon completed I never returned to the Farm. The barrage was well laid and absolutely effective."

†Report of Lt. Col. Stayton, 110th Engineers.

message was sent back by Major Hudson of the 110th Engineers, from his position in the front line:

"Hq. 1st B'n. 110th Engineers.

In position.

30 Sept. 18. 10:25 A. M.

The co-ordination between artillery, machine-gun and infantry fire has been splendidly maintained and if kept up we can hold this hill till the cows come home. Disposition of troops is unchanged. B Co. in reserve except two platoons. We are holding all stray Engrs. with the reserve.

O. Hudson"

A heavy hostile fire, including some gas, continued at intervals all day, wounding numbers of men, in Battery A in particular. Shell fire from the enemy on the Sanitary Train dressing station at Charpentry also caused some casualties.

At 3:20 p. m. (Sept. 30th) Colonel Clark, commanding the Engineers' Line, from his "pill-box" P. C. at the front, sent the following to Major Miles at Charpentry:



"Pill-box" on Baulny Hill, P. C. of 110th Engineers.

"From: Col. Clark. How Sent

At: P. C. Phone.

Date: 30 Sept. Hour: 15:20.

To: Major Miles.

Fire at once on Montrebeau Woods, sweeping the front of the woods in front and to right edge, going at least 200 meters inside the woods.

Col. Clark."

This request, addressed to the 1st Battalion commander, was promptly complied with.

Meantime the 2nd Battalion, from its position northwest of Cheppy, after its part in the early morning barrage which repelled the German counter-attacks, continued its supporting fire during the day. At hour 15:50 (3:30 p. m.) while the 1st Battalion was putting over the barrage requested of it by Colonel Clark on his front, the 2nd Battalion delivered an effective fire on the left, along the main line of approach for the enemy from the north. Beginning at L'Esperance, opposite Apremont (0883), the range was increased one degree at hour 16:15 and continued to hour 16:53. And at hour 19:33 (7:33 p. m.) on a rocket call,

a ten-minute barrage was directed at L'Esperance. The fierce reception he had received in the morning, however, and this continued harassment all the afternoon, had evidently done its work, for no further counter-attack of great strength was undertaken by the enemy during the day.



1st Division in Cheppy, October 1st.

All day of the 30th there were indications of infantry relief. The 1st Division troops were coming up, and Cheppy was soon alive with them. Riding out on the shell-torn Route Nationale, to the right and left could be seen thin lines of troops stretched across the hills; now advancing deliberately, at a walk; now lying down to make less of a target for the searching shell fire; rising again and ever forward. But the greater part of the relief was accomplished at night, and the morning of October 1st found the 35th Division troops well started toward the rear, for a well-earned and much-needed week of rest, re-equipment and replacement of losses. "Rest," that is, from fighting and danger, but busy days of reorganization.

It is interesting to note that the German 1st Guard Division, opposing the 35th, was relieved the same day, a few hours earlier. (See Appendix T.)

The relief of the 35th Division was by the 1st Division, which carried on the advance in this sector. On the night of the 30th of September, however, there appears to have been some plan for using the 82nd Division in connection with it, and a few units were actually brought up on the left, and temporarily effected the relief at that point.\* Some days later it did move up the Aire valley and assisted in the final clearing of the German defense which had been such a thorn in the 35th Division's left flank.

The artillery brigade, however, including the 129th F. A., stayed on the job; and the morning of October 1st found them in support of the 1st Division.†

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\*"Sept. 30, 1918. Troops held in reserve of Engineers who held first line. 327th Regiment of 82nd Division relieved 137th Regiment during night."—War Diary, 2nd Bn., 137th Inf.

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†First Army 29 September 1918, 16 hr. 30 min.

Field Order No. 30.

1. (a) The 1st Division is relieved from the 3d Corps and assigned to the 1st Corps. It will be moved by bus and marching at once to the region of Neuville and will tonight relieve the 35th Division as far as practicable. The artillery relief will be at the discretion of the Commanding General, 1st Corps.

By Command of General Pershing.

H. A. Drum, Chief of Staff."

"2nd October, 1918, 2.00 Hr.  
35th Division, France.

Field Orders No. 51

1. The 35th Division, less artillery and artillery section of Ammunition Train, and Ambulance Section of Sanitary Train, will proceed by marching to the area south of Cheppy.

2. The Division P. C. will close at Cheppy at 12 noon, 2nd Oct. and open at Auxeville same hour and date.

Peter E. Traub  
Major General U. S. A. Commanding."

"1st Army 2 Oct. 1918—15 hours.

Field Order No. 34.

3. (c) The 35th Division now assembling in the rear zone of the 1st Corps will be moved by marching to the region of Triaucourt, for rest and refitting. Its movement out of the 1st Corps zone into region of Triaucourt will be directed in special orders from these headquarters upon due notice from the Corps Commander that the Division is ready to move. The artillery of the Division will remain with the 1st Corps until its relief can be effected.

After the relief of the Division from duty in the 1st Corps it will be in Army Reserve. It will continue to be attached to the 1st Corps."



## CHAPTER XIII.

### SUPPORTING THE 1ST DIVISION.

On the morning of October 1st, the enemy, evidently aware of some movement of our troops, incident to the relief of the 35th Division, was restless and threatening. The 2nd Battalion kept itself in readiness for a defensive fire in front of our infantry lines (now occupied by the 18th and 28th Infantry of the 1st Division) and fired a short barrage of about 450 rounds at about 9:30 a. m. along the southeast edge of the woods (1789-1989), and several hundred rounds in the Bois de Taille l'Abbe, a strong German position to the west of Apremont and south of Chatel Chehery.\*

At the same time the 1st Battalion was devoting a part of its attention to the concentration of enemy batteries and supply stations in front of the 28th Division in the adjoining sector, which had given the 35th Division, and now the 1st Division, so much annoyance on its flank. At 7 a. m. B Battery opened fire on Chatel Chehery and at 8:45 a. m. the 1st Battalion fire was laid on a rectangle established by co-ordinates between Apremont and Chatel Chehery. Fire on other designated targets, as called for by the



Highway Bridge at Apremont.

\*See Map No. 14.

\*The 28th Division on our left was still fighting in the Aire valley and to the west of it, along a line now running nearly south from a point just northwest of Apremont, where it had liaison with the 35th. (See Appendix R, Oct. 1st, and Appendix S, Sept. 29-30, and Map 16-A.) Not far distant from us, between Varennes and Montblainville, the three battalions of the 60th C. A. C., of the Army Artillery, were in position, giving the aid of their 155 m.m. guns in counter-battery work in both the 28th and the 35th Division sectors.

infantry, continued during the day; on Hill 223 (north of Chatel Chehery), and on Montrebeau Woods.

The enemy, apparently from the general direction of Apremont, continued his active artillery fire with H. E. and gas on our battery positions. During the night of October 1st-2nd F Battery suffered a brisk hostile bombardment, resulting in the loss of six men. Private Arthur J. Breihan was killed outright, and several others wounded. Of these, Ellsworth Wilson had both feet shot off, and he lived only a short time after being carried to the Field Hospital. At the same time a limber was hit and the ammunition in it destroyed, and shells falling at the battery horse-line killed 17 horses. A very few shells rightly directed, in addition to the loss in human life inflicted, can



Looking west toward Apremont from Baulny Ridge at about 301.2-278.1.

do a large amount of damage to the essential equipment of an artillery battery, damage which it is one of the constant problems of the artillery to prevent or overcome, in order not to fall short in its effective usefulness.

Difficulty was found in discovering with any accuracy the locations of enemy artillery positions; but by establishing lateral O. P.'s it was determined that the fire of their 77s was from the direction 4900 to 5000 Y-Azimuth from our 1st Battalion position at Charpentry, which would be in the general direction of the wooded hills southwest of Apremont and beyond.

For two days, October 1 and 2, after the 35th Division infantry had been relieved, the 60th F. A. Brigade



Cheppy, October 1, 1918. Incoming 1st Div'n men watering their horses below the bridge, near F Battery's kitchen.

(128th F. A., 129th F. A., 130th F. A. and 110th Ammunition Train) with the Ambulance Companies at Charpentry, remained in support of the relieving troops of the 1st Division, whose artillery was for some reason delayed in taking position. During the time of the infantry relief, of course, no forward movement on their part was undertaken; and

the enemy infantry, also, lay comparatively quiet, attempting no large counter-attack. Our batteries therefore were not in those days called upon for many heavy barrages, either in support of advances or in protection against enemy counter-attacks. They kept their guns laid on the normal barrages, ready for instant service, and from time to time responded to calls.

The Germans were contesting the ground vigorously, and from their points of vantage across the Aire and on the heights beyond Exermont, continued their artillery resistance, bombarding in the region of Montblainville, Charpentry and Apremont,\* and the 1st Division Infantry, preparing for their new advance, suffered severely.

All the time our batteries kept themselves vigilantly ready for any emergency, either to repel enemy counter-attacks, or to shell special targets as called for by the infantry. Hostile fire on our battery positions continued, and the road between Cheppy and Charpentry, along which all supplies for the front came, was subjected to an almost continuous harassing fire, to go through which it was at times necessary, literally, to calculate with extreme nicety the time between shells, in order to hurry past a given spot where the shells were falling with none too deliberate regularity. At night, especially, the enemy fire was particularly

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\*See Summary of Intelligence, 1st Army, Oct. 2nd, Appendix R. See also Appendix T.

harassing, and at Charpentry a considerable part of it was with gas shells. On October 1st, Private Charles R. Boblitt of A Battery was killed, and during the following night and



The Romagne Road Northeast of Charpentry.

early morning the gas-fire was very heavy. C Battery had four men gassed or burned. In B Battery the shelling was most severe just back of the gun position at the horse-line behind what was commonly known as the "Roman Road," more accurately the Romagne Road. This road, like many of the roads in France, was lined with trees; and some

of the shells, coming through these trees, were detonated by their sensitive fuses striking the branches, and scattered their shell fragments at points otherwise partially protected from direct fire. In this manner Private Fred H. Hickman and Private Harry Kendall were killed by shell fire, and Private Robert H. Turner by gas. Seven men were wounded by shell-fire, and thirty-three men gassed more or less severely. At the same time 46 horses were killed; and four limbers, a water-cart and a ration-cart were destroyed. Corporal Clyde C. Chilson, Gas N. C. O., worked heroically in the gassed area for the protection of the men, until and after he himself was gassed. He died several days later from the effects of gas.† The horses, thus subjected to a sacrifice of suffering they could not understand, were not forgotten. The men were loyal to their duty, dangerous and undramatic though it might seem. Among others, Private Horace Tucker, of B Battery, remained with the horses under fire, adjusting their respirators; then, though himself gassed, assisted in carrying back the wounded till he was wounded by shell fire.\*

†Corporal Chilson was later cited in orders for this gallantry in action. (Citation Orders, No. 9, G. H. Q., A. E. F., Aug. 1, 1920.)

\*After his return home he died from the effects of his experience, and may properly be listed as one who lost his life in action, and in the service of his fellows.



Afterward. "B" Battery's "Horse-line" at Charpentry.

Too much credit cannot be given to the 110th Ammunition Train, and to our own ammunition officers, for their tireless and successful efforts in keeping the batteries supplied at all times during this battle. The work of the Train, and of Lieut. Edgar C. Kennedy, 129th F. A., who, under Captain Jobes, had direct charge of the

ammunition delivery, with the men under their commands, can best be commended by saying that at the times of heaviest fire, as on September 29th, when the 1st Battalion alone at the advanced position in Charpentry fired more than 3200 rounds, and the 2nd Battalion 2800 rounds, there was no shortage in the supply.† And this, too, in face of the fact that the ammunition had to be brought forward over the open road which was almost continuously under fire. There was no excitement of battle, no fever of combat, for the drivers who guided their carriages laden with high explosives, along those slippery, shell-shattered roads up to the gun positions, and then back for more; but they did their work in as matter of fact a way as driving the cows to pasture.

Aeroplanes from both sides were much in evidence all during the battle and it could not be said that either controlled the air. Actual aerial battles were few; but observation planes were numerous. The 1st Battalion reported that planes with friendly insignia, flying over their position, were repeatedly followed by a hostile shell-fire,

†Total ammunition fired by 129th F. A., in first week of Meuse-Argonne Offensive. From Official Regimental Reports.

Sept.	26th	11,806 rounds
"	27th	2,445 "
"	28th	3,656 "
"	29th	6,062 "
"	30th	7,423 "
Oct.	1st	1,366 "
"	2nd	285 "
Total		33,043 "

seeming to justify the conclusion that the enemy were using Allied insignia on their planes.

Our defensive aeroplanes were not sufficient for the needs. On the 26th, during the advance, a hostile plane brought down three Allied balloons, but was itself brought down shortly afterward. Two or three days later a single German plane brought down two Allied observation balloons, off to the east, within view of our sector, within five minutes of each other, without immediate interference. On the 27th, as mentioned above, the 2nd Battalion was bombed shortly after taking position near Cheppy, by hostile aeroplanes.

On October 2nd, about 5 p. m., seven German planes



Cross-Road Shrine Northwest of Cheppy.

flew from west to east over the 2nd Battalion position. They met a warm reception from the ground from machine guns, rifles, and every form of anti-aircraft weapon within range or seeming range; but unaffected by them they sailed deliberately over us several times, firing their machine guns and dropping bombs. The Amer-

ican fire had the effect, however, of sufficiently disconcerting them to prevent accurate direction of their fire; and their missiles for the most part did little damage. Almost the last one dropped, however, fell near the cross-roads at the wayside shrine on the right end of the battalion, and a fragment of shell, or a machine-gun bullet, or both, struck Private Stirling R. Speirs of F Battery, then on duty as a courier from the regimental headquarters. Carried quickly back to the dressing station, he seemed then beyond hope of recovery. It was a delight to all his comrades, therefore, when long afterwards they marched in their homecoming parade in Kansas City, to find that he had recovered and had come up from his home in St. Louis to march with them.

This was the last casualty the regiment suffered in the

Argonne. An officer who happened to be at his side when he fell was the same one who had helped to carry back Corporal Cantoni when he was struck in the bombardment of the position on Hill 290; and he always retained a feeling of satisfaction that he had been present and able to thus give personal assistance to both the first man and the last one, in the 129th, who were struck by hostile fire in this battle.

On the evening of October 2nd, at 9 p. m. the 1st Artillery Brigade of the 1st Division assumed our mission, becoming responsible for all artillery fire which might thereafter be called for in that sector. Pursuant to F. O. Hq. 60 F. A. Brig., Oct. 2, 1918, the 129th prepared to withdraw.

Orders were received by the 1st Battalion at Charpen-try to move out of their position at 11 o'clock p. m., October 2nd. At that hour the area around the position and the road leading back toward Cheppy and Varennes was under a heavy and steady shell-fire. B Battery's ammunition dump was blown up, and shells were bursting on the cross-roads continually.

To move with the minimum of risk the horses were kept harnessed back at the horse-line, and whenever there was an apparent temporary lull in the fire, enough would be brought down for one carriage at a time. In this way, section by section, the several batteries were moved out, the last one getting away about 5 a. m., and proceeded back up the hill and the Route Nationale to near Varennes, where they bivouaced. B Battery's loss in horses the night before had been so great that it required the aid of trucks back up the hill to the regimental assembly point, where horses were obtained from within the regiment. Due to this shortage of horses, it was necessary to leave behind C Battery's fourgon of signal equipment, and one gun and two caissons of B Battery, which remained there with a detail under Lieut. Sterling M. Newton until later in the day, when transportation was returned for them.

Except for this detail, the last to leave were Captain McGee, Captain Marks, and Chaplain Tiernan, who walked up the hill together. The road was still under shell-fire, and

Captain Marks noticed that Chaplain Tiernan was dragging behind.

"Come along," he urged laughingly, "haven't you had enough of this road?"

"Oh, let's not hurry," answered the Chaplain.

He was even then suffering from the effects of gas inhaled during his tireless and devoted work among the men at the front. He was shortly afterward evacuated to a base hospital, from which he did not return to the regiment for several weeks.

The 2nd Battalion, following its farewell exchange with the aerial enemy on the late afternoon of the 2nd, and its formal relief at 9 p. m., remained in position till towards midnight, when it moved out by way of Varennes, and bivouaced.

In organization, in unified working efficiency, in the aggressive morale of the personnel, in ammunition and in artillery equipment, the regiment was fit and willing to continue in action with the 1st Division, as desired by Gen-



Aeroplane view of Varennes. The road shown on left center was that followed by 129th on withdrawal.



eral Summerall of that division, in addition to his own artillery, but the plan was abandoned because of the feared difficulty of supplying sufficient ammunition for two full brigades in a rapid advance. General Summerall, himself an artilleryman, knew the value of artillery and how to adapt the movements of his division so as to get the best results from its co-operation, and it would have been a pleasure to have served under him.\*

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\*It is essential, to get the maximum of effectiveness in results from the artillery, to have close and accurate liaison and communication with the infantry; and to attain that maximum the greatest possible understanding of and training in the technique and practical working methods of the artillery on the part of the infantry officers is desirable. It is the function of the artillery to support the infantry, not of the infantry to support the artillery; and the infantry officer should understand the nature and elements of that support as well as the fact of needing it. This would enable him, too, to understand more clearly the functioning of the enemy artillery whose fire he meets, and how to minimize its effectiveness. To know what kind of artillery fire can be most effective in a given case in giving the support needed, how to ask for it, how to adjust themselves to it so as to enable it to be fired with the best results, and how to give in the briefest and clearest way the information needed by the artillery to enable it to deliver its fire promptly and accurately, are fundamental requirements. And it is equally necessary to know what the artillery cannot do under a given condition, so as not to place the infantry in an untenable and unsupportable situation; to co-ordinate closely with the artillery as to time, so as to avoid losing the benefit of the rolling barrage by failure to follow it promptly; and also to be in constant touch with the adjoining infantry units, both laterally and between advance and support, so that artillery fire in support of one will not endanger others, a situation very easy to arise. The infantryman, whose task it is to move forward over the terrain, when met with hostile fire only knows that he wants it stopped, and that quickly; and meantime to fight and endure. The artilleryman standing at his gun is ready and zealous to respond. But while modestly accepting all the commendation which may be accorded him, the artilleryman must disclaim a presumption of omniscience. Oft recurring messages from the hard-pressed infantryman to the effect that "we are under heavy fire and need artillery support" bear tribute to his sturdy valor and his steadfastness under hard conditions, but furnish no basis for determining whence the fire comes, nor as to the alternating bends and salients in his own front line. Between the infantryman and the artilleryman there is one thing, and only one thing, necessary to secure effective results. That is liaison, and that involves an instructed intelligence by those responsible, in the possibilities, limitations and functioning methods of each branch of the service; a constant, ready, active and intelligent communication between the different parts of the front, between them and the artillery and other supporting elements, and by all with the directing center of the whole movement, the Division Post of Command.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### "THE 35TH DIVISION REPORTS."

During the week the 35th Division had established its front nine kilometers in advance of the line from which it launched its attack on the morning of the 26th, and this through some of the typically strong German first positions in the defensive line. This does not include the additional three kilometers or more made in the daring advance of the 35th Division detachments which drove through and beyond Exermont to the foot of Hill 240.

The 1st Division, which assumed the sector of the 35th Division, was one of the best in the A. E. F. and justifiably points with pride to its long record of efficient service on many fields. It held the line taken over from the 35th from October 1st until October 4th. On that date it went forward in a new drive, which one of its historians\* describes as "the hardest experience of its existence—the Meuse-Argonne offensive," and adds, "If at the second battle of the Marne, the 38th Regular Infantry wrote one of the brightest pages in our military history, the 1st Division in the ruin and desolation of the Argonne turned the page and continued the story to the everlasting glory of the Regular Army of the United States. \* \* \* During its eleven days in line it had advanced seven kilometers, taken all objectives, and was relieved only because of the exhaustion and depletion of the troops."

That this is a tribute well bestowed it is a pleasure to testify. And by no one can it be testified to with more appreciative knowledge of the facts than by the men of the 35th Division. As above stated, and as shown by the official map of the Argonne-Meuse Offensive, issued by

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\*Official Souvenir Program issued on 1st Division's return home, N. Y., Sept. 10, 1919.

G. H. Q.,\* the farthest advance of the 1st Division in the seven days from October 4th to October 11th was seven kilometers. Their losses in this drive were close to 9,000 men. On this same front, including at the outset the "First Position," with its strong points of Vauquois, Boureuilles, the Bois de Rossignol and the Balkan and Zurich trenches, and the "Second Position" at Charpentry and Baulny, the same map shows that in the three days from the morning of September 26th, the opening day of the drive, to the night of the 28th when the 35th Division is given its maximum credit, no greater advance was made in the whole American front, than that, over ten kilometers, by the 35th and 91st Divisions, which in this, their first major offensive, occupied adjoining sectors of the front from Varennes eastward. No other division in the American army, as indicated on that map, made a greater advance during the same period of time, nor so great in any equal length of time during what General Pershing calls "The First and Second Phases"; that is, in the big offensives from September 26th to November 1st. After that time, it is fair to say, the strongly entrenched First, Intermediate and Second Positions, through which the 35th Division and its companion divisions had made their advance, had long been passed, and the German withdrawal, though still vigorously contested, was fairly on the way.

After September 28th the problem before the 35th Division became more than ever complicated with the conditions on its left in the adjoining sector occupied by the 28th Division, and by that of the 77th Division still farther west. The dense woods through which the 77th and the left flank of the 28th were compelled to operate furnished cover for a veritable hornets' nest of machine-gun emplacements, and from the start those divisions advanced but slowly. As their opposition continued firm, the right of the 28th Division (later with the co-operation of the 82nd Division), worked along up the western side of the Aire Valley, the eastern side of which had been cleared by the 35th, and thus flanked the enemy, while the 77th, on the left of the 28th, continued its frontal attack through the Argonne

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\*See Map No. 16A. From this and Map 13 it appears that the 35th, in its Exermont advance, was the first division to reach the American Army Objective

Forest. These tactics were eventually successful. But on September 28th and 29th, when the 35th was hammering its way forward through Montrebeau Woods and into Exermont, the Germans still held the terrain on their left, as far southward as the Bois de Apremont west of Montblainville, a good two miles to the 35th's rear, thus in effect broadening by that amount a front which was already second to none. From all along this flank the enemy poured a murderous fire into the 35th's infantry.\* Thus subjected to a fire from practically three sides it seemed to those in command imperative to effect a withdrawal of their salient to a line across the plain in closer touch with the 28th Division, though the men who were there still maintain that with reasonable reinforcements, if such were possible, they could have held the advanced line in Exermont.

This salient, even after the withdrawal of the advance, appears on the map, thrusting its nose sharply northward, with its left flank dropping abruptly to the rear. But the map does not show the whole truth; for at the foot of the slopes of Hill 240 (shown on some of the maps as "Montrefagne"), north of Exermont, are buried the venturesome men from the 35th Division Infantry who fell there on September 29th, twelve kilometers from where they went over the top three days before. Including this courageous but unsecured stroke the 35th's advance exceeded any on the American front. No division had a more difficult task, with its position thus in the open, and exposed to fire on its flanks as well as its front. The 33rd and 80th Divisions, along the Meuse on the American right, had a somewhat similar problem.

Comparisons of this sort are of value, not as indicating any relative superiority or otherwise as between divisions, for each had its own problems to meet, and none failed to rise to the emergency; but only as they display the bitter opposition which the Germans were making on this front, and as they tend to show whether any division, old or new, when at a given time offered its opportunity, made good to the extent of that opportunity. For judgment by this standard the 35th Division can review its record with confidence.

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\*See also Appendix T, "Sept. 29-30."

There is no single accomplishment, in all the records of the A. E. F., with which that of the 35th Division in the Argonne cannot be compared with satisfaction to its members and pride by its friends, in its spirit, its initiative, its vehement audacity, its countless acts of personal courage, and in the net results it achieved.\*

That its losses, over 7,000, were heavy,† on a front where the records show all losses were heavy, is a tribute to the determined valor of its personnel, which, in the face of an enemy long entrenched and defending a line vital to the security of his whole French front, pressed impetuously forward in spite of difficulties and losses, for the accomplishment of results, disdaining the greater security of a more deliberate but less definite type of warfare. With this ideal, they, with their like-spirited comrades on the whole front, dared, did and suffered, and so ended the war in 1918 instead of a year later. They did not complain, nor desire their friends at home to complain, of that which to them was a matter of "solemn pride" in the realizing consciousness of a hard task well performed. Nor can the dust untimely raised by the contentious bickerings of self-constituted champions obscure the brilliant luster of their achievement, nor efface the loving memory in the hearts of those who were there of the steadfast courage and heroic sacrifice of their comrades who still sleep on Baulny Hill.

The 129th F. A., after nearly 100 miles of forced marching at night under full equipment to reach the Argonne front, arrived on schedule time† and took position on the night of September 22-23, on Hill 290. Starting from this hill, from which it delivered its initial barrage on the morning of September 26th, keeping always within range of the infantry and practically overtaking them at Cheppy on the 27th, it advanced on the 28th to a total of 11 kilometers at Charpentry, the foremost position attained by any artillery in the Division; a front which it held till relieved by the artillery of the 1st Division on the night of October 2-3.

\*See Map No. 16-A.

†The casualties of the 35th Division, as given by the Statistical Section, A. G. O., 1st Army, were: Officers, 246; men, 7,168; total, 7,414. This was over 40 per cent of both officers and men actually engaged. See Appendix X. For losses of 129th F. A., see page 195.

†F. O. 21 Hq., 1st Army, Sept. 21, 1918; Appendix G.

It is entitled to look back with satisfaction to the fact that it was at all times ready to perform, and did perform (often under very trying conditions), every task or responsibility allotted to it. It took part in the opening barrage, first for one hour cutting the wire and demolishing the permanent defenses on a kilometer of the front line, from Boureuilles eastward, and then firing a rolling barrage continuing for  $2\frac{1}{2}$  kilometers north from Vauquois.\* Under this fire the defenses of Boureuilles were destroyed, Vauquois Hill and the German front line trenches were taken, and our infantry advanced to the borders of Cheppy. Ordered then to cease firing and advance, turning its mission over to others for the time being, the 129th went forward under shell-fire, over trackless fields of mud. The difficulties were enormous, but that was part of the job. The horses (bless their old hides!) did their part, worn and weary with long weeks of strain though they were. So did the men, with shoulders at the wheel and breasts at the ropes. And they arrived; constantly gaining on the infantry, from whom they were at no time thereafter so far distant as they were at the "jump-off."

Battery D went into position before Boureuilles at mid-day, and Batteries A and F went into "Action Left" in the open during the afternoon, but with no information available, even at Division Headquarters, as to the position of the advancing front-line troops, they were unable to deliver the fire they were prepared for, and continued to press forward. Taking position that evening behind Hill 221, from which it reported to Division Headquarters at 6 p. m., there was never a minute of time thereafter on any day or hour of the advance, when the regiment was not ready to deliver fire when called upon, or when it could by its own efforts obtain information upon which to determine its targets.

From that time the two battalions advanced in turn, close behind the infantry, as the drive progressed, to Cheppy and Charpentry and the edge of Baulny. Always the batteries of one battalion (and except for alternate brief periods of movement those of both battalions), were ready to fire

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\*See Barrage Maps Nos. 8 and 9.

at all times. And they did fire with untiring readiness, doing all that men could do, and only regretting they could not manifold themselves for the benefit of their comrades at the front line. Alert for any call, their only limitation was that of securing reliable information from the front lines; meantime maintaining harassing fire on the enemy reserves of men and ammunition, on his main avenue of reinforcement and supply along the Route Nationale from the northwest, and stoutly combatting the cross-fire of his flanking batteries to the west. Their harassing fire on the concentration of hostile troops in Charpentry and Baulny all the afternoon of the 27th, followed by their suddenly called for but promptly delivered creeping fire at 5:30 p. m., laid the way for the capture of those towns under the intrepid attack of our infantry at the latter hour. Their fierce barrage on the afternoon of the 29th, and again on the morning of the 30th, shattered the heavy German counter-attacks of those days; and their guns protected the memorable movement of those valorous men who pushed their way through Exermont.

From their positions, some of which were scarcely more than half a mile from the front lines, they effectively covered the relief of the 35th Division Infantry on the night of the 30th. Remaining on duty with the 1st Division for two days after the rest of the 35th Division was relieved, they won the commendation of the 1st Division's commander. At the close, they turned over their missions to their successors on the night of Oct. 2nd; and though they had lost scores of horses from enemy shell fire on their positions, they withdrew to their designated rest area in good order, with their own horse-power.

The other regiments of the 60th F. A. Brigade, the 128th F. A., the 130th F. A. and the 110th Trench Mortar Battery, performed their several missions of fire with like zeal, and with the 129th F. A. and the 110th Ammunition Train shared the commendation given by General Summerall of the 1st Division for the support rendered by the brigade.\*

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\*Letter Oct. 2, 1918, C. G. 1st Div'n to C. G. 35th Div'n.



Scale in miles 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100  
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100  
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100



100

[illegible]

100

100

1997

FROM JALISCO

100

32 JULY 2011

4000

2.

307,  
1544.

1000

2025

571

15

The regimental Radio Officer, Lieutenant Walter G. Slagle, had established his wireless apparatus, an unusually powerful one, with a very proficient detail of operators under Sergeant Siegfried, on Hill 290, and after the movement forward re-established it, first near the Bois de Ros-signal and later on the wooded hill just out of Cheppy; while each of the two battalions established its radio station



Regimental Radio Detail.

upon taking position. They were all up and in working order till the last moment before the regiment moved on the morning of October 3rd. During this time they received and reported the daily "Sondage" or weather data of barometer, temperature and wind (of much assistance in accurate artil-

lery firing), had daily received and transmitted the official time from the Eiffel Tower, and could read the cross-mess-ages of all sorts coming from along the front. They had received on September 23rd the latest code calls for the Di- vision, but it developed later that our Brigade Headquarters, by some mishap, were attempting to work under the old code used in the Vosges. Apparently the infantry had no send- ing equipment, and only once did an aeroplane call in to the regimental station, and it did not give any information of value.\*

One of the hardest fights, and one of the most trying, was that made by the telephone details in maintaining com- munications. On Hill 290 there was complete communica- tion throughout the regiment, and Lieut. Geo. M. Arrow- smith, Regimental Telephone Officer, had prepared to lay a wire to the infantry lines as well. This offer, however, was

\*"There was an Aerial Liaison Officer detailed for service with our division and although I saw him every day and requested him to make arrangements for 'shoots,' we did not during any of that time have a call from any of our air planes. About September 30th the Liaison Officer advised that he had made arrangements for air plane service and we designated our 2nd Battalion to do the shooting. However, on that same afternoon I witnessed an air battle between several of our planes and about three German planes, and one plane came down in flames, which I was afterwards advised by the Aerial Liaison Officer was our artillery plane, and therefore, as it was the only one they had, that we would do no shooting."—From report by Lieut. Walter G. Slagle, Radio Officer, 129th F. A.

declined by the infantry organization to whom it was made. At Hill 221 lines were promptly laid to the regimental P. C., and again promptly transferred to the new P. C. in Cheppy on the 27th, and to the 2nd Battalion P. C. when it moved up northwest of the town. Their real troubles, however, developed when they began to lay the wire to the new 1st Battalion position in Charpentry on the 28th. All day and night they struggled to keep it in order, against constant destruction by shell-fire, by being torn up by tanks and by passing troops. On the 29th Capt. Jobs, of the Supply Company, after some vigilant effort, aided by his assistant, Lieut. C. C. Bundschu (always an efficient and conscientious ordnance and supply officer), had procured and sent forward 10 or 11 miles of wire. With this fresh supply, Lieut. Arrowsmith's men laid a new line along the narrow-gauge line up the Buanthe Valley to Charpentry, which continued in use, though requiring constant attention because of shell-fire, until the regiment was relieved. On October 1st an additional 10 miles of wire was brought up which had been secured by Lieut. Col. Elliott, but because of the withdrawal of the regiment the night of the 2nd it was not needed and was left to our successors.

Throughout the engagement, and always, the regimental organization, as a unit, and every part of it, functioned smoothly, promptly and co-ordinatedly at all times. From top to bottom, and across, every man was on duty when and where he was supposed to be, without confusion, delay or lost motion. The regimental commander was always in command, issuing his orders with precision and directness; the battalion commanders were with their battalions, and executed the movements and missions assigned them promptly, understandingly and effectively; the battery commanders, and all the men under them, responded with spirit and enthusiasm, and with a personal initiative which achieved results quickly and with effect. The same spirit which was developed in Camp Doniphan of keen and conscious rivalry between batteries to win the most favorable reports on their efficiency, now, in a larger and more serious field, found expression in a working morale it would not be easy to surpass.

The men at the echelon caring for and forwarding

supplies and equipment; keeping up the necessary routine work, but standing ready at all times to act as reserves; under fire and unable to strike back; responding with almost automatic readiness to every call upon their functioning, were no small element in the strength which we felt was in our line.

To attain anything like a vivid impression and understanding of events in the battle, it is necessary as far as possible to put one's self in the place of those who were there, with the uncertainties, the constant and rapid succession of events, the keen personal initiative which as constantly sought to take advantage of them, the necessity for quick decisions, the individual limitations, the environment of every sort, all of which go to differentiate a present "now" from the perspective, the afterthought and the after-knowledge which come later; and he is indeed a bold man who would undertake, with any assumption of finality, to understand or tell the story of those days, without endeavoring to feel and reproduce in imagination the spirit and the situation which were there.

For this no better aid can now be had, perhaps, than is found in the daily intelligence reports to Headquarters of the American 1st Army; in form brief, laconic and undramatic, but fresh with the hopes, the enthusiasms, the balancing of events, the tragedies and anxieties, and the keen determination of the living present. With them should be read, also, the Summary of Operations made up at the same headquarters, the chronological record of events as they occurred.

In the same connection it is of interest to read similar reports which came to the German Headquarters through their own Intelligence Service; to get their story of events with which we are familiar from our own side, and to observe how far they were correct or in error in the conclusions they drew as to American troops and movements.\*

The casualties in the 129th F. A. in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive were:

Killed in action.....	23
Wounded and gassed.....	106
Total.....	129

This was 10% of the regiment's actual strength, and approximately 20% of the strength of the firing batteries.

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\*See Appendices R, S and T.

## CHAPTER XV.

### RELIEF AND RE-EQUIPMENT.

In the early morning of October 3rd the full regiment moved through Varennes southwestward through what a week previous had been well within the German lines.

Already a regiment of American colored troops were hard at work repairing the road. Cemeteries by the roadside containing monuments of considerable pretentiousness commemorating German dead, showed what a feeling of permanence had existed in the invaders' minds.

After a noon-day mess in the road on the hillside, and passing on to Four-de-Paris, which had long been a hotly contested point between the French and Germans, the regiment turned south through Les Islettes and Senados, a few miles eastward from the old battle-field of Valmy, to Futeau. As they went further south the sound of the guns on the front grew more distant. The world began to seem more normal, more human, and it gave a distinct relief from a theretofore hardly realized nervous strain to pass through villages which were not mere piles of ruins; to occasionally see smoke emerging from the chimneys; little shops, devoid perhaps of supplies, but at least not mere skeletons with gaping shell holes and open roofs; now and again an old civilian striving to keep alive the routine of daily life; and finally, in the doorways, solemn-faced women and children; all evidence that close as the war was to them, at least no whirring shells or buzzing bullets and no cries of "G-a-a-a-s" would disturb their night's rest.

At Futeau the 1st Battalion made camp, while the rest of the column turned eastward up a winding road into and through the Bois de Beaulieu, and late in the evening of October 3rd, camped in those woods several kilometers north of Waly. Here it remained all night and the next day and night, resting horses and men, and was joined by the 1st Battalion and by details who had in charge the supplies, records and equipment which had been left in the echelon.

At 12:30 p. m. on October 5th we were again on the move, southward through Waly, Evres, Sommaisnes, Rem-

bercourt (where we re-crossed our old north-bound route) and Marat, up a long hard hill, then on to where a trail turned to the left off the main road. Following this past a woods on the left, over the open high ground, at last, as the end of a march of twenty-five kilometers, at 9:30 p. m., October 5th, the head of the regiment drew down into Seigneulles, about five miles northeast of Bar le Duc.

This was a typical village of the area just back of the front lines. It was not, in fact, so much a town, as we know towns, of an industrial or commercial sort, as it was a collection of farm houses. French farms are largely made up of small holdings; and the farmers, instead of living on their farms and thus using up a large part of the tillable



Ligny-en-Barrois, southeast of Bar le Duc.

land by the house-lot and buildings, cultivate every inch of the farm very intensively. For their homes they congregate in villages, where each as a rule owns his own lot, on which



A Typical Village Laundry.

he is able to satisfy his desire to have his belongings all about him; and he builds one large structure, one end of which is his home, the other end is his stable and cow-shed; in the center, perhaps, is a space where he keeps his wagon and tools, or his chickens; while the second floor is divided between sleeping rooms, hay loft and storage. This arrangement of all living together in one village also appeals to the Frenchman's social instinct. Each day the farmer, with his family, perhaps, goes out to the field, often a mile or more away, returning at night to the village. Little "Epiceries," or groceries, usually in the front room of a dwelling house, supply his simple needs. A public fountain, with watering troughs for animals, and tanks for public laundering, are open to all. Built apparently along the routes of ancient paths and cross-ways, the streets follow the geometrical lines of a Chinese puzzle. Except in the smallest villages are always to be found the old church, with its ivy-covered walls and ambitious spire, and the Mairie, or Town Hall, usually occupied during the war as headquarters of whatever troops happened to be stationed there. Frequently, also, at a street crossing or open plot, stands a statue to some celebrated Frenchman who began life in the village.

Suddenly overwhelmed by an influx of American soldiers outnumbering their population three or four to one, soldiers just from the front and anxious to vary the monotony of army fare and the elementary conditions of army life by indulging in the luxuries supposedly obtainable in town, of fruits, sweets, chocolate, fresh eggs, and the like, the supplies of the little stores were soon exhausted. With the high prices which these French villagers were undoubtedly compelled to pay for their supplies, and the difficulty of getting them at all; with their own needs in a part of the country whence all prosperity-producing industry had fled and all reserve wealth moved away, farther from the ever-threatening front lines; with their manhood all gone into the war, or already dead on the field, and even their work-horses taken from them, down to an irreducible minimum, on the one hand; and on the other hand the sudden unlimited demand, represented by long "queues" of soldiers lined up to take their turns, each drawing as much pay in a month as a French soldier would get in four or six, and

apparently willing to spend it all freely, without questioning or bargaining—what wonder that prices seemed and were high when compared with values we had known at home before the war. Perhaps we did not realize, as we all have since our return home, the enormous increase in prices of everything, throughout the world. At least our money went where it was greatly needed; and it was impossible not to make comparisons with those of our own people, in the towns adjoining our training camps (even in the days early in the war before prices generally had risen), who had suffered nothing by way of loss or sacrifice for the great cause, who “profiteered” off of the soldiers in a manner for which no excuse but that of ordinary sordid greed can be offered. Not all, thank Heaven, were guilty, but very, very many. And those who were not, like the great body of the French people, must suffer unjustly for the sins of their more grasping fellow citizens.

Moreover, we were not over there merely to “help the French.” We were fighting our own battles, as well as theirs, and we were fortunate to be able to do so on their soil instead of on our own. ’Twas well enough to pay them in part by helping them to live. How, indeed, could a peasant live, on the country we saw just back of the lines!

This custom of the country, of the farmers living in groups, offers one of the problems of reconstruction in the devastated areas. The necessity for the restoration of these hundreds of ruined villages is most acutely presented, and at first one (especially an American) has the thought that the old villages should be abandoned, being but masses of crumbling rock, and new villages should be constructed at some place nearby which is now unincumbered. But these ruined villages represent the home-sites of the farm owners, and for the most part, probably, the homes will be rebuilt on the old spot, whenever there is an owner left alive to return.

At Seigneulles the men were billeted in such quarters as were available, under roof for the first time since the night of September 9th. Here they were given such re-equipment as was essential. The 110th M. O. R. S. (Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop) established its equipment there and made such repairs as were needed on the guns. It is worth



mentioning that the M. O. R. S. rendered signally good service during the time the division was at the front. In D Battery a shell in one gun "stuck," and in F Battery two tubes developed dangerous defects from use, though not causing a cessation of fire. In each instance a new tube was desired. In each instance, also, the M. O. R. S. was within distance to be notified, and promptly responded by at once and quickly furnishing a new tube which enabled the gun to continue action. In C Battery a whole new gun was called for on the battery's arrival at Charpentry, and was delivered for use within a very few hours.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### BEFORE VERDUN.

On the morning of October 12th the regiment was again in motion. Leaving Siegneulles by way of Erize-la-Brulee, lunching at midday in the road near Pierrefitte, it made camp in the afternoon in an open space by the roadside in the woods near Thillombois. The men barely had time to get up their "pup-tents" ahead of the usual rain. A wonderfully home-like, cozy place, those shelter tents were! Only high enough to sit up in, wide enough for two men



Camouflaged "Pup-Tent" in Woods.

to lie in with their heads to the opening, and their saddlebags or pack-carriers tucked in the low spaces at the edges or at the foot; when the tent was once safely erected, and a blanket spread on the ground as a carpet, the rain pattering on the canvas gave a sense of comfort and security to

the tenant underneath which was most satisfying. A steel helmet made an ideal hammer for driving tent-pegs, and when set at a proper slant to fit the back of the head into the bowl of the helmet, was a not unsatisfactory pillow.

Forward again the next afternoon, the 13th, a short trip, through Benoite-Vaux, brought us to the main road, east of Ramblazin; moving thence along this road for about a mile to the eastward, then turning to the left and crossing a creek (Rau. de Recourt), camp was established in the Chanois Woods on a hillside. Here, as was frequently found just back of the front lines, were numerous crude shacks built by the French for such troops as happened along, and most of the men slept under roofs. Not much but roofs, at that. That afternoon, as we passed along the road, a mounted soldier had met us with a copy of the Paris New York Herald, with the flaming head-line, "Germany Ac-

cepts." Great excitement, though it developed that it was merely part of the preliminary sparring which preceded the actual armistice.

October 14th the regiment remained at Camp Chanois till evening. As we were again approaching the front, further movements were to be made at night. About 9 p. m. of the 14th the firing batteries of E and F, with the 2nd Battalion Detail, left Camp Chanois for la Claire Cote, two kilometers east of Belrupt, southeast of Verdun, on our new front. The rest of the regiment, except a part of E Battery, which remained on guard of supplies, also moved out, past Recourt, and crossing the Meuse at Genicourt, along a so-called "Balloon Road" (that is, kept free from overhead wires, so as to permit the movement of trucks carrying the control wire of balloons), billeted in the ruins of Rupt-en-Woevre.

At Seigneulles, perhaps because of over-anxiety as to the transportation, peremptory orders forbidding the acquisition of any additional stores had prevented much needed re-equipment in anti-gas supplies. The old gas-masks had not only been long in service and had sustained much hard usage in the long forced marches and camps, in the mud and rain, previous to and during the drive, but in many instances they had seen so much use in actual gas attacks as to make a reissue imperative. Observing only the letter of the order, therefore, the responsible officers began at once upon leaving Seigneulles to take steps for a re-supply. With the cordial co-operation of Captain Harry C. Jobs, of the Supply Company, whole truck-loads of new masks were obtained from the rail-head at Rattantout, and brought in at Chanois and Rupt, and substituted for the old ones; so that the men were able to go again into the front lines with the satisfying feeling that these "bosom friends," uncomfortable and clumsy though they were, were not of a sort that would fail them in time of need. Captain Jobs was a conspicuous example of an officer who on every occasion was more desirous of co-operating whole-heartedly and intelligently in getting results for the common cause than in standing on his prerogatives for fear of assuming responsibility, or that he would do something outside the letter of his functions, or not in keeping with the dignity

of his rank; and the regiment owes much to his efficiency.

On the night of October 15th that part of the regiment at Rupt moved forward, through Genicourt, Haudainville, and Belrupt, to the new regimental position in the "Som-medieue Sector," which lay between the Cabaret Sector on the north and the Tragon Sector on the south, or from about Damloup on the north to Fresnes on the south. Here they relieved the French 15 D. I. C. (Division Infanterie Coloniale) which had participated in the St. Mihiel drive, southward from Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes. (See Maps No's. 16A and 16B.)

Some of the German divisions identified on our new front were these:

28th Reserve Division.

3rd Bavarian Division.

13th Landwehr Division.

106th A. H. D.

5th Guard Division.

192nd Division.



Verdun.

The Meuse River, like the Missouri, meanders lazily hither and yon in a broad valley, frequently overflowing its banks, and never of certain channel. For water traffic a well dredged canal has been constructed along the east edge

of the bottom-land. In places the range of hills known as the Meuse Heights comes so close to the canal that there is just room between the two for the National Highway which during the war constituted one of the main traffic roads from the direct south and from the rail-head at Rattentout, to the chain of forts which constituted the permanent defenses of Verdun on the east, and to the front lines which were strung out in the valley below the eastern slope of the hills. This road and canal, though not visible from the enemy's lines, except possibly at certain points from balloons, were yet more or less constantly under fire; for the Germans of course realized their importance as an avenue



Bellevue Ferme.

for supplies, and it was easy to lay on them with their long range guns. Riding along this road toward the front, after a week's freedom from any fear of hostile shells, our men could hear, but paid little attention to, the never-ceasing but gradually more distinct roar of distant artillery. As they rode, away off to the right, five or six miles

away, sounded the muffled "boom" of some German large calibers. A few moments of indifference as before—then—a sudden thrill of realization as out of the atmosphere comes that wicked "Br-r-r-r," and—"Bang!" a shell bursts on the hillside just above them. Another moment of silence, then from one of them: "Gee! I swallowed my chew!"

The Sommedieue Sector was just east of Verdun, at about the connecting point between the extreme north end of the line affected by the St. Mihiel drive, and the line, which swung westward through the Argonne district and Champagne to Rheims. The chain of Verdun forts above referred to extended through the sector; Fort Haudainville, just behind us; Fort Rozellier, close to headquarters at P. C. Moscou, and to 1st Battalion headquarters at P. C. Maubois; Fort Derame, near C Battery's last station; Fort Tavannes, close to D Battery's and E Battery's last posi-



tions; Fort de Souville, about 500 yards from last position of F Battery and the 2nd Battalion P. C.; Fort Vaux and Fort Douaumont, only a mile or two to the north of the latter; all names with which the history of the ever-memorable defense of Verdun are inextricably interwoven. When the 35th Division occupied the sector, the Crown Prince had long ago accepted as final the defiant "They shall not pass" of General Petain. Nevertheless it was sentimentally a matter of interest for our men to have entrusted to them the defense of a part of the line which had once burned so fiercely in France's brilliant fight for her own.

From the Meuse River the Meuse Heights extend eastward for varying distances averaging perhaps four miles.



Ammunition Dugout at "B" Battery's position near Maubois.

Then the country again drops suddenly into a broad valley (formerly dotted with villages, now heaps of ruins), and known in war dispatches as the Woevre. For some distance eastward from the foot of the hills, however, the ground was flat, low and swampy, which fact, together with

vast quantities of barbed-wire entanglement with which such of the ground as was passable was bestrewn, made a direct attack in either direction extremely difficult. The infantry front lines extended irregularly through this area. The artillery positions were on the high ground behind them.

Upon first coming into this sector, the regiment took positions as follows:

Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Co. at P. C. Moscou, 53-15, about 500 yards northwest of Ft. Rozelier.

Headquarters 1st Battalion—P. C. Maubois, 55-19.

A Battery—74-06, 200 yards north of the Metz highway, and 1,700 yards east of the Fort.

B Battery—58.5-19, just east of the 1st Battalion P. C.

C Battery—54.5-30.5, close to Ft. Derame.

Headquarters 2nd Battalion—57.5-41.5, near the Ouvrage de la Brandier.

D Battery—51-41, 600 yards west of 2nd Battalion P. C.

E Battery—48.5-38.5, St. Airy.

F Battery—47-41.5, 400 yards northwest of E.

Radio Station—56-20, near P. C. Maubois.

Horse-line at Claire Cote at about 49-23, 800 yards northwest of P. C. Moscou.

Supply Company and Echelon at Camp La Beholle at about 41-08 in the woods a mile west of Ft. Rozellier.

Brigade Headquarters were established in the abandoned but fairly intact village of Sommedieue; with the batteries of the other regiments of the brigade scattered about in the woods at such points as would enable them to fulfil their missions.

On the night of October 23rd-24th (pursuant to Field Order No. 13, Hq. 60th F. A. Brigade, F. O. No. 12, 129 F. A.), Batteries A and B were relieved at their positions by Batteries B and F of the 128th F. A., and in turn relieved Batteries D and E of the 129th and assumed their missions. The following night, October 24th-25th (F. O. No. 13, Hq. 129 F. A.), one platoon of A Battery was again



"D" Battery's P. C. west of Ft. de Tavannes.

moved to a position at 55-50, southwest of Ft. Moulainville and a kilometer west of the village of that name (the other platoon following the next night), and Batteries D, E and F, constituting the 2nd Battalion, moved northward and took positions (relieving the 1st Groupe 41st R.

A. C., French Colonial Division), as follows:

D Battery at 36-74, near the cross roads west of Ft. Tavannes.

E Battery at 39-72, just southeast of D.

F Battery at 38-79, 400 yards north of D.

2nd Battalion P. C. at 37-63, 500 yards north of Bellevue Fme.



O. P. Gallais at 54-11, on the hillside overlooking the valley, about midway between Ft. Douaumont and Dieppe.

This new arrangement left the 1st Battalion of the 129th F. A. in support of the 140th Infantry in front of Tavannes, and the 2nd Battalion in support of the 139th infantry in sub-sector Vaux (60th F. A. Brigade F. O. Nos. 13 and 15, Oct. 23-25, 1918).

On October 30th the 2nd Battalion P. C. was moved to the Batterie de l'Hopital, at 35-76, in some shattered old emplacements which were now pretty well blended into the landscape, and next day E Battery moved a few hundred meters to the south

into an old camouflaged position at 333880-266895 (3969) and F Battery to a position at 333225-268380 (32-84), about 500 yards northeast of Ft. de Souville, and the farthest north of any position occupied by any part of the regiment. The 2nd Battalion here was located literally on top of the tunnel through which



Batterie de l'Hopital, 2nd Battalion  
P. C. southeast of Ft. de Souville.

the railway from Verdun led eastward toward Briey and Metz and the open country between. This was the only railway outlet through the Meuse Heights between Commercy on the south and Sedan on the north, a distance of approximately 50 miles. Its importance, strategically and commercially, can be readily appreciated; and the clearing of the enemy from its eastern outlet was one of the major considerations in mind in the big drive which was being made in this sector at the time the armistice was signed.

The mission of troops in this sector had been heretofore primarily a holding one; to defend the sector and to prevent the enemy from securing a footing in the Heights of the Meuse, and "at all costs to retain possession of the O. P.'s which overlook the whole plain from the foot of the hills to the region of Briey and Mars le Tour"\*; and no

\*"Plan of Defense—The Sommedieue Sector," Hq. 35th Division.



of 18.  
N. FRONT.  
The Tunnel Entrance is shown close to "K" Barrels.

1000

THE V. L. L.

For more information, please contact the V. L. L. at 1000

extensive drives by our troops or counter-drives by the enemy were for the first two or three weeks undertaken. It does not follow that the life, even before the final drive, was an inactive one, or free from danger or hardship, or dramatic incidents. A's, B's and C's positions were in the woods; A on the brow of a ravine; B in a soft, mud-surrounded spot formerly occupied by E; C near Fort Derame in a thickly grown patch of forest, from a crow's nest in the edge of which Captain Marks could obtain fairly good observation of the German lines.



"C" Battery's P. C. near Ft. Derame.—(From sketch by John H. Bell of that battery.)

Going north the country gradually opened up. The forests, even where they had existed, were now merely tall gaunt trunks, leafless and almost barren of branches. Beyond Tillat, where on the edge of a ravine the 110th Engineers maintained a dump (with piles of lumber, elephant iron and the like, so carefully camouflaged that one could easily drive past without noticing it), over the crest of the treeless hill which protected it on the north, the country spread itself out as a barren waste. In this the 2nd Battalion (D, E and F) made its home, like chipmunks in a quarry, with such protection as could be derived from a few scattered dugouts, an occasional wayside ruin, or the mere hide-and-seek defense of sheets of woven-grass cam-

ouflage; the outlook a rolling ground-surface of nothingness; Fort Vaux and Fort Douaumont appearing as humps on the near horizon.

In some respects it was more trying than an actual advance; for the fixedness of the positions, more or less known to the enemy, or always within the range of search of his aeroplanes, made constant vigilance imperative. No lights at night, resort to cover from observation at the approach of any hostile aeroplane by day, the never-ending



A typical bit of "woods" on the Verdun front.

"searching" or "harassing" fire by enemy artillery over our area; and for the men at the battery positions, only the consoling refuge of a muddy hole in the ground as their ultimate haven of rest or safety. One inclined to moralize, if he could get a chance to indulge in that recreation, could not but be impressed with the abnormality of a situation which thus compelled men to resort to such elementary devices to protect themselves from being killed by their fellows. And further to wonder at, and be thankful for, the spirit of sacrifice and service which made men cheerfully and whole-heartedly willing to undergo so much for the sake of their ideals of life.



Looking east from in front of Ft. Douaumont. M. Maurice Thiebault, French Interpreter with 129th F. A., in foreground.

There was present, too, a sense of honest satisfaction in fighting back over the area our foe had devastated; that we were fighting only men, not women and children and homes and farms and schools and churches; that it was a fair fight with an enemy who had an equal chance; who knew how to and who could de-

fend himself; that if we died, it would be in an honest, open, clean-cut, manly fight for our ideals, not while engaged in an unholy attack on the helpless and the weak. And in addition to this there was the crudely elemental but distinctly convincing consideration that any German within range of our guns was so because he was where he had no business to be. No German lost his life on German soil.

At all times, when not in action, the guns were kept laid on their normal barrage, ready for any sudden call.\*

In "open warfare," or "warfare of movement," where the infantry is advancing in a drive, as in the Argonne, and later here on the Verdun front, and the artillery is following in their support, these "normal" barrages are rapidly being changed to cover the infantry's new front. But always while at rest the guns are kept laid on a definite target, ready for instant use if called upon, while constantly

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\*In the defense of a sector, each artillery regiment is assigned a certain portion of the front to cover. Artillery targets, in such cases are so selected and assigned that each battery has its "normal barrage" and its one or more "eventual barrages." For instance, our infantry is at a given front line position, with the enemy facing them. If the enemy should come "over the top" our infantry of course want our artillery to at once lay a barrage in No Man's Land to stop them. It would be impossible to do this unless the artillery could act at once. So "A" Battery, for instance, has the firing data all figured to fire at that point, the range, the direction, rate of fire per minute, with the variations necessary for different kinds of ammunition and fuses. This is, say, the normal barrage for "A" Battery. If not ordered to lay on any other target, they keep laid (that is, properly set and pointed) on this. If at any time the infantry sends out a call for "Barrage!" either by phone or signal rocket, "A" Battery begins to fire its normal barrage.

Now there may be other points of known danger, such as a road, or trench, or some other portion of No Man's Land, for which "A" Battery also has figured its data; and this is its "Eventual Barrage No. 1." If there is need of fire at that point, the call, instead of the one word "Barrage" is for "Eventual No. 1." So each battery may have several

there are calls for special fire on new targets as they develop, enemy advances at given points, hostile batteries, machine gun nests, ammunition dumps, enemy reinforcements, and the like. It is the mission of the artillery to be always attacking and harassing the enemy's rear, as well as his immediate front line. For this purpose the light artillery, such as the 75s, whose primary mission is to attack the enemy in his front lines and immediate rear, can be effective up to the limit of their range. For the greater ranges,



Capt. McGee's O. P. in St. Airy.

which involve a large part of the counter-battery fire (that is, fire directed at the enemy battery positions, perhaps far behind the front lines) the higher caliber guns are necessary. Each field Artillery Brigade of Divisional Artillery had two regiments (in ours the 128th and 129th) of 75s and one of 155s (the 130th). For the still higher powered guns dependence was had on the Corps and Army Artillery, outside the Division, not subject to the Division command, and still less to the Brigade command.

All the time the men were

eventuals. "B" Battery, and each other battery, also has its barrages, normal and eventual. "A" Battery's normal may be "B" Battery's 1st Eventual, and "C" Battery's 2nd Eventual; in which case it would be possible, by the proper order, to almost instantly concentrate the fire of the three batteries on the one point. All of that portion of the front for which a regiment is responsible is called its "sector"; and in position warfare the whole sector should be covered by either normal or eventual barrages; so that any movement by the enemy at any time at any point in the sector can be met instantly by artillery fire. By "instantly" is meant that in a literal sense. From the time the movement is detected upon which the call for the barrage is based, to the time when the first projectiles are on the way through the air, is only a matter of a few seconds; although the guns may be several thousand kilometers back, perhaps three or four miles, as was the case in several suddenly laid barrages fired by our regiment in the Argonne, covering the Exermont attack. To fire them the trails of some of the guns had to have a ditch dug almost to the gunner's waist. To have elevated the muzzle much more would have resulted in shortening the range instead of lengthening it, with ordinary ammunition; for the trajectory would have gone higher but fallen nearer. The firing tables show these limits for the various kinds of guns and ammunition.

working on their positions; extending communications; laying wires; camouflaging; gas-proofing their dugouts, when possible; digging new dugouts; filling in the muddy trails which served as roads through the woods; getting up ammunition; keeping guard. Daily and nightly the spasmodic enemy shell fire continued; often with gas shells, which added discomfort to danger. Even when not directly under fire, there was rarely a time when we were free from the sound of artillery firing somewhere. Waking up in the night, always

“We heard the distant and random gun  
That the foe was sullenly firing.”

And ever and again would come the sudden awakening from sleep when such a random shell would fall nearby. When they came more thickly, and the sound of the hostile long range batteries grew firmer, and more distinctly and cer-



Battery C, 130th F. A. This position is typical of that in which part of the 129th was located and is not far from where Batteries B and C of the 129th were stationed.

tainly having a mission not intended for our benefit or comfort (the rightly called harassing fire), rumbling and roaring away off in the rear areas of the enemy's country, too far for our 75s to reach them; lying there and listening, then there was never sweeter music to the ear than to suddenly hear, off in the valley behind us, the sonorous Boom-m-m! of our own big guns, the huge railroad guns



down near Haudainville and Belrupt, clearing their throats for counter-battery work, as they reached out in the darkness for their prey.

Near the P. C. at Moscou was one of those little soldier cemeteries which were everywhere along the front; by the roadsides, in the corners of fields, on the hillsides and in the woods. Sometimes only one or two graves, sometimes



Cemetery at P. C. Moscou

rows of tens and scores; but each grave identified by a little gray-white cross, a tri-colored rosette, and the name and organization of the soldier buried there. Always, when possible, they were watched and cared for, American graves as well as French, by the French army; and if this care is continued

our people will not need to feel that their dead are neglected and forgotten. In the cemetery at P. C. Moscou were six or eight graves of American marines who as part of the 2nd Division had occupied this sector earlier in the year.

The contest for the air was never-ceasing. Back and forth, every day, floated the aeroplanes, sometimes flying low as they sought to learn the secrets of the woods; but mostly very high, for in addition to the machine guns of the artillery, of which each battery had two for its own defense, there were scattered here and there along the whole front, permanent positions for powerful, long-range anti-aircraft guns (mostly French), ever on the watch for a hostile plane. The great heights which the aeroplanes were thus compelled to seek, and the absence of any land-marks, or air-marks, upon which to get an accurate estimate of the range, made the actual



Position No. 23 in St. Airy occupied first by "E" Battery and later by "B" Battery.

hitting of these aerial targets

proportionately infrequent; but the system of ranging and aiming on them was ingenious and interesting, and from time to time a plane was brought down, one very close to E Battery's position. Towards the last the German planes did not confine themselves to observation or to demonstrations with bombs and machine guns. A plane flying over the northern front dropped near our batteries' positions handfuls of pamphlets of peace propaganda. They were eagerly gathered up by our men as souvenirs, and as the butt of soldier wit. Their character and use indicated as crude an idea of American psychology and American intelligence as did the Spanish papers in 1898, which advocated landing troops along the Gulf Coast to stir up the South against the Federal Government.

To be always alert for barrage signals, night or day, from our own infantry, as well as to detect any movements of the enemy or any suspicious signs of impending activity, special observation posts at favorable locations were constantly maintained. O. P. Marine and O. P. Strasbourg (near each other at 336490-265310), overlooking Moulainville and the plain beyond, and O. P. Gallais (at 335400-271100) near the Ouvrage de Hardaumont, covering in its view the Vaux Sector, were eyes for the regiment from



Chaplain Tiernan at O. P. Marine, on parapet overlooking the Woivre Plain.



A typical concrete Observation Post on a hillside.

which a signal rocket could be picked up instantly. In each of these a detail of non-commissioned officers and men as observers under the general direction of Lieutenant Frank J. Grunewald, Regimental Intelligence Officer, were on duty day and night, with special Battalion observers as occa-

sion demanded. At the same time O. P. Strasbourg, with others further south served by other regiments, were in constant touch with the Brigade Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Burnam R. Jones.\* Through these reports, and the data furnished by the sound-ranging instruments, which the French had developed to a high degree of efficiency, combined with the aerial reports, it was possible to determine with considerable accuracy the location of hostile batteries. Telephonic connection with the infantry headquarters, the 139th at P. C. Normandie (31-00.5) and the 140th at P. C. Moscou, near the 129th headquarters, gave personal touch at all times.



A typical bit of woods at the front, showing method of stringing telephone wires.

Further liaison was maintained at all times by keeping an officer, a sergeant and several enlisted men on duty with each regiment of the infantry of whom the 129th was in support.


On October 27th the regiment was ordered§ to be ready to participate in a demonstration on "J-day," on objectives assigned in that and subsequent orders. The duration of fire was fixed at "H minus 2 hours to H plus 3 hours," and the consumption of ammunition as "2 days fire,"† and J-day was named as November 1st and H hour as 5:30 a. m.‡ It was evident that some big event was impending and on the morning set, November 1st, at 3:30 a. m. (H hour minus 2) another "show" was put over, similar to that of September 26th in the Argonne. For five hours the barrage continued, during which time the guns of the

\*Lieut. Jones relates an incident which would indicate that someone in the German lines had not read his ancient history without profit. One of our observers noticed certain activity about a small body of water near the Bois de Manheulles. A raiding party sent out by the infantry to investigate discovered that the Germans had tied in the pond a string of ducks which, finding themselves unable to escape on the approach of the raiding party, set up a quacking which compelled immediate withdrawal.

§F. O. No. 18, Hq. 60th F. A. Brig. Oct. 27, 1918.

†F. O. No. 23, Hq. 60th F. A. Brig. Oct. 31, 1918.

‡F. O. No. 22, Hq. 60th F. A. Brig. Oct. 31, 1918.





129th fired over 10,000 rounds. It was another big drive along the whole front, continuing the work, which indeed had never ceased, of forcing the German line on back, northward and eastward, and out of France. It was this continuous movement, ever forward, ever hammering, ever confident and victorious, along with the accompanying victories of our French and British and Belgian Allies further west and north, which drove home to the most optimistic and stubborn of Teutons a realization of the inevitable.

The 35th Division was on the pivot, so did not attempt to advance at first. Its participation was to hold the pivot, to threaten the hostile lines so as to prevent the transfer of troops to other points, to batter the enemy's morale, and to be ready to advance when the turning movement was far enough developed.

From that time on the movement never stopped. Night and day to the northwest was the constant rumble of big guns. And daily the world read the results—Dun-sur-Meuse, Stenay, Mouzon, and further north, Cambrai, Lille, Ostende—steadily, systematically, inevitably, the great arm swung eastward; its shadow, like a sun-dial, reaching farther and farther toward the Rhine. Already it could be seen across the short but strategically essential Lorraine country, hovering at the walls of Metz; already the French were competing with the Americans to retrieve, by first entering Sedan, their old humiliation of forty-eight years ago; already Britain's "Old Contemptibles" were reversing in glorious fashion their ill-fated but gallant "Retreat from Mons."

On November 1st German shell and shrapnel fire fell on E Battery's position as they were preparing for breakfast. Sergt. Vincent M. Bowles, while endeavoring to get his men protected, was mortally wounded, as was Mechanic Alphonse B. Wrzeciona. Two other men were seriously wounded at the same time.

Realizing the hopelessness of their cause, that every day they were losing ground, on the front as well as at home, the German High Command had for several weeks been making efforts toward an Armistice. At first they endeavored to bring about a "negotiated peace," whereby

their representatives might sit around a table and discuss the academic question of whether they were beaten or not, meanwhile holding the spoils they had for four years been exploiting, and strengthening themselves for further fighting. To this there could be but one answer: "We didn't start this thing, but we're going to end it. If there is any doubt as to who is beaten, we'll settle that on the field. If you know, as we do, that you're beaten, then stop fighting, hand over your guns, get rid of your war-lords, get back on your own soil (way back—where you won't spill over), return your stolen property, release all prisoners and 'sign here.' "\*"

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\*For Armistice Terms see Appendix U.



Billets at P. C. Moscou.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### THE LAST DRIVE.

Meantime the Allied plans went ahead without hesitation. As the line swung toward the east the pivot prepared to join the forward movement. On November 5th-6th, the 35th Division Infantry was relieved by the 81st Division; but, as in the Argonne, the 60th F. A. Brigade (128th,



Aeroplane view of Bois de Grimaucourt. Note clean-cut edge of woods.

129th and 130th F. A., the 110th Ammunition Train and the 110th M. O. R. S.) remained on duty in support of the relieving troops.\*

\*"F. O. No. 109.

Hq. 1st Army A. E. F., 9 Nov., 1918, 11:45 Hrs.

#### 2. Movements:

A. The 35th Division (less artillery and ammunition train) is relieved from duty in the 1st Army and assigned to the 2nd Army. It will move by marching to the zone of the 2nd Army on November 9th. Special orders No. 556 cover the details of the movement."



On November 9th the new drive began. The French 2nd Colonial Corps (to which the 81st Division and our artillery were now attached, but all a part of the American 1st Army) advanced in the general direction of the road Longuyon-Spincourt-Conflans. The 81st Division moved in a zone of advance, the north limit of which was generally parallel to the Verdun-Etain road, and the south limit the line Fresnes-Parfondrupt. It in turn was divided into two zones each with an advance guard. The left advance guard consisted of the 322nd Infantry of the 161st Brigade (with the 321st Infantry in reserve), the 2nd Battalion of the 306th Engineers, and the 317th Machine Gun Battalion, and in their support, the 129th F. A. The right zone was given to the 162nd Brigade (323rd and 324th Infantry), the 318th Machine Gun Battalion, and the 1st Battalion of the 306th Engineers, supported by the 128th F. A.

Plans had been prepared at 60th F. A. Brigade Headquarters, as soon as knowledge came of the proposed advance, for a general barrage; but at the last minute verbal orders came from the Commanding General of the Corps confining the artillery preparation to counter-battery work and the fire on "sensible" points (*i. e.*, points which had been sensed or discovered as known or probable specific hostile positions, of batteries, machine gun nests, O. P.s, infantry concentrations, or the like).

At 7:30 a. m., Nov. 9th, the 129th F. A. opened the engagement with an hour and a half's fire on known and suspected machine gun positions along the edges of the woods and lakes from which the Germans commanded the routes of the prospective American advance. The fire of Batteries B and C was directed on the road southwest of Blanzee toward Chatillon sous les Cotes (from T 97-40 to T 94-37); the northwest edge of Bois de Grimaucourt, a mile east of Blanzee (from U 14-46 to U 11-36) and extending on southward into the edges of the Bois Chabotte (from U 11-36 to U 06-30 to U 08-28), thence eastward to the north corner of Etang de Fayel (at U 18-30), and the north edge of Le Fayel (from U 20-30 to U 15-19).

Batteries A, D, E and F cared for objectives a little more to the north; the west edge of Bois de Moranville

(from T 85-75 to T 83-73 to T 87-70 to T 90-67) ; the north-east and south edges of Etang du Moulin (from T 90-67 to T 94-67 to T 92-64).

During the same time the heavier batteries of the 130th F. A. and of the French Groupement Artois (some of whom stated they had been in this position for fifty-six months) executed counter-battery fire, while the Army Artillery did the same in the direction of Etain.

At 8 a. m. the 322nd Infantry, under cover of the artillery fire, advanced toward Moranville, where at about 10 a. m. it was met by a heavy machine gun fire, and shortly afterwards by a heavy artillery barrage.

Meantime, following out the plan ordered, in the early morning horses had been sent by Lieut. Enoch P. Jones, C. O. at the Claire Cote horse line, to the echelon at Camp La Beholle for limbers and extra caissons, which (except the gun limbers which went direct to the battery positions) were gathered at the head of a ravine in the woods at 54-47, three-quarters of a mile west of Moulainville. Here they awaited the advance, the caissons loaded with H. E. Normal, the limbers with shrapnel.

Batteries E, F and C, under Major Gates, upon completion of their early morning mission as above described, limbered their guns and proceeded as rapidly as possible to the meeting place at 54-47 where their extra caissons awaited them. The day was rainy and cold, but, notwithstanding the difficulty, from an artillery standpoint, of moving the long lines of carriages, guns and heavily laden caissons, each with its team of six horses, down the ravines and out into the open, narrow, slippery roads between the mud-fields and barbed-wire thickets, and the inviting target which these long, heavy, slow-moving lines of horses and carriages offered to the most casual enemy observer, they moved forward behind the infantry advance. At 15 Hour (3 p. m.) E Battery took position about 75



Moulainville.



Moulainville.

lin, from which they delivered 120 rounds with direct observation into Moranville. This furnished the needed support to the 322nd, which acted promptly, and at 5:30 p. m. the report came back that Moranville was taken. Lieutenant Walthew and his men then returned to the battery position, arriving at 6:30 p. m., and the battery, which was then getting under increased enemy shell fire, moved about 300 meters to point 75.2-51, on the Moulainville-Chatillon road, where it took position, under cover of trees, some 50 yards southeast of the position which F Battery had meanwhile taken.\*

C Battery, as soon as it was dark, proceeded forward towards a position its battery commander selected for it about half way between Moulainville and Moranville, at point 84.5-62-8. The roads were bad and narrow, and the ground on either side too miry to travel on. A company of engineers behind the battery was waiting to move forward, and

German O. P. and Wire at Abaucourt  
Looking East.

\*"When the advance of this battalion was held up in front of Moranville on the afternoon of November 9th by severe machine gun opposition, certain guns of the battalion supporting this regiment were brought forward only a few hundred meters in rear of this battalion. When the artillery was called on to silence the machine guns in Moranville this artillery did very effective work. After firing 10 or 15 minutes the machine guns were silenced to such an extent that the infantry units from this battalion sent to flank the town from the south entered with very little opposition."—From report by Major P. B. Whitaker, 3rd Battalion, 322nd Inf., Nov. 18, 1918.

great difficulty was found in turning aside even enough for this; but by midnight the battery, after great exertion, was in position for the next morning's fire.†

At each of these forward battery positions there was promptly established a first aid station, with men from the regimental Sanitary Detachment, under Sergt. Leo E. Eckerle, all under the supervision of Maj. Chas. E. Wilson, Regimental Surgeon. To Major Wilson the men of the 129th feel a debt of warm appreciation for his untiring, constant, efficient and kindly care in watching over their health and

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†A brief, informal account of C Battery's experiences on this occasion, by Capt. Theodore Marks, describes conditions as they found them and met them, which were typical of those under which all the batteries worked, and of the spirit of the men generally, and is worth quoting: "Imagine being sound asleep in a hole under the ground on a cold November morning with a steady downpour of rain and receiving a message at 3 a. m. to report with the battery to Major Gates and going from one hole to another to get the men together. The cooks were up and just beginning to make biscuit. Needless to say, we ate 'Corn Willy' and hardtack. The men knew what it meant. There was no grumbling. They began to pull the guns out of the pits. First Sergeant Aspinwall, in command of the drivers at the horse lines, reported with the limbers on time, and the battery moved like clockwork. We loaded the limbers with shrapnel at Battery B's position and reported to the commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion, Major Gates. We were to advance in support of the 322nd Infantry of the 81st Division. Arriving near Moulainville, we took cover until dusk. I was ordered by battalion commander to proceed along the road to Moranville and select position for battery. I left Lieut. Mills in command of battery and rode through Moulainville La Basse towards Moranville. It was a dark night and the road, just wide enough for one carriage, had been shelled with gas, the only light being an occasional rocket from the German lines and the flash of machine-gun fire. The country here is open and swampy, making it difficult to select a position. I rode as far as the Etang du Moulin, but the condition of the ground made it impossible for a battery position, but good for duck hunting. I selected a position about 600 meters southwest of the lake, just off the road and behind a hedge. Three guns on one side of the road and one on the other. I returned and instructed Lieut. Mills to proceed along the road to Moranville. Went forward, accompanied by Lieut. Harry Fraser, the reconnaissance officer, and the detail. By the time the battery arrived at position, detail had laid wires and connected battery position with battalion commander's headquarters. The first and second guns were placed in position with some difficulty. The third section gun went into the mud to the hubs and the worn-out horses went down knee-deep. The Germans were shelling the field in front of us and it took the combined effort of the four gun squads and ropes to pull the guns out of the mire. When I saw the way the men worked, determined to save the guns, which they knew would be needed in the early morning, I felt proud that I had the privilege to command such a body of men. After placing camouflage nets over the guns, the men lay down under the brush till dawn. It was one of those cold, raw November nights that chilled you through. Some of the men had removed their shoes in an effort to warm their feet, and found it almost impossible to get them on again. The enemy shelled all night and fragments of shell whistled through the trees around us. The men had dug some narrow trenches which were half full of water by the time they were completed. I ordered the men to take shelter in a little trench up on the high ground 300 meters to the right and rear. They grumbled and wanted to remain where they were. They did not care because they were so tired. There was a heavy fog most of the day, which was in our favor and helped to conceal the battery. The men were on the move very early, as they were wet and cold, sleep being impossible."



P. C. Normandie.

marched to Camp Ronde Taille (71-25), west of Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes, where it arrived at about 11:30 a. m.

The morning of November 10th found the 322nd Infantry extending approximately along a line running south-eastwardly from the west edge of Le Grand Cognon (about 00-75), just south of Abaucourt, passing midway between Moranville and Grimaucourt, the batteries of the 129th being located as follows:

F 337500-265140

E 337520-265100

C 338440-266250

At 6 a. m., at the request of the commanding officer of the 322nd Infantry, these batteries opened a two-hour fire on the enemy lines in front of the 322nd Infantry, C Battery firing 385 rounds on the neck of Le Grand Cognon, E Battery firing on Grimaucourt, and F Battery 348 rounds of H. E. normal on Hermeville. B Battery, up on the hill, participated in the first on Grimaucourt, and D Battery in that on the Bois de Montricelle. From 8 to 10 the fire was distributed between Grimaucourt, Haute-court, Hermeville and the Bois de Montricelle just southeast of Haute-court. Between 10 and 11 a. m. the fire was lifted off of Grimaucourt, and the 322nd Infantry drove forward and entered the town, the artillery being lifted to Hermeville and Le Grand Cognon. Soon after entering Grimaucourt heavy enemy artillery

welfare all through their army service.

During the day of November 9th, the 321st Infantry was in reserve. Leaving camp, P. C. Normandie (31-05), a kilometer south of Ft. Douaumont, at 7:30 a. m., it



"B" Battery's No. 4 Gun Emplacement  
at St. Airy.



12011

Orinda, Cal.



fire\* was directed on our infantry there, forcing them at about 14:30 hour (2:30 p. m.) to fall back.

Meanwhile Lieut. Joseph B. Fraser, of the 129th F. A., Liaison Officer with the 322nd Infantry, was keeping regimental headquarters constantly advised of the progress of affairs, and at the same time personally telephoned the C. O. of the 130th F. A., asking for counter-battery work with their 155s against the German batteries which were firing from the northeast on our troops. At 12:40 p. m. Lieutenant Bourke, at O. P. Marine, telephoned to Captain



Grimaucourt, from Roof of German Concrete P. C., looking back into what had been German lines.—(Picture by Lt. Thos. C. Bourke, Nov. 12, 1918.)

McGee, of B Battery, at its position on the heights, to fire on a machine gun nest north of Moranville at 0668, just in front of our infantry lines. Captain McGee opened fire and secured a direct hit with the expenditure of only 17 rounds. B Battery continued during the afternoon, after the withdrawal of the infantry from Grimaucourt, to fire on assigned objectives along the Moranville-Grimaucourt road, and on Grimaucourt, firing over 500 rounds between 3:45 p. m. and 6:47 p. m., and effectively co-operating

“\*Nov. 10th. \* \* \*

During the day the German guns of the calibre 105 mm. and 150 mm., situated beyond the range of all guns in the sector except those of the Army Artillery, became active. Counter battery fire on these batteries was requested from the Army Artillery, including railroad guns and 6-inch marine guns.”—From report of C. G., 60th F. A. Brigade, Nov. 13, 1918.



with advanced batteries in covering the infantry relief late that afternoon.

At 16 hour (4 p. m.) of November 10th, the 322nd Infantry, having made a gallant fight in the open and suffered considerable losses, was ordered relieved by the 321st, which till then was in reserve. The relief was completed at 19 hour (7 p. m.), the 322nd going back through Moulainville, where it established its P. C. till the afternoon of the 12th, and thence moved to P. C. Escargot, near the Bellevue Ferme. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 321st Infantry assumed the positions vacated by the 322nd, while their 3rd Battalion remained in close support at Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes. Meantime our artillery was continuing active, pressing forward close behind the infantry. E Battery, between 5:30 and 7 p. m., November 10th, established a new position at the southeast corner of the Etang du Moulin at 339400-266460 (94-64.6), a half mile from Moranville, where direct fire could be used on the woods of Le Petit Cognon. This was the most advanced position obtained by any part of the regiment in this drive. F Battery was not far behind, at 338720-266140 (87.2-61.4), where it was established at 9:30 p. m., after delivering a fire from its old position, on Hermeville, Cognon Woods and again on Hermeville.\*

At midnight of November 10th-11th, First Lieut. Lyle J. Page, 129th Regimental Liaison Officer with headquarters of the 161st Infantry Brigade at Chatillon, received from General McIver, commanding officer of that

brigade, a memorandum of the mission desired from the artillery in the attack proposed to take place at 6 a. m. This he delivered in person to Major Gates at his P. C., which at 10 p. m., November 10th, had been moved from its first position on the Chatillon road south of Moulainville to a



Infantry Dugouts on Moulainville-Chatillon Road.

\*"I had my men start trenches for their protection, but water would fill them up as quick as they dug, as this is a morass, so had to give it up."—From Capt. Harry B. Allen, commanding F. Battery, 129th F. A.

new location at 85-62, about 250 yards westerly from F Battery's position.

The morning of November 11th found the American troops ready for further action. The 321st Infantry was in position, along a line extending northward and southward between Moranville and Grimaucourt, with the 129th Field Artillery close behind them. Germany's frantic efforts to secure a cessation of hostilities, begun some weeks before in such assured requests for a peace "discussion," had now come to the point where definite terms had



Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes.

been handed her with a time limit of 11 o'clock a. m., November 11th. Would she sign? No letting up of the pressure by the Allied troops was permitted to give her any encouragement to prolong her haggling. Moreover, it was well that when hostilities ceased the lines should be as far advanced as possible, in the event of a breaking over of the Armistice. Whether, on a front like that in the Sommedieue Sector, the capture of a few more ruined villages in the mud-flats below the hills justified the inevitable loss of life which occurred in the closing hours, cannot be decided except in consideration of the situation of the American and Allied front as a whole. It was a direct drive in the direction of Metz, to flank and capture which was the next big American objective (scheduled, we were afterwards told, for November 14th), and the tunnel through the heights, through which ran the railroad from Verdun, was valueless while the Germans controlled its eastern exit. Certainly the men who gave their lives that morning did so in sustaining the best traditions and standards of American soldiers and citizens, for courage, loyalty and devotion to duty. Their memories will remain a source of pride to their loved ones at home, an example and inspiration to their comrades, their communities, and their country.

At 5:30 a. m., and lasting one hour, the artillery barrage began, C and E Batteries on the Tranchee de la Girafe, between Grimaucourt and Hermeville (C Battery's target co-ordinates being 28.7-65.9 to 25.2-69.6), and F Battery the Ravine de Vionniue, a little farther south, while from the hills above, A Battery fired on Hautecourt and later at Bois de Grimaucourt (14-44 to 15-45.5). At 6:45 their fire was raised to the Bois Jean de Vaux, a mile east of Hautecourt, upon which some 400 rounds were fired, and later at about 10:15 on trench and machine guns at and about Ouvr. de Warcq (69.8-75.9), and eastward along the Warcq road.

While all this was going on the world was waiting with breathless interest for the word from Spa. Doubtless no one watched the slowly moving hours with greater interest than the German soldiers before our troops on the active fronts that day. But as they waited, they continued their fire, not only on our advancing infantry, but upon our battery positions as well.

At last the word came down that the Armistice was signed.‡ The following message was received at Regimental Headquarters, and was immediately transmitted to the battalions and batteries:

"Headquarters 129th F. A.  
11 November, 1918.

**WARNING MESSAGE      8:21 a. m.**

Hostilities will cease on whole front at 11:00 hours this morning, November 11th, 1918. Troops will not pass the line obtained at that period. Outguard will be established at that hour and no intercourse with the enemy allowed. The line reached will be carefully marked. Enemy soldiers may be received as prisoners but no communication with the enemy will be permitted either before or after cessation of hostilities. Further orders will be sent later.

(Signed)    ROBERTS,  
Chief of Staff.

Phoned P. C. Moscou 8:34 a. m. by telephone from Watzek.  
Official: K. D. KLEMM, Colonel, 129th F. A."

After the receipt of this message, there was less activity in the firing, except as given in response to calls. At 10:35 a. m. C Battery fired on the southeast corner of the Grand Cognon and on the Petit Cognon, evidently in re-

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‡For Armistice terms, see Appendix U.

sponse to the request of the infantry commander.\* The enemy fire continued, E Battery reporting that it was under shell fire at 10:35, and C Battery ten minutes later.†

"Who fired the last shot?" is a question to which the answer will probably never be agreed upon. The official records of the 129th F. A. have the latest entry in favor of C Battery, in whose operation report it reads, "At 10:45 a. m. first gun ordered to cease fire on account of shelling by guns of large caliber, one piece of shell hitting left wheel of piece." F Battery's report mentions firing up to 10:40 a. m.; E Battery to 10:35. The reports also tell of enemy shells continuing up till almost the last minute. Unofficial statements from different batteries make claims of firing up to 10:59 a. m.



Major Charles E. Wilson, M. C.  
Regimental Surgeon 129th F. A.

Did the Germans know they were beaten? When "Big

\*"At 5:30 hour Nov. 11th, the supporting artillery opened fire in Grimaucourt. This firing continued until 6:30 hour. The infantry went over the top at 6:30 hour. \* \* \* about 10:15 hour, when I called for a barrage on the Petit Cognon woods where my left company was held up by machine gun nests. The barrage lasted 15 minutes. Directly after its cessation my left company advanced rapidly through the woods with little opposition. The company commander of this left assaulting company reported afterward that without the artillery support not only would his company have been unable to advance, but he would have suffered severe casualties. The artillery support was excellent in this instance."—From report of Capt. M. B. Angell, Commanding 1st Battn., 321st Inf., Nov. 16, 1918.

†"At 9 a. m. the morning of the 11th, received orders to cease firing at 11 a. m., being advised of the signing of the Armistice. We continued to fire until about 10:45 a. m., when the enemy shelled our position, one shell bursting 30 meters from the 4th section piece and shattering a wheel. (The sections were reversed, with 4th section serving as first gun.) When I issued the order to cease fire there was no cheering or wild demonstration. The impression the war had made on the men could not be thrown off in such a short time. That night was clear and crisp. The guns had ceased to roar. Colored rockets were sent up on both sides and it looked more like a Fourth of July celebration instead of the front lines."—From account by Capt. Theodore Marks of C Battery.

Berthas" were falling in Paris, the people there took it calmly; when the terrible German drive in the spring of 1918 again brought them to the heart of France and to the very gates of Paris, when whole provinces of France were desolated by the invaders and even communication with her people cut off, the French were "very, very anxious," but steadfast, firm, self-controlled. When Zeppelins were dropping bombs in London, or shelling unfortified towns and villages of the eastern coast, there was no panic, no talk of terms or compromise among the islanders. It merely made them stubbornly mad in British fashion, and recruiting increased everywhere, from Dover to Glasgow, from Berwick to Cork. But with Germany, when hostile armies were still scores of miles outside her borders, and her soil, her industries, her cities and homes were untouched; at the first evidence that she was losing, that her boasted prowess would not save her; having a guilty realization, perhaps, of what she would do to her enemies if conditions had been reversed; at once a wail and cry from all over the land, even in far-off Berlin, of "Kamerad! Kamerad!" of terror and disorder. Did she know she was beaten? Her ready though nervous compliance with the Allied Ultimatum (she who was so lordly with Serbia in July, 1914) is answer enough. Can you conceive of France, or Britain, or America doing it? And we know Belgium's answer in 1914.

In his recently published commentaries on the late war the German General von Ludendorff tells of his hopes at this period of negotiations, for a "new spirit of determination and unity" at home which would favorably affect the morale of the army. He then goes on:

"France, Serbia and Belgium had suffered far more than we had, and had held out. If the war should approach our own territory, if the feeling that he was protecting home and all that the word meant, entered into the heart of each man at the front, who knew full well the meaning of such terms as 'theatre of war,' 'battle-field,' 'lines of communication,' if the war with all its destruction threatened German soil, then I felt that our seventy millions of Germans would stand like one man, determined and ready to sacrifice for their country all the mighty strength that still remained to them. Whether France, herself, bled white and suffering worse than we were, would remain in the field long after her territory was evacuated, also was doubtful." ("Ludendorff's Own Story," Vol. II, p. 375. Harpers.)

As a confession of the ruthlessness of the German at-

tack on Belgium, France and Serbia, so that a contemplation of the horrors with which they themselves had conducted it in the name of war was relied on by its very terror to stiffen their own defense, this is sufficiently striking.

But it is even more striking, more subtly significant because unconscious, as a laying bare of German war psychology; an instinctive, frantic appeal to "terrorism" in reaction, confused by its own failure; the guilty conscience in dread of its just reward. It explains why the Germans adopted "terrorism" as a military policy; a policy which, if applied against themselves, they seemed to assume would (and the bare fear of it in fact did) affect their morale unfavorably; whereas in their opponents, whose psychology they did not and could not understand, it had a contrary effect.

The batteries of the 129th which had gone forward remained at the positions where the Armistice found them until next morning, Nov. 12th, when they returned to their old positions on the heights.\* The regiment continued on duty, with its guns laid for the protection of our advanced lines, until November 17th. Meantime the Germans were moving back, and on that day the 1st Division, who had taken over our mission in the Argonne, moved east along the Verdun-Etain road beyond the line of outposts of the 81st Division, and at 5 a. m., Nov. 17, 1918, the 60th F. A. Brigade was relieved of its missions and passed into reserve.†

"Finie la Guerre!"

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
\*Some weeks later the Commanding General of the 81st Division issued an order (G. O. 50, Hq. 81st Division, Dec. 25, 1918), reviewing the action and commending, among others, the 129th F. A. battalion which accompanied the division, in the following language:  
"129th Field Artillery.

Major Marvin H. Gates: Exceptional coolness and ability in conducting his battalion, assisting materially the progress of the infantry attack.

Sergeant Edward F. Mulvihill, Hq. Co.; Corporal Charles L. Fredricks, Hq. Co.; Private Louis S. Eichelberger, Hq. Co.; Private Lewis C. Entrekin, Hq. Co.; Private William E. Semler, Hq. Co.; Private C. B. Smith, Hq. Co.; Private Lewis E. Taylor, Hq. Co.: Conspicuous bravery and ability as liaison agents with the infantry in attack."

To this well-deserving list he might well have added, had they been within his observation, the names of numbers of men at the battery positions of this battalion, for their enduring courage and steady dependability under hard conditions.

†F. O. No. 27 Hq., 60 F. A. Brigade, 16th Nov., 1918; F. O. No. 23 Hq., 129 F. A., 16th Nov., 1918.



The "Hindenburg Line" as shown above (known to the Germans as the "Siegfried Stellung," and the movement as the "Alberich Retreat") is the prepared line to which they retired in March, 1917, devastating the abandoned area as they withdrew.

"The fact that much property belonging to the inhabitants was destroyed was to be deplored, but it could not be helped. The bulk of the population was driven eastward, only a small proportion being collected in certain places \* \* \* and provided with rations for several days and left behind."

("Ludendorff's Own Story," Vol. II, p. 5.)

Commonly the whole line as it existed prior to the Allied Offensive of 1918 was called the Hindenburg Line, but more accurately the line was limited as above.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### "MARCH ORDER."

All guns, equipment and personnel of the regiment were withdrawn from their forward battery positions and concentrated in echelon; Batteries A and C at Camp Claire Cote, along both sides of a wooded ravine up which ran the road from Belrupt to Derame, with the 1st Battalion Headquarters and B Battery at P. C. Maubois; the 2nd Battalion and Supply Company in the woods at Camp La Beholle.



Billets at P. C., Moscou.

Regimental Headquarters and the Headquarters Co. remained at P. C. Moscou. It was a relief of a tangible sort to be able to discard the clumsy, flopping gas-masks, to lay aside the steel helmets (save when needed as rain hats—a very effective use), and to be free from the necessity of keeping all movement under constant cover, of camouflaging, and of avoiding lights at night; long nights which, now that "St. Martin's Summer" was over, began by 4 o'clock or shortly thereafter.

Then began the long tedious wait till the time came to go home. The regiment was not unpleasantly situated, as camps go. Mud there was, in plenty, and time to kill. Daily drills and marches, care of the animals and equipment, making as comfortable as possible the long, frame sheds which served as billets, with their double-deck plank bunks, and the ever active pursuit of firewood, occupied part of the time. For amusement, athletic games were organized—base-ball, basket-ball, etc., and systematic pistol practice on target ranges fixed up in the woods. Occasional trips to the points of interest in that part of the country were now also possible. Verdun was only three or four miles distant,



on the banks of the Meuse; Verdun, with every house a ruin. Its great Cathedral, high on the hill in its center, at a distance still seemed to hold its head up proudly; but it was a mere shell with great holes in its roof and walls.



Interior of Verdun Cathedral.  
(Note holes in ceiling.)

Our sector, now open to our free movement, overlapped the old Verdun battle fields of 1916. Where we were now concentrated, the country was rolling, rather pronouncedly so, with considerable forest on the hill-sides, with open stretches on the high ground or in openings in the valleys. Around Ft. Douaumont, Ft. Vaux, Ft. Tavannes, Fleury and Ft. Souville, it was probably originally pretty much the same. But now for miles about those places there was a barren waste, so pitted with shell craters that not a square inch had been unmoved, and walking was difficult. Only at rare intervals an occasional blackened, ragged trace of a tree trunk suggested the original woods. One had to guard his steps, not only to keep from falling, but also to avoid the old hand grenades and unexploded projectiles of various sorts which still lay scattered about, along with rusty old rifles, helmets, machine-gun clips and the like; and more gruesome still, not a few bones. The German helmets, however, seemed to have been



Camouflaged Gun Position on Fleury  
Road, South of Ft. Douaumont.

mostly gathered up already. Ft. Douaumont was an underground steel-and-earth-capped, concrete fort, at the crest of a hill. On October 24th, less than three weeks before the Armistice, there were 52 shells of 420 mm. (about 16 inches) caliber, fired at the fort. One struck a steel gun-turret without damaging it, save for a dent or scar. At such times, from our positions, we could hear the rumble and roar of artillery with great distinctness, but except when under fire ourselves we could not tell what guns were firing, or just where. For, in fact, at practically all times, we could hear the guns to the north and northwest of us for



View Southwest from Ft. Douaumont.

miles up the Meuse, in the Bois de Consenvoye, around Sivry, and probably as far as Dun-sur-Meuse, perhaps to Stenay.

But now nothing more hostile occurred than occasional calls to special duty, such as hauling gravel for forage stations and roadways through the ever enveloping mud, or "policing" the camp and its surroundings of thick underbrush and muddy hillsides, or a 5-mile trip with the guns and caissons to the railhead at Dugny on a countermanded order to turn them in; while the shattered villages in the Woivre plain to the east of us, Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes,

Moranville, Abaucourt, Eix, were as quietly historic as Gettysburg or Waterloo.

But deserted and out of the world as our camp now seemed, with not even passing travel to give touch with the outside; with the objective which had made even the hardest experiences only passing incidents now attained, so that the routine of army life, with the best of spirit, grew to be a purposeless monotony, yet our men may be excused a little feeling of satisfaction that they played the game through as they began. They came to France at a time when the tide of the German drive had not been turned; they did their part to turn that tide and in the final events; and then they remained in the old fighting area and in the drab villages just back of it until they started home. With no artificial aids to amuse or divert them, save such as they developed among themselves, they soldiered to the end.



P. C. Moscou. Looking southeast from lower center of camp.

Near us, in Fort Rozellier, and in the hollows of the woods behind P. C. Moscou, were stationed a number of French troops. Their uniforms of sky-blue, with high, rolling collars, bulging pockets, and helmet of blue steel, narrower-rimmed and lighter than ours, but reinforced with a ridge on top from front to

rear, were in quiet contrast to the vivid red uniforms of previous wars with which our school books had made us familiar. They did a thriving trade with our men in making souvenirs, carved canes, hammered shell-cases, and the like.

Now, from time to time, in detachments selected in turn, our men were sent to the various areas in Southern France chosen for the purpose, for a two weeks' leave. The favorable reports as to the manner in which the men demeaned themselves on these outings were a pleasing commentary on the general stability of character which was

demonstrated by the members of our Army in France.\* The Army was a cross-section of the country's citizenship, and naturally contained men of every type. Removed thus



Group of "C" Battery men in typical dugout entrance.

6,000 miles from home, and from the restraints which normally affect them, their true characters came to the front. Men of principle remained so, as much as at home. Those whose standards were not based on principle, but only on the compulsion of decent public sentiment around them, found opportunity to show themselves up for what they were, and army senti-

ment soon placed them. It is a tribute both to the native good sense and fundamental standards of Americans as a whole, and to the forward vision and wise leadership which established precedents and traditions in the early stages of the A. E. F., that the general high level was so well maintained. In their relations with the French people, in spite of the differences in language, customs and point of view, there was little serious friction. The "discipline" of which this was evidence was primarily the self-discipline of men who had their own standards and ideals, and applied them to themselves in their own way.



Headquarters 129th F. A. in Vavincourt.

\*"Headquarters Savole Leave Area A. P. O. 736, France.  
From: Ass't Provost Marshal. 23 November, 1918.  
To: Commanding Officer, 35th Division, A. E. F.  
Subject: Conduct of men on leave.

I. The detachment from the 35th Division on leave arrived at this Area in perfect order, and the detraining, registration and assignment was accomplished without the slightest difficulty and in good military manner.

II. The manner in which the men conducted themselves shows that discipline has been enforced, and the men are entitled to commendation for their admirable conduct.

WILLIAM F. ALCORN,  
Major, Inf., U. S. A."

On Thanksgiving Day and Christmas extra efforts were made by the mess sergeants, not without success; the villages and markets, even as far away as Bar le Duc and Commercy, being ransacked for chicken, pork, fruits, cheeses and such other delicacies as the country afforded. An old shack, 60 or 80 feet long (whether originally designed as a stable or a billet, may be questioned) with the



129th F. A. Band in Vavincourt.

cracks stopped up as far as conditions and conveniences permitted, hung with the evergreen, mistletoe and red berries which abounded in the surrounding woods, heated by the stoves at each end (generally speaking, small, simply made stoves were plentiful), the dirt floor covered with a layer of gravel hauled from a quarry in the vicinity, and a menu which spoke volumes for the resourcefulness of our mess sergeants and cooks; such was our Christmas, 1918. These efforts, with the little oblong boxes, to which the War Department limited the loving liberality of the home-folks, which for the most part arrived close around Christmas Day, helped very greatly to keep up the cheerfulness of all.

Beginning soon after the Armistice, the stream of returning prisoners just released from German prisons, went past us. Not far to the west from our camp, on a hillside toward Verdun, a large camp of returned Russians was established, maintained by the French. Aside from the natural difficulties incident to handling them, thus dumped out unceremoniously by the Germans, the conditions in Russia, political, social and economic, made their disposition something of a problem. Poor homesick fellows, with no certainty as to when they



Square in Vavincourt.

would get back to their land, or whether they would find a home when they got there! Homeless, purposeless, friendless, they wandered around, hanging about our camp for any possible remnants of the relatively luxurious American ration, until it became necessary to issue standing orders forbidding them. They were, generally speaking, a rather ignorant, but not sullen or unkindly looking type of men. Uncouth and untidy, after their long service in army and prison camp; clothed in motley uniforms of Russian, German, French and American origin, it was impossible not to have a warm sympathy for them; and in a vague way to feel a sort of understanding of the conditions of society with the problems of which Russia was struggling.

The 60th Artillery Brigade at the time of the Armistice was attached to the 81st Division, and so continued until that division moved out of the area. Then it was attached for administrative purposes to the 1st Army Artillery,



Barracks at Souilly, 1st Army Hdqrs.

whose headquarters were at Souilly. When that moved, the brigade remained for a time somewhat "on its own hook." On Jan. 22, 1919, at 8 a. m. (pursuant to F. O. No. 2, Hq. 60th F. A.), the 129th F. A. left its station in the woods on Meuse Heights, which had been its home for over three months, and marched southward. Camping that night at Camp Gibraltar and Camp Thillombois (on the road between Thillombois and Courouvre), they came to their new billeting stations, in the Commercy-Bar le Duc area, in the afternoon of January 24th. Here they again became attached to the 35th Division (now under command of Brig. Gen. Thomas Dugan, who had succeeded Maj. Gen. Traub on Dec. 27, 1918), the headquarters of which were at Commercy, as part of the



Rue des Capuchins, Commercy.

2nd Army, under Lt. Gen. Robt. L. Bullard. Commercy had been a town of some importance, but had been within range of long-distance artillery fire and of bombing raids, and was largely abandoned. The new stations were:

Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Supply Company at Vavincourt.



Salmagne.

1st Battalion Headquarters and A Battery at Salmagne.

B Battery at Loisey.

C Battery at Culey.

D and E Batteries at Rosieres.

2nd Battalion Headquarters and F Battery at Naives.

The new quarters were in partly inhabited villages

which had not suffered any actual destruction, and it seemed to our men a little more like normal life than living in the woods, where they had been completely unattached and disassociated from all direct or personal connection with the outside world. For actual comfort the improvement was questionable, for fuel was not so plentiful. However, there were tangible evidences of an early movement, and the morale was maintained at a high level. During the winter the formation of divisional and regimental shows were encouraged by the A. E. F., and the one made up in the 35th Division showed for several weeks in the market building at Commercy, whither the men of the different organizations in the division were nightly brought in trucks to see it. The 129th reorganized, improved and brought down to date, to accord with their later experiences, the show which made such a success at Camp Doniphan, and produced it with equal success for the soldiers stationed at Commercy, Bar le Duc,



Naives.



Col. Karl D. Klemm.

Lerouville, Vavincourt, Chaumont-sur-Aire, Gondrecourt, Nancy, Toul, and elsewhere; and later at Courcemont and Bonnetable, near Le Mans.

Athletes from the regiment were meantime winning their share of the honors in the inter-organization meets which before the winter was over were being held all over France.

On Feb. 2d, Col. Klemm, who had commanded the regiment most of the time since its organization, including all its service at the front, where he had dis-

played military ability of a high order, was transferred to the 27th Division (S. O. 30, G. H. Q. 30 Jan. '19) and on that day took leave in the following general order:

"Headquarters, 129th Field Artillery  
2 February 1919

General Order  
No. 17.

It is with mixed feelings of elation and sorrow that I publish this General Order saying farewell to the Officers and Enlisted Men of this regiment. Elation at the prospects of returning to my home and loved ones, and sorrow at leaving you after such eminently satisfactory service as we have enjoyed together.

The highest praise that I can give you is the expression of my feeling that every man amongst you has always performed his full duty. To thank you for your good and loyal service is futile when you consider the above statement. Your service is rendered to your country and your country will be increasingly appreciative as they learn more and more of your accomplishments.

You have an untarnished record of which we all may be exceedingly proud, and I trust that events will so continue to shape themselves that you may also speedily be home and wind up, as gloriously as you have so far carried it along, the record of the One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Field Artillery.

K. D. Klemm,  
Colonel 129th F. A."



By the same G. H. Q. order, he was succeeded in command of the 129th F. A. by Colonel Emery T. Smith, theretofore commanding officer of the 106th F. A. He continued in command of the 129th thereafter until the final demobilization of the regiment.

On February 17, 1919, the 35th Division as a whole was reviewed by General Pershing and the Prince of Wales. Lieut. Gen. Bullard, commanding the 2nd Army, Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn, commanding the 9th Corps, Maj. Gen. A. M. Brewster, Inspector General of the A. E. F., and Lord Hamilton and Maj. Gen. Wagstaffe, of the British Expeditionary Forces, were also in the reviewing party. Early in the afternoon the various organizations of the division were assembled on the open field on the east side of the Meuse River, across from Commercy, north of Vignot. Heavy rains and overflowing river banks had left the field in poor condition for the purpose; but the review went through according to schedule. General Pershing and the Prince passed, on foot, around every platoon of each regiment. After the inspection they mounted and rode to a position down the field, past which the division marched in review, in platoon column. The heavy clouds, which had been lowering all the afternoon, broke just as the 60th F. A. Brigade swung into column, and Colonel Smith, of the 129th, who was in command of the brigade, gave the order to unfurl the colors. The effect of the regimental colors and of the red artillery guidons in each battery, in the sudden spot-light of sunshine, against the gray of the misty hill-sides beyond, made a striking picture. Following is General Pershing's letter to the 35th Division's Commander referring to the review:



129th en route to Review, Feb. 17, 1919.

**"AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES**

Office of the Commander-in-Chief.

France, February 20, 1919.

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to extend to you and the offi-

cers and men of the 35th Division my compliments upon their excellent appearance at the review and inspection on February 17th near Commercy. It was gratifying to see your troops in such good physical shape and to see them so well equipped. It is still more gratifying, however, to know that the moral tone of all ranks is so high. It is hoped that this will continue to the end of their service and will remain after their return to civil life as one of the most lasting and beneficial results of their military experience.

The Division is to be congratulated on its record in France. Arriving on May 11th, its training with the British Expeditionary Forces was cut short and by the end of June it was placed in a quiet sector of the line, where it released for the battle veteran divisions. On September 26th it attacked with the American First Army in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, capturing Varennes, Cheppy, Charpentry and Baulny. It was then withdrawn from the battle and took position in the Somme-Dieue Sector until the armistice.

The officers and men of your Division may proudly carry home with them the gratitude of the Allies with whom they fought and the pride of their fellows throughout our forces.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN J. PERSHING."

The reference to service with the British does not, of course, apply to the Artillery Brigade, which took its training separately. Nor does the General make any allusion to the final drive on Nov. 9-11, in which the 60th F. A. Brigade participated after the 35th Division, as a unit, had been withdrawn.



Fourgons of Supply Co. en route to be turned in.

By G-3 Orders No. 152, Hq. 2d Army, Feb. 20, '19, the 35th Division was transferred to the S. O. S., as the first official step in its movement homeward. On March 5th the regiment abandoned quarters in the various villages where its parts had been stationed, and on the morning of March 6th it entrained at

Nancois-Tronville for the west (except F Battery, which traveled on a separate train).

On March 8th, about noon, the regiment detrained at Connere, in the Le Mans area, and was distributed as follows: Regimental and both Battalion Headquarters and Supply Company, at Chateau la Chenay, one-half kilometer



Battery "C" enroute from Culey to turn in guns.

by G. H. Q., where troops were assembled for inspection, equipment, checking and rechecking, while awaiting their turns at the chief embarkation points, Brest, St. Nazaire and Bordeaux. Several divisions at a time were accommodated in this area, the 27th Division having just preceded the 35th in our particular district.

Drill, inspections, road-marches, athletics, and the

northwest of Courcemont. Headquarters Company in Courcemont. A, B, C, D and E Batteries in Chateau la Daviere, two kilometers northeast of Courcemont. F Battery in Beaufay.

The regiment, with the whole 35th Division, was now in the large "concentration area" established



Chauteau du Ponte, Courcemont.  
Enlisted Men's Billet.

routine of taking care of itself occupied the regiment's time for the next two or three weeks. Battery F took a turn at special duty in the Motor Overhaul Park No. 762 at Le Mans for several days, returning to quarters in Beaufay on March 25th.

The time spent in this area was not unpleasant. Spring was coming on,



Chateau la Chenay. 129th Regimental Headquarters at Courcemont.

clothing with the beauties of Nature a country unspoiled by the ravages and neglect of war; farms were cultivated,

cities and towns ran along in their normal life—normal except as inevitably affected by the swarming American soldiers.

While here the regiment lost several of its officers and men, who were transferred to other divisions in the Army of Occupation and elsewhere.

While here, too, our old Division Commander, Maj. Gen. William M. Wright, who had meantime served as commander of the 89th Division and as Corps Commander, returned to the 35th, and remained in command until its final demobilization.

Request was also made for volunteers to stay over in



En Route—Le Mans to Brest.

various branches of the service, such as the Motor Transport Corps, the Military Police, etc., and a few men responded. For the most part, however, it would have taken extraordinary attractions to have induced the men to stay a minute longer than was necessary, now that the war was over.

On March 29th, 1919, the last lap of the journey in France began, from Connere to the coast. On the 31st the regiment moved into its quarters in Camp Pontanezan just outside of Brest. The rains, which had been the normal feature of the weather there through most of the winter and spring, as we were told, became less frequent about the time the regiment arrived. Duck-board walks, too, had by that time been pretty generally constructed throughout the camp, thanks to the industry of troops which had preceded us; and with the milder weather of spring the camp of pyramidal tents (the first of that kind we had used since leaving Camp Mills) was not uncomfortable. Here the final processes of renovation of clothing, inspecting and substituting of equipment, and the preparation of passenger lists, was gone through.

Army "Paper Work," mentioned in such awesome whispers by old army men, and carried through with such

mechanical, inelastic formalism by its devotees (who would rather see a whole regiment's pay delayed for a week



Col. Emery T. Smith.  
Commanding 129th F. A., Feb. 2, 1919, to  
May 6, 1919.

than, for instance, to have the wrong abbreviation of a title appear on the payroll of one battery), was one of the bug-bears of organization commanders and of battery and company clerks, frequently men who in civil life were accustomed to seeing business affairs involving thousands, or perhaps millions of dollars, and the routine of huge enterprises, carried through with a smoothness, efficiency and flexibility of detail in unessential matters which contrasted strongly with what was often the unbending red-tape of army paper-

work on the most trivial subjects.

While in this camp formal presentation was made to the regiment of the ribbons to be attached to the regimental standard commemorating the engagements in which it had had a part—Gerardmer Sector, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne. The regiment was drawn up in a square under the regimental commander, Colonel Emery T. Smith, and received the ribbons from the hands of the Brigade Commander. At the same time he presented to the men of the regiment entitled thereto, the Distinguished Service Crosses which had been awarded them.

Camp Pontanezan had been a principal station for incoming troops during the war, and was equally so for homeward bound troops after the armistice. Well established and equipped Y. M. C. A., Knights of Columbus and Red

Cross centers were there, a feature of which was the large and well assorted selections of books, made possible by the American Library Association.\*

\*Through the efforts of this association, generally known as the A. L. A., millions of books had been made available in the various training camps and cantonments, on board transports, and finally overseas. From permanent headquarters in Paris books were sent any person connected with the army; deposit collections were made in all Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., K. of C. and like welfare organization buildings. The Army P. O. carried books to soldiers and returned them to the libraries free, over 100,000 being issued from Paris alone. The A. L. A. followed the army, making books available everywhere and at any time, in the areas back of the lines; and was rapidly extending its service toward the front at the time of and after the Armistice. A large library was established at Coblenz with the Army of Occupation, and maintained by the A. L. A. until November, 1919, when all books and property of the association in war service were turned over to the U. S. Government.

The 129th and its companion regiments, camped for some weeks after the Armistice in the woods, and later scattered through the farm-villages just back of them, had not yet established arrangements for this book-service when they moved westward, and the libraries at Camp Pontanezan were their first opportunity to enjoy it.



Camp Pontanezan, Brest.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### COMING HOME—AND HOME.



Torpedoed S. S. Westbridge. In dry-dock at Brest.

At noon of April 8th came orders for embarking. Regimental Headquarters and A Battery at 1:30 p. m. followed by C Battery at 6 p. m. marched to the dock, where they assisted in loading the regimental baggage and other ship supplies. In a near-by dry-dock was a torpedoed transport, undergoing repairs. The rest

of the regiment rose at 4 o'clock the next morning, and by 7 a. m. was on the march, under full pack, for the dock, Pier 7-8, Jetty del 'Est. There, as they marched on board the steamship, each man was given a farewell gift by the Red Cross, a pair of socks filled with good things to eat. Our ship was the North German Lloyd S. S. Zeppelin, then recently taken over. She had been locked in a German harbor ever since her completion in Bremen, in 1914, and this was to be her maiden voyage across the Atlantic, under command of U. S. Naval officers.

As described in the New York papers, when we arrived there, the Zeppelin was a twin-screw steamer of 15,200 tons, 670 feet long, 67 feet beam, with six decks, three of which were used for troops.

On board were 53 officers and 1,274 men of the 129th F. A., with some casualties, chiefly from hospital units.

At 1:09 p. m., April 9, 1919, a shiver ran through the ship, and a thrill filled all on board. We were off for home!

The voyage home was with no incidents of special note. The newness of the ship made its officers properly cautious. A tendency to run on one side or the other, rather than with a normal roll, and some slight engine trouble, not

only cut down the speed at times, but one time the ship was stopped in mid-ocean, for the purpose, so we understood, of adjusting the ballast.\*

On April 20, 1919, Easter Sunday, the regiment awoke to find itself in the outer harbor of New York.

France never did a better thing, or more graceful thing, in the way of international amenities, than when she presented Bartholdi's Statute of Liberty to the American people. It was the symbol of "Home" to two million men "over there," of friends, of American ideals and customs. And next to "Home" it was probably the most frequently spoken of thing there was back in what was commonly known as the "good old U. S. A."

Now all were alert to get a first view of the statue, as an assurance that they were indeed at home. Shortly there appeared on our bow first one and then another boat,



Mayor's Welcoming Committee, New York Harbor, April 20, 1919.

with the New York Mayor's Welcome Committee, gay with flags and streamers and joyous bands. No one need ever apologize for the manner in which New York met the returning soldiers, if the experience of the 129th is a criterion. When the Zeppelin finally pulled up to the dock in Hoboken, at about 11 a. m., representatives of the Y. M. C. A.

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- \*The daily bulletins showed the following:
- Apr. 10. 8 A. M. Lat. 47° 29' North, Long. 10° 27' West.  
Distance from Brest 230 miles, from N. Y. 2,932 miles.
  - Apr. 11. No bulletin.
  - Apr. 12. Noon. Lat. 45° 56', Long. 25° 12'.  
Distance from Brest 844 miles, from N. Y. 2,268 miles.
  - Apr. 13. 8 A. M. Lat. 44° 47' 42" Long. 29° 43'.  
Distance from Brest 1,042 miles, from N. Y. 2,069 miles.
  - Apr. 14. 8 A. M. Lat. 43° 20', Long. 36° 08'.  
Distance from Brest 1,335 miles, from N. Y. 1,777 miles.
  - Apr. 15. 8 A. M. Lat. 41° 33' 36", Long. 41° 33' 18".  
Distance from Brest 1,740 miles, from N. Y. 1,472 miles.
  - Apr. 16. 8 A. M. Lat. 39° 36', Long. 49° 30'.  
Distance from Brest 1,947 miles, from N. Y. 1,165 miles.
  - Apr. 17. 8 A. M. Lat. 39° 47' 18", Long. 56° 15'.  
Distance from Brest 2,260 miles, from N. Y. 852 miles.
  - Apr. 18. Noon. Lat. 39° 39', Long. 63° 37'.  
Distance from Brest 2,598 miles, from N. Y. 514 miles.
  - Apr. 19. 8 A. M. Lat. 39° 48', Long. 68° 42'.  
Distance from Brest 2,860 miles, from N. Y. 252 miles.



the Red Cross, the Knights of Columbus and the Jewish Welfare Board vied with each other to express their welcome with gifts of chocolate, cigarettes, post-cards, fruits, and even handkerchiefs. And an even more substantial evidence, not only of good-will but of efficiency, was given by



129th F. A. Debarking from Ferry  
for Camp Mills, April 20, 1919.

the Red Cross, when at about 11:30 a. m. we were marched up the dock, straight from the ship, to a covered pier, where a lunch of appetizing American home cooking was served; served abundantly and without waiting, served rapidly and served hot. No long drawn-out mess-line,

no wearisome delay. As they ate, Salvation Army representatives passed through and handed each man a small box, which upon being opened was found to contain a candy Easter egg. And not to be out-done in cordiality, the Red Cross workers of Brooklyn, when we had finally been loaded on a big ferry-boat and carried around to the Long Island shore, met the men as they passed out of the pier to the train for camp, and handed to each a huge chunk of rich



129th F. A. Band at Camp Mills.

American cake. Trivial things these may seem to record; but their effect on us, so long away from home, was tremendously gratifying.

Camp Mills, where the regiment spent the next ten days, was greatly improved since, a year before, we had slept there in tents set up in the mud. Now there were permanent frame billets, steam-heated, electric lighted, with hot and cold water, shower-baths, and cots to sleep on. And there were large American "canteens" where the delicacies so long unobtainable, ice cream, pie, cake and fruits, and all the conveniences and accessories to daily life which an American finds such aids to his comfort and enjoyment, could be bought *ad libitum*.

At Camp Mills the final sorting out of men and officers whose homes were in parts of the country distant from Missouri and Kansas, was made. They were detached and formed into or attached to casual detachments to be sent for discharge to camps nearer their homes. Proportionately there were not a great many of these, for the regiment was not only originally recruited in Kansas City, but a large part of its replacements had come from Missouri and Kansas.

On the afternoon of April 30th the regiment left Camp Mills and entrained for the west in two sections, commanded by Colonel Smith and Major McGee, respectively, via Lehigh Valley R. R. and Grand Trunk R. R. to Chicago. At Niagara Falls, which was reached next morning, an hour's stop made it possible to march over for a view of the Falls. Reaching Chicago early the following morning, the trains were taken over by the Chicago and Alton R. R. and proceeded toward Kansas City. All along the way from New York westward, the Red Cross workers were active and alert. Hot coffee and other delicacies were provided in profusion, and with a cordiality and good will which added to the appreciation of them. The intelligent, efficient management, and the personal sacrifice and loyalty of the women of America in the conduct of the Red Cross and allied work in the many forms of its activity, is a bright spot in the history of the war.

On the morning of May 3rd, the men on the trains were



In the Home-Coming Parade in Kansas City, May 3, 1919.  
Headquarters Co., under Lieut. Ralph E. Crenshaw, who commanded the  
company during most of its service in France.

stirring early. So, too, were their friends at home; for as the trains pulled into the Kansas City Union Station at



Welcome Arch on Grand Ave.,  
Kansas City, Mo.

7 a. m., early as it was they were there to greet them. Hot coffee and doughnuts were but an incident to the welcome. At 9 o'clock the regiment formed and marched in platoon column through crowded streets from the station to Convention Hall; under full pack, as they marched in France, minus horses and

mounted equipment. At the Hall, to which their families and friends had been invited, ranks were broken and several hours of visiting followed, interpolated with a bountiful dinner. And as a final token of the good will, the devotion, the sacrificing efforts and loving remembrance with which they had followed the regiment all through the war, the

members of the "Women's Regimental Auxiliary of the 129th Field Artillery" presented a silver cup or trophy, on which were to be engraved the names of those of the regiment who had given their lives.



They did not forget. 129th Auxiliary at work.

At 2 o'clock we marched back to the station and the train pulled out for Camp Funston. There followed the final inspections, muster-rolls and turning in of equipment. Each man was permitted to retain his uniform, including his overcoat and rain-coat, his steel helmet and his gas-mask; and in addition to his final pay, was given a bonus of \$60.00, with mileage to his home. Final discharges were issued on the morning of May 6th, 1919, and the 129th Field Artillery, as a formal organization, ceased to exist.

## CHAPTER XX.

### NOW THAT IT IS ALL OVER.

As a formal organization the regiment ceased to exist. But who will say that he regrets he had a part in its experiences? Who would be willing to have missed sharing in the events which called it into being? To have been an American in 1776 and not to have responded to the call of the Minute Men! To have been an Englishman when the hosts of Spain threatened his native island and not to have been on the decks of England's "wooden walls" or on the plains of Tilbury! To have been a Frank in the centuries long ago, when Attila's Huns of old were beating against Western civilization, and not to have been with Theodoric and Aetius at Chalons!

To "have been a part of all that I have seen" is something worth while in a man's life when what he has seen is one of the great crises of human experience, the marking of an epoch in human history. Not merely to have fought a fight (there is nothing ennobling or satisfying in that by itself) but to have taken a manly part in a great event, whether that part for each was large or small. The whole with its momentous strength and significant portent was but the aggregate of the individual parts of many men and women working together for a common purpose.

It was your privilege, you men of the 129th, to be of those whose part was at the front, and to have seen the effect on men when they feel the uplift of a common service

in a general cause; where it was the accepted commonplace, without thought of doing otherwise, that each man should do his duty faithfully and reliably whatever it might be, at whatever cost.

There each man did that duty as it arose; whether dramatic and unusual or routine and monotonous. Those who gave their lives met their fate courageously, as a matter of course, and any other man there would have met it in the same way. It was an inspiring demonstration, now that we are back in the hum-drum of life, with its pettinesses and anxieties and personal differences, that however men may love life, however commonplace their ordinary point of view may be, in spite of their seeming littleness and selfishness and their failure, often, to measure up to even their own best standards, when the time comes for a great test, they will make good; that when, irrespective of causes and previous predilections or affiliations, the movement of history has brought them face to face with a concrete situation, and each of them for the moment represents home and country, and that country's ideals of life and social order and of human liberty, then calmly and resolutely, as a matter of course, they do their duty as it is presented to them. To some in this case it meant death or wounds; to all it meant endurance and fortitude and self-denial, and oftentimes danger, with death hanging hungrily over them. But with no heroics, with no hanging back or evading of personal responsibility; and not merely to "kill Germans," nor even to defeat any particular nation or people as such, but rather what that nation at that moment in human affairs stood for, and not to fail in their own responsibility as their country's representatives and defenders, they "carried on." Some who in one moment were there at our sides in all respects like ourselves, in the next had given all, and still lie over there, mute sentinels on guard over the ideals for which they died.

Those who gave their lives should not be mourned as lost, except in a personal sense, but as having risen to an emergency which suddenly confronted them and theirs; and as having done their duty in that emergency as good citizens and brave men; as men who would not have had it otherwise if it meant anything less than their having of-

fered their all and having done their best. We who are left can do no better than continue that spirit.

"In Flanders' fields  
The poppies blow  
Between the crosses,  
Row on row,  
That mark our place;  
And in the sky  
The larks still bravely  
Singing fly,  
Scarce heard amidst  
The guns below.

We are the dead.  
Short days ago we lived,  
Felt dawn,  
Saw sunset glow,  
Loved and were loved,  
And now we lie  
In Flanders' fields.

Take up our quarrel  
With the foe;  
To you from falling hands  
We throw the torch—  
Be yours to hold it high.  
If ye break faith  
With us who die,  
We shall not sleep,  
Though poppies grow,  
In Flanders' fields."\*

That challenge is before us who are left. The call to service was no greater in the war than it is now to do our share to bring to our country, here at home, as the part of the world in which we live and for which we are responsible, those elements of honest purpose, fair dealing, co-operation and mutual helpfulness (based on an underlying confidence in the essential good faith of the other fellow, and an honest effort to see and understand, not only his view, but his point of view) which go to the stabilizing of our social system on those foundations of justice and self respect which make for human happiness; and for the development of a capacity for a sane, decent and normal enjoyment of life by ourselves and those among whom we live.

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\*"In Flanders' Fields" by Lt. Col. John McCrae, M.C., Canadian Forces. Written during second Battle of Ypres. The author was later killed in action.—(Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers.)

"The foe" is no longer Germany, as an armed enemy, but that for which she permitted herself to stand. It is well if she, and all of us, have learned her lesson. But because the rattling saber has now been dropped, the mailed fist is now unclenched and upheld in apparent surrender as she cries "Kamerad," because she now appears weak and contemptible, let us not forget what she was in her days of power and good fortune; her scornful pride, her worship of the right of Might, her broken faith (with the world and with those of her own people who had had visions of her possibilities for intellectual and moral greatness), her bullying terrorism toward the helpless, and her boastful threats toward her opposers, even America, from whom she would "take no nonsense." Let us remember these, not in a spirit of hatred or revenge, but to aid us to keep in mind the acuteness and reality of the crisis we had to meet; and better to appreciate the standards of life and government, of social responsibility, of national decency and of international fair dealing which are our own national standards, and for the realization of which our comrades died. The spirit which we fought in Germany is just as much our "foe" wherever found, even here at home, in ourselves or others.

Nations, or men, who control themselves and who are seeking only their proper right, not mere self-indulgence, will not only not be unfairly opposed but will meet with friendly recognition and sympathetic co-operation from the world at large. But nations or men who cannot control themselves, who run amuck, seeking only their own temporary selfish ascendancy, disregarding the fair "rules of the game," callously overriding the rights, interests and legitimate aspirations of others, and their common ideals of social life—breaking their faith, (not merely that of formally pledged agreements but the good faith between man and man which is the foundation of all human relationships) all such will find, and ought to find, that the sober, sane and liberty-loving people of the earth will do the controlling for them.

It is part of the job, it is in fact a simple carrying on of the job, of the men who rallied to the country's service in the war, to see that this is done. Not in any swashbuck-



ling or self-serving manner, but with the steady, well-balanced, self-respecting power of men who have seen the play on a large and vital stage of elemental human emotions and antagonisms, who have experienced the realities of life in the crudity of its elemental needs, and who are bigger, broader, stronger men because of that experience.

We heard much, while we were in France, of the sacrifices and economies at home, and they were true, to the fullest extent. But by the time we got home, after six months of dispiriting waiting following the Armistice, the reaction had come. The drive for money and display, the spirit of going as far as you can "put it over," which is the profiteering spirit, whether in money-making, in social standards or in personal relationships, (all superficial and temporary, perhaps, but glaringly and offensively apparent) was on, and, coming as we did from the front of ruined villages, neglected farms and a life reduced to its crudest forms, with the feeling still sub-consciously affecting us that we had been engaged in something not for ourselves, it shocked and upset us a little at first. Perhaps the thoughtful of those at home looked for a new inspiration from the returning soldiers, and were also a bit disappointed. There was a poster at the time of the Victory Loan Drive, about the time we returned, showing a big man in work clothes reaching into his pocket, with the words, "Sure, I'll see it through." The spirit of that appeal must stay. The problems of life in the country at large, and in the world, which follow the war, need a broad vision, a sympathetic outlook, a willingness to do our part in giving full value in service and helpfulness and above all, a firm grip on ourselves in the preservation of our best ideals. The world needs, never more than now, the best from everyone. Let's "see it through."

Not the least of the problems which have come to us as a result of the war is our place in and our relationship with the world at large. We cannot think of the peoples of the Old World in the same detached, half real, half story-book manner that we inherited from our school days and felt before the war. We have met them face to face, as nations and as individuals, and have felt the reflex of personal contact with them, from which we feel a better,

or at least a more real, understanding of them. And with it all we remember their sacrifices, their agonies, their national fortitudes; not as Frenchmen, or Englishmen, or Belgians, or as belonging to any race or people, but as fellow-humans who shrank at nothing in meeting a crisis which was suddenly thrust upon them; who showed us what men can do, and will do, when occasion demands. The more we experienced ourselves, the greater the dangers, the hardships, the strain or the sacrifices which we saw men of our own armies called upon to meet (and at which they did not fail in the meeting), the more deeply we felt the magnitude of what these others had gone through, in the four long years before we came among them. And in the aftermath of the war, which so affects our social, industrial and political life here in America, we can better realize the difficulties through which Europe is struggling, with her greater sacrifices and lesser reserve, with her inherited racial animosities and unavoidable national frictions; with her peoples, like the great body of the people in every land, sincerely but worriedly trying to build for themselves and theirs in honest industry; doing it in the face of the greatest unbalancing in the history of the world. Doing it, too, with the same difficulties arising from legitimately conflicting interests, and with the same handicaps of selfish and narrow or honestly limited and distraught leadership from which we are not free in our own land.

More than a century ago France stretched forth her helpful hand when we were weak, and we never forgot it. But she did it as a free gift, and in the doing of it the debt was cancelled, in any mercenary sense. Again, in the movement of history, the opportunity for mutual helpfulness arose, this time the other way. What we did for France was not in payment of an already cancelled debt, nor as the creating of a new obligation in our favor; but again it was a free gift of service for what we felt was right. No debt remains, except the debt owed by France, by us and by all people who feel the instinct to help the world along, to do what can be done at any given moment, in the manner for which they are best fitted or are best situated.

In the perspective of history it will doubtless be manifest that in this era it was the mission of America to lend its steadying hand in restoring the balance in this great unbalancing. For this the first essential is to have a complete understanding and control of ourselves, our institutions and our national ideal. New formulae and new codes will not of themselves do the work. We may well feel that with our experiences we have a better understanding, a keener vision, a broader outlook and a wider sympathy than before; but to these we must apply the same fundamental principles which got results in the army—of mutual confidence, fair dealing and honest service; of doing our best for the sake of the doing; of good faith in spirit as well as in form—and, not the least, with a realization that we are judged, and the effectiveness of our work is finally determined, as much by our sense of what is fine as by our facility in demonstrating that it is civilly, socially or morally legal.

The world is ourselves. Not somebody else; not some overshadowing giant to whom we may look for favors, or whom we can blame for disagreeable conditions. It was so in France. There is no concrete, separate and individualized "they" who can be blamed for what we may think were mistakes in the war. "They" was all of us, in all branches and stations of the service, generals and privates, and all between. It was new work for all, and all were doing their best under untried, abnormal, pressing and colossally important conditions. We learn in life from experience, which implies that we do not know it all in advance. We know the result was a success, the war was ended a year ahead of time, the work which we dropped everything to do was done and the end sought was accomplished. We may properly study our record, to profit by both our successes and our mistakes, for our future guidance if similar exigencies shall arise, or in the prevention of them. But there is small satisfaction to any man of breadth, or vision, or of appreciation of human endeavor, to see only those things in which he can find fault and criticism.

Individuals who failed in past emergencies, or whom fortuitous circumstance brought into undeserved promi-

nence, soon sink to the obscurity which is their level unless their importance is magnified by dwelling on their faults, their mistakes, or (if that is what it be) their narrowness. But if, lifting our imagination above the ground, not seeming to measure our own efficiency by the facility with which we can pick flaws in others, we withhold our captious criticisms until there has been told all that was fine, all that was courageous, all that was self-sacrificing, steadfast and enduring, all the unrecorded instances when men of common mold lifted themselves above themselves, in deeds of quiet endurance and unheralded heroism, to heights of which they themselves had not dreamed, and then quietly resumed their places—if, when all this has been told, those who were there and thus feel qualified shall speak in sober judgment on what they saw, their thoughtful words may well be heeded.

Whether we will or no, the men who gathered for the country's service in the war will for long be a distinct and forceful element in our national life; as individuals, because the war called for the best of those in the early manhood of our citizenship, and because of the broadening effect of their experience; collectively, because of the inherent instinct for association in any group of men who have shared in a great and moving common experience.

There was a saying in the army that "Some officers grew with their experiences; others merely swelled." It is a good distinction to keep in mind. No man who served in the war wants anything in the nature of reward or "pay" for his service. That was not what he went for; but rather because he had it in him, and could not do otherwise; a thing by which he might be judged; not what he did, but what he did not fail to do. The appreciation, the sympathetic understanding of the spirit of those who went into the war, and of those who gave it their unstinted support (which with a man's own sense of responsibility well met is his most satisfying reward) will come instinctively from those whose appreciation is worth the having. From all others, he only expects and demands a "square deal"; not for himself alone, but for everyone; being wary of the "dud," the "camouflage" and the "false alarm."

As a formal organization the regiment ceased to exist.

But that which made it possible, of which it was merely the expression, the fundamental fact of robust, genuine, conscious Americanism at its best, of definite ideals of life, of institutional and social standards, of the conceptions of life which make men willing, when an emergency calls, to go to the limit in whatever of sacrifice or effort is necessary for the defense of those standards and ideals, has not ceased now any more than it had its beginning with the coming of the war. It was there in our national life, in all parts and elements of that life. We do not always realize it, in ourselves or others, until the appeal comes which calls it forth. It is difficult to analyze in its existence, and more so to describe in its manifestation. But how real, how simple in its strength, when that manifestation comes!

Try to get a few thousand, or even a few hundred, people in any community to agree on a common objective, and to work together intelligently, systematically and cohesively for even a part of their time or with a small part of their energy or their means, to accomplish it. What a herculean task you have!

Yet often at the front, when in the dead of night so dark you could not see the man a horse's length ahead, with rain pouring down, soaking through the men's inadequate rain-coats, chilling their flesh and numbing their fingers and joints; with deadly weariness and sleepiness; with the brightest hope before them that of a chance to lie down on damp ground under a thin shelter-tent to rest a few hours before again starting on a similar night's march; with even the hours of supposed rest shortened by the onerous requirements of caring for the horses and equipment; on such nights, with the column of march strung out for miles, each man moving forward alone with his own thoughts, no talking or singing, no smoking even, but tramp, tramp, tramp! rumble, rumble, rumble! hour after hour, one could but wonder and marvel at it all. What miracle had brought together all these men, men of every type and temperament, from every corner of the country; the educated and the ignorant, the rich and the poor, the fastidious and the uncouth, the self-restrained and the self-indulgent, mere boys and middle-aged men, all together thousands of miles from the homes which they might never see again;

all moved by one impulse, without excitement, friction or hesitation; all submitting to a common authority under which they had voluntarily placed themselves; and quietly, steadily, hour after hour, tramp, tramp, tramp! rumble, rumble, rumble! What were they all thinking about? The homes they had left, the friends they hoped to see when they would be free to act for themselves in the problems of peace at home? But now all centered on a common mission, which at this moment was merely to move forward, in silence and darkness and rain and cold; not blocking the roads by disorderly crowding, but keeping their proper column, each man following the shadowy form in front, and when even that was indistinguishable in the murky blackness, then blindly feeling his way guided only by the sounds ahead; tramp, tramp, tramp! rumble, rumble, rumble! And when the objective was reached, whether it meant going into action, with barbed-wire thickets, depthless mud and treacherous mine-fields to maneuver through; or in orderly fashion driving into position and establishing the guns in place under enemy fire; or steadily and diligently maintaining their own fire in support of the "front line" while ignoring, in the active performance of their duties, the hostile shells which burst murderously about them, striking down their comrades at their sides; or whether it meant the gruelling experiences of defensive positions, living in holes in the ground and constantly subjected to the searching shell or gas fire of a tireless foe; yet always and everywhere taking it all in matter-of-fact willingness, as part of the work they had undertaken to perform and which they had no thought but to carry through to the end!

Can you define it? Can you understand it, even? And equally marvelous, equally incomprehensible when gauged by our accustomed experiences and the assumed standards of ordinary life—the millions of people at home; Wall Street and "Swanee River," Little Italy and Quality Hill, farmer and banker and boy scout, shop and counter and country club, all united in a grand "Go to it! We'll back you up!"

They did back us up with a constant flow of ships and men and supplies, without stint. And it is worth saying that there was never a minute, a second, when the army

"over there" did not feel that the folks at home were back of them, heart and soul. That is what won the war.

"It ain't the individual, or the Army as a whole;  
But the everlastin' team-work of every bloomin' soul."


—*Kipling*.

With the memory of that spirit, in the army and out of it, no feeling of pessimism as to the essential soundness and ultimate stability of our country can long endure; and no greater opportunity is before the men who came forward in the war than that of now proving themselves a steady, well-balanced, high-purposed influence towards our country's future greatness.



## APPENDIX, GLOSSARY, ROSTER





# APPENDIX

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## APPENDIX A.

### DECLARATION OF WAR

#### PUBLIC RESOLUTION No. 1

S. J. Res. 1

65th Congress

Sixty-fifth Congress of the United States of America; At the First Session, Begun and Held at the City of Washington on Monday, the Second Day of April, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventeen.

#### JOINT RESOLUTION

Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial German Government and the people of the United States and making provision to prosecute the same.

*Whereas*, The Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America:

Therefore be it Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

CHAMP CLARK,  
*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

THOS. R. MARSHALL,  
*Vice-President of the United States  
and President of the Senate.*

Approved 6 April, 1917.

WOODROW WILSON.

## APPENDIX B.

## RECORD OF SERVICE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE 129TH F. A.

(From Report of Chief of Field Artillery, 1919.)

Organization.	Date of recognition under Act of		Mexican Border Service.	
	June 3, 1916.		Mustered in.	Mustered out.
Headquarters Co.	July 27, 1917			
Supply Co.	Aug. 1, 1917			
Battery A	May 31, 1917			
Battery B	June 22, 1916	June 25, 1916	Dec. 22, 1916	
Battery C	June 20, 1916	June 25, 1916	Dec. 22, 1916	
Battery D	June 20, 1917			
Battery E	June 20, 1917			
Battery F	June 24, 1917			

The Act of June 3, 1916, was a general act covering both the Regular Army and the National Guard. The dates in the first column above are those at which the respective organizations were recognized under this law, though already in existence and operating under the old law.

Battery B was organized June 14, 1905, in Kansas City, Mo. Under the call for service on the Mexican border, which was effective June 19, 1916, it reported for duty and was mobilized with the other Missouri troops at Nevada, Mo., and moved thence to Laredo, Texas. At that place and vicinity it was on patrol service from July 4, 1916, until December, 1916.

Battery C was organized in Independence, Mo., in November, 1914. Called into federal service in June, 1916, it went first to Nevada, Mo., and thence to Laredo, Texas, where it served from July 4, 1916, until December. With Battery B of Kansas City, and Battery A of St. Louis, it constituted the 1st Battalion, Field Artillery, Missouri National Guard.

The dates of actual mustering in of the various organizations, prior to their recognition by the War Department, were as follows:

	Actual Muster	Recognized by State Adj. Gen.
Battery A,	May 8, 1917	June 6, 1917
Battery B,	June 14, 1905	Apr. 24, 1905
Battery C,	Nov. —, 1914	Feb. 4, 1915
Battery D,	June 4, 1917	June 28, 1917
Battery E,	June 17, 1917	June 28, 1917
Battery F,	June 22, 1917	June 28, 1917
Supply Co.,	July 26, 1917	July 26, 1917
Headquarters Co.,	June —, 1917	July 26, 1917

## APPENDIX C.

## STRENGTH OF AMERICAN ARMY.

(From Report of Chief of Field Artillery, 1919.)

On April 6, 1917, the Field Artillery of the U. S. Army totaled 9 separate regiments, with 408 officers and 8,252 enlisted men.

On Nov. 11, 1918, the Field Artillery totaled 22,393 officers and 439,760 enlisted men, in 234 regiments, 77 brigades and headquarters,

62 trench mortar batteries, 11 trench mortar battalions, 11 army and corps artillery parks, besides training and replacement activities.

Of these artillery forces, 12,496 officers and 298,713 enlisted men were in France.

\* \* \* \*

On Oct. 31, 1918, the strength of the 60th F. A. Brigade is given as follows:

	Officers	Men	Guns
60th F. A. Hdqrs. ....	7	52	....
128th F. A. ....	55	1443	24
129th F. A. ....	52	1293	24
130th F. A. ....	55	1695	24
110th T. M. B. ....	3	179	12 (mortars)
110th Amm. Train ....	26	1177	....
	<hr/> 198	<hr/> 5839	<hr/> 84

\* \* \* \*

On Nov. 11, 1918, the day of the Armistice, the total strength of the American Army, including those both at home and abroad, was 3,665,000, composed of the following:

Field Artillery* .....	502,515
Infantry .....	974,000
Cavalry .....	29,000
Engineers .....	394,000
Medical .....	300,000
Ordnance .....	64,000
Signal Corps .....	52,000
Coast Artillery Corps* .....	23,485
Quartermaster .....	228,000
War Department .....	212,000
Air Service .....	202,000
Munition Train .....	103,000
Chemical Warfare .....	18,000
Tanks .....	13,000
Miscellaneous .....	550,000
	<hr/> 3,665,000

\*All Coast Artillery serving with the Field Artillery is included in the Field Artillery in above figures.

In his report of Nov. 20, 1918, corrected on Jan. 16, 1919, General Pershing gives the following figures:

Total American Army in Europe.....	2,053,347 (less losses)
Of these the combatant troops num- bered .....	1,338,169
Killed and died of wounds.....	36,154
Deaths of disease.....	14,811
Deaths not classified.....	2,204
Wounded .....	179,625
Prisoners .....	2,163
Missing .....	11,660
Prisoners captured.....	44,000
Artillery captured .....	1,400
(Guns, howitzers and trench mortars)	

## APPENDIX D.

## ORGANIZATION OF 35TH DIVISION.

By G. O. No. 114, War Dept., Aug. 23, 1917, Major General William M. Wright was assigned to command of the troops to be sent to Camp Doniphan.

The 35th Division was formally organized (conforming to G. O. 101, War Dept., Aug. 3, 1917, and Tables of Organization, Series "A," Aug. 8, 1917) by G. O. No. 10, Hq. 35th Division, Sept. 13, 1917, as follows:

(The figures given are the number called for by the Tables of Organization when at full strength; the organizations designated in parentheses are those from which the new units were formed.)

Division	Headquarters (Troop "A")	Enlisted		Officers	Men
		Officers	Men		
69th Infantry Brigade Hqrs. (Hq. 1st Mo. Brig.)	1st Kan. Cav.)			43	195
137th Infantry (1st and 2nd Kan. Inf.)		5	20		
138th Infantry (1st and 5th Mo. Inf.)		106	3,699		
129th Mach. Gun Batt'n (2d Bn. 2d Mo. Inf.)		106	3,699		
Veterinary Detachment (added later)		28	748		
		1	3		
		246	8,169		
70th Inf. Brigade Hdqrs. (Hq. 1st Kan. Brig.)		5	20		
139th Infantry (3d Kan. Inf. and 4th Mo. Inf.)		106	3,699		
140th Infantry (3d and 6th Mo. Inf.)		106	3,699		
130th Mach. Gun Batt'n (3d Bn. 2d Mo. Inf.)		28	748		
Veterinary Detachment (added later)		1	3		
		246	8,169		
Total Infantry				492	16,338
60th Field Art. Brig. Hdqrs. (organized within Division)		9	54		
128th F. A. (light) (1st Mo. F. A.)		62	1,480		
129th F. A. (light) (2d Mo. F. A.)		62	1,480		
130th F. A. (heavy) (1st Kan. F. A.)		70	1,587		
110th Trench Mortar Battery (Hq. Co., Sup. Co., 2nd Mo. Inf.)		5	168		
110th Ammunition Train (organized within Division)		37	1,295		
		245	6,064		
Total Artillery				245	6,064

# APPENDIX

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110th Engineers (1st Bn. Kan. Eng. and 1st Bn. Mo. Eng.).....	50	1,647
Engineers Train (Kan. Eng. Train).....	2	82
110th Field Signal Batt'n. (Kan. Sig. Bn.) .....	15	473
128th Mach. Gun. Batt'n. (1st Bn. and M. G. Co., 2d Mo. Inf.).....	16	377
Train Hdqrs. and Military Police (Troops B, C and D, 1st Kan. Cav.)	15	359
110th Supply Train (Mo. Sup. Train and transfers) .....	16	485
110th Sanitary Train—137th, 138th, 139th and 140th Ambulance Co.'s (Mo. Amb. Co.'s 1 and 2, Kan. Amb. Co.'s 1 and 2). 137th, 138th, 139th and 140th Field Hosp.'s (Mo. Field Hosp.'s 1 and 2, Kan. Field Hosp.'s 1 and 2).....	50	901
	944	26,921
		944
Total Authorized Strength of Division.....		27,865

# APPENDIX E.

## OFFICIAL RECORD OF DISEASE AND MORTALITY IN 35TH DIVISION.

### In Camp Doniphan in 1917-18.

Epidemic.		Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Total
Meningitis.....	{ Cases.....	0	0	5	25	11	5	46
	{ Deaths.....	0	0	3	6	4	0	13
Measles.....	{ Cases.....	10	24	236	965	170	29	1,434
	{ Deaths.....	0	0	1	11	25	9	46
Diphtheria.....	{ Cases.....	1	9	47	34	19	66	176
	{ Deaths.....	0	0	1*	0	0	0	1
Smallpox.....	{ Cases.....	0	0	0	2	1	12	15
	{ Deaths.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pneumonia.....	{ Cases.....	1	10	78	111	131	82	413
	{ Deaths.....	0	1	3*	14†	18*	15	51
Typhoid Fever..	{ Cases.....	0	7	0	2	0	0	9
	{ Deaths.....	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
Scarlet Fever...	{ Cases.....	1	6	10	13	0	0	30
	{ Deaths.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
								2,123
								113

\*1 Civilian.

†2 Civilians.

## APPENDIX F.

Enlisted men of the 129th F. A. who received commissions after attendance at the 35th Division Training Camp, January 5 to March 31, 1918:

Wendell C. Arrowsmith  
Edward T. Curtis  
Keith W. Dancy  
Carl E. Davidson  
Godfrey C. Downey  
Lowell W. Dyer  
Arthur A. Hale  
Howard W. Jewell  
Burnam R. Jones  
Fred E. Junior

Joseph F. Major  
Fred L. McDonald  
James B. Miller  
Charles R. Mize  
James M. Pendergast  
Francis V. Rudd  
Ruskin A. Smith  
Frank Stanley  
Sherwood O. Stubbs  
William R. Ward

The following enlisted men of the 129th F. A. also received commissions after their enlistment:

Clarence C. Banholzer  
John A. Broaddus  
Lester E. Cadman  
Charles P. Crawford  
Lafayette S. Demand  
William F. Guthrie, Jr.  
Landis D. McDowell  
James E. Martin  
Fulton Moore  
John E. Moore

Francis Poindexter  
Cedric E. Routh  
Frederick H. Seligman  
Robert E. Shook  
Ralph J. Smith  
Norton Thayer  
Edwin L. Unland  
Henri L. Warren  
Herbert E. Ware

In addition to the foregoing, a considerable number of our men had been sent to the Officers' Training School at Saumur, France, and were near the end of their course, when at the signing of the Armistice it was ordered that no further commissions be issued.

## APPENDIX G.

## Headquarters First Army.

Secret

Field Orders No. 21.

21 September, 1918, 16.00 hrs.

1. In accordance with agreement between the French and American high command, the Commanding General, 1st Army (U. S.) will take over, effective at noon, September 22, the present front of the IId French Army extending from Mesnil (inclusive) to La Harazee (inclusive); and the present zone of the IId French Army, the boundaries of which are indicated in accompanying annex.

2. The new front of the 1st Army will thus extend from Clemery (exclusive), east of the Moselle, to La Harazee (inclusive).

3. In taking over the present zone of the IId French Army, the 1st Army (U. S.) will not take over any permanent installations in the zone, unless such action is essential to the success of the contemplated operation.

4. According to an understanding with the Commanding General Group of Armies of the North and Northeast, the staff of the IId French Army will remain at Laheyecourt and under the directions of the Commanding General, 1st Army (U. S.) will continue until further orders its present functions including the supply of all French units in the zone of the IId French Army.

5. The defenses of Verdun will remain in the hands of the 17th Corps.

6. Headquarters 1st Army (1st Echelon) will close at Ligny-en-Barrois at 2 p. m., September 21, and will open at Souilly at noon, September 21, 1918.

7. The boundaries of the Army Zone and the Corps Zones are as indicated in accompanying annex.

By command of General Pershing.

H. A. Drum,

Chief of Staff.

Official:

R. McCleave,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
A. C. of S., G-3.

## APPENDIX H.

## 35th Division, France.

24th September, 1918, 5 P. M.

Secret

Field Orders No. 44.

\* \* \* \*

## II. General Plan. \* \* \*

## (b) Zone of action.

The boundaries of the zone of the 35th Division are:

Right (east) boundary:

Vauquois (inclusive).

Very (inclusive).



Eclisfontaine (exclusive).  
 Sommerance (inclusive).  
 St. Georges (inclusive).  
 Imecourt.

Left (west) boundary:  
 Boureuilles (exclusive).  
 Varennes (exclusive).  
 Montblainville (exclusive).  
 Apremont (exclusive).  
 Fleville (inclusive).  
 St. Juvin (exclusive).

(c) Objectives.

Corps Objective: The heights southeast of Charpentry connecting Points 02.6-75.4 and 05.8-77.9.

American Army Objective: A line through l'Esperance-Hill Montrebeau-La Neuville le Comte Fme.

The Combined Army First Phase Line: East of Fleville.

Combined Army First Objective: Line 1 kilometer south of line connecting Champigneulle-Imecourt.

\* \* \* \*

III. \* \* \*

(d) Attacking Troops.

The 69th Brigade with one battalion of the 70th Brigade will lead the attack. To each first line and support battalion will be attached one machine gun company. The attack to include the Corps Objective will be made by the leading battalions.

Parallel of departure for leading battalions—a line approximately 500 meters from the enemy's trenches; junction with the 91st Division, point 06.7-70.5; junction with the 28th Division 03.8-70.0.

The leading battalions will avoid Vauquois and the Bois de Rossignol passing them by the flank. The battalion of the 70th Brigade attached to the 69th Brigade will be used to mop up Vauquois and Bois de Rossignol, mopping up operation to start at conclusion of smoke barrage. The battalion will join reserve brigade as it passes that point.

\* \* \* \*

V. Command Post.

Dugouts near southern edge of woods on Les Cotes des Forimont.

Peter E. Traub,

Major General, U. S. A., Commanding.

Annex No. 1 to F. O. No. 44.

Hq. 60th F. A. Brig., Sept. 24, 1918.

1. The Artillery of the Sector consists of the following units:

60th Field Artillery Brigade consisting of

128th F. A. (6 batteries 75 mm).

129th F. A. (6 batteries 75 mm).

130th F. A. (6 batteries 155 mm C).

110th T. M. B. (1 battery 6-inch).

219th Regiment Artillerie d'Campagne (9 batteries 75 mm).

1 Bn. 282nd Regiment d'Artillerie M. T. R. (2 batteries 220 mm)

3rd Group 317th A. L. C. (3 batteries 155 mm C).

\* \* \* \*

L. G. Berry,  
 Brigadier General U. S. A.

## APPENDIX I.

## Headquarters First Army

## American Expeditionary Forces, France

20 September 1918. 15 Hour

Secret

Field Order

No. 20

Map: Special Map No. 12 G-3. Verdun-Mezieres 1/80000. Metz-Chalons-Mezieres 1/200000. Metz and Commercy 1/80000.

1. (a) The enemy holds the front from Clemery (east of the Moselle) to the Aisne, as follows: \* \* \*
  - (b) The Allied Armies attack on the front the Meuse exclusive to the Suippe exclusive:
    - (1) Direction: Toward Mezieres.
    - (2) Mission: To force the enemy from the line of the Aisne.
    - (3) Objectives:
 

First, Dun-sur-Meuse—Grand Pre—Challerange—Somme Py.

Second, Stenay—Le Chesne—Attigny—Rethel.
  - (c) The IVth French Army attacks on the front La Harazee exclusive to the Suippe exclusive, and assists our army in the reduction of the Argonne Forest by the capture of the Binarville-Lancon and Grand Ham. The 38th French Corps will attack on the right of the IVth French Army.
  2. The First Army, A. E. F. will attack on D day at H hour on its front west of the Meuse and will hold on its front east of the Meuse to Clemery, exclusive.
    - (a) Front of Attack:
 

The Meuse exclusive—La Harazee inclusive.
    - (b) Zone of attack:
 

Right boundary—The Meuse exclusive.

Left boundary—La Harazee inclusive—Binarville exclusive—Lancon exclusive—Grand Ham exclusive—Grand Pre inclusive—Boult aux Bois inclusive—Chatillon sur Bar inclusive.
    - (c) Direction: Buzancy—Stonne.
- Troops:
- (A) 4th Corps
  - (B) 2nd Colonial Corps
  - (C) 17th French Corps
  - (D) 3rd Corps
    - Division A—The 80th Division
    - Division B—The 33rd Division
    - Division C—The 4th Division
    - Division D—The 3rd Division
  - (E) 5th Corps
    - Division E—The 79th Division
    - Division F—The 37th Division
    - Division G—The 91st Division
    - Division H—The 32nd Division
  - (F) 1st Corps
    - Division I—The 35th Division
    - Division J—The 28th Division
    - Division K—The 77th Division
    - Division L—The 92nd Division

- (G) Army Reserve  
 Division M—The 1st Division (3rd Corps)  
 Division N—The 82nd Division (1st Corps)  
 Division O—The 29th Division (5th Corps)
3. (A) The Fourth Corps  
 \* \* \* \* \*
- (B) The Second Colonial Corps  
 \* \* \* \* \*
- (C) The Seventeenth French Corps  
 \* \* \* \* \*
- (D) The Third Corps  
 \* \* \* \* \*
- (E) The Fifth Corps  
 \* \* \* \* \*
- (F) The First Corps  
 (1) The First Corps will attack on the front Vauquois inclusive to La Harazee inclusive as indicated on the map.  
 (2) Zone of Action:  
 Right boundary—Vauquois inclusive—Very inclusive—Eclisfontaine exclusive—Sommerance inclusive—Imecourt inclusive.  
 Left boundary—La Harazee inclusive—Binarville exclusive—Lancon exclusive—Grand Ham exclusive—Grand Pre inclusive.
- (3) Mission:  
 (a) It will reduce the Foret d' Argonne by flanking it from the east.  
 (b) It will assist in cutting off hostile artillery fire and observation from the eastern edge of the Foret d' Argonne.  
 (c) Upon arrival at the Corps Objective it will advance to the American Army Objective in conjunction with the Fifth Corps.  
 (d) Upon orders from the Army Commander it will advance to the Combined Army First Phase Line and assist the Fifth Corps in the capture of the Bois de Moncy and Le Petit Bois.  
 (e) It will clean up the Foret d' Argonne.  
 (f) When ordered by the Army Commander it will continue the advance to the north in the zone Imecourt inclusive—Sivry Lez Buzancy inclusive—1 kilometer east of Buzancy—1 kilometer west of Sommauthe, and the western line of Grand Pre inclusive—Boult aux Bois inclusive—Chatillon sur Bar inclusive—Les Petites Armoises inclusive.  
 (g) It will maintain contact with the 38th French Corps on its left.  
 (h) Special measures will be taken to insure contact between the 35th Division and the 28th Division on the line of the Aire River.
- (G) Army Reserve.  
 \* \* \* \* \*
- (H) Artillery:  
 (1) For plan of employment of artillery, see Annex No. 1.  
 (2) Artillery preparation will start at the hour designated by the Army Commander.

- (3) Hostile artillery fire and observation will be neutralized especially at the following points:
  - (a) Heights east of the Meuse.
  - (b) Montfaucon.
  - (c) Eastern edge of the Foret d'Argonne.
- (4) The Chief of Army Artillery will designate certain units of Army Artillery to accompany the advance. Routes over which they will move will be designated and regulated by the Corps Commanders.
- (5) Corps Commanders will insure that Corps and Division artillery move forward with the advance.
- (6) Gas:
  - (a) Non persistent gases will be used in the Foret d'Argonne—Bois de Montfaucon—Bois de Chehemine and the Bois de Septsarges (N. E. of Montfaucon).
  - (b) Persistent gases will be used on the heights east of the Meuse.
  - (c) Gas bombardment will cease as follows:
    - At H minus 4 hours:
      - (1) Foret d'Argonne south of hostile second position.
      - (2) Bois de Montfaucon.
      - (3) Bois de Chehemine.
      - (4) Bois de Septsarges (N. E. of Montfaucon).
    - At H Hour:
      - (1) Foret d'Argonne south of Bois de Chatel (inclusive).
- (I) Anti Air-Craft Defense.  
\* \* \* \* \*
- (J) Tanks.  
\* \* \* \* \*
- (K) Air Service.  
\* \* \* \* \*
- (L) Special Gas Troops.  
\* \* \* \* \*
- (X) (Y) General Instructions.  
\* \* \* \* \*
- 4. (a) Evacuation and Supply.  
\* \* \* \* \*
- 5. (A) Liaison:  
\* \* \* \* \*
- (C) Posts of Command:
  - 1st Army, Advanced P. C.—Souilly.
  - 1st Echelon—Ligny en Barrois.
  - 2nd Echelon—Neufchateau.
  - 4th Corps—Menil la Tour.
  - II French Army—Laheycourt.
  - 2nd Colonial Corps—St. Mihiel.
  - 17th Corps (French)—Ft. Regret.
  - 3rd Corps—Rampont.
  - 5th Corps—Ville Sur Cousance.
  - 1st Corps—Rarecourt.
  - 1st Division—Blercourt.
  - 82nd Division—Clermont en Argonne.
  - 29th Division—Osches.

By Command of General Pershing:  
H. A. Drum, Chief of Staff.

## APPENDIX J.

## ARMY, CORPS AND DIVISION ARTILLERY.

The American artillery in action was divided into three general classes:

1. The Divisional Artillery, consisting usually of the three regiments of each division's artillery brigade, with such additional batteries as might be attached, all under the control of the respective Division Commanders.

2. The Corps Artillery, under the direction of the Corps Commander. It was chiefly of higher power guns, and was available in support of the Corps (generally 3 Divisions) as a whole.

3. The Army Artillery. This was under the supervision of the Army Headquarters (in co-operation with the Corps Artillery Chiefs), and that along the whole front was divided into several "groupings," known as the Verdun, the Meuse, the Aire and the Aisne Groupings, and the Railway Artillery Reserve.

The Army Artillery back of the 35th Division and its companion divisions of the 1st Corps was the "Aisne Grouping." Its fire was limited to long-range firing in the "Army Zone," which was defined by General Walch of the French Army (then Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps) as the terrain north of a line 4,000 meters from the infantry front lines from day to day. This mission was calculated primarily "to interdict the roads, prevent the bringing up of supplies, and to break up assemblies of German troops for counter attack," rather than for close co-ordination with our own infantry movements.

This Aisne Grouping consisted of about 90 guns, principally 155 mm. long range guns, with a few assorted batteries from 6-inch Naval and 270 mm. (11-inch) mortars.

Following the relief of the 35th and its adjoining divisions, the support of the Aisne Grouping remained substantially the same in character and number of guns for the divisions which immediately succeeded them. That the available artillery for the active corps of the 1st Army thereafter grew gradually less, however, as the American advance became more rapid, and as preparations developed for the proposed drive toward Metz, in co-operation with the new 2nd Army, is shown by the following reports as to guns in the 1st Army at successive dates (as given by Maj. Gen. W. S. McNair, Chief of Army Artillery, 1st Army, in a lecture at 1st Army Hdqrs., Bar-sur-Aube, Dec. 23, 1918):

## GUNS IN FIRST ARMY, A. E. F., 1918.

12th September—3010

	Divisional:	Corps:	
Ist Corps .....	680	282	
IVth Corps .....	588	225	
Vth Corps .....	372	168	
2nd Colonial Corps (French) .....	312	127	
	<hr/> 1952	<hr/> 802	2754
Army Artillery (including 35 Anti-Aircraft guns) .....			256
Total .....			<hr/> 3010

# APPENDIX

279

American made and manned.....	0
British made and American manned.....	160
French made and American manned.....	1521
French made and French manned.....	1329
	<u>3010</u>

## 26th September—3980

	Divisional:	Corps:	
Ist Corps .....	600	144	
Vth Corps .....	612	151	
IIIrd Corps .....	572	106	
17th Corps (French) .....	210	128	
2nd Colonial Corps (French) .....	178	102	
IVth Corps .....	396	239	
	<u>2568</u>	<u>870</u>	3438
Army Artillery (including 83 Anti-Aircraft).....			542
Total.....			<u>3980</u>

American made and manned.....	0
British made and American manned.....	276
French made and American manned.....	2240
French made and French manned.....	1464
	<u>3980</u>

## 1st November—2528

	Divisional:	Corps:	
Ist Corps .....	480	80	
Vth Corps .....	392	120	
IIIrd Corps .....	360	80	
17th Corps (French) .....	476	177	
	<u>1708</u>	<u>457</u>	2165
Army Artillery (including 64 Anti-Aircraft).....			363
Total.....			<u>2528</u>

American made and manned.....	5
British made and American manned.....	156
French made and American manned.....	1415
French made and French manned.....	952
	<u>2528</u>

The combined number of guns of the Army, Corps and Divisional Artillery supporting the 1st Corps (of which the 35th Division was a part) on Sept. 26th, is seen by the foregoing to have aggregated 834 guns; or approximately a gun centered every fifteen yards if they had been placed side by side across the 1st Corps sector.

## APPENDIX K.

Headquarters, 60th F. A. Brigade  
American Expeditionary Forces  
September 25th, 1918.

Secret  
Field Order No. 9.

Maps: Verdun A, 1/20,000; Foret d' Argonne, 1/20,000; Buzancy, 1/20,000; Verdun, 1/80,000.

1. The 60th F. A. Brigade, plus the 219th Regiment Artillerie d'Campagne, 1 Battalion 282nd Regiment Artillerie M. T. R., 3rd Groupe 317th A. L. C. will support the attack of the 35th Division as indicated in Field Order No. 44, Headquarters, 35th Division, France 24th Sept., 1918, ..... P. M.

2. Fire of destruction will be opened at H minus X hours with the following missions: The 129th F. A. destruction of the barbed wire from the western limit of the sector to L 5009. The 110th Trench Mortar Battery will cut the wire from Vauquois to the eastern limit of the sector. One battery 282nd M. T. R. will destroy Ouvrage A and B to the east of Boureuilles and the strong point in the vicinity of L 5205. The other battery of the same battalion will destroy the works on the north slope of the Hill of Vauquois. The 130th F. A. less 1 battalion will fire on the hostile intermediate position including Ouvrage de Geneve at L 5822. One Battalion Rossignol, ceasing fire at H plus 25. The three batteries of the 317th A. L. C. will destroy the communicating trenches, from the Bois de Rossignol to the front line trenches, the Boyau d'Agram, the Boyau des Houris, and the trench through L 4711 to the north.

3. At H hour the mission rolling barrage will be taken up by the 219th A. C. the 129th F. A. and one battalion of the 128th F. A. in accordance with the barrage map. The barrage on the front line will lift at H plus 25 minutes, will proceed by steps of 100 meters each 4 minutes until arriving on the hostile intermediate position, where it will rest for 10 minutes. At this point the mission of barrage of the 129th F. A. will terminate and that regiment will be ordered to move forward. The mission of barrage will then be assumed by the 219th A. C. and the 128th F. A. at H plus 131. One battalion of the 128th F. A. will fire on fugitive targets in liaison with airplane service. When not so engaged this battalion will execute fire of interdiction, one battery on the south exit of Varennes on the Varennes-Vauquois Road, one battery on the south exit of Cheppy and the 3rd battery at the Cross Roads L 5937. On the move forward of the Infantry beyond the hostile intermediate position at H plus 131, the first mission of this battalion will cease and it will take up the mission of barrage and with the other battalion of this regiment will cover the right half of the sector. Their fire will be continued until the advance approaches the range of the guns when the regiment will be ordered forward in echelon.

4. At H plus 30, the fire of the battalion of the 317th A. L. C. will lift to the Boyau des Eunuques, Ouvrage de Geneve, and Hill 190, and continue on these targets until H plus 65, when it will lift to Cheppy. At H plus 45 the battalion of the 130th F. A. firing on the wood of Rossignol will lift its fire to the hostile intermediate

position and continue to perform the missions assigned to the regiment.

5. At H plus 131 the 130th F. A. will lift its fire to the Ravine of Very from L 4549 to L 5455 and the battalion of the 317th A. L. C. will lift its fire to the town of Very. At H plus 185 this fire will cease and missions will be assigned in accordance with the development of the action.

6. At H plus 25 the fire of the 110th Trench Mortar Battery on the wire will cease and it will take up fire of destruction against the north slope of Vauquois. It will continue this fire until such time as it would interfere with the infantry assault. The T. M. B. will then be assigned to other missions.

7. At H plus 150 the mission of barrage for the entire sector will be taken over by the 219th A. C.

8. The rate of fire will be as follows: For the 75's four (4) rounds per gun per minute. For the 155's left at discretion of Regimental Commander. One gun per battery of 75's will be left out of action.

9. To minimize the loss in tanks, one battery of the 1st Bn. 128th F. A. will be assigned the additional mission of establishing a smoke screen around guns reported as firing on our tanks.

10. The method of reporting these guns will be as follows: An airplane will drop smoke bombs on any guns found firing on our tanks, or report by wireless; as soon as this is seen or the wireless report received, the battery so designated will open fire.

11. It will be necessary for the battery assigned this mission to establish an O. P. from which they can adjust their fire, as it is not sufficient to conduct this fire from a map.

12. Special smoke shell to be used for establishing the smoke screen is known as the Special Shell No. 3. One thousand of these shells will be brought forward by the ammunition train on the 25th. Details must be ready to receive this ammunition. Instantaneous fuses must be used with this shell. In case of move forward, none of these special shells will be carried.

13. The 1st Battalion of 128th F. A. less 1 battery is assigned the mission of co-operating with the 1st Aero Squadron, for the purpose of firing on fugitive targets. Radio and panel stations must be established and the necessary preparations made to properly establish and conduct this fire. It is advisable at once to establish liaison with the 1st Aero Squadron.

14. Each regiment, the ammunition train, and trench mortar battery will send two runners to report to Brigade Hdqrs. at H minus 5 hours.

15. The Post of Command of the 60th F. A. Brigade will be located at the same point as the Post of Command of the 35th Division.

16. After crossing the front line trenches, the Commanding Officer of the 129th F. A. will designate a battery to act as a forward battery in close liaison with the advancing infantry. The C. O. of the battery so designated will at once establish liaison with the C. O.'s of the advance infantry Battalions.

L. G. Berry

Brigadier General, U. S. A.

(Memo: H Hour was later designated as 5:30 a. m.)



## APPENDIX L.

Headquarters First Army.

26 Sept. 1918 22:00 Hours

Secret

## Field Orders No. 25

(Maps: Same as Field Orders No. 20, 1st Army, Am. E. F.)

1. (a) The enemy without offering serious infantry or artillery resistance has been driven back on our whole front.  
(b) The IVth French Army has its right at Cernay-en-Dormais.
2. The First American Army will continue its advance to the Combined Army First Objective. The advance will be continued at 5:30 A. M., September 27th.
3. A. 4th Corps. No change.  
B. 2nd Colonial Corps. No change.  
C. 17th French Corps.  
It will continue its present mission, maintaining constant observation on the enemy's rear area. It will follow up any withdrawal of the enemy on the heights east of the Meuse.  
D. 3rd Corps.  
The 3rd Corps will continue its advance. It will push reconnaissances to the heights east of the Meuse southeast of Dun-sur-Meuse.  
E. 5th Corps.  
The 5th Corps will continue its advance.  
F. 1st Corps.  
The 1st Corps will continue its advance. Upon reaching the Combined Army First Objective it will gain contact with the IVth French Army through the Valley of the Aire. The 5th Cavalry Division will be held in concealment in the vicinity of Varennes prepared to advance to the north through the Aire Valley when ordered by the Army Commander.  
G. Army Artillery.  
It will continue its present mission.  
H. Air Service.  
The Air Service will carry out its present program with special reconnaissance in the area Metz—Conflans—Longwy—Mouzon.
- I. Army Reserve Divisions.  
No change.
- X. General Instructions.
  - (1) Corps will advance independently to the Combined Army First Phase Line.
  - (2) Corps will advance from the Combined Army First Phase Line to the Combined Army First Objective upon orders from the Army Commander.
  - (3) Upon reaching the Combined Army First Objective, troops will be organized to resist counter-attacks, and strong reconnaissance will be sent towards the Exploitation Line of First Objective.
  - (4) No changes in administrative detail.
  - (5) No changes in Posts of Command or Axis of Liaison.

By command of General Pershing

H. A. Drum

Chief of Staff.

## APPENDIX M.

EXTRACT FROM SUMMARIES OF INTELLIGENCE FIRST ARMY  
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

(September 20, 1918, to November 11, 1918, inclusive.)

October 31, 1918.

No. 63.

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## "STELLUNGS" AND "FOX-HOLES."

## STELLUNGS:

Present use of the word "Stellung," coupled with a proper name to designate a particular German position, is sufficiently different from the use of the word in the past to call for a definition of a name stellung, based on present experience on the front of the First Army.

In the past a "Volker-Stellung" or a "Kriemhild-Stellung" has appeared to be a defensive line prepared by the enemy along a series of naturally-strong defensive positions, such as a series of ridges, and a connected series of defensive works along this position. The defensive works have consisted of wire, concrete dugouts at regular intervals, and trenches, but in many instances the trenches have not been constructed owing to the fact that this part of the works can be added in a few hours. The extent to which the construction of these defensive works had progressed has been considered to be of vital importance, in estimating the value of a named Stellung.

From present knowledge of the Kriemhild Stellung, in the Vth German Army Area, and the Brunhild Stellung, its continuation in the IIIrd German Army Area, together with such limited knowledge of the Freya Stellung as is available, it is clearly established that the factor of constructed defensive works is no longer vital. The Kriemhild Stellung has wire, has a few concrete dugouts for command posts, and has trenches but not a complete trench system. So far as photographic evidence and statements of prisoners have supplied information, the Freya Stellung is practically without wire, dugouts or trenches.

Considerable evidence is at hand, however, to indicate that the Kriemhild and the Freya Stellungen have been completely developed from the standpoint of surveyed positions. In July the daily bulletin of orders of the Meuse East Group (Vth Reserve Corps Staff) issued a warning to the troops against the destruction of sign posts on which were inscribed simply letters or numbers stating that these signs were in the Kriemhild Stellung, and indicated points which had been established by careful surveys, where batteries, observation posts and ranging marks were located, in anticipation of an eventual possible occupation of the Kriemhild Stellung. These sign posts have been found in considerable number in the Kriemhild Stellung.

A named stellung such as the Freya Stellung on our front may then be defined as follows:

A German Stellung which has been given a proper name by the enemy is a projected rear line of defense, located so that it utilizes the terrain to the maximum. In the instances now known, this line of defense has been surveyed so that when the time comes for occupying the position, the infantry and the artillery units will all have

designated positions which will have the proper relationship to each other, and for which firing data has been worked out. These positions do not necessarily have any wire, dugouts or trenches, either constructed or projected, and may be defended without any such constructed works.

#### FOX-HOLES:

The phrase "fox-hole" is used by the German soldier, as determined from the examination of a large number of prisoners, to describe a hole in the ground sufficient to give shelter from splinters and perhaps from the weather also, to one or two soldiers. In general, there are two types. One is a hole in level or nearly level ground, usually a deepened shell hole, some of them having improvised overhead cover from shell fragments and shelter for protection from the weather. The other is a hole in steeply sloping ground, such as a railroad embankment, the bank of a stream, the deep ditch of a road or the steep slope of a hill. These are often partly closed in with wood or tin, covered with dirt, in order to increase the protection from the weather. Protection from shell fragments is given by the surrounding earth and not by the covering, except in rare instances where a considerable amount of earth has been piled over the covering. The fox-holes in level ground as a rule give best protection against shell fragments, but the fox-holes in steep slopes give better shelter from the weather and are more easily constructed. Consequently the second type is somewhat more frequently found than the first type.

In some cases these fox-holes have been so located that they could be linked-up into a defensive line. In most instances there does not appear to have been any such purpose in the siting of the fox-holes. A battalion at rest or in support needs shelter from artillery fire and from the weather, and promptly digs in, preferably where it is protected from observation. Within certain limits the men use their own judgment in choosing the locations of their own shelters. When the battalion moves away a new set of fox-holes is dug. The constant shifting of troops results in great numbers of fox-holes scattered over the front line and support areas. The discovery of fox-holes at any point cannot by itself be taken as indicative of the existence of a line of resistance.

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## APPENDIX N.

### TANK OPERATIONS IN THE OPENING OF THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE.

(From Lecture by Brig. Gen'l S. D. Rockenbach, U. S. A., Chief of Tank Corps.)

In the 1st Corps (35th, 28th and 77th Divisions), the 344th Battalion (less one company) and the 345th Battalion (less one company), under command of Col. George S. Patton, Jr., with the 14th and 15th Groups of French Tanks, were assigned to operate in the sector of the 35th Division. One company each of the 344th and 345th Battalions were assigned to the 28th Division.

The 344th Battalion left their positions of departure at the trenches in front of Boureuilles-Vauquois at 5:30 A. M. on the 26th. They found strong artillery and machine-gun fire, but continued their advance east of Vauquois and to Cheppy and Varennes, which

latter place they reached about 9:30 A. M. By the morning of the 27th, 43 tanks were out of action. On this morning 11 tanks went forward northwest of Varennes along the edge of the Forêt d'Argonne; while two platoons of tanks from Co. A of the 344th supported an attack north of Very.

On the 28th, more than 80 tanks were ready for action; 15 were assigned to the 28th Division, 42 (6 French and 36 American) to the 35th Division, and 5 to the 91st Division for liaison, with 27 in reserve. On this date the tanks reported taking Apremont five times before the infantry of the 28th Division succeeded in entering, consolidating and exploiting the success.

On the morning of the 29th, after all-night work by the repair and salvage men, 55 tanks were ready for action. On this day the tanks on the west of the Aire remained in Apremont, with the expectation of meeting a counter-attack. On the east of the Aire the tanks moved to Baulny as reserve for the 35th Division, and assisted in meeting the German counter-attack in the afternoon along the line Baulny-Eclisfontaine. The tanks were withdrawn after dark. On the morning of the 30th, 20 tanks were sent to assist the 35th north of Charpentry, but did not get into action.

On October 3rd, the Chief of Tank Corps, 1st Army, reported as follows on the status of Tank Troops attached to the 1st Corps:

Killed and wounded:

Officers, 53% (4 out of 6 captains; 12 out of 24 lieutenants).  
Men, 25%, or 65 men.

Tanks ditched or disabled under enemy fire, 70.

In his "Tactical Conclusions," General Rockenbach says:

"On the greater part of the attacking front the Tanks supported an infantry which not only knew nothing of fighting with Tanks but, what is more, had never been under fire and were not skilled in infantry combat.

"Groupement IV, supported by the 35th Division, which had seen some experience, obtained good results. October 4, the 14th Battalion attacked with the 3rd Division, which had already seen action; here again the ground won by the Tanks was occupied.

"Sept. 26th, the attack enjoyed a partial success. The forward movement being stopped, the effort immediately dwindled. No orders were forthcoming, and the Tanks in order to keep busy were reduced to participating in minor operations until Sept. 29th. Even these minor operations were often suggested by the commanders of the battalions or the companies. Sometimes the Tanks would lead the infantry forward.

"The 4th, 5th and 9th of Oct., the American command succeeded in giving an impetus to the whole. The results were much better, and the gains realized were partially taken advantage of by the infantry's occupation."

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## APPENDIX O.

35th Division, Cheppy.

28th September, 1918, 10 P. M.

Secret  
Field Orders  
No. 48.

1. The main body of the enemy has retreated. We are opposed

by artillery and machine guns.

The 91st Division on our right is reported to be north of Eclisfontaine.

The 28th Division on our left has taken Apremont.

2. This Division will attack vigorously at 5:30 a. m., September 29th in two columns, and destroy or capture the enemy.

General direction of attack, Exermont-Bois de Boyou—practically parallel to the road connecting Baulny and Fleville.

3. (a) The right column, Colonel Walker commanding, consisting of the 138th Infantry, 140th Infantry, and 129th Machine Gun Battalion, will attack from Exermont (inclusive) to the right limit of our sector. The 138th Infantry will lead the attack with two battalions in the front line and one battalion in support. One machine gun battalion will be attached to each front line and support battalion.

(b) The left column, Col. Nuttman commanding, consisting of the 137th Infantry, 139th Infantry, and the 130th Machine Gun Battalion, will attack from Exermont (exclusive) to left of our sector. The 137th Infantry will lead the attack with two battalions in the front line and one battalion in support. One machine gun company will be attached to each front line and support battalion.

(c) A squadron of the 2nd Cavalry, Lieut. Col. Hazzard commanding, will reconnoiter the flanks, keeping in touch with the Divisions on right and left and will keep the Division Commander informed as to the progress and position of the infantry.

(d) The Divisional Artillery will support the attack by a rolling barrage of 75's which will start at 5:30 a. m. about 100 meters south of Exermont, and move forward at the rate of 100 meters in four minutes. This barrage will cease one kilometer north of Exermont.

A fixed barrage of 155's will be placed one kilometer north of Exermont. When the rolling barrage reaches the fixed barrage the fixed barrage will lift and the 155's will fire on Chatel and heights northwest.

(e) The attack will be assisted by tanks, the manner of their use being arranged between the senior Brigade Commander and the Tank Commander. Leading infantry units must follow closely and vigorously support the attack of the tanks.

(f) The 110th Engineers and the 128th Machine Gun Battalion will be Divisional Reserve. The 110th Engineers, less one battalion, and one company of 128th Machine Gun Battalion, will follow the right column. The 2nd Battalion 110th Engineers and 128th Machine Gun Battalion less one company will follow the left column.

(g) The leading skirmish lines will advance at wide intervals. Machine gun nests must be held in front and vigorously attacked in flank. The leading battalion must push rapidly forward, leaving mopping up to be done by units in rear. One battalion from the column to the right will be detailed to mop up Exermont.

4. Strong combat liaison will be kept with the 91st Division on our right and the 28th Division on our left, and between our right and left columns.

5. The Divisional P. C. will be at Cheppy.

Peter E. Traub,  
Major General U. S. A.

Official: W. V. Gallagher, Lt. Col. G. S. G-3.

## APPENDIX P.

1st Army Corps, U. S.  
Second Section, G. S.  
September 20, 1918.

Confidential  
Not to be taken  
into front line trenches.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE SECTOR VILLE SUR TOURBE TO MEUSE  
(See 1/50000 Defensive Organization Map).

1. From Forges (left bank of the Meuse) the lines run Generally West Southwest to the southern tip of the Bois de Cheppy; from this point they run generally W. to the limit of the sector, at Ville-sur-Tourbe, with a bulge Southward in the Argonne forest in order to include Hill 263 in the enemy's line.

2. Along this front there are several important woods within the German lines. From E. to W. there are: Bois de Forges, the group of woods N. of Avocourt including Bois d'Malancourt, Bois de Cheppy, Bois de Bethincourt, Bois de Montfaucon, Bois de Very, Bois de Cuisy and Bois de Chehem; part of the Argonne forest.

The woods N. of Avocourt are divided into three parts. The largest and Southernmost part consists of the Bois de Cheppy, Bois de Malancourt and the Bois de Bethincourt. The Lae Fuon ravine separates this part from the smaller part lying N. of it and consisting of the Bois de Montfaucon and the Bois de Very. N. W. of this, in turn, and separated from it by the Chambronne Brook.

3. The Meuse is the Easternmost and principal watercourse in this sector.

Flowing between the opposing lines and emptying into the Meuse near Forges is the Forges Brook. Along its course, from Haucourt to the Meuse the terrain is very marshy and is impassable in very wet weather and in winter. The Germans have recently removed the foot bridges that they had thrown across at various places.

The remaining streams in the sector run in a generally N. NW. or NE. direction, and would oppose no serious obstacle to an advance. Among them are the Buanthe, flowing into the Aire which is in turn a tributary of the Aisne, which flows through the lines between Bour-euilles and Pte. Boureuilles, and the Aisne which flows N. through the lines near Serven-Melzicourt.

4. The highest point in the sector is Montfaucon, on the main line of resistance of the battle zone about 6 km. in rear of the enemy's front line, and used by him as an observation in all directions. This height is the dominating one of all in the sector.

The Argonne forest covers a long ridge running generally N. and S. and the slopes of which are very much cut up by a great number of deep ravines.

The country is generally hilly and cut up. The principal valleys run in a generally northern direction while the smaller ones turn more to the E. and W. Two high points held by the Germans to be most important to them are Vauquois and Hill 263 across the valley of the Aire from it. These two heights are in the very front line and completely bar the passage up the valley of the Aire.

In considering heights and woods, sight must not be lost of those on the east side of the Meuse, between Damvillers and the river.

5. The method of occupation of the sector conforms to the

recent German regulations. The outpost zone is about 1 km. wide at the Meuse and continues at this width about to Moulin de Raffecourt. At this point the Hagen Stellung Nord bears N. of W., away from the Hagen Stellung. The former is the original German line and the main line of resistance of the outpost zone. The latter is an abandoned element of the French line which had been converted by the enemy into an intermediary line. The Hagen Stellung Nord which follows the crest of the high ground around a bond, thereby increasing the width of the outpost zone about 3 km., which it maintains until the Argonne Forest is reached. At this point the main line of resistance swings southward, in order to include Hill 263, and from here westward to Servon-Malzecourt coincides with the front line of the outpost zone. At Servon-Malzecourt the main line of resistance swings north and from there west to Ville Sur Tourbe the outpost zone gradually broadens from  $1\frac{1}{2}$  km. to  $3\frac{1}{4}$  km.

At Vauquois, which is on a height and over which both our own and the enemy's lines run, the enemy has organized a position for all around defense and has equipped it for prolonged resistance. Orders are given the troops to hold this point and Hill 263 at all costs.

The battle zone is about 5 km. deep along the left bank of the Meuse, but gradually narrows down to about 1 km. in width behind the Hagen Stellung Nord, at which point the outpost zone is widest and contains the intermediate Hagen Stellung. At Bois de Montfaucon the battle zone again widens and from there to the west limit of the sector has depth of from  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to 6 km. In the Argonne Forest, its main line of resistance, the Volker Stellung generally paralleling the line of resistance of the outpost zone.

The withdrawal zone is from  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 km. wide throughout its extent.

The total depth of these three zones varies between 6 and 10 km. approximately.

The trenches of this position are of the old, narrow type. There is a great deal of wire which is broad in some places and narrow in others.

Very little change is going on in this position, but all information points to the fact that it is being very well kept up.

Except for a few batteries, there is no artillery in the outpost zone; it is all in the battle zone or in rear of it in the case of the heavier calibers.

The supply of the entire position is very well laid out, each group (corps) being served by a standard gauge railroad. This is true on the east side of the Meuse as well, except in the case of the Meuse East Group (LXIIIrd Corps), which is supplied by a very efficient 1-meter gauge road.

The standard gauge road supplying the Meuse West Group (XXIst Corps) is the Sedan-Autrecourt-Stenay-Dannevoux line which follows the valley of the Meuse. At Doulecon a branch goes off to the west, turning south at Bantheville in order to reach Romagne and Cierges. At Brioules, on the main line, standard and narrow gauge lines run southwest to meet the standard gauge at Cierges. This circuit, if in operation, facilitates the supply and removal of material. The French believe that parts of the circuit, notably between Romagne and Cierges, have been so destroyed by shell fire that they are not in use.

The standard gauge road supplying the Argonne Group (LVIIIst

Corps) is the Sedan-Autrecourt-Oches Harricourt-Apremont line.

It will be noted that Autrecourt is the junction of these two lines and a point of extreme importance for purposes of supply.

Both of these standard gauge lines terminate at railheads from which a very good system of narrow gauge railroads and wagon roads carry supplies to the very front lines, especially in the woods. These railheads are within shelling range and, partly as a precautionary measure and partly to facilitate supply, additional narrow gauge roads have been built but joining the standard gauge roads well to the rear and out of range.

Many of the ammunition dumps in this sector were used during the Verdun battles; of these, a number have apparently been abandoned, but what is more significant in an effort to plumb the enemy's attitude, the most important one in each group, together with some of lesser importance, have recently been moved well to the rear and out of range of our artillery.

From the recent changes that the enemy has made in his railroads and dumps, from prisoners and from his general attitude it is estimated that has nothing but defensive intentions. It is thought that he has been somewhat uneasy over the possibility of an attack, in the E. part of the sector, if not in the Western.

From the point of view of the attacker there are several points that must be carefully borne in mind and which a neglect of have in the past proven costly to the French.

1. The observation posts on the right bank of the Meuse permit of observation well along the rear of our lines.

2. The artillery on the heights of the right bank of the Meuse commands the ground over which any attack on the left bank must be made and can render the Bois des Forges untenable.

3. The artillery in the Bois des Forges commands terrain over which an attack to the W. of that wood would proceed.

4. The Artillery in the Bois de Very, Bois de Montfaucon and Bois Chehemin, of which there is a great deal, commands all of the ground and valleys to the E. and W. of these woods. It has in front of it a deep ravine.

5. The artillery in the Argonne forest commands all of the terrain and valleys to the E. and W. of it.

6. These various groups of artillery then, in addition to their own front enfilade our lines and bring area fire to bear on them and the terrain over which the development for attack must take place as well as covering defensively the terrain and valleys lying well within their defensive zone. Their general arrangement merits careful study.

7. The enemy has many excellent observation posts from which no considerable movement, even behind our own lines, could be hidden unless they were effectively blinded.

8. In considering an advance, the line of crests of which Montfaucon is the Key, should be considered an objective to be attained as soon as possible. A long stop short of them would probably result in an uncomfortable situation, to say the least.

At a distance of from three to twelve km. in rear of the position described runs the ultimate withdrawal position known as the Kriemhilde Stellung. This position runs generally E. and W. It is a continuation of the Brunnhilde Stellung which comes from the N. W. and which joins with the Kriemhilde Stellung N. E. of Mouron.



On the left side of the Meuse the Kriemhilde Stellung is only partly finished but the finished part is strongly constructed in accordance with recent German regulations. It was begun in October and November, 1917. On the right side of the Meuse the position is more nearly completed and is very strongly organized.

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1st Army Corps, U. S., Second Section G. S.  
September 22, 1918.

Confidential—Not to be taken into front line trenches.

#### VAUQUOIS.

Vauquois may be taken as the perfect example of German fortification combining an elaborate trench system with the use of mines.

(1) The trenches, during the day, are occupied by sentinels, as few as are absolutely essential. The garrison is in deep dugouts, affording protection from our largest shells. These are very comfortably equipped, having electricity, water supply and kitchens close at hand. All necessary supplies are brought in by a railroad. On the slightest signal, everyone can be at his post of combat.

(2) The fortress of Vauquois, dominating the plain for 100 m. is one of the points on the front where the Germans have installed themselves with great thoroughness.

In the defensive system of Vauquois mines figured very prominently throughout 1916, and the beginning of 1917. Since the month of June, 1917, mining activity has steadily decreased. At the present date galleries are known to be in existence, but there have been no recent explosions.

From captured documents dated December, 1917, it appears that Vauquois must be held at any cost.

If the tactical situation eventually necessitates a retirement, the Commandant of Vauquois is ordered to blow up all mined galleries.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### DUGOUTS:

Most of the dugouts are situated on the slopes N. of Vauquois between Hills 265 and 270.

#### COMMUNICATION TRENCHES AND TRACKS:

Two important communication trenches enter Vauquois from the W: the Boyau de Gratz and the Boyau d' Agram. These lead to a point about 100 m. from the entrances to the dugouts. From this point the reliefs come across open ground to the foot of the ladders which lead to the tunnels of the dugouts.

The Varennes-Vauquois road seems to be the one most used. The paths along side of the Boyau de Gratz are also much frequented.

#### RAILWAYS:

A narrow gauge railway leads from Varennes to Vauquois over the Varennes-Pont des Quatre Enfants road as far as the Boureuilles road. A branch line leads to the Pioneer depot. Another branch line leads to the Bois du Grand Bec to supply the M. W. ammunition depot.

#### ELECTRICITY:

The electricity for Vauquois is furnished by a power house installed in the caves of the Moulin Varennes. The current is trans-

ported to Vauquois by two isolated cables 15 mm. in diameter fixed on posts 1 m. high; these cables leaving the Moulin cross the fields to the S. and follow the river as far as the Pont des Pionniers 1 km. from Vauquois. From there the cables pass to the S. of Hill 213, across the Boyau des Eunuques, and through the Bois du Rossignol. From there the cables follow the line of the Boyau de Gratz into Vauquois.

#### TUNNELS:

The tunnels opening on the N. slope of Vauquois come out on the perpendicular line of the second trench. Shafts about 15 m. deep, in which ladders are placed, constitute the means of communication between the tunnels and the trench. These tunnels were constructed by an electric drill. The tunnels are  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 m. wide. The walls are not propped except in a few places where there is risk of them falling in. The exit of the shafts is protected by a roof consisting of a bed of rails covered with a slab of reinforced concrete and a layer of sand bags. There are probably 4 tunnels in actual use now. Dugouts have been built on the right and on the left by simply enlarging the tunnel.

#### TRENCHES:

The trenches of the front line, often not well kept up, are only occupied by sentinels. The trench of the second line is reinforced with brick on the side towards the enemy. In the parapet steel plates are imbedded about 4 to 5 mm. thick containing loop-holes. Empty sand bags conceal these steel plates from view. The Germans use less sand bags for reinforcing their parapets than the French. A good number of the trenches are covered.

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Headquarters G-2 1st Army Corps  
American Expeditionary Forces,  
France, Sept. 19, 1918.

Army Headquarters, April 2, 1918.

#### GERMAN PLAN OF DEFENSE IN THE SECTOR OF THE VALLEY OF THE AIRE.

From documents recently fallen into our hands, we are able to partially reconstitute the plan of occupation and of defense of the German Division which occupies the Valley of the Aire (part of the front included between Petite Gruerie and the western edge of the Bois de Cheppy).

This plan gives accurate details concerning the fashion in which the enemy intends defending the divisional sector in the event of a partial attack by us.

In addition it emphasizes the essential variableness of the depth of the advanced combat zone (German Regulations of August, 1917, concerning the construction of positions). Thus the advanced zone merges into the main combat zone in the Argonne while it extends for several kilometers in depth in the Bois de Cheppy.

#### I. ENEMY DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION.

In the sector we are considering the enemy system of defense is made up of a series of successive lines very close together on the West (Argonne) and gradually diverging as they approach the East.

The sector of the Aire therefore assumes the character of an intermediate zone between the system of defense in the Argonne where the lines are very close together and that of the Eastern group of the Meuse where they are markedly echeloned in depth.

The successive lines of defense contemplated in captured documents are:

The old first position running as follows: Hill 263, Boureuilles, Vauquois.

The "Grune Sud Linie" along the line of the strong points on Hill 263, the Cote d' Osse de Bitlis, the Bois du Rossignol and the Moulin St. Martin.

The "Grune Nord Linie" along the strong points of Hill 207, Hill 213, Hill 190 and the Bois Carre.

The old second position extending from the strong point on Hill 207 to Lai-Fuon, passing through the strong points of Varennes, Battantout (sic) Cheppy, and of Hill 208.

There is no mention made in the captured documents of the Montfaucon line (Wolkerstellung) nor of the Romagne-s/-Montfaucon Line (Kriemhilde Stellung).

The first position and the terrain extending to the "Grune Sud Linie" constitute the advanced combat zone.

Therefore in the Western sector of the Division the advanced zone does not exist; on the other hand in the zone of the neighboring division on the East, it includes practically the whole of the Bois de Cheppy (up to the Ravine of Lai-Fuon, a depth of 2 kilometers).

## II. MANNER OF OCCUPATION IN CASE OF EXPECTED ATTACK.

The enemy makes a clear distinction:

The case of a foreseen attack on a large scale.

The case of an ordinary attack.

### A.—Attack on a Large Scale:

We have no exact information concerning disposition in the case of an attack on a large scale. The defense is then based on the systematic intervention of reinforcements previously brought up in the rear of the sector.

### B.—Ordinary Attack:

\* \* \* \* \*

Furthermore, the following points constitute two independent defensive entities:

1st—Vauquois, held by a battalion of infantry reinforced by:

2 Sections of the Infantry Pioneer Company of the Regiment.

1 M. W. Detachment.

. Detachments of 2 Companies of Pioneers and 2 Mine Companies.

2nd—Hill 263, on the right extremity of the sector where the two lines of resistance of the advanced zone merge, and which must be held to the last without possible maneuver of retirement, held by an entire battalion of infantry reinforced by one company of Infantry Pioneer troops and one M. W. detachment.

\* \* \* \* \*

## III. DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION.

### Infantry:

Provision is made for defense by systematic retirements of the

first line and a series of counter attacks continued until the first line is completely reoccupied.

"Before the beginning of the enemy's bombardment, at all events before the launching of his infantry attack, the division may, according to circumstances, give the order to abandon the line. This order may be requested by the commanders of battalions in line when they believe that they can thus relieve their troops from being subject to a particularly violent bombardment of the first line.

"In such cases the advanced infantry elements retire to the second line, but without departing from their axis of combat and as much as possible without allowing the enemy to see them. In the first line, there should only remain advanced posts armed with light machine guns capable of repulsing enemy reconnaissances and possessing ample means with which to signal and ask for counter-preparation fire." (Plan of defense of the 80th Reserve Division, Par. 4.)

The following units are expected from this plan on the right wing of the division: The battalion in line on Hill 263 which must hold its position; the garrison of Vauquois which must remain and hold Vauquois at all costs, even though momentarily isolated.

As soon as the attack of the enemy infantry is launched, the posts left in the first line give the signal for counter-preparation fire and fall back slowly to the line of defense.

On Hill 263 and at the Cote d' Osson, the first line must be maintained at all costs. An enemy who succeeds in crossing the hills is taken from all three sides by machine gun fire and bomb throwers and is then counter attacked from the flank and thrown out of the first position.

Between the Argonne and Vauquois an enemy marching on the "Grune Sud Linie" after the first line has been evacuated is taken partly on his left flank by fire from the strong point of the Cote d' Osson in front and on the right by fire from the Bois du Rossignol and from Vauquois. Counter attacks advancing from those strong points as well as from the whole of the "Grune Sud Linie" encounter the attacker and repulse him.

Vauquois must be defended to the last extremity as an independent entity. Being defended by successive lines and very strong fortifications it should hold out as long as possible, even though completely enveloped.

On the East of Vauquois after the abandonment of the first line an enemy who would attempt to advance would be exposed to the fire of machine guns and M. Ws. at Vauquois, in the Bois du Rossignol and Moulin St. Martin, then counter-attacked from all sides by the companies in support in the works of the Moulin du Pre St. Martin, of the Hill 190 and of the Bois du Rossignol.

#### Artillery:

The only indications we have concerning the employment of artillery are as follows:

During the hostile artillery preparation vigorous counter-battery fire on hostile batteries, and destruction of his P. C.'s.

As soon as the infantry is launched all fire becomes counter-preparation fire on the first position immediately after its evacuation; then withdrawn to the rear in front of the "Grune Sud Linie."

From:

#4351/2

S. C. 6258—Second Bureau Staff, IId Armee.

## APPENDIX Q.

## OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE.

The story of the American drive along the whole front, told in the crisp, brief "Official Communiques" issued by American G. H. Q., as published in the Paris edition of the New York Herald from day to day, are of interest, and show the no small part that the 35th Division had in the important accomplishments thought worthy of reporting. They are here given in full as published for the first four days of the drive, beginning with the operations of Thursday, September 26, 1918.

Of the places mentioned, Vauquois, Varennes, Cheppy, Very, Charpentry and Exermont were in the 35th Division's sector, with Montblainville and the Aire Valley on their left flank, and Epinonville on their immediate right.

"American.

Thursday, 9 P. M.

This morning, northwest of Verdun, the First Army attacked the enemy on a front of twenty miles and penetrated his lines to an average depth of seven miles.

Pennsylvania, Kansas and Missouri troops, serving in Major General Liggett's Corps, stormed Varennes, Montblainville, Vauquois and Cheppy after stubborn resistance.

Troops from other corps, forcing the Forges Brook, captured the Bois de Forges and wrested from the enemy the towns of Malancourt, Bethincourt, Montfaucon, Cuisy, Nanthillois, Septsarges, Dannevaux, Gercourt, Drillancourt.

The prisoners thus far reported number over 5,000.

American.

Friday, 9 P. M.

Northwest of Verdun the First Army continued its attack begun yesterday.

The towns of Charpentry, Very, Epinonville and Ivoiry were taken.

Repeated hostile counter-attacks on Major General Cameron's corps were thrown back by troops from Ohio, from New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia and from Oregon, Washington, Colorado, Wyoming and Montana.

The captured material includes more than 100 guns of which twelve are heavy calibre, many trench-mortars and hundreds of machine-guns.

The number of prisoners has risen to more than 8,000, including 125 officers.

American.

Saturday, 9 P. M.

The attack begun on September 26 continues to develop successfully. Today our troops, advancing in the face of heavy infantry, artillery and machine-gun fire, have reached the outskirts of Brieuilles and Exermont.

More than twenty towns and an enormous quantity of material have fallen into our hands. The number of prisoners continues to increase.

American aviators have kept command of the air. They have brought down twelve balloons and more than sixty enemy planes, while less than a third of that number of our planes are missing.

In conjunction with French and British aviators, they have,

notwithstanding unfavorable weather, rendered valuable service and successfully executed many missions.

American.

Sunday 9 P. M.

Our troops have continued to meet with determined resistance on the part of the enemy, who has been forced hastily to bring up and engage divisions from other parts of the front.

Between Cierges and the valley of the Aire we have met and repulsed heavy counter-attacks."

## APPENDIX R.

EXTRACTS FROM SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE, G-2, 1ST ARMY, A. E. F.

"Sept. 24th. \* \* \* \*

VI. Railways: \* \* \* During the day 15 trains were observed moving in both directions in the vicinity of Chatel-Chehery and the standard gauge railhead at Apremont.  
\* \* \* \*

In the region east of the Argonne, unusual activity was reported southwest of Montfaucon. Eight cannon and seven caissons moved eastward into the Bois de Chehem, trucks were heard during the night north of Vauquois, and 100 trucks were observed going from Charpentry towards Eclisfontaine. At 11:45 P. M., Sept. 24th, a report was received to the effect that, in the locality above noted, there was abnormal circulation of individuals and groups, also railway trains.

Sept. 25th. \* \* \* \*

VI. \* \* \* 4. Rather unusual activity left of the Meuse. Between the Meuse and the Argonne, a new activity on the roads and railways is noted. Cannon were reported moving into the woods southwest of Montfaucon, and abnormal circulation was seen on the railway leading to the standard gauge railhead at Apremont. This activity seems to be a reinforcement that would be expected in view of the known anticipation of the Germans of an attack on this front.

Throughout the whole sector, recent enemy dispositions of units in both relief and reinforcement may in a large degree account for the abnormal road and railway circulation.

Sept. 26.

I. After a heavy bombardment of the enemy's lines, our troops attacked at 5:30 A. M., September 26th, on the front from the Meuse to Vienne le Chateau, about 30 km.  
\* \* \* \*

### II. Enemy Front Line.

East of the Meuse, Marcheville has been taken and our troops are at the south edge of the Riaville. From Dannevaux on the west bank of the Meuse, the line runs through the north part of the Bois la Cote le Mont to point 3135/2836, thence southwest to Nantillois, Eclisfontaine, Charpentry, Montblainville; thence west to point

2948/2752. From here our line is continued westward by the French to Binarville and north of Cernay, Rouvroy and Ripont."

III. Enemy Order of Battle.  
(Gives enemy troops identified.)

\* \* \* \*

Sept. 27th.

I. General Impressions of the Day:

Between the Moselle and the Meuse, no infantry activity of importance. The usual harassing artillery fire with gas.

From the Meuse to the Argonne, the enemy's resistance stiffened, mainly by reason of the action of several strong points occupied by machine guns, but partly because of the use of four additional divisions. Hostile artillery played a more important part in the operations of today than in those of yesterday.

\* \* \* \*

II. Enemy Front Line.

The line follows the Meuse River from Forges north to the point 315.3-284.5 (southeast of Briulles), thence southwest to a point one kilometer east of Nantillois, thence swinging south and west, crosses Hills 267 and 261, just south of Nantillois, and skirts the southern edge of Bois de Beuge, Bois Emont, and Bois Cierge. It includes Eclisfontaine and continues just north of the Eclisfontaine-Charpentry road, along the slopes northwest of Charpentry, about 500 meters to the north of Montblainville, thence southwesterly toward the Abri St. Louis, and west to the Trench des Fontaine, at about 297.0-271.4.

III. Enemy Order of Battle. \* \* \* \*

Prisoners of the 2nd Landwehr Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Landwehr Division, in a preliminary examination, state that the 53rd Reserve Division is on the left of the 2nd Landwehr Division, east of Baulny. They further state more artillery is being brought up at Baulny.

Prisoners of the 3rd Guard Grenadier Regiment and of the 20th Regiment were captured in neighborhood of Charpentry and Eclisfontaine. This confirms statements of prisoners of 1st Guard Division, captured Sept. 26th, that the 5th Guard Division was in close support.

\* \* \* \*

IV. \* \* \* West of the Meuse, our entire advance has been delayed by a more stubborn resistance, particularly by organized strong points heavily armed with machine guns. \* \* \*

Sept. 28th.

I. General Impressions of the Day:

Between the Moselle and the Meuse, there was continuous and sometimes heavy circulation towards the northwest. Increased harassing fire by hostile artillery with considerable gas. Little infantry action. In the region immediately west of the Meuse, our troops advanced with considerable rapidity against a retreating enemy.

Farther to the west there were hostile infantry reactions this morning, at Eclisfontaine, Epinonville and Ivoiry, and counter-attacks of some forces, later in the day, at Cierges and near Nantillois. In the Argonne our troops met with firm resistance from machine guns and trench mortars. The volume of artillery fire,

in this region, was considerably increased, especially in the valley of the Aire.

## II. Enemy Front Line:

From Forges we hold the west and south bank of the Meuse River to the southern edge of Briuelles. From there the enemy's front line appears to run north of the Bois de Peut de Faux, then from Cunel (which they hold) to Cierges, then west to a point north of the Tronsol Farm. Turning from here to the southwest, it crosses the Aire River and the northern outskirts of Apremont and continues to La Chene Tondeu. From this point it runs nearly due south to a point approximately 289.0-274.4, then west to the end of the sector southeast of Binarville.

## III. \* \* \*

(e) \* \* \* The enemy, apparently, now has less fear of a continued offensive on Metz, and appears to have decided to send support from that front to the Verdun front. The 195th Division appears to be in process of transfer now.

## Sept. 29th. General Impressions of the Day:

I. Between the Moselle and the Meuse the day was characterized in a special way only by an unusually heavy rearward movement of troops and vehicles on the lines Les Baraques-Mars-la-Tour and Pagny-Cornay.

West of the Meuse, the enemy has increased his resistance with infantry reinforcements, machine guns and artillery. Important counter-attacks have taken place, particularly in the region of Exermont, immediately east of the Aire Valley.

II. We hold the west bank of the Meuse River to Briuelles. From the southern edge of Briuelles, the hostile line runs south to approximately 314.0-283.0, then turning west parallels the northern edge of the Bois de Briuelles and continues to the eastern edge of the Bois des Ogons. From this point it turns south for about one kilometer, then takes a southwesterly direction to and including the town of Cierges. It passes just south of Gesnes and follows the ridges north of the Gesnes-Exermont road and the ridges east and west of Exermont. The line then passes north of Apremont to the hill 245, and the cross-roads 600 meters southwest, thence about two kilometers in a southerly direction, turning finally west and a little north to the end of the American Sector.

## III. Enemy Order of Battle:

\* \* \*

52nd Division—Prisoners of the 111th, 169th and 170th Regiments, in valley of Aire, afternoon of Sept. 29th. The prisoners state that the division detrained at St. Juvin, Sept. 28th, where it had been sent directly from Metz. The division was reported resting in Flanders, Sept. 17th. \* \* \*

## Sept. 30th. General Impressions of the Day:

I. Between the Moselle and the Meuse the day was generally quiet. Much traffic was observed on the line from Metz to Conflans, moving west.

West of the Meuse, in our right sector, there was some cessation of hostile infantry and artillery activity.

In the vicinity of Cierges, a hostile counter-attack with heavy artillery preparation was broken up.



Increased hostile artillery activity in the vicinity of Baulny and Charpentry. A counter-attack against Apremont, during the night 29-30th, was repulsed.

Our troops continued to advance through the Argonne against stubborn machine gun and trench mortar resistance.

## II. Enemy Front Line:

From Forges to Briulles we hold the left bank of the Meuse River. From the south edge of the town of Briulles the enemy line runs south to a point slightly north of the northeast corner of the Bois de Briulles, then west to the eastern edge of the Bois des Ogons and south about one kilometer toward Nantillois. From here it runs southwest, passing slightly to the south of Cierges, then west, including the Tronsol Farm, thence south of the woods northwest of Serieux Farm to Montrebeau. The line crosses the Aire River north of Apremont, passes to Hill 245 and the cross-roads 500 meters southwest, thence about two kilometers south, turning then west and slightly north to the end of the American Sector.

\* \* \* \*

## V. Enemy Artillery Activity:

\* \* \* \*

Considerable activity on Baulny and Charpentry. Varennes, Cheppy and vicinity were heavily shelled. The Very-Charpentry road was subject to severe harassing fire.

## October 1. General Impressions of the Day:

I. Quiet along the entire front, from the Moselle to the Argonne, with the exception of a hostile attack north and west of Apremont at about 6 hours, October 1st, which was repulsed.

## II. Enemy Front Line:

The Meuse River from Forges to Briulles forms a line of division between our troops and the enemy. Indications point to the conclusion that the enemy is holding the Kriemhilde-Stellung as his main line of resistance from Briulles to the Bois de Valoup, southwest of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon. Between this position and our lines he maintains a deep outpost zone. From the Bois de Valoup the enemy line runs south to a point north of Gesnes where it turns west on the ridges along the Exermont stream to a point west of Exermont. From here it crosses the Aire River and follows the ridges one kilometer northwest of Apremont and one kilometer northwest of Hill 245. It passes northwest of Le Chene Tendu, north of La Viergette, and along the ridge that runs out to a point near 296.0-276.0. Here it breaks sharply towards the south for about 800 meters, then follows the southern slopes of the Charlevaux stream northwest to about the point 295.0-276.0.

\* \* \* \*

## October 2nd. General Impressions of the Day:

I. Between the Moselle and the Meuse our troops made minor attacks on the Bois de Warville and Hautes Epines Woods.

Artillery activity immediately east of the Meuse.

In the region between the Meuse and the Argonne, there was considerable artillery activity—harassing fire on front lines and roads and a heavy bombardment in the region of Apremont and Charpentry.

Activity of machine guns in the sector nearest the Meuse. Most hostile machine gun and trench mortar fire in the Argonne.

## II. Enemy Front Line.

No change.

## III. Enemy Order of Battle.

\* \* \* \*

(c) The 52nd Division which counter attacked along the Aire, Sept. 29th, is a clear illustration of the development of the enemy's information concerning the present offensive. Prisoners of the 111th Regiment state that they left Flanders on September 23rd and went to Lorraine, east of Metz. On the morning of September 26th they were given an alert and sent by rail to St. Juvin, which they did not reach until the afternoon of September 28th.

\* \* \* \*

## 5th Guard Division.

Prisoners of the 20th Regiment captured today state that on September 30th eight hundred replacements reached the division, coming from Beverloo Camp in Flanders. The 8th Company of the 20th Regiment received one officer and forty men. So far as the prisoners knew, there were no boys of the 1920 class among these replacements. This company had lost 15 men near Charpentry, but had suffered heavily on the Laon front. A non-commissioned officer of this regiment stated that our artillery had "smashed everything" in the Grand Pre-St. Juvin region.

\* \* \* \*

## V. Enemy Artillery Activity.

\* \* \* \*

Farther west, in the sector from Nantillois to the Bois Communal de Baulny, there was lively firing during the morning and much harassing fire. In the region from the heights east of the Aire to include the Argonne, there was little activity except a bombardment in the region of Montblainville, Charpentry and Apremont."

# APPENDIX S.

## EXTRACTS FROM SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, FIRST ARMY, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

Aug. 9th to Nov. 11th, 1918.

From original records, by Major Charles J. Calcrow, under the direction of Col. Ralph T. Ward, C. E., Chief of Operations Section, G-3, 1st Army.

(Note that the record of operations of each Corps is carried through chronologically by itself; therefore the parts of interest to the 35th Division, which at times served in different Corps, do not all come in chronological order.)

"The First Army, A. E. F., took command of the front in the Woivre from Port sur Seille on the east to Watronville on the west, relieving portions of the VIIIth and IInd French Armies, at 4 p. m.,

August 30, 1918. The following corps passed under the command of this army at that time.

- 1st Army Corps, A. E. F.
- 4th Army Corps, A. E. F.
- 2nd Colonial Corps (French).
- 5th Army Corps, A. E. F.

\* \* \* \*

On August 28, 1918, the headquarters of the army were moved to Ligny en Barrois.

\* \* \* \*

Chap. III. \* \* \*

2. \* \* \*

- (c) In preparation for the attack the entire line was put under the command of the 1st American Army and on the 11th of September was held as follows (from right to left):

- (1) 1st U. S. Corps—Clemery to Limey  
82nd, 90th, 5th, 2nd Divisions  
78th Division in reserve.
- (2) 4th U. S. Corps—Limey to Xivray  
89th, 42nd, 1st Divisions  
3rd Division in reserve
- (3) 2nd Colonial Corps (French)—Xivray to Mouilly  
39th D. I., 26th D. I., 2nd D. C.  
No reserve division
- (4) 5th U. S. Corps—Mouilly to Watronville  
26th U. S., 15th D. I. C. (French)  
4th U. S. in reserve
- (d) Divisions designated as army reserve on September 11th were located as follows:  
35th Division—Liverdun  
91st Division—Void

The following divisions, not designated as army reserve, were available:

- 80th Division—Tronville
- 33rd Division—West of Verdun

3. (a) The artillery preparation commenced at 1 a. m., the southern attack began at 5 a. m., and the western attack began at 8 a. m., September 12th.

The order of battle from right to left was as follows:

1st Corps

In line	Reserve	Remarks
82nd Div.	78th Div.	82nd Div. was to make a follow up attack astride the Moselle
90th Div.		
5th Div.		
2nd Div.		

4th Corps

In line	Reserve	Remarks
89th Div.	3rd Div.	
42nd Div.		
1st Div.		

2nd Colonial Corps (French)

In line	Reserve	Remarks
39th D. I.		This corps made a holding and follow up attack
26th D. I.		
2nd D. C.		

5th Corps		Remarks
In line	Reserve	
26th U. S.	4th U. S. (part)	The attack was made by 26th and 15th Divisions.
15th D. I. C.		
4th U. S. (part)		
Army Reserves		
35th Division—not used.		
91st Division—not used.		
80th Division—one regiment moved.		
33rd Division—not moved.		

\* \* \* \*

5. The 1st Army order of battle on September 15th was as follows:

1st Corps  
 82nd, 90th, 5th, 2nd, in line  
 78th Division relieving 2nd

4th Corps  
 89th, 42nd, 1st, in line  
 3rd in Corps reserve

2nd Colonial Corps  
 39th and 2nd, in line  
 26th in reserve

5th Corps  
 26th U. S. and 15th D. I. C., in line  
 4th in reserve

**Army Reserve**

35th at Liverdun.  
 91st en route to Verdun sector at Vavincourt.  
 80th en route to Verdun sector at Souilly.

The operation was entirely successful, the objectives being gained with comparatively small loss.

\* \* \* \*

Chap. IV. \* \* \* On the 21st day of September the Advanced P. C. of this army was moved to Souilly.

Chap. V. \* \* \* \* Part 4. Account of operations of 33rd Corps.

\* \* \* \*

Activities of this corps were confined to patrolling and raiding. During the night of October 14th-15th the 35th Division U. S. relieved the 15th D. I. C., French, and the latter division placed at the disposal of the 17th French Corps.

\* \* \* \*

At 8 hours, November 1st, the command of this sector passed to the 17th Corps, French.

Part 5. \* \* \* On the 6th \* \* \*

The command of this sector passed to the 2nd Colonial Corps this day (relieved from duty with the 2nd Army, American E. F.). The 81st Division relieved the 35th on the right of the corps.

**Chapter V.**

**Part 8.—Account of Operations of 1st Corps.**

At 5:30 hours September 26th, after the completion of the artillery preparation, this Corps attacked and during the afternoon the objective was reached in part, the enemy offering slight resistance

to the advance, and except for delays due to machine gun nests, fairly steady progress was made.

The Corps map shows the line as follows: In front of Tirpitz Trench (94.7x72.7)—600 meters south of Bagatelle Pan—200 meters southwest of St. Huberts Pav—east along south slopes of the head of Rau de au Mortier to Abri St. Louis—north and east to north part of Bois de Bouzon—north of La Forge—600 meters southeast of Charpentry—northeast of line 500 meters from and approximately parallel to the Charpentry-Eclisfontaine Road—point 1 kilometer of Eclisfontaine. The Division maps show lines as follows: 77th Division—junction Boy—Von Mudra (94.3x72.3)—along Trench Karl—Fme aux Charmes—S. W. of St. Huberts Pav—east along south slopes of the head of Rau de au Mortimer to Abris St. Louis—to western slopes of les Precipices. The 28th Division—200 meters north of Carre des Meurissons—south and east of Cotes des Perrieres—les Escomportes Fme—west of Fme de Belair—north of La Forge—northeast to Baulny-Varennes Road. The 35th Division—point on east bank of Aire River 1400 meters north of Varennes—east and north of Rau de Very—north of Very—point 06.5x76.5.

The report of the 28th Division states: \* \* \*

The report of the Commanding General, 35th Division, states: "The Division Commander made a personal reconnaissance of the situation and gave personal directions to Brigade and Tank Commanders to start another advance. This carried the line to 1½ kilometers south of Charpentry on the left and 1 kilometer north of Very on the right. This advance was made under heavy artillery fire, but with less machine gun resistance than in the earlier attack. At 4 p. m. the leading elements received the order to dig in, the other units being disposed in depth. The night was passed in this position, under intermittent artillery fire."

The report of Lt. Col. Ristine, 139th Infantry, states: "Cheppy was cleaned and hasty reorganization was effected. Colonel Howland, who had a machine gun wound in his wrist, was evacuated and Lt. Colonel Parker assumed command of the regiment. The order was given to advance in the allotted sector and moved on Very, taking same with little local opposition, but some artillery resistance."

The report of Major Comfort, 138th Infantry, states: "We then pushed on forward, reducing all opposition and machine gun nests up to a point about one kilometer south of Charpentry. During this advance we were enfiladed by artillery and machine guns, especially from our left flank, about one kilometer south of Charpentry we dug in and waited for the regiment, which failed to show up.

"I left the skirmish line and returned to the regiment, and ascertained that shortly after leaving the regiment Major Stepp had been killed, and the regiment had halted. I moved the regiment up behind the skirmish line, threw out a line on both flanks and we dug in for the night, with the regiment in column of battalions from front to rear as follows: 3d battalion, 1st battalion, 2d battalion. We were obliged to move our regimental headquarters a time or two on account of severe shelling, but it was always along the Baulny-Fleville highway, about two kilometers south of Charpentry."

At 5:30 hours September 27th, the Corps again advanced, finding great difficulty in making a general and steady advance due to

the broken country. The enemy's resistance grew stronger during the morning, but at noon the Corps' front was: 3 km. north of La Harazee—Fontaine au Mortier—La Forge—500 meters north of Montblainville—towards Epinonville. Progress was made on the right of the Corps during the late afternoon, carrying the line further to the north and west of Montblainville.

The Corps map shows no changes in the line on the left. The line on the right ran as follows: 500 meters west of Montblainville—northeast to south of St. Quentin Mn—300 meters north of Charpentry—east to elevation 188 in Square 57—northeast to elevation 191 in Square 57. The Division maps show lines as follows: 77th Division—point 94.6x73.3—Fme Madame—St. Huberts Pav—Abris St. Louis—Quart en Reserve. The 28th Division—no change in southern portion of line—Cote les Perrieres—west of les Escomportes Fme—west of Montblainville—Aire River west of Charpentry. The 35th Division—west and north of Baulny—across Ravin de Mollevaux—elevation 206 on Charpentry-Eclisfontaine Road—thru ravine to elevation 191 at point 05.5x78.0.

The report of the 77th Division states that during the 27th the positions of Abris St. Louis, Fme Four Zube and St. Hubert Pav, were assaulted and carried.

The report of the 35th Division states that: "It was difficult to maintain contact between units in the night advance over difficult rough terrain and finally the main body dug in for the night beyond Baulny, with advanced elements beyond the Montrebeau Woods."

During the morning of September 28th, the continuation of the attack met with success and at noon the line was: ½ km. south of Binarville—Bois Bouzon—north to Apremont—thru Montrebeau Woods—towards Tronsal Fme.

The Corps map shows the line 400 meters south of Min d l'Homme Mort—Fme aux Batons—900 meters east of Bagatelle Pon—1 km. north of St. Huberts Pav—3 meters south of Abris de Crochet—west of les Precipices—Bois de Bouzon—point 00.0x75.0—across head of Rau de Vaux—western edge of le Chene Tondou—west and north of Apremont—northeast thru Montrebeau Woods—towards Tronsal Fme. The Division maps show lines as follows: 77th Division—500 meters south of Min de l'Homme Mort—east to meridian 96.3—south to parallel 73.3—east along ridge—point 98.7x73.2—point 79.0x72.6 along Quart en Reserve. 28th Division—north of Pont a l'Aupe (78.8x75.3)—east of Chene Tondou—west and north of Apremont. 35th Division—600 meters northwest of l'Esperance—thru Montrebeau Woods—east along parallel 79.3 to meridian 05.0.

The report of the 77th Division states: \* \* \*

The report of the 28th Division states: \* \* \*

The report of the 35th Division states: "At daybreak the enemy made a counter attack which was repulsed. An advance was ordered and was carried out under heavy artillery fire, the fire from the left flank across the river being particularly deadly as it was necessary to cross open fields in full view of the enfilading batteries. On the left the advance reached the northern edge of the Montrebeau Woods.

On the right the attack was made a little later and reached a position about 500 yards north of l'Esperance-Chaudron Fme. Road with its left directly north of Chaudron Fme. Enemy artillery and machine gun resistance was strong, especially from the left flank."

On the morning of the 29th, the infantry advancing, met with determined resistance. The 77th Division on the left was unable to advance any distance thru the forest. The 28th Division made no progress and the 35th Division attempting to move forward from Montrebeau was driven back by machine gun and artillery fire. The 92d Division, less one infantry brigade and engineer regiment, was assigned to the 38th French Corps at noon. A counter-attack in the afternoon was repulsed by the 28th and 35th Divisions with heavy losses to the enemy.

The Corps map shows line as follows: Point Binarville road at intersection by meridian 94.0—southeast to Depot de Machines—east passing south of Fme. du Ton, to cross roads south of Pont a l'Aune—north to eastern end of Le Chene Tondou—west and north of Apremont to the river—500 meters north of l'Esperance—400 meters north of Chaudron Fme—800 meters northwest of Cote 231 in Les Bouleaux Bois. The Division maps show the lines as follows: 77th Div.—400 meters south of Mn de l'Homme Mort—500 meters south of les Chenes—along slopes to point 400 meters south of Fme de Ton—cross roads south of Pont a l'Aune—east about 500 meters.

The 28th Division—southern and eastern slopes of le Chene Tondou—north to trench system northwest of Apremont—north of Apremont—northeast to the Aire River. The 35th Division along l'Esperance Serieux Fme Road.

The report of the 154th Infantry Brigade states: \* \* \*

The report of the 153d Infantry Brigade states: \* \* \*

The report of the 28th Division states: \* \* \*

The report of the 35th Division states: "At different times during the day small bodies of troops were pushed up to Exermont, but in each case they were met by artillery fire from both flanks, as well as from the front, and enemy machine gunners worked around to their rear on the flanks, making withdrawal necessary. Finally after a personal reconnaissance by the Division Commander, the order was given to retire to the prepared line of resistance north of Baulny. The withdrawal was successfully accomplished by night, the wounded being taken back from the woods and from Chaudron Farm, the advanced dressing station. An enemy counter attack was repulsed by the covering troops in Montrebeau Woods and the general line l'Esperance-Chaudron Farm—Cote 231 was organized."

On the 30th of September, the 77th Division took Moulin de l'Homme Mort and Depot de Machines in the afternoon and continued the advance. The 1st Division relieved the 35th Division during the night.

The Corps map shows no change for the 30th. The Division maps show lines as follows: 77th Division, just south of Mn de l'Homme Mort—along parallel 74.5 to les 4 Chenes—northeast to point 96.6x75.8. 28th and 35th Divisions, no change.

## APPENDIX T.

EXTRACTS FROM TRANSLATION OF AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT OF  
THE 3RD GERMAN ARMY, FROM SEPT. 26TH TO OCT. 9TH, 1918.

The 3rd German Army occupied a part of the area in front of the 1st Army Corps of the American 1st Army, along the Aire River and in the Argonne Forest, and in part facing the French 4th Army.

Its boundaries were: East, Epinonville, Gesnes (both incl.), Landres et St. Georges (excl.); West, St. Marie-a-Py, Machault.

From copy secured by Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2, U. S. Army of Occupation, Coblenz, 1920.

"The Defensive Operations in the Champagne.

September 26.

Morning Report:

\* \* \* \* \* Heavy artillery bombardment directed against left flank and lively harassing fire in Argonne group, commencing at 11 p. m. \* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \* Americans observed on evening of September 25th seemingly near the heavy mortar emplacements at Vauquois in front of the Tiefland Division. \* \* \* \* \*

Afternoon Report:

\* \* \* \* \* Attack directed against Py and Parthos group and against left flank of Argonne group with the assistance of numerous tanks and air squadrons. \* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \* On the left flank, 2nd Landwehr Division front line bends back from the east side of the Argonne to main line of resistance near Montblainville, then via Charpentry (south edge) to Epinonville, there connecting with the Fifth Army. \* \* \* \* \*

Evening Report:

\* \* \* \* \* In the evening on the left flank of the Argonne group, the enemy, supported by tanks, forced his way up the Aire Valley as far as Baulny. Counter-attack under way. \* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \* Army counts on continuance of attack on its whole front. \*

Seemingly only Americans east of Aisne.

"To the Third Army:

The enemy attacked the front of the First and Third Armies today with overwhelmingly superior forces.

Leaders and troops have again shown that their spirit is not dismayed by the superior forces of the enemy. The enemy did not reach his goal. Your devotion to duty and spirit of sacrifice brought his attack to a standstill. The first hard day has been weathered. We must count on further fighting. After what you have accomplished today you can face any further storms with full confidence and full trust in your strength.

The Fatherland and the whole world is watching the fight in the Champagne. The enemy cannot break through if every leader and every man holds his place to the last. That is our duty.

This command is to be published at once.

WILHELM Kronprinz.'



September 27.

Morning Report:

\* \* \* \* \* Heights of Baulny retaken by counter-attack in the evening. \* \* \* \* \* 5 a. m. Fire on 2nd Landwehr Division of Argonne group intensified. \* \* \* \* \*

Afternoon Report:

\* \* \* \* \* East of the Argonne at least four American divisions in front of the 1st Guard Division, two of these in first line and two in second line (reserves.) \* \* \* \* \*

East of the Argonne enemy attacking since 10 a. m. west of Aire River and in the Aire Valley. Attack against line Charpentry-Eclisfontaine is expected.

Evening Report:

\* \* \* \* \* In the afternoon enemy attacked left flank of Tief-land Division in force, supported by tanks. After an initial success the attack was stopped by counter-attacks. As it grew dark a renewed attack was under way. Situation still uncertain. \* \* \* \* \* Until dark lively traffic in the direction of the front of the Tiefland sector. \* \* \* \* \*

Newly ascertained from prisoners: 76th American Division east of the Aisne, 91st and 28th American Divisions in front of Tiefland.

September 28.

Morning:

\* \* \* \* \* During combats with changing success, Division Tiefland was forced back approximately to the eastern edge of Montrebeau, south of La Grange aux Bois. \* \* \* \* \*

At the present time, powerful infantry attack supported by cavalry and tanks under way against this front and from the Aire Valley against the Bouzon. \* \* \* \* \*

Situation: Further attacks are expected today west of the Aire. East of the Argonne very strong American forces seemingly intend to continue drive toward the north. \* \* \* \* \*

Afternoon:

\* \* \* \* \* Argonne Group engaged in heavy fighting since early morning. Attempted tank attack against Chatel in Aire Valley under way. The Guard Division are approximately in their old position. According to observation, fresh enemy forces being sent against this front. \* \* \* \* \*

Assumed disposition of the enemy: \* \* \* \* \* East of the Aisne, 76th American, 77th American, 91st American, 35th American. Possible reserves, 40th American, 7th American, 81st American.

Evening:

\* \* \* \* \* Tank attacks in the Aire Valley against Apremont and beyond were repulsed by a powerful counter-attack delivered by the 4th Foot Guard Division and parts of the 2nd Landwehr Division. We held the village. In spite of repeated assaults by fresh troops the brave but greatly weakened Guard Divisions held their place in the line east of Chatel, northwest of Cierges, with the exception of unimportant losses of ground. \* \* \* \* \* Report of tanks destroyed today: Argonne groups, approximately 30; total in army, 140. Infantry and artillery share the honors in their destruction. \* \* \* \* \* Between 1 and 2 p. m. aerial battle units successfully attacked the

enemy units engaged east of Apremont. The enemy attack was not carried out. The American troops fled before the planes. \* \* \* \* \* The army expects a continuance of the offensive, especially east of the Argonne.

#### September 29.

##### Morning:

\* \* \* \* \* Fighting has begun south of Exermont, after a heavy preparatory barrage by enemy artillery; still going on. \* \*

##### Afternoon:

\* \* \* \* \* Repeated enemy assaults, directed against the heights southwest of Apremont, and supported by tanks, were repulsed. Tanks penetrated line northeast of Montrebeau; counter-attack under way. \* \* \* \* \*

##### Evening:

\* \* \* \* \* The counter-attack of the 52nd Infantry on the enemy who broke through at Exermont under cover of tanks was successful. The two Guard divisions regained contact. For a short time the whole American front between the Aire and the left flank of the army was in retreat. Concentrated artillery fire did great damage among the retreating enemy masses. By quickly bringing up reserves, the enemy, who saw its line yielding, just in time brought the Guard Division to a stand east of Apremont and south of Montrebeau. At the same time the left flank of the second line division took Apremont. \* \* \* \* \* Our troops in the Aire Valley were attacked by enemy planes in force during the afternoon. \* \* \* \* \*

Newly ascertained from prisoners: 92nd American Negro Division east of the Aire. \* \* \* \* \*

#### September 30.

##### Morning:

\* \* \* \* \* During the night, in order to improve the tactical conduct of operations and to establish a dummy position, we partly transferred our main line of resistance, from Bouconville to Apremont, to main line of resistance No. 2.

\* \* \* \* \* Toward evening bombs were dropped by strong enemy air forces. The 1st Guard Infantry Division is being relieved by the 52nd Infantry Division.

##### Afternoon Report:

\* \* \* \* \* Massed attack of enemy tanks against our front from Apremont wood to the left flank of the enemy under way. \* \* \* \* \*

##### Evening:

\* \* \* \* \* The violent attacks, reported this afternoon east of the Argonne, the objectives of which were Apremont and Montrebeau, resulted in a complete repulse of the Americans. Eleven tanks destroyed here. Local attacks in the afternoon were without success. \* \* \* \* \*

According to prisoners' statements, the especially esteemed 28th and 35th American Divisions suffered losses up to 80% of the strength of their companies from the counter-attack of the 52nd Division and the enfilading artillery fire from the Argonne. According to state-

ments of our own troops hundreds of dead Americans are lying near Montrebeau (a hill). \* \* \* \* \*

There are indications that the First American Army Corps has established headquarters east of the Aisne. Since September 26th the following have been identified as having been on the front \* \* \* \* \* six American divisions. \* \* \* \* \*

#### October 1.

##### Morning:

\* \* \* \* \* Unsuccessful local attacks against Montrebeau. \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

Prisoners brought in from \* \* \* \* \* 35th American Division east of the Aire.

##### Afternoon:

\* \* \* \* \* East of the Argonne, local attacks around Apremont. \* \* \* \* \*

##### Evening:

\* \* \* \* \* According to prisoners' reports, 77th Division being relieved by 32nd, 35th by 29th. \* \* \* \* \*

Newly ascertained as being in front line: \* \* \* \* \* One American Division in front of the 2nd Landwehr (relieved 28th American Division.)

#### October 2.

##### Morning Report:

\* \* \* \* \* Towards evening French-American attacks were carried out against our positions north of Conde, at Binarville, and west of Apremont. The two later attacks were repulsed. \* \* \* \* \*

##### Afternoon:

\* \* \* \* \* Local attacks against Group Aisne and Argonne were repulsed. \* \* \* \* \*

Newly ascertained: 40th American Division (from prisoners.)

\* \* \* \* \* Presence of 91st American confirmed by prisoners.  
\* \* \* \* \*

##### Evening:

\* \* \* \* \* A continuation of the violent offensive against the entire front of the army as well as against the Argonne is expected.

#### October 3.

##### Morning:

\* \* \* \* \* No activity east of the Argonne. \* \* \* \* \*

##### Afternoon:

\* \* \* \* \* Little activity in Argonne sector.

\* \* \* \* \* The enemy is entrenching on the heights north of Charpentry and at Eclisfontaine. \* \* \* \* \*

##### Evening Report:

\* \* \* \* \* Little activity of artillery in the Argonne Group. Apparently registration. \* \* \* \* \* Columns of troops marching through the Argonne to the west. Enemy quiet in front of Argonne group. Only light artillery fire and digging in operations. \* \* \* \* \*

## APPENDIX U.

## SUMMARY OF ARMISTICE TERMS

Signed at Spa on November 11, 1918, by the Allied and German  
Representatives.

1. Military operations by land and in the air to cease 6 hours after signature of the armistice.
2. Evacuation of Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg, with occupation by Allied forces, within 14 days.
3. Repatriation within 15 days of all inhabitants of above countries, including hostages and persons under trial or convicted.
4. Surrender in good condition of 2,500 heavy guns, 2,500 field guns, 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 *minenwerfer*, 1,700 airplanes (fighters and bombers).
5. German evacuation and Allied occupation and administration of German territory on the left bank of the Rhine, the Allies to hold the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mainz, Coblenz and Cologne) with bridgeheads radiating 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) eastward therefrom. A neutral zone 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) wide to be left east of the Rhine and the bridgeheads. These rearrangements to be completed within 31 days after the conclusion of the armistice.
6. The inhabitants in the evacuated area to remain unmolested. There shall be no destruction of factories, food or unremoved military material.
7. There shall be no destruction of roads, telegraphs, telephones, etc., nor removal of personnel employed on the same. Five thousand locomotives, 150,000 railroad cars and 5,000 motor trucks to be surrendered. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine to be handed over with their pre-war personnel and material. Stocks of coal, etc., and signals and repair shops to be abandoned. Barges taken from the Allies are to be restored.
8. All destructive agencies (mines, poisoned wells, etc.) shall be revealed within 48 hours, under penalty of reprisals.
9. The Allies may make requisitions in the occupied regions, subject to regulation of accounts with whom it may concern. The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (except Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.
10. Unconditional and immediate repatriation of all Allied prisoners, without reciprocity; previous conventions on this subject are annulled, except for Germans interned in Holland and Switzerland.
11. German sick and wounded, who cannot be removed, will be cared for by Germans left for that purpose, with required medical material.

12. German troops are to withdraw at once from Austria-Hungary, Roumania and Turkey, and from Russia when the Allies decide that the Russian situation permits.

13. German instructors, prisoners, civilian and military agents in Russia, to be immediately recalled.

14. No further supplies for Germany to be seized or requisitioned in Russia or Roumania.

15. The treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk, and supplementary treaties, to be renounced.

16. Freedom of access to Russia granted to the Allies, via Danzig and the Vistula, to carry supplies and to maintain order.

17. Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed.

18. Repatriation, without reciprocity, of all interned Allied civilians within one month.

19. Reparation for damage done. No public securities which may serve as a pledge for reparation are to be removed. The cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium to be immediately restored; also all documents, species, bonds, paper money, etc., in the invaded countries. The gold yielded to Germany by Russia and Roumania to be delivered in trust to the Allies.

20. Immediate cessation of naval operation; information as to location and movements of German ships to be given. Allied shipping may use territorial waters, without violating neutrality.

21. Release of all Allied mercantile and naval prisoners, without reciprocity.

22. Surrender of all submarines, including submarine cruisers and mine-laying submarines, with complete armament and equipment.

23. The following German warships to be interned in neutral or Allied ports, under the supervision of the Allies and of the United States: 6 battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers, 50 destroyers. All other surface warships to be concentrated in German naval bases designated by the Allies and the United States and completely disarmed.

24. The Allies and the United States to have the right to sweep up all mine fields laid by Germany outside of territorial waters, Germany indicating their positions.

25. Freedom of access to and from the Baltic given the associated powers. To secure this, German forts and defenses at the entrance may be occupied by the Allies and the United States, and mines removed even in German territorial waters.

26. Existing blockade conditions set up by the associated powers to remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea to remain liable to capture. But the Allies and the United States "should give consideration to the provisioning of Germany during the armistice, to the extent recognized as necessary."

27. All naval aircraft to be concentrated and immobilized in specified German bases.

28. All port and river navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, all naval aeronautic apparatus, material and supplies, and all arms, apparatus and supplies of every kind, in Belgian ports and coasts, to be abandoned *in situ*.

29. Russian Black Sea ports to be evacuated, with surrender of Russian war vessels seized by Germany, and release of neutral vessels. German materials there to be abandoned as in article 28.

30. Allied and associated merchant vessels in German hands to be restored, without reciprocity.

31. No destruction of ships or material to be permitted.

32. Germany to notify the neutral governments, particularly Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland, of the cancellation of all German restrictions on their trade with the Allied and associated countries.

33. No transfer of German shipping to neutral flags after the signing of the armistice.

34. The duration of the armistice to be 30 days, with option to extend. In order to assure the execution of this convention the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is admitted, to act under the authority of the Allied military and naval commanders in chief.

35. This armistice to be accepted or refused by Germany within 72 hours of notification.

"This armistice has been signed the Eleventh of November, Nineteen Eighteen, at 5 o'clock French time.

F. FOCH,  
R. E. WEMYSS,  
ERZBERGER,  
A. OBERNDORFF,  
WINTERFELDT,  
VON SADOW."

## APPENDIX V.

G. H. Q.

American Expeditionary Forces.

General Orders

France, Dec. 19, 1918.

No. 232

It is with a sense of gratitude for its splendid accomplishment, which will live through all history, that I record in General Orders a tribute to the victory of the First Army in the Meuse-Argonne battle.

Tested and strengthened by the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, for more than six weeks you battered against the pivot of the enemy line on the western front. It was a position of imposing natural strength, stretching on both sides of the Meuse River from the bitterly contested hills of Verdun to the almost impenetrable forest of the Argonne; a position, moreover, fortified by four years of labor designed to render it impregnable; a position held with the fullest resources of the enemy. That position you broke utterly, and thereby hastened the collapse of the enemy's military power.

Soldiers of all of the divisions engaged under the First, Third and Fifth American Corps and the Second Colonial and Seventeenth French Corps—the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 32nd, 33rd, 35th, 37th, 42nd, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 89th, 90th and 91st American divisions, the 18th and 26th French divisions, and the 10th and 15th French colonial divisions—you will be long remembered for the stubborn persistence of your progress, your storming of obstinately defended machine gun nests, your penetration, yard by yard, of woods and ravines, your heroic resistance in the face of counter-attacks supported by powerful artillery fire. For more than a month, from the initial attack of September 26th, you fought your way slowly through the Argonne, through the woods and over hills west of the Meuse; you slowly enlarged your hold on the Cotes de Meuse to the east, and then, on the 1st of November, your attack forced the enemy into flight. Pressing his retreat, you cleared the entire left bank of the Meuse south of Sedan, and then stormed the heights on the right bank and drove him into the plain beyond.

Soldiers of all army and corps troops engaged—to you no less credit is due; your steadfast adherence to duty and your dogged determination in the face of all obstacles made possible the heroic deeds cited above.

The achievement of the First Army which is scarcely to be equaled in American history, must remain a source of proud satisfaction to the troops who participated in the last campaign of the war. The American people will remember it as the realization of the hitherto potential strength of the American contribution toward the cause to which they had sworn allegiance. There can be no greater reward for a soldier or for a soldier's memory.

This order will be read to all organizations at the first assembly formation after its receipt.

John J. Pershing,  
General, Commander in Chief,  
American Expeditionary Forces.

Official:

Robert C. Davis,  
Adjutant General.

## APPENDIX W.

## "TACTICAL LESSONS OF THE OPERATIONS."

From lecture by Major General C. P. Summerall (then commander 5th Corps, previously commanding 1st Division), delivered January 27, 1919.

"Many discussions of open warfare indicate an impression that when once trench warfare has ceased, there follows an indefinite opportunity for maneuvering and outwitting the enemy by superior tactics and determination. Every initial attack is started by the capture of an organized position. \* \* \*

In the Meuse-Argonne operations, there resulted successive periods of stabilization. Thus, on September 28th, the troops had advanced to a line beyond which no further gains could be made without new preparations. On the 29th, both the 91st Division, of the 5th Corps, and the 35th Division, of the 1st Corps, had been forced to retire from extensive gains that they had made, because of the enemy's superiority of fire and of the inability to receive support from the remainder of our line. Though not in a prepared position, the enemy had occupied a naturally strong position, which had been previously selected, and had brought up fresh reinforcements. To advance from here, it became necessary for us to relieve the original divisions by fresh troops and to organize a new attack after a delay of five days. By desperate fighting, the fresh divisions were able to carry the line forward to the Kriemhilde Stellung, where it was again temporarily stabilized. In spite of successive efforts, the gains were slight during a period of two weeks. \* \* \*

These successive lines of resistance are inevitable. Not only does the enemy bring up reinforcements, as well as retire to naturally strong positions, but our own advance is restricted by the necessity for bringing up supplies and ammunition, of reorganizing our communications, roads and depots, and of reconstituting our forces. These conditions give rise to distinct phases in the employment of the troops. The first is the dislocation of the enemy from his organized positions and the second is overcoming his resistance until the next position is reached. The latter task must, of necessity, be performed by the assaulting battalions. They must, therefore, be fitted for this purpose and the initial position must be overcome by the other troops. In both phases, a superiority of fire is essential. In the first, it must be obtained entirely by the artillery, the machine guns and even the infantry not belonging to the leading battalions. The employment of infantry fire, for example, added greatly to the suppression of the enemy during the crossing of the Meuse. In the second phase, the assaulting battalions must be rendered every possible assistance by the other troops. Covered by the fire power of the division and the corps, and closely followed by their machine guns, mortars, 37mm. guns and accompanying artillery, the assaulting battalions must advance until the enemy's resistance compels local action. It is believed that if these methods had been better understood by the troops, our successes would have been greater. The formation of the assault battalions so as to minimize losses, preserve cohesion and keep the fire power of all arms available for use when needed, should form an important part of all training."



(From a lecture by Major General W. S. McNair, U. S. A., Chief of Army Artillery, 1st Army, delivered at 1st Army Hdqrs., Bar-sur-Aube, France, on Dec. 23rd, 1918.)

"H hour was set at 5:30 o'clock on September 26th and the plan for the artillery worked out practically as contemplated with two exceptions.

The first was in connection with the rolling barrage which almost universally ran away from the infantry, the rate of four minutes per 100 meters being too rapid for the crossing of organized enemy positions. This had the unfortunate result of having the fire of the Army Artillery, which was progressively lifted in accordance with pre-arranged time schedule, removed from points at period when fire would still be possible, and, sometimes, very advantageous. That this was the case was brought to the attention of the Army Artillery by repeated calls from the infantry for fire against points which were within the lines which the barrage had already passed according to schedule. The usefulness of Corps and Divisional Artillery was similarly impaired.

The second exception concerned the provision of the order calling for certain units of Army Artillery to accompany the advance. This provision was based upon the hypothesis that road circulation would be such as to permit reasonably rapid progress of accompanying artillery. As a matter of fact, only three axial roads existed for the entire front of three corps, and for a distance of approximately five kilometers; across no man's land even these roads were so destroyed as to render complete rebuilding necessary. This had the result of making forward movement of Army Artillery at, or immediately after, the advance of the infantry, a complete impossibility. A few units of Army Artillery, especially 155 mm. G. P. F. operating in the area of the 3rd Corps, did try to get forward, starting three days after the original advance. The only result of this move was further to block traffic, and to keep the guns that had been so started out of action. It was not until about a week after September 26th that any considerable portion of the Army Artillery was able to fire from new advanced positions. The extreme width of the track made by 155 mm. G. P. F. guns, this being about nine feet, made it impossible for them to leave sufficient road space for other traffic without ditching themselves and becoming immobile. As a result these guns were highly unpopular with those in control of road traffic, and their forward displacement required not only constant effort but considerable tact."

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(From lecture by Brig. Gen'l Wm. M. Cruikshank, Chief of Artillery, 1st Corps, delivered at Tonnere, France, Jan. 20, 1919.)

"The bulk of the artillery used in the Argonne attack of September 26, as well as the infantry and other forces, were brought from the St. Mihiel front. This is dwelt on by Lt. Col. Repington, military critic of the London Morning Post, in an article of December 9, in the following language:

Few people in England know that this operation (the Argonne-Meuse offensive) was preceded by one of the most interesting and difficult staff operations of the war, namely,

the transfer within fourteen days of the bulk of the 1st American Army from the Metz front to that of the Meuse-Argonne, and its replacement by the 2nd American Army. No less than ten divisions began the Meuse-Argonne attack on September 26. \* \* \* while there stood in reserve, all eventually to be thrown into the fight, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 29th, 32nd, 82nd and 92nd Divisions. A comparison of these divisional units with those which fought at St. Mihiel shows that ten divisions were withdrawn from the Metz front and aligned for the new operation. It was a fine piece of staff work and no other staff could have done it better.

That which enhanced to an enormous degree the difficulties of this operation and at the same time made more noteworthy its successful achievement, was the concealment with which the movement was covered. The keynote of the operation was secrecy. To this end all movements were executed at night. The artillery units from the St. Mihiel front came over by night marches. Artillery from other parts of the front were detrained at distances even farther than that from the St. Mihiel front and reached the area of operations by long marches. To prevent the appearance of new battery positions, the artillery for the most part was located in previously constructed emplacements which had existed unoccupied for a long period of time. The occupation of these positions, the bringing up of ammunition, and return of empty trucks, construction of telephone lines, and in fact all movement and signs of life of any kind, were confined to night or done under cover. In order not to disclose to the enemy the occupation of the battery positions which had previously been vacant, no firing of any sort was to be done by the artillery (except by batteries previously in positions), but great care was taken in the preparation and calculation of the initial firing data.

Many of the American divisions had no artillery of their own, and there was a serious scarcity of horses. The American Army was faced by a shortage of artillery and a shortage of horses for that artillery, with no tractors to replace them. An attack of this nature, once started, makes heavy demands upon the horses, requiring them to haul ammunition long distances over muddy and poor roads, draw batteries forward, haul rations and their own feed, to remain almost constantly in harness and to suffer from unavoidable lack of water, feed and rest. In order to stand this tremendous strain horses should be strong and fresh at the beginning of operations. The horsed units of artillery reached the area of the Argonne attack by long night marches, which were particularly hard on the animals. The last lap of a six nights' march kills more horses than the first three together. But the early time at which it was desired to begin this attack required that these marches be made in long stages; and secrecy required that they be done at night. Many of the horses, at the beginning of the attack, were not in condition to stand the enormous demands that would necessarily be made upon them. It had to be anticipated, therefore, that after a month of this operation the American artillery would be largely immobilized, and to that extent rendered powerless for manoeuvre warfare. Our artillery resources were, by this plan, risked for success."

# APPENDIX X. CASUALTIES REPORTED BY DIVISIONS OF FIRST ARMY. ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE. September 11-16, inc., 1918.

Divns.	Killed		Prisoners		Missing		Wounded		Gassed		Total		Grand Total
	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	
1st	2	76	—	—	—	60	3	377	—	9	5	522	527
2nd	9	186	—	12	—	292	34	1,007	—	23	43	1,520	1,563
3rd	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	—	11	11
4th	3	15	—	—	—	6	3	45	—	14	6	80	86
5th	11	274	—	2	1	72	36	1,198	2	18	50	1,564	1,614
6th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sub-Total	25	553	—	14	1	430	76	2,636	2	64	104	3,697	3,801
26th	15	182	1	11	—	24	50	999	—	510	66	1,726	1,792
28th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
29th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
32nd	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
33rd	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	5	5
35th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
36th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
37th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
42nd	11	151	—	—	1	43	16	626	1	27	29	847	876
Sub-Total	26	336	1	11	1	67	66	1,627	1	537	95	2,578	2,673
77th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
78th	1	4	—	—	—	—	—	34	—	1	1	39	40
79th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
80th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
81st	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
82nd	3	58	—	6	1	49	19	510	13	339	36	962	998
89th	14	135	—	—	—	4	31	682	6	205	51	1,026	1,077
90th	11	241	—	—	—	41	63	1,599	14	442	88	2,323	2,411
91st	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
92nd	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sub-Total	29	438	—	6	1	94	113	2,825	33	987	176	4,350	4,526
TOTALS	80	1,327	1	31	3	591	255	7,088	36	1,588	375	10,925	11,000

Compiled by Statistical Section A. G. O. 1st Army.

CASUALTIES REPORTED BY DIVISIONS OF FIRST ARMY.  
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE.

September 26-November 11, 1918.

Divns.	Killed		Prisoners		Missing		Wounded		Gassed		Total		Grand Total
	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	Off.	Men	
1st	23	1,221	—	4	3	1,329	84	4,909	17	1,596	127	9,059	9,186
2nd	11	392	—	15	1	435	82	2,290	3	85	97	3,217	3,314
3rd	51	1,218	1	66	4	456	211	5,130	55	1,182	322	8,052	8,374
4th	29	591	—	—	3	370	192	3,683	24	548	248	5,192	5,440
5th	45	881	—	33	—	220	196	4,181	11	251	252	5,566	5,818
6th	1	6	—	—	—	2	4	86	1	2	6	46	52
7th	2	9	—	—	—	3	3	28	3	85	8	125	133
Sub-Total	162	4,318	1	118	11	2,815	772	20,257	114	3,749	1,060	31,257	32,317
26th	21	504	1	257	—	—	99	1,542	—	1,648	121	3,951	4,072
28th	21	482	—	—	1	403	104	2,888	—	—	126	3,773	3,899
29th	29	447	2	32	2	136	92	2,383	26	1,616	151	4,614	4,765
32nd	30	650	—	62	11	797	115	4,084	17	578	173	6,171	6,344
33rd	14	355	—	71	1	57	61	1,596	40	2,158	116	4,237	4,353
35th	27	555	4	64	2	446	207	5,727	6	376	246	7,168	7,414
36th	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
37th	18	417	—	5	—	148	84	2,420	26	375	128	3,365	3,493
42nd	13	398	—	10	—	55	54	2,413	27	703	94	3,579	3,673
Sub-Total	173	3,808	7	501	17	2,042	816	23,053	142	7,454	1,555	36,858	38,013
77th	44	973	—	—	5	230	119	3,629	17	544	185	5,376	5,561
78th	21	765	1	11	2	198	104	3,138	54	1,693	182	5,805	5,987
79th	35	666	—	43	2	1,417	131	3,982	22	466	190	6,574	6,764
80th	39	773	—	85	1	137	118	3,072	50	1,334	208	5,401	5,609
81st	11	167	1	56	—	6	28	592	6	165	46	986	1,032
82nd	34	741	7	178	9	385	116	3,511	33	1,260	199	6,075	6,274
89th	41	874	—	12	1	201	112	3,249	39	1,296	193	5,632	5,825
90th	19	609	—	18	6	267	68	2,864	19	707	112	4,465	4,577
91st	36	850	—	10	1	100	132	3,296	26	350	195	4,606	4,801
92nd	2	36	—	—	7	7	3	181	5	45	10	269	279
Sub-Total	282	6,454	9	413	27	2,948	931	27,514	271	7,860	1,520	45,189	46,709

Additional Field Artillery Regts. Serving with Divisions. 119th, 120th, 121st Regts. (57th F. A. Brig), 147th Regt. (66th Brig.).

Totals	4	29	—	—	1	12	207	3	18	19	255	274
TOTAL	621	14,609	17	1,032	55	7,806	2,531	71,031	530	19,081	3,754	113,559

Compiled by Statistical Section A. G. O. 1st Army.

The foregoing tables give the losses for the American First Army. They therefore do not include those of the 27th and 30th Divisions, which were in the British area; nor the losses in any division prior to the St. Mihiel Offensive.

## APPENDIX Y.

## ABSTRACT OF MOVEMENT OF U. S. DIVISIONS

in the 1st Army, A. E. F., preparatory to and during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Operations.

From record prepared by 2nd Sub-Section, G-3, First Army.

The points named are those of the locations of the Division P. C. at the dates indicated. The entries in parenthesis refer to movements of the division as a whole. The last entry in each case indicates the disposition of the division at the close of the record in the First Army.

The record does not show the movements of the divisions when not a part of the First Army; nor does it indicate what part of the time the divisions were in action except as the locations themselves show it.

At the close of hostilities the headquarters of the First Army were at Souilly; of the Second Army at Toul; while the Third Army, organized at about the time of the Armistice, became the Army of Occupation.

## 1st Division.

Aug. 20, Saizerais. Aug. 24, Vaucouleurs. Sept. 3, Trondes. Sept. 4, Pagny-sur-Meuse. Sept. 8, Rangeval. Sept. 11, Beaumont. Sept. 13, Nonsard. Sept. 16, Bois de la Belle-Oziere. Sept. 16, by bus and marching to Souilly. Sept. 22, Benoitte-Vaux. Sept. 27, Blercourt. Sept. 29, by bus and marching to Neuville. Oct. 1, Varennes. Oct. 2, Cheppy. Oct. 12, Les Islettes. Oct. 15, Conde-en-Barrois. Oct. 28, Verrierres-en-Hesse-Ferme. Oct. 31, Epinonville. Nov. 2, Bois de Romagne. Nov. 4, Nouart. Nov. 7, Chehery. Nov. 8, Veaux-en-Dieulet. Nov. 12, Romagne. Nov. 14, Malancourt. Nov. 15, La Cabaret Ferme. (In 3rd Army.)

## 2nd Division.

Aug. 12, Colombey-les-Belles. Sept. 4, Frencheville. Sept. 10, Lironville. Sept. 13, La Griziere Ferme (2 km. S. E. of Thiaucourt). Sept. 19, Manonville. Sept. 23, Toul. Oct. 7, Suippes (4th French Army). Oct. 15, Ferme de Fedenay. (Oct. 23, by bus and marching to Les Islettes area). Oct. 23, Herpont. Oct. 27, Charpen-try. Oct. 31, Exermont. Nov. 1, Landres et St. Georges. Nov. 3, Bayonville. Nov. 4, Fosse. Nov. 17, Stenay. Nov. 18, Vitron. (Nov. 17, in 3rd Army.)

## 3rd Division.

Aug. 20, Gondrecourt, (from Chateau Thierry front). Sept. 5, Vaucouleurs. Sept. 10, Boucq. Sept. 13, Beaumont. (Sept. 14 by bus and marching to Bar-le-Duc area). Sept. 16, Bar-le-Duc. Sept. 19, Julvecourt. Sept. 22, Osches. Sept. 26, Blercourt. Sept. 27, point 200 meters northeast of Esnes. Oct. 1, 1 km. southwest of Montfaucon. Oct. 8, Montfaucon. Oct. 14, Ferme de la Madeleine, 2½ km. northwest of Nantillois. Oct. 19, Montfaucon. Oct. 31, Jubecourt. (Nov. 1, by bus to Tronville area). Nov. 1, Tannois. (Nov. 13, ordered to proceed by bus to south of Champlon, in 2nd Army.)

## 4th Division.

Aug. 20, Rimaucourt. Sept. 1, Reynal. Sept. 2, Vavincourt. Sept. 9, Haudainville. Sept. 21, Lempire. Sept. 22, Lemmes. Sept. 25, Montreville. Sept. 27, Cuisy. Oct. 19, Jouy-en-Argonne. Oct. 22, Benoite Vaux. (In 2nd Army.)

## 5th Division.

Aug. 21, St. Die. Aug. 27, Arches. (Sept. 1 to region of Luneville by bus.) Sept. 1, Neuville. Sept. 8, Martincourt. Sept. 10, St. Jacques. Sept. 18, Domevre. Oct. 1, Pagny-sur-Meuse. Oct. 5, Blercourt. Oct. 11, Fayel Ferme. Nov. 3, Cunel. Nov. 8, Dun-sur-Meuse. Nov. 11, Murvaux. Nov. 12, Lion-devant-Dun. (Nov. 21, assigned to 3rd Army.)

## 6th Division.

Oct. 12, Gerardmer-Vosges. Oct. 26, Beauchamp Ferme. (Nov. 2, Varennes area.) Nov. 2, Champ Mahaut. Nov. 3, Grand Pre. Nov. 4, Authe. Nov. 5, Stonne. Nov. 9, Germont. Nov. 11, Champ Mahaut. Nov. 13, Verdun. Nov. 22, Ancerville. Nov. 30, Aigny-le-Duc, (in 14th Training Area.)

## 7th Division.

Sept. 20, Ancy-le-Franc. Sept. 28, Toul. Sept. 30, Gondreville. Oct. 10, Villers-en-Haye, (in 2nd Army, Oct. 11).

## 26th Division.

Aug. 30, from Mussy-sur-Seine to Vavincourt. Sept. 1, Sommedieue. Sept. 5, Rupt-en-Woevre. Sept. 14, Troyon-sur-Meuse. Oct. 8, Citadelle-Verdun. Oct. 18, Bras. (Nov. 13-14 by marching to Chaumont-sur-Aire area.) Nov. 14, Pierrefitte. Nov. 15, Benoite-Vaux. Nov. 19, Frebecourt. Nov. 23, Montigny-le-Roi, (in 8th Training Area.)

## 28th Division.

Sept. 10, Nettancourt, (northwest of Revigny.) Sept. 19, Clermont. Sept. 25, Fontaine des Combier. Sept. 28, Varennes. Oct. 3, La Forge Ferme. Oct. 9, Varennes. Oct. 10, Menil-la-Tour. (Oct. 12, to 2nd Army.)

## 29th Division.

Sept. 15th, Montreaux-Vieux, Vosges. (Sept. 25, Robert Espagne.) Sept. 24, Conde-en-Barrois. Sept. 29, St. Andre. Sept. 30, Blercourt. Oct. 4, Verdun. Oct. 8, Vacherauville. Oct. 29, Robert Espagne. Nov. 18, Tannois. Nov. 20, Bourbonne-les-Bains, (in 11th Training Area.)

## 32nd Division.

Sept. 10, Joinville. Sept. 22, Autrecourt. Sept. 25, Brabant-en-Argonne. Sept. 27, Verrieres-en-Hesse Ferme. Sept. 30, Montfaucou. Oct. 8, 1½ km. southeast of Very. Oct. 10, 3¼ km. southwest of Montfaucou. Nov. 2, Romagne. Nov. 3, Ancerville. Nov. 10, Vilosnes. Nov. 18, Longwy, (in 3rd Army.)

## 33rd Division.

Aug. 20, on British Front. Aug. 25, Tannois. Aug. 26, Tronville. Sept. 9, Blercourt. Sept. 11, Fromereville. Sept. 25, Ft. de Bois Bourrus. Oct. 21, Dieue. (2nd Army.)

## 35th Division.

Aug. 20, Gerardmer, Vosges. Sept. 5, Romain. Sept. 7, Rosieres-aux-Salines. Sept. 10, Liverdun. Sept. 18, Passavant-en-Ar-

gonne. Sept. 21, Lavoye. Sept. 23, Grange le Comte Ferme. Sept. 25, Cotes de Forimont. Sept. 28, Cheppy. Oct. 2, Passavant. Oct. 3, Triaucourt. Oct. 6, Conde-en-Barrois. Oct. 11, Benoite-Vaux. Oct. 15, Sommedieue. Nov. 6, Dieue. Nov. 7, Pierrefitte. (To Com-mercure, in 2nd Army.)

(Note: The 60th F. A. Brigade did not move with the Division on Nov. 6th, but remained with the 81st Division in the 1st Army until after the Armistice.)

#### 36th Division.

Aug. 30, Bar-sur-Aube. Oct. 7, Vadenay. Oct. 12, Sommepey. Oct. 20, Dricourt. Oct. 31, Sampierre-le-Chateau. Nov. 2, Conde-en-Barrois. Nov. 19, St. Dizier. Nov. 21, Colombey-des-Eglises. Nov. 22, Doulevant-le-Chateau. Nov. 23, Colombey-des-deux-Eglises. Nov. 26, Essoyes. Nov. 27, Tronchoy. Nov. 29, Cheney. (In 16th Training Area.)

#### 37th Division.

Sept. 15, Baccarat, Vosges. (Sept. 17, by train to Revigny region.) Sept. 18, Robert Espagne. Sept. 24, Verrieres-en-Hesse Ferme. Sept. 27, Bois de Very. Sept. 28, 3½ km. southeast of Ivoir. Sept. 30, 3 km. south of Montfaucon. Oct. 1, Recicourt. Oct. 4, Pagny-sur-Meuse. Oct. 7, Euvez. (Oct. 11th to 2nd Army.)

#### 42nd Division.

Aug. 20, Bourmont. Sept. 1, Chatenois. Sept. 5, Colombey-les-Belles. Sept. 7, Toul. Sept. 9, Ansaerville. Sept. 13, Pannes. Sept. 16, Essey. Sept. 25, Bois-de-Pannes. Oct. 1, Benoite Vaux. Oct. 4, Recicourt. Oct. 8, point 2¼ km. southwest of Montfaucon. Oct. 11, 1½ km. southwest of Exermont. Nov. 3, Champigneulle. Nov. 4, Autruche. Nov. 5, Maisoncelle. Nov. 10, Buzancy. Nov. 13, Landreville. Nov. 16, Brandeville (to 3rd Army.)

#### 77th Division.

Sept. 17, Givry-en-Argonne, (by truck from Epernay.) Sept. 21, La Grange-aux-Bois. Sept. 23, Les Islettes. Sept. 24, Les Vignettes. Sept. 25, Fontaine-les-Emerlots. Oct. 1, 3 km. southwest of Le Four-de-Paris. Oct. 3, Bois du Bel Orme. Oct. 12, Chatel Chehery. Oct. 16, Champ Mahaut. Oct. 31, Chehery. Nov. 2, Cornay. Nov. 3, Verpel. Nov. 4, Fontenoy. Nov. 5, La Besace. Nov. 7, Raucourt. Nov. 12, Vaux-en-Dieulet. (In 1st Army.)

#### 78th Division.

Aug. 24, Bourbonne-les-Bains. Sept. 2, Bourmont. Sept. 6, Chatenois. Sept. 8, Rosieres-en-Haue. Sept. 12, Rogeville. Sept. 14, Limey. Sept. 27, 2 km. northwest of Remenaville. Sept. 28, Logemangin. Oct. 5, Benoite Vaux. Oct. 7, Beauchamp Ferme. Oct. 10, Varennes. Oct. 12, La Menil Ferme. Oct. 16, Chatel Chehery. Nov. 2, La Besogne. Nov. 3, Beffu et le Morthomme. Nov. 5, Le Champy Haut. Nov. 7, Champ Mahaut. Nov. 9, Florent. Nov. 11, Verrieres. Nov. 15, by rail to Semur (in 21st Training Area.)

#### 79th Division.

Aug. 20, Prauthoy, (in 10th Training Area.) Sept. 8, Robert Espagne. Sept. 17, Jouy-devant-Dombasle. Sept. 19, Jouy-en-Argonne. Sept. 25, Hill 309. Sept. 26, 500 meters northeast of Esnes. Sept. 27, Haucourt. Sept. 28, Montfaucon. Sept. 30, 3rd Corps area.

Oct. 1, Jouy-en-Argonne. Oct. 4, Thillois. Oct. 8, Troyon-sur-Meuse. Oct. 26, Dieue. Oct. 29, Vacherauville. (Dec. 3, passed to 2nd Army.)

## 80th Division.

Aug. 27, in 14th Training Area, (by marching to Chatillon-sur-Seine.) Sept. 1, Stainville (by rail.) Sept. 8, Tronville. Sept. 16, Ippecourt. Sept. 19, Oches. Sept. 22, Lempire. Sept. 25, Bois de Bourrus, (2 km. southwest of Chattancourt.) Sept. 30, Cuisy. Oct. 1, Septsarges. Oct. 2, Cuisy-Bethincourt road, (1½ km. southwest of Cuisy.) Oct. 11, Blercourt. Oct. 14, Triaucourt (less artillery.) Oct. 23, La Claon. Oct. 24, Le Nefour. Oct. 30, Chehery. Nov. 2, Imecourt. Nov. 4, Sommauthe. Nov. 8, Verpel. Nov. 10, Champ Mahaut. Nov. 11, Flörent. Nov. 19, Triaucourt. Nov. 20, Couvonges. Nov. 22, Vaux-sur-Blaise. Nov. 26, Arrentieres. Nov. 27, Ancy-le-Franc, (in 15th Training Area.)

## 81st Division.

Oct. 22, in Vosges. Nov. 2, Dieue. Nov. 7, Sommedieue. Nov. 9, Belrupt. Nov. 19, Benoite Vaux. Nov. 22, Conde-en-Barrois. Nov. 23, Combles. Nov. 25, Wassy. Nov. 28, Arrentieres. Nov. 1, Mussy-sur-Seine, (in 12th Training Area.)

## 82nd Division.

Aug. 20, Marbache. Sept. 20, Liverdun. Sept. 24, Passavant-en-Argonne. Sept. 27, Grange-le-Comte Ferme. Oct. 4, Varennes. Oct. 9, La Forge Ferme. Oct. 12, Chehery. Oct. 31, Champ Mahaut. Nov. 2, Florent. Nov. 24, Prauthoy, (in 10th Training Area.)

## 89th Division.

Aug. 20, Lucey. Sept. 11, Noviant. Sept. 13, Euvezin. Oct. 7, Royaumeix. Oct. 8, Commercy. Oct. 9, Recicourt. Oct. 13, point 3 km. south of Montfaucon. Oct. 14, Epinonville. Oct. 24, Gesnes. Nov. 1, La Druy Ferme. Nov. 3, Barricourt. Nov. 4, Rilly. Nov. 22, Stenay, (in 3rd Army.)

## 90th Division.

Aug. 23, Villers-en-Haye. Sept. 12, Maney. Sept. 19, Villers-en-Haye. Oct. 10, Lucy. Oct. 15, Blercourt. Oct. 19, Cuisy. Oct. 23, Montfaucon. Oct. 24, Cuisy. Oct. 31, Romagne. Nov. 3, Villers-devant-Dun. Nov. 10, Sassy. Nov. 11, Mouzay. (Nov. 27 to 3rd Army.)

## 91st Division.

Aug. 20, Montigny-le-Roi, in 8th Training Area. Sept. 6, Gondrecourt. Sept. 11, Sorcy-sur-Meuse. Sept. 19, Vraincourt. Sept. 21, Bertram Ferme. Sept. 27, cross roads 400 meters southeast of Very. Sept. 28, Epinonville. Oct. 5, point 3 km. southeast of Very. Oct. 7, Jouy-en-Argonne. Oct. 10, Nettancourt. Oct. 11, Cheminon-la-Ville. Oct. 13, Contrisson. (Oct. 16, entrained at Revigny and Mussey for Belgium.) Oct. 17, P. C. closed in 1st Army area.

## 92nd Division.

Sept. 15, Bruyeres, Vosges. Sept. 19, St. Die. Sept. 20, Corcieux. (Sept. 21-22, by rail to Revigny.) Sept. 22, Triaucourt. Sept. 23, Passavant. Sept. 24, Beauchamp Ferme. Oct. 2, St. Menehould. Oct. 4, Passavant. (Oct. 6, by rail to Nancy region.) Oct. 6, Marbache. Oct. 7, Jailion. Oct. 9, Marbache. (Oct. 12, 2nd Army.)



## APPENDIX Z.

Camp Doniphan, March 27, 1918.

Hq. 35th Division

## General Orders

No. 25

1. (Symbol adopted for 35th Division.)
2. (Division Q. M. to furnish stencils, etc.)
3. The symbol is round, divided into four quarters by a "Santa Fe" Cross, and is circumscribed by a circle. The following colors will be used in the quarters and circle to designate the organization to which the property belongs:

\*   \*   \*   \*   \*   \*   \*

129th F. A.   Three quarters red, one quarter yellow, circle red.

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# GLOSSARY

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## ABBREVIATIONS.

A. E. F.	American Expeditionary Forces in Europe.
A. W. L.	Absent with leave.
A. W. O. L.	Absent without leave.
B. C.	Battery Commander.
B'n	Battalion.
Bgde.	Brigade.
C. A. C.	Coast Artillery Corps (which operated large caliber guns all over the front, and in effect were heavy field artillery).
C. E.	Corps of Engineers.
C. G.	Commanding General.
C. O.	Commanding Officer.
D. C.	Dental Corps.
D. R. C.	Dental Reserve Corps.
D. S.	Dressing Station.
D. S. C.	Distinguished Service Cross (given only for distinguished service in action).
D. S. M.	Distinguished Service Medal (for distinguished service, whether in the field or elsewhere).
F. A.	Field Artillery.
F. O.	Field Order.
F. S. B.	Field Signal Battalion.
G. H. Q.	General Headquarters. The G. H. Q. of the A. E. F. was most of the time at Chaumont, in Haute Marne.
G. O.	General Order.
H. E.	High Explosive.
H. E. Normal	High explosive shells with normal charges; as distinguished from shells with a reduced charge and producing a higher trajectory whereby a shell can be lobbed and dropped behind intervening obstacles.
Hq., Hdq.	Headquarters.
L/D	Line of duty.
M. C.	(a) Medical Corps; (b) Marine Corps.
M. O. R. S.	Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop.

M. P.	Military Police.
M. R. C.	Medical Reserve Corps.
M. T. C.	Motor Transport Corps.
N. C. O.	Non-commissioned Officer.
O. D.	(a) Officer of the Day; (b) Olive Drab.
O. O.	Operations Officer.
O. P.	Observation Post.
P. C.	Post de Commande (Headquarters at the front).
R. I. O.	Regimental Intelligence Officer.
R. T. O.	Railway Transportation Officer.
S. C. D.	Surgeon's Certificate of Discharge.
S. D.	Sanitary Detachment.
S. O.	Special Order.
S. O. S.	Service of Supply; all that part of the A. E. F. back of what was known as the advanced or combat zone. It included the training areas, and all supply, transportation, intelligence and co-ordinating services back of the combat zone.
T. M. B.	Trench Mortar Battery.
V. C.	Veterinary Corps.

## TRANSLATION OF FRENCH EXPRESSIONS.

Abri	Shelter, dugout.
Allez	Go (used as imperative, "go on—move along").
Bas, basse	Low, inferior, shallow.
Bois	Woods.
Boyau	Communication trench.
C'est la guerre	It is the war.
Champ	Field.
Chateau	Castle, mansion.
Cote	Hill.
Croix	Cross.
Croix de Guerre	War Cross.
Etang	Pond, lake.
Ferme, Fme.	Farm.
Foret	Forest.
Forge	Forge, smithy.
Gare	Railway station.
Grand, grande	Large, great.
Guerre	War.
Haut, haute	High.
Moulin, Min	Mill.
Ouvrage	Works, construction.
Petit, petite	Little.
Pre	Meadow.
Ravin, Rav	Ravine.
Route	Road, highway.
Ruisseau, Rau	Stream, brook.
Soixante quinze	Seventy-five (popular name for the 75 mm. guns).
Tout de suite	Instantly, right away.
Tranchee, Tr.	Trench.
Vieux	Old.
Ville	Town, city.

## DEFINITIONS.

- Barrage**..... Artillery fire by a considerable number of guns so directed that the shells will fall and burst in an extended line, usually where the enemy infantry is advancing or threatening to advance, or are in position where it is desired to overwhelm or drive them back.
- A creeping or rolling barrage is one where the range is gradually increased in short successive increments, by all the guns uniformly, so that the effect is to clear the field of enemy troops in front of our own advancing infantry. When the barrage is continued on one line without changing the range it is called a standing barrage, or curtain of fire.
- When a barrage is laid directly in front of our own lines to secure it against an enemy advance it is called a protective barrage.
- For "Normal" or "Eventual" barrage, see text, Chap. XVI, foot-note.
- Caisson**..... A 2-wheeled ammunition chest which accompanies each gun.
- Cannoneer**..... A soldier who performs any of the duties connected with operating a gun and handling its ammunition.
- Carriage**..... A gun and its limber, or a caisson and its limber.
- Chariot-du-Parc**..... A large, slatted wagon used for transport.
- Combat Train**..... The remaining sections of a battery other than the "Firing Battery," consisting of additional ammunition caissons, and a battery-wagon with repair equipment and reserve parts.
- Co-ordinates**..... Maps of all of the possible combat area of France and western Germany were crossed with meridians and parallels, one kilometer (1,000 meters) apart. A point near Treves (Trier), Germany, was assumed to be 500,000 meters east and 300,000 north of the point of origin, and was used as the basic point. The east and west lines were called X-lines, those north and south Y-lines. The Y-lines did not converge to the north (like the lines of longitude), but were equidistant at all points, so did not exactly coincide with either the true north or the magnetic north. Points between the successive 1,000 meter lines were determined by imaginary lines at fractional distances. For instance, on Map No. 11, the X-line 275,000 (abbreviated 75) and the Y-line 303,000 (abbreviated 03) cross near the bend of the Aire River south-east of Montblainville. The imaginary line through a point 200 meters east of this on the X-line would be 303,200, and that through a point 200 meters north along the Y-line would be 275,200. The co-ordinates of the point where these two lines cross would be 303,200-275,200.

- Eliminating, for brevity, the first two and the last two figures in each we have 32-52, which is the point designated, where Captain Harry S. Truman had his O. P. This system fixes the location of any point within 100 meters, and by adding further fractions it can be fixed exactly. For example, as above, 32.5-52.4 (303,250-275,240) would be a point 50 meters farther east and 40 meters farther north.
- The figures which appear at each crossing of the co-ordinate lines on some of the maps (e. g. Map 14) refer to the 1000 figure of the X and Y lines respectively. For instance, the figures "28" just north of Baulny mean that the lines crossing at that point are the Y line 302,000 (02) and the X line 278,000 (78). They should not be confused with the figures on the margin of the map, e. g., "02" and "78" respectively.
- D-Day**.....The day appointed for a particular action. So designated in advance orders, the actual day not being announced till the latest possible moment. Any letter might be used, e. g., J-Day.
- Defilade**.....Protection from view by an object in front, such as a hill, a wood or a building.
- Detail**.....In general, a number of soldiers ordered to some special duty. Specifically, in the artillery, soldiers regularly designated and trained for duty as scouts, field telephone men, observers, map-makers, range-finders, and the like. They are eyes, ears and hands for the regimental and battalion commanders. B. C. Detail, or Battery Commander's Detail, is such a detail organized in each battery.
- Driver**.....In the artillery, a soldier who rides one horse of a pair in harness, guiding the other with a connecting rein.
- Echelon**.....(a) A base near the front, frequently within the zone of fire, where the immediate reserves of men, horses and supplies are kept, with regimental records; the regimental headquarters, save for the personal P. C. of the regimental commander at the immediate front.  
(b) When the units of an organization, e. g., the different batteries, are so placed alternately to each other that they are not in line with each other either laterally or towards the front and rear, they are in "position in echelon."
- Enfilade**.....To rake a line lengthwise from the side, by rifle or shell fire.
- Field of Fire**.....The area which is within range of a gun or battery and not protected by intervening obstructions or defilade.
- Fire**.....Counter-battery: Fire directed at the enemy's artillery positions.

**Fire for Demolition:** Fire of high explosives directed at fixed targets, such as trenches, forts, buildings, and the like, which its primary purpose is to destroy; fire against inanimate objects.

**Harassing Fire:** Fire intended to interfere with enemy concentrations, at positions, trenches and camps; not for the purpose of meeting a present movement on his part, but to interfere with his tactical preparations and security.

**Fire of Interdiction:** Fire directed to the prevention of movement by enemy troops in a given direction or manner.

**Fire of Neutralization:** Fire directed to making a given enemy position untenable, without necessary reference to permanent destruction of either the position or its occupants.

**Firing Battery.....** The first five sections of an artillery battery, consisting of four guns and their caissons, and the fifth section of two caissons, which usually constitute the minimum fighting element of a battery.

**Firing Data.....** The data upon which gun settings are based for a given fire. It includes a number of elements, of which the following are the most important:

**Sondage:** The net result of the calculations of the effect of wind, temperature and barometer on artillery fire at a given time. It can be readily understood that a projectile fired with the wind will go farther than one fired against the wind. A cross-wind will have an effect varying with the angle. A cross-wind also affects the direction of fire, in a substantial but calculable manner. As the trajectory of a shell follows a high curve extending hundreds of feet into the air, it may strike wind of considerably different velocity from that near the ground, so the calculations take into consideration the wind reports for different levels.

The temperature perceptibly affects the course of the projectile, directly by the resistance of the air, which varies in density with its temperature; and indirectly by its effect on the propelling charge, the strength of which also varies with its temperature.

The barometer, in connection with the temperature, must also be considered.

The artillery firing manuals contain tables for making these calculations, with their respective plus and minus effects, so that, in firing, the net result is added to or subtracted from the actual map distance.

The same gun, set at exactly the same angle, fired with the same kind of projectile, under conditions when these elements are all with the

## GLOSSARY

projectile and again when they are all against it, may show a difference in range of several hundred yards.

**Site:** The elevation of the target as compared with that of the gun. Map distances assume a level ground from gun to target. If a gun is set to fire at 3,000 yards, but when the projectile reaches that distance its target is in a valley 100 feet below it, it continues its flight till it strikes the ground beyond, and so fails in effect. If the target is on a hill 100 feet higher than the gun, the same lack of effect is had, because the projectile strikes the slope short of the target.

Hence, to get accurate fire, the "site" of the target must be known and its effect taken into the calculation.

The gunner lines his sight, not on his target, which he cannot see, but upon a visible object (with the 75s, usually an aiming stake set out in front; with the panoramic sight on the American 3-inch gun, usually some tree, building, peak or other well-defined object at a considerable distance). It is thus necessary not only to first measure on the map the distance of the target, but also to determine, with a protractor, its variation from the "Y-line" or north, and the same of the aiming-stake; then to combine these two by addition or subtraction to determine the "deflection" at which to set the gun. (See Co-ordinates.)

These calculations, with those of the "Sondage" and the "Site" (and in case of shrapnel, the "Corrector," or regulation of the height above the ground at which the projectile will burst) are included generally in the expression "firing data."

The firing manuals contain tables for different caliber guns and for shells with normal and reduced charges.

**Fourgon**.....A French army supply wagon.

**General Staff**.....The General Staff at G. H. Q. (and analogously that at Corps and Division Headquarters) was divided into five general sections, as follows:

- G-1 Administration
- G-2 Intelligence
- G-3 Operations
- G-4 Supply
- G-5 Training

**Gun**.....In artillery, a cannon, of 3-inch or 75-millimeter caliber, or greater, having a rifled bore and a high initial velocity, producing a relatively straight trajectory. A 75 mm. gun, with carriage, weighs 2657 lbs.

**H-Hour**.....The hour of a proposed action or movement—(sometimes called Zero Hour)—analogous to "D-Day."

- Howitzer**.....A cannon intended for high angle fire, designed and mounted so as to fire a large caliber projectile with a relatively lighter powder charge and with a shorter (hence lighter) tube than would be necessary for a lower angled gun of the same caliber. The howitzers used in France were of 155 mm. (6 inches) caliber or greater.
- Kilometer**.....1,000 meters, or .621 of a mile.
- Laying Guns**.....To place the guns in position, with the range and direction of fire set according to calculated data, so that fire will fall at a given desired spot or target. In the field, the guns are always kept "laid" on some known point of danger, even when not actually being fired.
- Liaison**.....Close and continual communication between the different elements of a principal unit or others working with it, so that they are at all times acquainted with each other's positions, movements, conditions and needs, thus promoting the maximum of co-ordination and co-operation.
- Limber**.....The front two wheels and their connecting framework of a carriage, carrying a small ammunition chest, and having the pole attached, to which the horses are hitched. To move a gun or caisson, its "trail" is hooked to the limber, and when drawn into position is unhooked and the limber pulled away by the horses.
- Materiel**.....The military equipment of a regiment or other unit, as distinguished from the personnel—sometimes used to include animals, but more frequently applied only to inanimate equipment.
- Meter**.....Unit of lineal measure, 3.28 feet. Used in France and on the continent of Europe generally.
- Mil**.....1/6400 of a circle. Artillery calculations use this basis almost exclusively instead of degrees, minutes and seconds.
- Sheaf of Fire**.....The planes of fire of the various guns of a battery, taken collectively; the distribution of fire between the right and left limits of a battery's fire.
- Sondage**.....See Firing Data.
- Target**.....Any objective fired upon.
- Train**.....Any column of wagons, trucks, caissons or animals with supplies, ammunition, or other equipment; or the organization which handles such, *e. g.*, the Ammunition Train.
- War Diary**.....A brief, daily, official record kept in each battalion and higher organization outlining the movements of the day.





# ROSTER

## OF THE

### 129TH FIELD ARTILLERY

COMPLETE FROM ORGANIZATION TO DEMOBILIZATION  
August 5, 1917-May 6, 1919.

Names indicated by an asterisk (\*) are those of men whose connection with the regiment ended prior to its departure for France, by death, promotion, transfer, discharge or otherwise. A large portion of these saw foreign service in other organizations. The ranks here given are the highest rank held in this regiment only; except that in the case of enlisted men of this regiment who received commissions, their first new rank is given in parenthesis, whether they were assigned to this regiment or elsewhere.

Lieutenants, except in the Sanitary Detachment, are not listed by separate organizations, as most of them served at times with different batteries. The words, "*killed in action*," etc., in italics in parenthesis, refer to the single individual whose name they follow only.

## FIELD AND STAFF

### REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS

Klemm, Colonel Karl D.

\*Danford, Lieut.-Col. Robert M.  
(Promoted to Brigadier General)  
Smith, Colonel Emery T.

### LIEUTENANT COLONELS

Elliott, Arthur J.  
Gates, Marvin H.

### ADJUTANTS

Carr, Capt. Fielding L. D.  
Paterson, Capt. Newell T.  
(later Major 128th F. A.)  
Sermon, Capt. Roger T.

### PERSONNEL OFFICERS

Ducournau, 1st Lieut. John A. (acting)  
Sermon, Capt. Roger T.  
Lawson, Capt. William D., Jr.

### REGIMENTAL CHAPLAIN

Tiernan, 1st Lieut. L. Curtis (*Gassed*)

### SERGEANT MAJORS

\*Poindexter, Francis (2nd Lt.)  
Routh, Cedric E. (2nd Lt.)  
Hardaway, Joseph B.  
Farley, Neal H.

### ATTACHED

Thiebault, M. Maurice (French Interpreter)  
Padieu, Denis (2nd Lt. French Army)

## ROSTER

## 1ST BATTALION

(A, B and C Batteries)

## COMMANDING

Miles, Major John L.

## BATTALION ADJUTANTS

Thacher, Capt. John H. (later  
Major 128th F. A.)

Paterson, Capt. Newell T.

Bourke, 1st Lieut. Thomas C. (acting)

## BATTALION SERGEANT MAJORS

Sapp, Kitt G.

*(Gassed)*

\*Hale, Arthur A. (2nd Lt.)

Burns, Ralph C.

## 2ND BATTALION

(D, E and F Batteries)

## COMMANDING

Gates, Major Marvin H. (Pro-  
moted Lieut. Colonel)

McGee, Major Thomas S.

## BATTALION ADJUTANTS

\*Boyer, Capt. Harry M.

Sermon, Capt. Roger T.

\*Butterfield, Capt. Chauncey G.

Paterson, Capt. Newell T.

Truman, Capt. Harry S.

Younger, 1st Lieut. Wm. H., Jr.

Dowell, 2nd Lieut. Jesse M. (acting)

## BATTALION SERGEANT MAJORS

Davis, Condit H.

\*Davidson, Carl E. (2nd Lt.)

Bohrer, Everett H.

*(Injured in action)*

Downey, Leo C.

Moore, David H.

## ATTACHED OFFICERS

## MAJOR

\*Waring, Roy F.

## CAPTAINS

\*Ruf, Edward J.

\*Thurston, Wm. W.

## FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Rife, George J., V. C.

Haller, Forrest, V. C.

## LINE OFFICERS

---

### FIRST LIEUTENANTS

- |                        |                          |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Arrowsmith, George M.  | Jones, Winfield D.       |
| Baldwin, Lawrence J.   | Jordan, Gordon B.        |
| *Bennett, Horace C.    | Kennady, Homer F.        |
| Betts, Herbert P.      | (Gassed)                 |
| Bourke, Thomas C.      | Kennedy, Edgar C.        |
| *Brown, Henry M.       | Lang, Chester H.         |
| Bundschu, Charles C.   | Lee, Jay M.              |
| Christmann, Henry A.   | *Liebst, Charles A.      |
| Crenshaw, Ralph E.     | Newton, Sterling M.      |
| Cunningham, Lorain H.  | Page, Lyle J.            |
| Ducournau, John A.     | *Perry, Dexter S.        |
| Dyer, Lowell W.        | *Pickrell, Charles U.    |
| Eckberg, A. Ralph      | Rainey, Eugene T.        |
| Flynn, Michael J.      | Scott, Gilbert W.        |
| Fraser, Joseph B., Jr. | Slagle, Walter G.        |
| Grunewald, Frank J.    | Stumberg, Whitelaw R.    |
| Hatfield, John A.      | Teasley, Walter          |
| Hinde, Edgar G.        | Walthew, Francis G.      |
| Householder, Victor H. | Warren, Henri L.         |
| *Hubbard, William      | Wengert, Charles Stanley |
| Jones, Enoch P.        | Zemer, Leslie M.         |

### SECOND LIEUTENANTS

- |                        |                         |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Anderson, Josephus     | Lee, John B.            |
| Benoist, Theodore, Jr. | *McCarron, Wm. C.       |
| Biglow, William K.     | McCoy, Percy B.         |
| *Breckenridge, Archie  | Milham, Russell F.      |
| Brown, Valentine J.    | Miller, Wilkie M.       |
| *Cash, Merrill A.      | *Milligan, Warren E.    |
| Cates, Charles W.      | Mills, Archibald S.     |
| *Clark, Clyde C.       | *Mize, Charles Roderick |
| Crawford, Charles P.   | *Morg, Frederick A.     |
| (Director of Band)     | *Pendergast, James M.   |
| Curtis, Edward T.      | *Phelps, Robert L.      |
| Dowell, Jesse M.       | Power, Edmond           |
| Eagleton, William L.   | Reed, Nelson            |
| Fenner, Francis M.     | *Ricks, H. L.           |
| *Forrest, Ralph L.     | Riley, Morris G.        |
| Fraser, Harry B.       | Senecal, James E.       |
| *Hale, Herbert J.      | Smith, William I.       |
| *Hastings, Vernon      | Snoble, Adolph J.       |
| Hinman, Clark F.       | Stewart, Thomas J., Jr. |
| Jewell, Howard W.      | *Stubbs, Sherwood O.    |
| *Johnson, Arthur N.    | Van Deventer, Philip    |
| Jones, Frank           | Wanzer, H. Stanley      |
| *Kelly, Chas. Wallace  | Wilson, Andrew Douglas  |
| Kleeman, William       | Wilson, Arthur W.       |
| *Knauss, Fred          | *Yeates, William        |



CORPORALS—Continued

Hughes, M. Seibert  
 Jackson, Floyd W.  
 \*Jones, Burnam R. (2nd Lt.)  
 Kelly, Harry T.  
 \*Kirk, Minor  
 Lancaster, Ray A.  
 Lane, Hobart F.  
 Lewis, Alan A.  
 Linton, Melville L.  
 MacDonald, Frank E.  
 McDermott, Francis C.  
 Maier, Lawrence A.  
 Mathews, John G.  
 Maxwell, Leslie E.

Mercer, George S.  
 Meredith, William B.  
 Moore, Paul  
 Mosby, Emerson A.  
 Peacock, Leslie  
 Satterfield, Lawrence  
 Saulisbury, William L.  
 Shannon, Harry C.  
 Silcott, Robert F.  
 Storms, Arthur P.  
 Stout, Duval D.  
 Taylor, Lewis E.  
 Way, Robert

PRIVATES

\*Albano, Daniel T.  
 Allen, Leslie E.  
 Anderson, Arthur C.  
 Anselmo, John  
 Aurilli, Nicholas  
 Barnes, Silas Franklin  
 Beason, Allen W.  
 Bender, Bassell D.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Blackwell, Carroll C.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Bodny, Powell  
 Boner, Harry T.  
 Boswell, Alphonse W.  
 Boyd, Ernest  
     *(Died in France, L/D.)*  
 Boyle, John E.  
 Brickle, John R.  
     *(Left in Brest hospital)*  
 Brom, Edward A.  
 Brown, Carl J.  
 \*Brown, Hayward  
 Bullis, Henry C.  
 Bunney, Harry K.  
 Burke, Thomas F.  
 Campbell, Neil A.  
 Carlisle, Charlie C.  
 Carpenter, Noble D.  
 Clark, George W.  
 Clinton, Elmer  
 Coleman, Leo A.  
 Collins, Hubert C.  
 Commo, Fred  
     *(Died in France, L/D.)*  
 Cowan, William J., Jr.

Dack, Harry G.  
 \*Davies, Elmer  
 Davis, George L.  
 Davis, Jake  
 Davis, Jesse G.  
 Delfino, Tony  
 Demers, Frederick  
 De Talent, Lyle E.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 \*Dodson, Roy W.  
 \*Dooley, Hugh E.  
 Dootson, Clarence W.  
 Dumont, William E.  
 \*Duncan, Everett R.  
 Eichelberger, Louis E.  
 Fallstead, Coral C.  
 Feiner, George W.  
 Finley, Grover M.  
 Fisher, Frank B.  
 Ford, John R.  
 \*Frederick, Herman J.  
 Fredericks, Aubrey L.  
 Gale, Robert  
 Galle, Fred  
 Gamache, Claud S.  
 Gee, Harry I.  
 Glaski, John  
 Gleason, William A.  
 Godley, Eugene  
 Greene, Robert A.  
 Grigory, Sylvester  
 \*Hall, Eugene F.  
 Hardcastle, Jerome B.  
 Hawbecker, Alfred G.  
 Henman, Joseph

## PRIVATES—Continued

- Heyle, James R.  
 Holderle, John H.  
 Holtan, Lewis  
 \*Hood, Otto D.  
 Hope, Hugh B.  
 \*Horine, Stanley M.  
 Hornaday, Ralph C.  
 Hunter, John Jones  
 Jackson, Evert R.  
 Jacobs, Russell C.  
 \*Jenkins, Spencer B.  
 Johnston, James E.  
 Jones, Owen D.  
 Jones, Wilbur M.  
 \*Josse, Jasper P.  
 Konopka, Michael  
 Korman, Henry J.  
 Krahn, Abraham A.  
 Krehm, James M.  
 \*Kretzer, John F.  
 Lahtinen, Aksel  
 Laub, Harry  
 \*LeBow, Max R.  
 \*Leigh, Harry B.  
 Linsea, Fred  
 \*Liston, William J.  
 Llafet, Jesse D.  
 \*Love, James  
 \*Lyon, Stuart D.  
 \*McCarthy, Clinton C.  
 McClung, William T.  
 McConville, Tom  
     *(Gassed)*  
 McGuire, Frank T.  
 \*McKinley, John J.  
 McMillian, Clarence O.  
 Mahlum, Sanford M.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Mansell, Emmett L.  
 Martin, Lyle R.  
 Martin, Samuel A.  
 Mattock, James F.  
 \*Mendel, Allie  
 Messmer, John C.  
 Moore, Charles F.  
 Moore, Newton O.  
 \*Morris, Burl  
 Myers, Harry  
 Nathan, Frank E.  
 \*Norman, Bond Hughes  
 \*Olson, Paul A.  
 O'Sullivan, John A.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 \*O'Toole, Edwin V.  
 Pearl, Robert J.  
 Peden, Frank E.  
 \*Pitts, Shirley  
 Potter, Guy  
 Pulse, Lewis E.  
 Redrick, Charles E.  
 Reeve, Roy A.  
 Rice, Earl S.  
 \*Riley, Ace E.  
 Robinson, Earl R.  
 \*Rogers, John Wesley  
 Rookstool, Charles E.  
 \*Routt, Willard T.  
 Runner, Rolla W.  
 Sanders, Edgar J.  
 Sawdy, Lorenz A.  
 Schaeffer, Charles A.  
 Schmidt, Walter P.  
 \*Schumacher, Lawrence J.  
 Seal, Clifford M.  
 Semler, William  
 Smith, Clarence B.  
 Smith, Mike  
 \*Smock, Lee A.  
 \*Speed, Lloyd J.  
 Stanley, James  
 Storms, Walter R.  
 Surface, Elmer R.  
 \*Tamblyn, William L.  
 \*Tillery, Forrest A.  
     *(Died at Camp Doniphan,  
     L/D.)*  
 Van Dyke, George W.  
 Van Tine, Elmer L.  
 \*Vining, Louis  
 Wall, George C.  
 Weakley, Denver L.  
 Weaver, Elmer Ross  
     *(Wounded, Gassed)*  
 \*Weimer, Cleo F.  
 Whitesel, Otto S.  
 Wilson, Blake L.  
 Wilson, Walter T.

# A BATTERY

## CAPTAINS

\*Olney, Roy T.  
Sermon, Roger T.

Dancy, Keith W.

## FIRST SERGEANTS

Robey, Rolla G.

Hulen, Charles C.

## SERGEANTS

Dyer, Chas. M.  
Fling, Raymond J.  
Haynes, Maurice E.  
Holcroft, Harry S.  
Lyon, Sam F.

\*Major, Joseph P. (2nd Lt.)  
Maxfield, Leslie R.  
Montague, Ralph H.  
Moore, Fulton (2nd Lt.)

\*Oakley, Cyrus K.  
(*Injured in Camp Doniphan,*  
*L/D.*)

Odell, Jesse G.  
Poe, William H.  
Pollard, George H.  
Reed, Harold  
Searcy, Roy M.  
Shelton, Charles J.  
Sullivan, Michael  
Weir, Floyd A.  
Young, Andrew G.

## CHIEF MECHANIC

Altman, Homer

## CORPORALS

Allison, Harold  
Baker, Fred  
Batliner, Andrew R.  
Becker, Howard R.  
Beckett, Finis  
Bender, Robert W.  
Bishop, Arthur E.  
Blackburn, Robert C.  
Bloomer, Arthur

\*Browning, Royce B.  
Campbell, Harold C.  
Carver, Lorenzo F.  
Colby, Walter H.  
\*Cooper, John E.  
\*Coxhead, Clinton H.  
Craig, John F.  
Crowther, G. Newton  
Dickhut, Lloyd F.  
\*Dobinson, Elza J.  
Dougherty, Lynn  
Dyer, Lowell W. (2nd Lt.)

Earnheart, Paul  
Flora, Isaac  
Fogel, Sidney M.  
\*Gamble, John  
Heustis, Roy  
Holland, Monta C.  
Horn, Geo. A.  
Link, Leo C.  
Lyon, Otis R.  
Menze, Milton E.  
Moore, Frazier D.  
Nies, Frank R.  
O'Neill, Ray  
Percell, Donald A.  
Perry, Stewart  
(*Wounded in Action*)  
Phillips, Harvey C.  
Pratt, Clarence W.  
Priest, Donald F.  
Pugh, Benj. D.  
Waller, Harry Hill

## PRIVATEES

Acker, Sidney H.  
\*Allen, Clyde S.  
Babin, Joseph P.  
Baker, Leroy

Barrington, Eugene  
Barrington, Fred  
Bartholomew, Herman O.  
\*Bernstein, Morris M.



## PRIVATES—Continued

- Bean, Evert R.  
*(Killed in Action)*  
 Beaty, Clarence A.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 \*Berry, Carroll W.  
 Berry, Louis J.  
 Bigus, Morris  
 Blunk, Floyd C.  
 Boblitt, Charles R.  
*(Killed in Action)*  
 Boland, Michael  
 Bosworth, Leslie B.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 \*Boyd, James M.  
 Brazeal, Charles H.  
 \*Brewster, Harry E.  
 Brice, George F.  
 Brodeur, Albert J.  
 Brunner, John  
 Cameron, James S.  
 Cardwell, Elmer F.  
 Carroll, Claude J.  
 \*Cheulakes, James  
 \*Chisham, Irving  
 Ciavara, Paul  
 Clem, George W.  
 Clemence, Thomas  
 \*Connors, Thomas  
 Cooley, Ralph E.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 Coplan, John L.  
 Corrigan, Thomas E., Jr.  
 Cover, Lincoln A.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 Cramer, Ward B.  
 Cummings, Robert T.  
 \*Davis, Henry H.  
 \*Davis, Hillard J. M.  
 Delaplaine, Richard  
 \*Dennison, Ralph C.  
 Denton, Harry C.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 \*Divelbiss, Lyman E.  
 Eddins, Bryan  
 Elliott, Ralph C.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 Evans, Charles B.  
 Ferguson, Eugene R.  
 Finn, Charles H.  
 Friedman, Sam C.  
 Funk, Jesse E.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 \*Gartman, Louis  
 Goebel, Frederick B.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 Gosvenor, Richard F.  
 Granahan, William J.  
 \*Grover, Benj. W.  
 Hall, Charles A.  
 \*Hans, John H.  
 Harper, Roy  
 Haynes, Harvey M.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 Hendrix, Archie  
 Hendrix, John  
 Hill, John W.  
 Hitchcock, John  
 Hobbs, William L.  
 Holwick, Charley  
 Hoover, Carl  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 Housman, Walter  
 \*Howe, Neal A.  
 Jasionkowski, Frank J.  
 Johns, Warren  
 \*Johnston, Thomas J.  
 Jones, Frank W.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 Jones, Jesse  
 Joyce, William P.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
 Kelley, Geo. O.  
 \*Kelley, James  
*(Accidentally killed at Camp Doniphan, L/D.)*  
 \*Kent, Walter J.  
 Kettman, Theodore  
 Kinkade, Roy H.  
 Krueger, Ralph O.  
 Lansing, John N.  
 Lapides, Clarence L.  
 Lee, Roy N.  
 \*Long, John C.  
 \*McBride, Oscar  
 \*McComas, John A.  
 \*McCubbin, Sandy  
 McDaniel, Frank  
 McDonald, Roy L.  
 McGrew, George W.  
 McNutt, Henry E.  
 \*Maguire, Paul  
 Maienshein, Andrew  
 Mann, Carl  
 Martin, Houston

PRIVATES—Continued

- \*Martin, John P.
- Martin, Orvel R.  
(*Wounded in Action*)
- Marvin, Dean E.
- Mattingly, Harrison F.  
(*Wounded in Action*)
- Mattingly, Houston
- Mattingly, Robert
- Mattingly, Sanford
- Mercer, Earle M.
- Miller, Arthur
- Miller, Keith
- Minter, Herman E.
- Mooney, Robert L.
- Moore, James F.
- Morgan, Kirby L.
- Murphy, Alfred W.
- Musselman, James C.
- Nall, Henry M.  
(*Wounded in Action*)
- Newkirk, Everett F.
- Newman, Arthur E.  
(*Died in France, L/D.*)
- \*Newman, George W.
- Nies, Frederick J.  
(*Died of Wounds in Action*)
- \*North, Emil A.
- Olney, David H.  
(*Wounded in Action*)
- Opitz, George William
- Pawling, Wm. H.
- \*Pearson, Lawrence
- Pfunder, George W.
- Pollock, Joseph H.
- Pounds, Joel L.
- Priester, George  
(*Injured in Action, L/D*)
- Pugh, Edward E., Jr.
- Rauhoff, Harry G.
- Reagan, Vance W.
- \*Richmond, Milford I.
- \*Rigg, Charles H.
- Riley, James M.
- Rinard, Bernard I.
- Robertson, Jerome Benj.
- Roberson, Robert Harris
- Rodgers, Glenn H.
- \*Rolls, Raymond J.  
(*Died in Camp Doniphan  
from Accident, L/D.*)
- Rose, Wm. S.
- Rowland, James L.
- Russell, Thomas H.
- Schwarzel, William
- Shaw, Ralph E.  
(*Wounded in Action*)
- Shay, Wm. M.
- Shepherd, Clarence H.
- Sheridan, John F.
- Sigler, William W.
- Simmons, Jesse A.
- Sims, Loral
- Sjoberg, Swen A.
- Smith, Dave
- Smith, Edward R.
- Smith, John M.
- \*Stanford, Richard L.
- \*Stauver, Frank R.
- Stewart, Clarence G.
- \*Stimmel, Bruno R.
- Stoenner, Edwin D.
- Stone, Adolph E.
- Storey, George E.  
(*Wounded in Action*)
- Stringer, James D.
- Stroud, George B.
- Stubblefield, Pearl
- Stump, David O.
- Sutton, Charles V.
- \*Sydenstricker, Cecil
- Thomas, Sullivan
- \*Tillman, Edgar Milton  
(*Died in Camp Doniphan,  
L/D*)
- Tiller, John E.
- Tollett, Will P.
- \*Tozzi, Joseph
- Ulrich, Elmer L.
- \*Unland, Edwin L. (2nd Lt.)
- Vecera, Klement
- \*Vetter, John E.
- Waechter, Edward H.
- Walker, Robert James
- \*Waller, Harold D.
- Ward, Walter E.
- Ware, Wilber M.
- Waters, Luther E.
- Waugh, George
- Weaver, Raim Esco  
(*Wounded in Action.*)
- Webb, Victor O.
- West, Carl
- Wilborn, Menefee
- \*Williams, Horace C.
- Wilmoth, Walter F.
- Young, Joseph J.

## B BATTERY

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### CAPTAIN

McGee, Thomas S. (Promoted to Major)

### FIRST SERGEANTS

Page, Charles G.  
Rule, Curtis T.

\*Seligman, Frederick H. (2nd Lt.)

### SERGEANTS

\*Boltman, Harold L.  
Brown, Clarence O.  
Chesterfield, George M.  
Devin, Harry E.  
Dozier, Homer C.  
Feiner, George W.  
Ferguson, Robert H.  
(Gassed)  
Fisher, Frank

Hare, Harvey E.  
Hibbs, Howard L.  
Meador, Robert F.  
Myers, James L.  
Richards, Robert Lloyd  
Ruttinger, Frank B.  
Shreck, Boyd R.  
Uhlenhop, Ludolph H.  
Weeks, Mark L.

### CHIEF MECHANICS

Becker, Lawrence F.  
\*Branch, Montie B.

\*Frothingham, Alfred M.  
Vickery, Frank

### CORPORALS

Allen, Marvin E.  
(Left Sick in Brest)  
\*Banholzer, Clarence C. (2nd Lt.)  
\*Barwick, Walter W.  
Beckett, William G.  
Chilson, Clyde C.  
(Gassed. Died in Hospital)  
Clark, Floyd H.  
(Gassed)  
Davis, Hobart H.  
Dietrick, Harold C.  
English, Frank  
\*Fosdick, Beauford Y.  
Frazier, Walter S.  
Freitag, Walter R.  
Gile, Clifford  
Hanna, Raymond J.  
Hartner, Wm. D.  
Howard, Jack  
Hyatt, Joseph R.  
Jennings, John H.  
Key, Glenn J.  
Ledgerwood, John

Linman, Oscar  
Love, James O.  
(Gassed. Died in Hospital)  
Lucas, James O.  
MacDonald, Donald E.  
\*McDonald, Harry W.  
Miller, Jacob A.  
Nelson, Joe  
O'Dell, George W.  
Payne, Melchior B.  
Pillow, James H.  
(Wounded in Action)  
\*Ranson, John W.  
Riley, Augustus M.  
Roesler, Ray G.  
Sanstra, Edward L.  
Sanstra, Jesse F.  
Sawtell, Hobart C.  
Scott, Fred A.  
Sudberry, Bonner H.  
Troutman, Harry  
Wooldridge, Glen F.  
Worster, Joseph R.  
\*Young, Cogshall C.

PRIVATES

- Ahearn, Edward F.  
 \*Akers, Charles A.  
 Allmond, Sidney A.  
 Anderson, Fred C.  
 Armbruster, Harry J.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Askins, Claude  
 \*Axtell, Hall  
 Balz, Alfred  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Banks, William J.  
     *(Died in France, L/D.)*  
 \*Bannister, William H.  
 Barber, Walter N.  
 Barnes, Harold L.  
 Beckett, Clinton E.  
 Bellman, George  
 \*Beltman, Harold L.  
 Bennett, Earl S.  
 Blackburn, Albert R.  
 Blewett, Ralph A.  
 Boggs, Thomas A.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Bohlken, Ed. M.  
 Bowden, Howard T.  
 Bowman, Wayne D.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Bradley, Delbert H.  
 Brown, Kibble J.  
 Brown, Patrick  
 Brown, William N.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 \*Bucklew, Charles E.  
 \*Bucklew, Lewis S.  
 Burnley, Boniface J.  
 Burns, John C.  
 Butler, John V.  
 Campbell, Alvin R.  
 \*Canine, George M.  
 Caron, Walter E.  
 Carrier, Harvey O.  
 Chichirillo, Sam  
     *(Died in France, Angers.  
     L/D.)*  
 Chipman, Jack H.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Clark, Van G.  
     *(Gassed. Died in Hospital)*  
 Coffey, James F.  
 Cohen, William H.  
 Coldsmith, Floyd F.  
 Cole, Morris R.  
 Cook, Alvin  
 \*Craggs, David W.  
 Curtin, John J.  
 Daley, Dennis T.  
 Daly, Edward J.  
 Darling, James W.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Davis, Lawrence E.  
 Deguire, William J.  
 Delaney, Harry A.  
 Devaney, John  
 Dillard, John W.  
 \*Donnelly, Edward  
 Dorsch, John G.  
 Doyle, Herndon C.  
 Drake, Carl A.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Dunderdale, William H.  
 \*Dunsworth, Walter C.  
 Dyer, Cleon L.  
 Dyer, Fred W.  
 \*Ellison, August B.  
 Emery, Herbert T.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Emory, Orville R.  
 Engel, Albert D.  
 \*Erb, Kennett D.  
 Erickson, Alfred J.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Fisher, Floyd E.  
 \*Flemming, Lawrence F.  
 Flexer, Earl J.  
 Flynn, Bernard J.  
 Foster, James A.  
 \*Fourmy, Albert Lacy  
 Fowler, Jesse W.  
     *(Died in France, L/D.)*  
 Fuller, Edwin J.  
 Fuller, George M.  
 Gagne, Ledore G.  
 Ganum, Paul V.  
 Garbish, Joseph  
 Gaudet, Timothy F.  
 Gauldin, Alvah C.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 \*Gautier, Pierre J.  
 \*Goldberg, Harry  
 Golino, Joseph  
 Goodman, William M.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Grass, Lawrence L.  
 Gray, Richard L.  
 Green, Edward L.  
 \*Greenstone, Norman

## PRIVATES—Continued

- Gregory, John J.  
 Griggs, James Harvey  
 Griggs, John S.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Hagerty, William J.  
 Haguewood, Spurgeon  
 Harmon, Phillip  
 \*Harris, George G.  
 \*Hart, Charles D.  
 Haupt, Robert F.  
 \*Heimbürger, George  
 Heller, Henry J.  
 \*Hereford, Francis W.  
 Herman, Raleigh A.  
 Hickman, Fred H.  
     *(Killed in Action)*  
 Hildebrand, Lawrence J.  
 Hilgardner, Fred C.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 \*Hill, Ernest  
 \*Hinchman, Edwin L.  
 Hinckley, Harold C.  
 \*Hirsch, Eugene  
 \*Hughes, David  
 Hutsell, Luther D.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Ingolia, Sam  
 \*Irwin, Henry P.  
 Jones, William  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Keil, William F.  
 Kendall, Harry  
     *(Killed in Action)*  
 Kircher, Joseph  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Kirchoff, Arthur L.  
 Kretzer, Elmer E.  
 Lang, Ray J.  
 Lee, Walter  
 \*Leitner, Frank  
 Lutz, William O.  
 \*McCauley, Lonnie W.  
 \*McGrath, Allman  
 McMonigle, Milton B.  
     *(Gassed. Died in France)*  
 Martin, Isaac N.  
 \*Martin, James E. (2nd Lt.)  
 Mathis, Thomas N.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Maxwell, Joseph F.  
 Meldrum, Henry  
     *(Died in France—Accident.  
     L/D.)*
- Merriman, William R.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Milam, Earl C.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Milam, Fred C.  
 Missey, Joseph J.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Mitchell, Harry M.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Montise, Frank  
     *(Gassed)*  
 \*Moody, Burley  
 \*Moore, Joseph E.  
 Moore, Silas S.  
 Moriarity, Leo M.  
 Morrison, Earl W.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Morrison, Robert V.  
 Munday, Corda A.  
     *(Killed in Action)*  
 Munday, Ramon L.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 \*Munday, Charles W.  
 \*Myers, Harry S.  
 Nichols, John E.  
     *(Gassed. Died in France)*  
 Noggle, Lawrence C.  
 Norris, Fred  
 North, Robert J.  
 \*Norton, Frank J.  
 \*Norton, Thomas R.  
 \*Null, Dennis M.  
 \*Oberkramer, Edw.  
 \*Olsen, Julius B.  
 Olson, Oxel Pete  
 Ostman, John F.  
 Parker, Milford F.  
 \*Parker, Thomas  
 Petrillo, Giovanni  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Pierce, Thomas J.  
 \*Plumb, Edward W.  
 Pottkamp, Rudolph  
 Power, Edmond  
 \*Poyea, George  
 \*Provencher, William A.  
 Rankin, Arthur B.  
 \*Reeves, Curtis O.  
 \*Rhea, Charles D.  
 \*Ridge, Joseph A.  
 \*Roberts, Charles C.  
 Robertson, Harry.  
     *(Gassed)*

PRIVATES—Continued

- \*Rodgers, Atwell
- \*Rose, Ben F.
- \*Rotermund, Frank
- Ruger, Fred J.  
(*Wounded in Action*)
- Sands, John V.
- Scott, Vol
- \*Scrivner, Errett P.
- \*Sechrist, Floyd H.
- \*Selkirk, Benjamin J.
- Shairrick, Joseph S.  
(*Gassed*)
- Shanklin, William N.
- Sherman, Benjamin E.
- Shipley, Burd
- Short, Marvin
- Sifford, Thomas A.
- Singer, Walter T.
- Smith, Francis C.
- Smith, Frank T.  
(*Gassed*)
- \*Smith, Ralph J.
- Smith, Sam W.  
(*Gassed*)
- \*Sparks, Louis J.
- \*Sparks, Paul H.
- Sprinkle, Mack C.
- Stacks, Louis Edward
- Stafford, Logan
- Stevens, Locksley R.
- Stewart, Elza L.
- \*Stone, Boyd
- \*Stout, Jasper E.
- \*Stroud, Von D.
- Stuart, Will H.
- Sullivan, John F.
- \*Sutton, Etsel C.
- Swearingen, Harley E.
- Swiggett, William H.
- Talley, Roy B.  
(*Gassed*)
- Tarbutton, John W.
- Tate, Earl
- \*Taylor, Joy O.
- Taylor, Leo
- Taylor, William W.  
(*Gassed*)
- Terry, Henry M.
- Tilly, Lawrence C.  
(*Gassed*)
- Timmons, Alfred E.
- Thompson, John D.
- Tomlinson, Thomas V.
- Truehitt, William E.
- Tuck, Clyde E.  
(*Gassed*)
- Tucker, Horace  
(*Gassed and wounded. Died in U. S., Dec., 1919*)
- Turner, Robert Henry  
(*Killed in Action*)
- Tutcher, Emmett  
(*Gassed*)
- Van Zandt, Pierce W.  
(*Wounded in Action*)
- Vinson, Lottie
- \*Ward, William R. (2nd Lt.)
- \*Warford, Charles P.
- Watson, Melvin G.
- \*Watters, Eugene
- Welsh, Leo
- Wildt, Nickedemus  
(*Gassed*)
- Wilkinson, Archie C.
- \*Wilson, James A.
- Wilson, William A.
- \*Wolff, Charles H.
- \*Wood, Jerome K.
- \*Worden, John J.
- Wyrick, William A.
- Yancey, Paul W.
- York, Allen A.
- Zavlanes, Tony Z.  
(*Gassed*)
- Zetzman, John M.

## C BATTERY

## CAPTAINS

Sermon, Roger T.  
 \*Boyer, Harry M.

Marks, Theodore

## FIRST SERGEANTS

Aspinwall, Vernie L.

Searcy, Roy M.

## SERGEANTS

Anderson, Otto F.  
 Bell, Warren H.  
 Brown, Ira L.  
 Carter, Robert C.  
 Chambliss, William J.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 \*Coady, Michael  
 Crocker, Carl  
 Cushwa, Clay  
 Ford, Tirey J.  
     *(Killed in Action)*  
 Gilmore, Lloyd  
 Hall, Edward  
 Jackson, Joseph O.  
 Jones, Roy W.

\*Knight, Arthur  
 Lippman, Morris M.  
 McDonald, Webster C.  
 \*Martin, Asa  
 O'Neill, Harry C.  
 \*Pearson, Jack  
 Rice, Guy N.  
 Robey, Rolla G.  
 Ross, Edward B.  
 \*Rudd, Francis V. (2nd Lt.)  
 Sands, Irving H.  
 \*Tindall, Frank E.  
 Williams, Victor E.  
 Yankee, Compton

## CHIEF MECHANICS

Bellew, Thomas

Farrow, George R.

## CORPORALS

Agee, Jesse H.  
 Alderman, William A.  
 Bell, Arthur H.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Burnham, Edward A.  
 Byars, James T.  
 Cook, Earl H.  
 \*Courtland, Mack C.  
 Crayton, Earl C.  
 Delafield, Floyd D.  
 Duff, Arnold J.  
 Farrington, Buford E.  
 Funke, August F.  
 \*Hamilton, Ernest L.  
 Hedges, William D.  
 Huck, Louis A.  
 Johnson, William R.  
 Judkins, James R.  
 Kyle, Ralph B.  
     *(Killed in Action)*  
 Lanham, Raymond F.  
 Linnenbringer, Oliver  
 McFarland, Gilbert F.

McGinnis, Owen  
 Martin, Emile L.  
 Moore, John E. L.  
 Niemann, William H.  
 Penland, James N.  
 Peoppelmeyer, Ernest A.  
 Pfefferkorn, Leo J.  
 Roberts, Ernest W.  
 Sams, D. Milford  
 Sanders, Otis R.  
 Sands, Maynard M.  
 Shepperd, Oscar  
 \*Shook, Robert E. (2nd Lt.)  
 Shrock, Keith P.  
 Sibole, William L.  
 Slusher, Arnold F.  
 Smith, George A.  
 Street, Arthur R.  
 Truesdale, Hugh A.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Walters, William C.  
 Wilkes, Robert L.  
 Winton, James F.

PRIVATES

- Alley, Perry O.  
 \*Augustin, Ferdinand  
 \*Azar, Richard  
 \*Bach, Henry  
 Bailey, Orbie L.  
 \*Bacon, George H.  
 Banman, Alvin K.  
 Bazzill, Harry C.  
 Beavers, Lester F.  
 Bell, John H., Jr.  
 Bergner, Tony A.  
 Bittle, Fred W.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Boyd, Thomas W.  
 Brady, Otis R.  
 Brasher, Jesse O.  
 Brown, Charles E.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 \*Carmichael, Edgar M.  
 Cleveland, Willard  
 \*Collins, James R.  
 Cook, Ralph H.  
 Davenport, Charles B.  
 Dehoney, Clarence D.  
 Doherty, Earl  
 \*Doty, Roy  
 Duncan, Frank  
 \*Durrett, Pearl Bernard  
 Dwyer, James  
 \*Edmondson, Leonard K.  
 Ellis, Gilbert  
 Everett, Newell  
 Farrow, Harry  
 Farrow, Jesse H.  
 Ferrill, Lloyd  
 Fisher, Martin L.  
 Ford, Dorrell L.  
 Fraas, Frank X.  
     *(Died from wounds in Action)*  
 Fulton, Selmo (D. S. C.)  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Garrett, Fred  
 Gault, Edom A.  
 Gersic, John A.  
     *(Killed in Action)*  
 \*Gibson, John W., Jr.  
 Gorsuch, Leon M.  
 Hamrick, Dennis R.  
 Harrington, Edd.  
 Harrison, Ellsworth L.  
 \*Hauska, Frank  
 Haven, Henry H.  
 Haycraft, Emmett S.  
 Heard, Edward C.  
 \*Hempfen, Clarence H.  
 \*Hostuttler, Jno. E.  
 Huckshold Wm. F.  
 Huddleston, Joseph  
 Hughes, Alfred W.  
 \*Humphreys, Bert C.  
 Hurst, John Henry  
 Hurst, Willie  
 Isaac, Allen  
 Isom, James N.  
 James, Lebert  
 Jansa, Lewis  
 Jarrel, Goldie H.  
 Jarvis, Robert L.  
 Johnson, Edd L.  
 Johnson, Preston  
 Johnson, Sam  
 Jones, Jesse Everett  
 \*Jupp, Charles C.  
 Kadera, Frank  
 \*Kasal, Victor  
 Kennedy, Thomas F.  
 Ketchum, Calvin W.  
 Kiefer, Adam H.  
 Kilkenny, John J.  
 Kincaid, Albert C.  
 King, Walter B.  
 \*Kittle, Edgar  
 Kluge, Loomis L.  
 Kraft, Howard R.  
 \*Lamberton, James F.  
 Lane, Lester A.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Lattray, Louis A.  
 Lawhon, William Dave  
 \*Lee, Elmore S.  
 Lester, Joseph O.  
 Linck, Edwin F.  
 \*Loback, Chester B.  
 Loper, Kebby C.  
 Love, Terrence N.  
 \*Lowe, Floyd R.  
 Loyd, Robert S.  
 Lucas, Philip G.  
 Luckett, James E.  
 Lynn, Harley E.  
 \*McInturff, Eugene  
 Macon, John H.  
 Malbaff, Joseph  
 Marlow, Joshua D.  
 Martin, Charles E.



## PRIVATES—Continued

- Martin, Paul H.  
 Massie, Claude H.  
 \*Matthews, Roy Y.  
 Maurer, Thomas R.  
 Mayfield, Robert K.  
     *(Killed in Action)*  
 Melton, Leroy  
 Mengwasser, Herman U.  
 Michlovitz, Simon  
 Mills, Harry H.  
 Moberly, Stanley F.  
 Molz, Wm. J.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Moore, Abner  
 Moore, Clarence H.  
 \*Morrison, Raymond  
 Moxon, Oscar O.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 \*Murphy, Melvin J,  
     Nave, Thad  
     Newton, George H.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Owings, Ernest D.  
 Owings, Walter H.  
 Parker, Alma L.  
 Pearce, James T.  
 Penning, Carl A.  
 Phelps, Edward F.  
     *(Died in France, L/D.)*  
 Porter, Ermon A.  
 Potillo, Sam  
 Powers, John H.  
 Potts, Clement J.  
 \*Prendergast, George E.  
 \*Prendergast, Jeff  
 \*Pruitt, Ernest W.  
     Ralls, James E.  
 \*Ramm, Ferdinand  
 Rapp, Arthur G.  
 Rauch, Geo. L.  
 Reddick, Asa  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Reheisse, Frank J.  
 Rice, Chester A.
- Rice, Martin D.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Robey, Wm. M.  
     *(Gassed)*  
 Rose, Edward W.  
 Rummell, Herbert F.  
 Ryan, Richard R.  
 St. Clair, Joseph H.  
 Sappenfield, Felix G.  
 \*Schultz, Ferdinand F.  
 Sheets, Earl A.  
 Siebert, Louis  
 Smith, Jesse R.  
 Smith, Roy A.  
 Smitson, David H.  
 Solonowsky, Sam  
 \*Spradley, Chas. A.  
 Stamback, Lon F.  
 \*Steel, Lawrence R.  
 \*Sterritt, Anthony B.  
 Stewart, John  
 Sullivan, McKinley  
 Sumpter, Clarence  
 Sweet, Wm. H.  
 \*Temple, Orta  
     Throtyear, L. Dee  
     *(Gassed. Died in U. S. from effects)*  
 \*Tousley, Melvin L.  
 Vaughn, Hugh W.  
 Walker, George B.  
 \*Weare, Wm. W.  
 \*Webb, Wm. G.  
     Wehner, Arthur J.  
     Welch, Harold W.  
     Westwood, David H.  
     White, Lafayette D.  
     Wilguess, Louis M.  
 \*Winton, George M.  
 \*Winton, Wm. C.  
     Wood, Herman  
     Wood, James L.  
     Wood, Ralph  
     Wyatt, Hershel

## D BATTERY

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### CAPTAINS

\*Allen, Charles B.  
\*Ritter, Rollin

Thacher, John H.  
Truman, Harry S.

### FIRST SERGEANTS

Bowman, Frederick  
Chaney, Verne E.  
Eggleston, Giles L.

Wooldridge, Glen F.  
Sieben, Paul T.

### SERGEANTS

Bell, Arthur H.  
\*Bowman, Harold J.  
Carnie, John M.  
Brice, George F.  
Doherty, James J.  
Hamma, Carl A.  
\*Downey, Godfrey C. (2d Lt.)  
Heillman, Lee A.  
Keenan, Leo P.  
*(Died in France, L/D.)*  
Kelley, Harry M.  
\*Junior, Fred E. (2nd Lt.)  
Logan, James P.  
McKim, Edward D.

Meisburger, Edward P.  
Menefee, Walter B.  
Murphy, Thos. E.  
Sandifer, Edward L.  
Schmidt, Fred J.  
Thacker, Ralph  
\*Taylor, Thomas L.  
Tierney, Wm. F.  
Werner, Carl  
Wickline, Elmer E.  
*(Died in France, L/D.)*  
Wimmers, Joseph A.  
Young, Ernest B.

### CHIEF MECHANICS

Wooden, McKinley

Becker, Lawrence F.

### CORPORALS

Brown, John W.  
Chamblee, Cleo  
Coyle, Joseph F.  
*(Wounded in Action)*  
Cunningham, Fred C.  
Donnelly, Eugene P.  
Gadwood, James W.  
Gordon, John L.  
\*Groff, Harry G.  
Hardy, George A.  
\*Hart, Dennis C. M.  
Hoffman, Frank G.  
Jeserich, Emil  
Joyce, Robert E.  
King, Ray  
Lavery, Joseph L.  
Leming, Daniel B.  
McCarty, Harry A.  
McGowan, Francis G.

McNamara, James T.  
McRae, Marion S.  
Milton, Donald L.  
Murphy, Harry E.  
O'Hare, Wm. A.  
Rielly, Carl J.  
Robinson, Wallace A.  
\*Rodgers, John G.  
Sampson, Clifton J.  
Schmidt, Ernest L.  
Schmitt, Edward H.  
Smith, Curtis C.  
\*Stanley, Frank (2nd Lt.)  
Stewart, Walter K.  
Stuart, Edw. V.  
\*Weidenmann, Fred J.  
Wilkinson, Wm. J.  
Woods, Glenn B.

## PRIVATES

- Allcock, Omer L.  
 Allen, James Robert  
 Anderson, Adolph F.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Anderson, James M.  
 Andrews, James W.  
 \*Argenbright, Jesse B.  
 Baker, Harold A.  
 Baker, Roy W.  
 Banning, Roland R.  
 \*Bates, Frank  
 Baum, George R.  
 Bebee, Joseph A.  
 Beene, Alfred L.  
 \*Begley, Edward  
 Bergman, John A.  
 \*Berry, Harold  
 Bingham, Stetson T.  
 Blankemeier, Chas. F.  
 Blount, Charles R.  
 Boggs, Grover C.  
 \*Bollin, Frank J.  
 \*Bonner, Patrick L.  
 Booth, Joseph L.  
 Borrer, James L.  
 Boyle, Charles M.  
 Braddy, Elias L.  
 Bradshaw, Erwin J.  
 Brannon, Francis A.  
 \*Bray, Lauren E.  
 Breen, William H.  
 Bridges, David A.  
 Brooks, Gentry W.  
 \*Bryan, Joseph  
 \*Bryant, Mitchel  
 Bullington, Frank L.  
 Burdge, Charles L.  
 Burgin, Fritz E.  
 Campbell, William B.  
 Carlson, Hilding H.  
 Carver, Oad D.  
 Casey, James E.  
 \*Casey, Patrick E.  
 Christensen, Christen S.  
 Conboy, Francis L.  
     *(Died in France, L/D.)*  
 Condon, Edward V.  
 Conway, James B.  
 Curto, John P.  
 Dabner, Harry J.  
     *(Died in France, L/D.)*  
 Dailey, Keenan J. B.  
 Dantzig, Samuel  
 \*Dobel, Riley E.  
 \*Dobson, Horace R.  
 Duren, Robert L.  
 Edelman, Lawrence H.  
 Edwards, Thomas C.  
 Evans, Milton R.  
 Farrow, Earl W.  
 Febro, Joe  
 Flaherty, Daniel L.  
 \*Flannigan, Joseph D.  
 Flint, Ray  
 \*Fort, Wm. H.  
 Fowler, Alonzo F.  
 \*French, Schuyler  
 Gadbury, Charles  
 Gaines, Henry F.  
 Garrett, John W.  
 Gent, Leo J.  
 Gibbs, Chester E.  
 \*Gladstone, Abraham M.  
 Goosey, Orrie B.  
 Grady, John J.  
 Hall, John B.  
 \*Hampton, Woodie L.  
 Hedrick, Julian B.  
 Higinbotham, John J.  
 \*Holmes, Mosie M.  
 \*Howard, Thomas M.  
 Hughes, Robert E.  
 Hutchins, Glynn H.  
 \*Jackson, Everest E.  
 James, Charles R.  
 \*Jameson, Frank H.  
 Janda, John N.  
 \*Jann, Victor  
 Jarrell, James Milton  
 Jeffers, Jack A.  
 Kelly, Genaro  
 \*Knight, Winfred E.  
 Kramer, Stephen G.  
 \*Kuhlmann, Wm. H.  
 Kunz, Frank J.  
 \*Kwast, Herman J.  
 LaMaster, Emmet D.  
 Leeman, Earl  
 Leigh, Vere C.  
 Leiss, Daniel R.  
 Liebnitz, Paul W.  
 Lucas, Lucien L.  
 McCarty, William H.  
 McClung, William W.  
 McConnell, Harry T.  
 McDonald, Fred H.

PRIVATEs—Continued

- McDonald, Thomas F.  
 McKay, Chester  
 Malmfeldt, Theo. J.  
 \*Maloney, Timothy V.  
 Maret, Charles B.  
 Maxey, Barney  
 \*Maynard, Jack W.  
 Maynard, Russell B.  
 Messmer, James  
 Meyers, Morris  
 Montague, Elmer C.  
 Moore, Ralph W.  
 Moore, Wm. A.  
 Mutschler, Robert L.  
 Naulty, John T.  
 Nease, Hilbert H.  
 Nielson, Lars M.  
 \*Nix, Edwin T.  
 \*Nuckles, Kent B.  
 \*Oberndorff, August  
 O'Hare, Thos. F.  
 \*Page, Clarence L.  
 Parent, Ovila  
 Parkins, Ralph J.  
 \*Pauly, Frank B.  
 Pendency, John W.  
 Percintina, Roy  
 Peschen, Harold F.  
 Phillips, Lonnie L.  
 Pierce, Lenord  
 \*Poole, Eugene H.  
 Pratt, Harry G.  
 \*Reule, John E.  
 Ricketts, Floyd T.  
 Ridge, Albert A.  
 Riley, John H.  
 Rogers, Leroy T.  
 Rogerson, Wm. J.  
 (*Hosp. in France, L/D.*  
*Died on ship, Feb. 11,*  
*1919.)*  
 \*Roller, Guy Ira  
 Ross, Albert D.  
 Rupple, Andrew P.  
 Sain, Frank J.  
 Sargert, Frank  
 Schoellkopf, Louis C.  
 Schrader, Harry J.  
 Schweering, Ernest H.  
 \*Schweizer, Wm. W.  
 Seaman, Richard W. Jr.  
 Shaffer, Daniel L.  
 Shea, Mike  
 \*Sherlock, Jos. W.  
 Sherman, Leon H.  
 Shine, Patrick  
 Smith, Chester E.  
 Smith, Raymond J.  
 \*South, Reed  
 Spencer, Charles L.  
 \*Spencer, John R.  
 Spina, Frank E.  
 Stackley, Geo. W.  
 \*Stanley, Albert D.  
 Statzel, Daniel S.  
 Stephenson, Adelbert  
 Stewart, Robert R.  
 \*Stricker, John  
 Taylor, Ralph W.  
 Thacker, Daniel R.  
 Thornhill, Byron E.  
 Toy, William G.  
 Trotter, Oliver L.  
 \*Uehlie, Walter B.  
 Uncles, John J.  
 (*Sent to West Point*)  
 VanBuskirk, Earl A.  
 VanHaverbeke, Alfons L.  
 Vaught, Louis C.  
 Walleggham, Joseph R.  
 Walthall, Elmer  
 Walton, James T.  
 West, Harold A.  
 Whited, Paul T.  
 Whitney, Harry E.  
 \*Williams, Dwight L.  
 Wise, Leo O.  
 Woods, Geo. P.  
 Woods, Sylvester E.  
 Yeager, Francis D.  
 Younker, Frederick L.

# E BATTERY

## CAPTAINS

Salisbury, Spencer

Bostian, Kenneth V.  
(1st Lt. Com'd'g.)

## FIRST SERGEANTS

Cameron, Wallace

\*Lynch, Joseph J.

## SERGEANTS

Bowles, Vincent M.  
(*Killed in Action*)  
Carroll, Edwin S.  
Cleveland, William J.  
Cook, Robert P.  
Dunn, Wm. C., Jr.  
Guard, Frank K.  
Jeffress, Joseph L.  
Johnson, Rolly  
Kaplan, Max  
Lubert, Wm. H.

McClure, Herbert C. (D. S. C.)  
(*Wounded in Action*)  
\*McCormick, William F.  
Morgan, Roy C.  
Prussing, Max M.  
\*Schenk, George H.  
Soapes, Fred L.  
Sollars, Eugene K.  
Sturges, Harry A.  
Thomas, Charles  
Van Smith, Herbert C.  
Young, William C.

## CHIEF MECHANICS

Martinek, Harley L.  
Mack Karr, Jack

Schlie, Arnold F.

## CORPORALS

Barrett, John W.  
Bowen, Ralph E.  
Cantoni, Edward J.  
(*Killed in Action*)  
Coughlin, John L.  
\*Davis, Thomas  
Deibel, Charles  
Ellman, Harold J.  
Enger, Edwin A.  
Glynn, Charles W.  
Hardin, Elmer R.  
Henson, Frenche  
Hokanson, Harold B.  
Humphrey, Lee M.  
Hymes, James E.  
Ivy, Charles N.  
Johnson, Ward C.  
\*Knight, Rufus W.  
Jones, Roy H.  
\*Lewright, Harold L.  
Liebi, Christian

Louderback, Frank D.  
Maret, Carl G.  
\*Miles, Arthur R.  
Moyer, Lester W.  
Nimmo, William S.  
Radmal, Marlan G.  
Ragan, William E.  
(*Wounded in Action*)  
Raymond, Harry  
Raymond, Homer N.  
Sommers, George C.  
Stewart, Byron E.  
(*Wounded in Action*)  
Stoneking, Clark L.  
Strickler, Harry G.  
Wallace, Jefferson D.  
Wilhelm, Leslie D.  
Workman, John L.  
Wrzeciona, August A.  
Young, Joseph A.

PRIVATES

Adams, Walter  
 Alliett, Charles  
 Andre, George W.  
 \*Armstrong, William J.  
 \*Arnold, Benjamin F.  
 \*Balin, Chas. J.  
 Basham, Earnest L.  
 \*Beck, Lee  
 Bedford, Charles E.  
 \*Bell, Albert  
 Bloom, John  
 \*Boner, Elliott H.  
 Brenner, Louis M.  
 \*Brizendine, Lanie  
 Brown, Nuburn S.  
 \*Bryant, George E.  
 Bullinger, Otto  
 \*Burch, Ernest L.  
 Burdick, Benjamin E.  
 Burkhardt, James A.  
 \*Bush, Jess J.  
 Campbell, Thomas A.  
 \*Ceranich, Bosko  
 \*Chastine, George A.  
 Clasby, George  
 Cochran, Thomas C.  
 \*Connolly, Charles C.  
 \*Cooley, Charles F., Jr.  
 Conway, Orville  
 \*Couch, Elmer A.  
 Cox, Herbert E.  
 Crawford, Melvin  
 Crump, Howard M.  
 Curtis, Will O.  
 Dailey, Orval J.  
 Daily, Quincy E.  
 \*Danner, Homer  
 \*Davis, Joseph  
 Day, Frederick E.  
 \*Demeke, Clarence E.  
 \*Dunkin, Wm. L.  
 Earl, Arnold  
 \*Edwards, Claude  
 \*Ehrman, Karl  
 \*Emery, Sam  
 England, Sofe L.  
 Erikson, Gus  
 \*Evans, Grover C.  
 Fay, John J.  
 Ferguson, Willard L.  
 Fillingin, Leslie T.  
 Firkenhoff, Fred A.  
 Fleming, Earl M.

Flournoy, Spurgeon  
 \*Foss, Earl F.  
 Frakes, William J. B.  
 \*Fuerst, Louis H.  
 \*Gachich, Risto S.  
 Gamble, Jess  
 (*Killed by Accident in  
 Saulxures, L/D.*)  
 Gard, George  
 \*Gilchrist, William A.  
 Giles, Richard M.  
 Gillispie, Clarence R.  
 Gingrich, William A.  
 \*Gladish, Harry E.  
 Gossett, Walter  
 (*Gassed*)  
 \*Gower, Floyd M.  
 \*Graves, Leonard F.  
 Greer, Wm. F.  
 Grelle, Ernest A.  
 Griffin, Dan E.  
 Grutzmacher, Willie M.  
 \*Guess, Robt. H.  
 Hale, George W.  
 Hall, Howard W.  
 Hamby, Finis H.  
 Hamby, George W.  
 Hammontree, Howard M.  
 \*Hanover, Ross M.  
 Hanson, Walter  
 Harris, William J.  
 Hart, Lee A.  
 Hary, Clemens M.  
 Hatfield, Travis K.  
 Hawkins, Gailyard  
 Hayes, Lee Arthur  
 Hennig, Arthur C.  
 Hight, Homer  
 Higinbotham, Warren S.  
 \*Hill, Joe  
 \*Hillstade, Fred  
 Hines, Fred Matthew  
 Hoffman, Geo. A.  
 \*Hogan, Alfred D.  
 Huber, George R.  
 Huff, Grover A.  
 Hughes, Richard Bland  
 \*Hutchinson, John B.  
 Jacobs, Floyd A.  
 Jeffries, Albert  
 Jenkins, Walton P.  
 Jimason, Oscar L.  
 Johnson, Charles H.

## PRIVATES—Continued

- \*Johnson, James E.
- \*Jones, Edward
- Jones, Joseph
- (*Wounded in Action*)
- \*Jones, William A.
- \*Junge, Frederick A.
- Kadora, Aziz
- \*Kaplan, Robert
- Kehoe, Martin B.
- \*Kilgore, Jess
- \*Kinch, Rolland D.
- Kinneman, Clarence E.
- Klotz, Dewey
- \*Krispin, Phillip
- \*Lacey, Thomas C.
- Lafferty, Gilbert D.
- Lasley, Floyd
- Lassister, Waldon H.
- \*Leahy, Dan
- \*Longsworth, Luther E.
- Lutjen, Samuel J.
- McClung, Luther M.
- \*McComas, Harry
- \*McDonald, Fred L.
- McDonald, Robert Roy
- McGinty, Archibald
- McInvale, John C.
- McMinn, Grover C.
- McNamara, William T.
- \*McPherson, Scott
- Maloney, Joseph
- Maness, Carl T.
- Martin, Carl
- \*Martin, Thos J.
- Miller, Chas. N. J.
- Molles, Sam
- Monroe, Robert L.
- Moon, Thomas J.
- Moss, Elmer L.
- Moss, Nessel
- Mosse, Samuel
- Munson, Joseph W.
- (*Wounded in Action*)
- Myers, William H.
- Nadow, Thomas L.
- \*Nichols, Chas. A.
- Nixon, Harry M.
- Noakes, Elmer
- Nobles, Walter
- Nokes, Eugene T.
- Norman, Robert Lee
- Nowotny, Alex
- Oliver, Alonzo
- Ollin, Auva C.
- O'Neill, Frank J.
- Overbey, Claud R.
- Page, Harold R.
- \*Palmer, Albert O.
- Farmer, Cecil H.
- Farmer, Howard J.
- \*Parker, Robert B.
- Pemberton, Chas. H.
- Pemberton, Jeff D.
- Perdue, Wallace
- \*Perry, Leroy
- Peterson, Arthur W.
- Petree, Marvin
- \*Pettit, Elmer
- \*Poldan, John
- Pope, Edward
- Pounders, Phillip P.
- Putcheski, John J.
- Raub, Paul M.
- \*Reed, Walter
- Reed, Earl C.
- \*Reeves, Charles R.
- Reynolds, Paul F.
- Riddle, Grover C.
- Robinson, Joseph H.
- \*Robinson, Lawrence R.
- \*Rodgers, Claude
- \*Rogers, Milton
- Rogers, Raymond R.
- \*Roof, Walter M.
- Sandifer, Edw. L.
- \*Schuppman, Chas. A.
- Sisco, Riley
- Smith, William Herbert
- Smith, William P.
- Smith, Zenas E.
- Souder, Elmer L.
- South, John M.
- Sprenkel, Sam L.
- Stevens, William E.
- \*Stewart, George
- \*Stinnett, Edward S.
- Stone, Winnice E.
- Strachan, Wm. D.
- \*Stratton, Jesse L.
- \*Sturges, Ralph A.
- Terrill, James S.
- \*Tevis, Paul
- Thiele, Reuben E.
- \*Thompson, Vernon N.
- Tivy, John B.
- \*Toohey, Hollis
- Trogdon, Daniel C.

PRIVATES—Continued

Tucker, Roy L.	*Whitley, Jacob R.
Unkefer, Homer L.	Whiteley, Clyde L.
*Verch, John	Whitman, Leslie R.
Voris, Charles D.	*Whitt, Arthur M.
Wallace, Victor F.	( <i>Died in U. S., L/D.</i> )
*Walls, Russell A.	*Williams, Harry
Warner, William	*Wimmer, Tom
*Watkins, John	*Woodring, Henry H.
*Welch, George O.	Wrzeciona, Alphonso B.
Weller, Carl E.	( <i>Died of Wounds in Action</i> )
Wheeler, Lawson G.	*York, Buford J.
*White, Wiley	Youngman, Bruce



## F BATTERY

## CAPTAIN

Allen, Harry B.

## FIRST SERGEANTS

Dickinson, Cedric M.

McCabe, George H.

Warren, Henri L. (1st Lt.)

Housley, Gilbert O.

\*Smith, Ruskin A. (2nd Lt.)

(Gassed)

## SERGEANTS

Brock, Charles E.

Moore, Charles F.

Buchanan, Grover C.

\*Page, Florian

Caleb, Phillip I.

Richeson, Louis H.

Campbell, Bruce K.

Seifert, Frank Louis

Duvall, Harold

Snodgrass, Thomas F.

Gabelman, Fred Jr.

Springer, William B.

Harvey, Leo E.

Sturdy, Orvis A.

\*Hubler, Charles P.

Swartz, Milton E.

Jacobson, Edward

Talbot, Jack

Jennings, Edwin S.

\*Thayer, Norton (2nd Lt.)

\*Johnson, Harry W.

Winfrey, Guy M.

Klemme, Whelan W.

Young, Eugene L.

\*Miller, James B. (1st Lt.)

## CORPORALS

Adams, Hollie

Henry, Joe C.

*(Wounded in Action)*

Holder, Cam R.

Baldwin, Charles A.

Hook, James F.

Barnes, Murle C.

Irish, Fred F.

Beaven, Joseph A.

Jeffries, Chas. R.

Beck, Clyde O.

Kamm, Karl B.

Berry, Francis X.

Kobs, Adolph J.

*(Gassed)*

Mandl, Frank J.

\*Broadus, John A. (2nd Lt.)

Moore, Hugh C.

Brockfeld, Rudolph

Morgan, Harold N.

Blewett, Ralph A.

Parkerson, Harvey L.

Carter, Robert L.

Pearson, Henry B.

\*Chauvin, Chas. B.

Robinson, Earl R.

Chinn, Burton E.

Sain, Frank J.

\*Clegg, Arlington L.

Schwartzberg, Harry

Dowell, Ora A.

Sennewald, Ferd. W.

Downs, Elbert D.

Smith, David J.

Dulin, Amiel Louis

Smith, Elza C.

Earnheart, Harry I.

Smith, Michael J.

Elliott, Joseph B.

Stolle, William M.

Farris, Fred A.

Watson, Leon

Fleming, Richard Jr.

Wells, Guy C.

Griffith, Rolland J.

White, Joe H.

Hancock, Murray J.

Wiggins, Roy W.

Haseman, Otto F.

## CHIEF MECHANIC.

Wolfe, Charles W.

## PRIVATEES

Ackerman, John

Armstrong, Earll J.

Althaus, William A.

\*Arrowsmith, Wendell C. (2d

Anderson, Earl M.

Lt.)

## PRIVATES—Continued

- Barnett, Robert  
 Barrett, James I.  
 \*Bayer, Otto  
 \*Beal, Bruce A.  
 \*Bell, Thos. L. D.  
 Benson, Ernest H.  
 Bigus, Isadore L.  
 Binkley, Otto  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Blair, Frank O.  
 Bornemann, Fred  
 \*Bosworth, Jos. W.  
 Bradley, Frank T.  
 Brannan, Joseph J.  
 Breihan, Arthur W.  
     *(Killed in Action)*  
 Brickey, John  
 Brown, Daniel C.  
 Brown, Robert Lee  
 Buchrucker, Fred C., Jr.  
 Burgess, Ralph  
 Burkhart, Walter L.  
 Butler, Francis  
 Byer, Joe F.  
 \*Card, Zara C.  
 \*Carder, Clem C.  
 Carley, Charles W.  
 Carley, George W.  
 \*Carter, Cecil H.  
 \*Cibula, Jake J.  
 \*Clay, Frank  
 Clay, Louis M.  
 Collins, Charles A.  
 \*Creed, Robt.  
 Cronemeyer, Frederick E.  
 Debaene, Alois  
 DeBoever, Fred  
 DeBragga, John J.  
 Denni, Harry  
 Deshazer, Elmer S.  
 Dick, Alvah A.  
 \*Dimond, Theodore W.  
 \*Disselhoff, Willie  
 \*Dudacs, John  
 \*Dugal, Joseph A.  
 Dugas, Edwin  
 Dull, Russell C.  
 \*Dunk, Howard E.  
 Dusky, Jack R.  
 Edwards, Fred J.  
 Egan, James  
 Elam, Joe C.  
     *(Died in France, L/D.)*
- \*Ellenburg, Ernest F.  
 Esley, Walter  
 Ferrell, John D.  
 Fink, Joseph  
 \*Fitzpatrick, Clement  
 Foltz, Frank  
 Franke, Charles A.  
 Fulton, Edd  
 Garten, Carl T.  
 \*Gass, Claud Alva  
 Gatto, Michael E.  
 Giblin, Edward J.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Gillette, Wm. H.  
 Green, Harry  
 Guedry, Charles A.  
 Hackinsky, Stanley M.  
 Hackley, Porter L.  
 \*Hall, Benjamin F.  
     *(Accidentally Wounded,  
     L/D.)*  
 \*Hamlin, Frank M.  
 Hancock, Leslie  
 Harding, William V.  
 Harland, Frank G.  
 Harp, Carl E.  
 Harper, Charles E.  
 Harris, William H.  
 \*Hartmann, August J. W.  
 Hendrickson, Evar  
 \*Henley, Michael A.  
 Herrling, Carl M.  
 Herzog, Louis H.  
 Hibbert, Chester A.  
 Hightower, Charles M.  
 Hoffman, Jake  
 Hood, Willie Lincoln  
 Horigan, Joseph D.  
 Hunn, Troy O.  
 \*Jacobs, Eugene  
 \*Johnson, Adolph  
 \*Jones, Wiley S.  
 \*Jordan, David I.  
 Keith, Francis O.  
     *(Wounded in Action)*  
 Kern, Aloysius G.  
 \*Kopp, Henry M.  
 \*Landman, Raymond H.  
 Lang, Fred N.  
 \*Lang, Wm. F.  
 Long, Ray E.  
 \*Lucas, John I.  
 \*Luncford, James F.

## PRIVATES—Continued

- \*McAllan, John F.
- McCallum, Charles J.
- \*McDowell, Landis D. (2nd Lt.)
- McKenna, Robert J.
- \*McMurry, Charles R.
- Maddox, Edmon R.
- Mailen, James H.
- \*Mang, Carl C.
- Maybee, Bert E.
- \*Maybee, Lee H.
- \*Mikesell, Loy G.
- Milan, Wm. E.
- \*Miller, Harry
- \*Mohesky, Tony
- \*Montfort, Earl D.
- \*Mooney, W. Weldon
- Moore, Edwin W.
- Morrell, Joseph B.
- Murphy, John J.
- (*Wounded in Action*)
- Murray, Benjamin R.
- \*Newall, James A. A. L.
- Noonan, Allan S.
- \*Occhipinto, Dominico
- \*Otis, Thos. A.
- \*O'Toole, Michael
- Owen, James F.
- Parker, John L.
- Parker, Roy H.
- Pattison, James H.
- Paul, Russell B.
- Payne, Henry E.
- \*Pelphrey, William G.
- Pemberton, Raymond M.
- Perryman, Jack
- Pierce, Thomas J.
- Pinger, Hobart M.
- (*Wounded in Action*)
- Poore, Luther F.
- Powelson, Okla A.
- Prichard, Benjamin B.
- Procopio, Leo
- Pruitt, John S.
- Pryor, Roy E.
- Regan, Vester L.
- Rich, Robert J.
- \*Richter, George C.
- Riddle, William R.
- Rieves, James H.
- \*Salloom, Phillip
- \*Sanford, John R.
- Schoen, Carl H.
- \*Scott, Walter W.
- Sickel, John
- \*Sindel, Thomas F.
- Sirdoreus, Xilon
- Smith, George W.
- Smith, John L.
- Smith, Nathan O.
- Speirs, Sterling R.
- (*Wounded in Action*)
- Stearns, Morris L.
- \*Stone, Arthur L.
- Strode, John R.
- \*Stutenkemper, Herbert F.
- Sullivan, Richard H.
- Thiell, Rex F.
- Thomas, Donald R.
- Thompson, Wesley A.
- \*Trumbull, Ralph W.
- Ulrey, Ernest
- Ulrey, Henry L.
- \*Urick, Hoyt
- \*Vander Lippe, Paul F.
- VanLuchene, Rene
- Wachtel, Siegmund
- Wagner, Nicholas C.
- Wagner, William L.
- Warner, Francis S.
- Warriner, Homer W.
- \*Weber, Paul J.
- Welsh, Edmund B.
- (*Wounded in Action*)
- White, Clyde E.
- Williams, Dan F.
- \*Williams, Starkey L.
- (*Died in U. S., L/D.*)
- Williams, Wayne K.
- Williams, William E.
- Williamson, Joe B.
- Wilson, Barnett A.
- Wilson, Ben D.
- Wilson, Ellsworth W.
- (*Killed in Action*)
- \*Wilson, Edmund W.
- Wilson, Silas L.
- \*Wood, Earl N.
- Woods, James M.
- Woods, Samuel F.
- Wootten, H. Rieff
- Wright, Chandler P.
- (*Killed in Action*)
- \*Wright, John L.
- Wright, Macel
- Ziegelmeier, Peter
- Zimmerschied, Ardie E.
- (*Died in England En Route, L/D.*)

# SUPPLY COMPANY

## CAPTAIN

Jobs, Harry C.

## FIRST SERGEANTS

Cockrill, Norborn F.

Springer, Paul H.

## SERGEANTS

Breitenstein, Herbert W.  
\*Campbell, Phillip D.  
\*Cole, Joseph M.  
Davidson, Roy E.  
Fike, Austin W.  
McCullah, John W.

Morrow, Lewis Jackson  
Pendleton, Rice L.  
Schroeder, Walter  
Stevens, Earl A.  
Winkler, Lewis C.  
Yarrington, Alvah C.

## CORPORALS

Denton, Roger H.  
Hudelson, Gordon  
Mack Karr, Jack

Moots, Frank  
Olliges, Joseph J.  
Winters, Thomas M.

## PRIVATES

Adams, John Quincy  
Ahlmeier, Henry J.  
Allen, Perry O.  
Allen, Wm. C.  
Baker, Jacob  
Blunk, Clarence O.  
\*Boyster, Walter  
\*Carlow, John F.  
Carver, Lorenzo F.  
Claiborne, Phil  
\*Clark, George J.  
Collins, James R.  
Cross, Virgil William  
Crouch, Joe W.  
\*Crow, Harvey  
Cunningham, Jesse J.  
Davidson, John Tillman  
Davis, George J.  
\*Demand, Lafayette S. (Lt.)  
Duckett, David N.  
Dougherty, John H.  
Dudenhoeffer, Ben  
Dudley, John P.  
Duncan, Charlie  
Dunagan, Lewis N.  
Dyson, Chester A.

Edwards, Ivy C.  
Elliott, Charles M.  
Erickson, John J.  
Eutsler, Luther R.  
Ewing, Albert B.  
Faulkner, Quincie J.  
Fleshman, George W.  
Fortner, Alexander C.  
Fortner, George G.  
Foster, David, Jr.  
France, William T.  
Gold, Louis  
Goode, Lin  
\*Hall, Charley  
Ham, Holman T.  
Hartman, John W.  
Hines, Joel C.  
\*Hoffs, Henry  
Hollman, John  
Huff, John  
Huskey, Arnold  
Jackson, Ernest  
\*Jackson, Herbert M.  
Johnson, Ole P.  
\*Keeling, Ira  
\*Keeling, Thos. L.

## PRIVATES—Continued

- \*Kennedy, Paul H.
- \*Kiefer, Albert F.
- Koch, Bernard
- Lagarce, Peter
- Laxton, Walter B.
- McVey, Grover C.
- Maroney, Patrick
- Mathews, Alfred H.
- May, Joseph J.
- \*Meiners, Herbert C.
- Miller, Harold E.
- Moseley, William C.
- Myers, Ora C.
- Newton, Efton
- Oetting, Francis A.
- Oetting, Henry E.
- Olson, William L.
- O'Rourke, Andy
- \*Overstreet, Elmer
- \*Owen, Richard C.
- (*Died in U. S., L/D.*)
- Palmer, Earl E.
- Payne, Ernest
- Payne, James B.
- Powell, Richard G.
- Pruitt, Willie
- Purnell, Leroy
- Quinn, Charles L.
- Ramsay, Daniel C.
- Rapp, Van C.
- Reaves, William W.
- Reed, James R. L.
- Rice, Harry E.
- \*Robertson, John R.
- Rogers, Geo. W.
- Rooney, Leo A.
- Rushing, Alfred
- Russell, Ossie O.
- Rutherford, Joseph W.
- \*Safly, Roy V.
- St. Clair, Benj. J.
- Schader, Albert
- Schrum, Chas. M.
- \*Schrum, Wm. L.
- Schupbach, Franz
- Schupbach, John
- \*Shoemaker, Chas. T.
- \*Simmons, Robert H.
- Slay, Wm. S.
- Smith, Fred A.
- Smith, Hershel R.
- (*Died in France, L/D.*)
- Smith, Sidney V.
- Smith, Thomas H.
- Southard, Albert F.
- \*Tate, Raymond L.
- Taylor, John H.
- Todd, Joel D.
- Torbett, Ora C.
- \*Van Gilder, John W.
- Vick, Louis H.
- Walker, Robert F.
- Wallace, Gus W.
- Walters, Patrick M.
- Walton, Wendell G.
- Wardlow, John Lee
- Warren, Joseph H.
- Weatherford, John E.
- Wells, Marvin C.
- Wheeler, Jess
- \*Wheeler, William O.
- White, John T.
- Wilson, Luther C.
- \*Wyatt, Joseph E.
- \*Yochum, Walter L.
- (*Left in Hospital in Hali-  
fax*)
- York, Oscar

## SANITARY DETACHMENT

### MAJORS

\*Pittam, J. Thomas, M. C.

Wilson, Charles E., M. C.

### CAPTAINS

Alford, Joseph S., M. C.

Rush, William D., D. C.

Rowland, Elliott H., D. C.

Wilson, Thomas, M. C.

### FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Boland, Daniel J., M. C.

Heil, Roy H., D. C.

\*Bondurant, Alpheus J., M. C.

\*Vardan, Colin C., M. C.

\*Brown, James Terrill, M. C.

Kampmeier, Arthur J., M. C.

\*Broyles, Glen H., M. C.

Seibert, Alexander W., M. C.

Buff, Arthur J., D. C.

\*Shaw, Burnham E., D. C.

Chiles, Jacob W., D. C.

Maness, James F., D. C.

Edwards, Frank T., M. C.

\*White, Edwin C., M. C.

### SERGEANTS

Anthony, John B.

\*Falk, Harry S.

\*Deakins, William B.

Rohr, Jake P.

Eckerle, Leo J.

### PRIVATES

Babcock, William

Hughes, Lawrence D.

Baldwin, Charles A.

\*Jones, Sam I.

Bryde, Phillip

Lehan, John F.

Bullard, Harry J.

\*McDonald, Andrew

\*Burden, George A.

\*McKelly, Robert C.

\*Cadman, Lester E. (2nd Lt.)

\*Merritt, John P.

Chamberlin, Rex L.

\*Morgan, John A., Jr.

Church, Lawrence T.

Pearson, Lowell D.

Corder, Jackson

Pennington, Thomas J.

Coover, Clay C.

Phillips, George K.

Erps, Harry I.

Railsback, Thomas S.

Foland, Ray V.

\*Redding, James J.

Fuller, Wesley J.

Rosenberg, Herman P.

\*Gerye, James E.

Shapiro, Louis

Gordon, Austin

Shipman, David F.

Hammerschmidt, Charles A.

\*Thompson, Virgil G.

Hensley, Marshall A.

Walker, Henry

Hook, James F.

Wood, John D.

\*Hoverstoot, Claude T.

## VETERINARY DETACHMENT

### SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Parker, Carl

Riley, Timothy

### PRIVATES

Bockhurst, Charles M.

McClune, Murven C.

Desmond, Elmer H.

Nazer, Ernest L.

Dooley, Edgar C.

Overman, John L.


English, Frank

\*Patterson, Coombs

Horstman, Henry B.

Wren, George

McCabe, George H.






















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